National Economic and Social Council
An Chomhairle Náisiúnta Eacnamaíoch agus Sóisialach

The Economic and Social Implications of Emigration

No. 90

March 1991

NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

Constitution and Terms of Reference

1. The main task of the National Economic and Social Council shall be to provide a forum for discussion of the principles relating to the efficient development of the national economy and the achievement of social justice, and to advise the Government through the Taoiseach, on their application. The Council shall have regard, inter alia, to:

   (i) the realisation of the highest possible levels of employment at adequate reward,
   (ii) the attainment of the highest sustainable rate of economic growth,
   (iii) the fair and equitable distribution of the income and wealth of the nation,
   (iv) reasonable price stability and long-term equilibrium in the balance of payments,
   (v) the balanced development of all regions in the country, and
   (vi) the social implications of economic growth, including the need to protect the environment.

2. The Council may consider such matters either on its own initiative or at the request of the Government.

3. Members of the Government will meet regularly with NESC on their initiative or on the initiative of NESC to discuss any matters arising from the terms of reference and in particular to discuss specific economic and social policy measures and plans and to explore together proposals and actions to improve economic and social conditions. Any reports which the Council may produce shall be submitted to the Government, and shall be laid before each House of the Oireachtas and published.

4. The membership of the Council shall comprise a Chairman appointed by the Government in consultation with the interests represented on the Council, and

   Five persons nominated by agricultural organisations;
   Five persons nominated by the Confederation of Irish Industry and the Irish Employers' Confederation;
   One person nominated by the Construction Industry Federation;
   Five persons nominated by the Irish Congress of Trade Unions;
   Nine other persons nominated by the Government, including one from the National Youth Council, the Secretary of the Department of Finance, the Secretary of the Department of Industry and Commerce, and the Secretary of the Department of Labour.

   Any other Government Department shall have the right of audience at Council meetings if warranted by the Council's agenda, subject to the right of the Chairman to regulate the numbers attending.

5. The term of office of members shall be for five years. Casual vacancies shall be filled by the Government or by the nominating body as appropriate. Members filling casual vacancies may hold office until the expiry of the other members' current term of office.

6. The numbers, remuneration and conditions of service of staff are subject to the approval of the Taoiseach.

7. The Council shall regulate its own procedure.

NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

The Economic and Social Implications of Emigration

PUBLISHED BY THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

Copies of this Report may be obtained from
THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
Upper Castle Yard, Dublin Castle, Dublin 2.
or The Government Publications Sales Office.

Price £10.00 (Students £7.50)

(Pl. 7840) ISBN 0-907116-54-X

NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL MEMBERS

Contents

Page

Page

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

Part I

THE COUNCIL'S COMMENTS ON THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF EMIGRATION

INTRODUCTION[1]

1. In 1985, the Council published the report *Manpower Policy in Ireland*.[2] The Council argued in the report that the concept of Manpower Policy should give way to the concept of an overall labour market policy. This view derived at that time from: the lack of progress in integrating economic and social policy with Manpower Policy: the continuing high level of unemployment, and the absence of any overall perspective on the labour market.

2. Attempts by the Council to be more specific about labour market policy foundered on the absence of research on the Irish Labour Market. Subsequently, therefore, the Council initiated a programme of research on the labour market, beginning with a report, *The Nature and Functioning of Labour Markets: A Survey of International and Irish Literature and a Statement of Research Priorities for Ireland*.[3] In this report, a number of key issues were identified as central to an understanding of the labour market: one such issue was the issue of labour supply, including the role and impact of emigration on the supply of labour to the labour market.

3. The consultant's conclusions in the report on the labour market regarding the importance of emigration and the need to undertake research on the topic were as follows:

> Emigration has been studied, but the experience of the last five years makes this, again, a priority area. Most of the Irish research on emigration has been on its causes. This is still an important topic, in the light of findings that the social welfare and tax systems of the U.K. and Ireland affected migration flows. Recent changes in the U.K. tax system, and the overhaul of the social welfare system could influence the size and destination of Irish emigration, with consequences for the adequacy of the education system as well as the domestic labour market. The effects on the Irish labour market of emigration have not received the same attention as the causes; this is also an important issue (NESC, 1988).

4. In the light of the above recommendation, the Council therefore resolved to undertake an analysis of emigration. This resolve was considerably strengthened by the resumption of large scale emigration in the nineteen eighties: in the year to April 1988, for instance, the gross outflow was estimated at 56.4 thousand. Considerable concern was expressed at the implications of these trends for the Irish economy, and for Irish society.

---

1 Following discussions by the Council of the NESC, these comments were drafted by Tony McCashin in the Council's Secretariat.

2 NESC (1985), Report No. 82, *Manpower Policy in Ireland*. Dublin: NESC.

3 NESC (1988), Report No. 86, *The Nature and Functioning of Labour Markets*. Dublin: NESC.

5. The Council considered, therefore, that an overall assessment of emigration was warranted and contracted consultants to undertake a study with broad terms of reference as follows:

(i) To document the historical, and more recent, levels of external migration.

(ii) To ascertain the social and economic characteristics of emigrants and immigrants – their origins, education, occupations and destinations.

(iii) To locate external emigration in the context of the overall structure of the population and the labour force – both current and projected.

(iv) To determine the economic factors affecting emigration – such as unemployment levels or income differentials between Ireland and destination countries.

(v) To examine the social and personal factors which might motivate individuals to migrate – family ties, employment status, educational qualifications and so on.

(vi) To document the experience of Irish emigrants in their destination countries and, in particular, to identify the extent of migration to the U.K. among vulnerable young emigrants and the nature and severity of their difficulties.

(vii) To assess the overall economic and social impact of emigration and to identify the policy implications and questions which arise.

6. The study was carried out by Professor Gerry Sexton (Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin), Professor Damian Hannan (Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin), Professor Brendan M. Walsh (University College, Dublin) and Ms. Dorren McMahon (Nuffield College, Oxford). The consultants' study is published as Part II of this report.

7. A summary of the consultants' findings is given below. This is followed by the Council's views on the policy implications of the consultants' findings.

SUMMARY

8. To place the substantive material on emigration in a conceptual framework, it is necessary, first, to note the relationship between migration and changes in the total population. As outlined by the consultants, changes in the total population between two points in time derive in the first instance from *natural increase (decrease)*. The natural increase is the difference between births and

Table (i)
Components of Population Change 1871-1990

Intercensal Period	Population Change	Natural Increase (i.e. births less deaths)	Net Migration
		Annual Average	
1871-1881	−18,317	+31,855	−50,172
1881-1891	−40,133	+19,600	−59,733
1891-1901	−24,688	+14,954	−39,642
1901-1911	−8,214	+17,940	−26,154
1911-1926	−11,180	+15,822	−27,002
1926-1936	−357	+16,318	−16,675
1936-1946	−1,331	+17,380	−18,711
1946-1951	+1,119	+25,503	−24,384
1951-1961	−14,226	+26,652	−40,877
1961-1971	+15,991	+29,442	−13,451
1971-1981	+46,516	+36,127	+10,389
1981-1986	+19,447	+33,824	−14,377
1986-1990	-9,500	+24,200	-33,700
		Rates per 1,000 annual average population	
1871-1889	−4.6	+8.0	−12.7
1881-1891	−10.9	+5.3	−16.3
1891-1901	−7.4	+4.5	−11.9
1901-1911	−2.6	+5.6	−8.2
1911-1926	−3.7	+5.2	−8.8
1926-1936	−0.1	+5.5	−5.6
1936-1946	−0.4	+5.9	−6.3
1946-1951	+0.4	−8.6	−8.2
1951-1961	−4.9	+9.2	−14.1
1961-1971	+5.5	+10.2	−4.6
1971-1981	+14.5	+11.3	+3.2
1981-1986	+5.6	+9.7	−4.1
1986-1990	-2.7	+6.9	-9.6

Sources: Table 2.4, Chapter 2.

deaths. In addition, there are migration flows into *(immigration)* and out of the population *(emigration)*. If the immigration figure is subtracted from the emigration figure, it gives the figure for *net migration*. Where the net migration figure is negative, it is subtracted from the natural increase in the population to calculate net population change. Conversely, if the net migration figure is positive, it is added to the natural increase to arrive at the net change in the population.

9. In Ireland, the total population data, and the births and deaths data, are independently compiled, while the net migration figure is a *residual*. The population not attributable to natural increase is arithmetically attributable to net migration. Within this framework only *net* migration flows can be calculated.

10. Table (i), drawn from the consultants' data, gives an overview of historical population data presented in the accounting framework summarised above. Three aspects of the table should be noted.First, the table illustrates clearly the arithmetical relationships between the different components of population change. For example, during the most recent inter-censal period, 1981-1986, annual average population change was +19,447; the natural increase, however, was +33,824. The difference between these changes is -14,337, representing the residual *net* migration figure. This latter figure is a *net* figure, representing the outcome of two countervailing flows: external migration flows (i.e. emigration) from Ireland and migration flows into Ireland (i.e. immigration).

11. Second, the figures reveal the association between gross and net migration flows and highlight the need for careful interpretation of the residual *net* figure. For example, in the 1970s, the net migration figure was positive – an annual average of +10,389 over the decade 1971-81, as Table (i) records. However, this does *not* mean that emigration had ceased, but that whatever level of *gross* emigration outflows took place were exceeded by the population inflows during that period.

12. Third, the historical data in the table clearly reveals the close correlation between general socio-economic conditions and levels of net migration. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, in the post famine decades, net outflows were very high, reaching a peak of -16.3 per 1,000 annual average population in the decade 1881-1891. The figure declined in both absolute numbers and per 1,000 population until 1951, increased significantly during 1951-1961, and then declined dramatically during the decade 1961-1971. The next decade was unique by historical standards, witnessing the first period of net positive migration, reflecting the higher levels of economic growth and employment growth at that time. From 1981 onwards, net migration again became a negative figure and rose very rapidly during the eighties, as will be seen below.

Figure (i)

Components of Population Change 1871-1991 (per 1,000)



Source: Table 2.4, Chapter 2.

(i) Historical Trends in Migration

13. Figure (i) below summarises the historical experience of emigration and places the migration patterns in the context of the factors affecting the natural increase in the population. The net migration rate has exhibited considerable volatility. In contrast, a continuing and rapid decline in the death rate, combined with (until recently) a constant birth rate, has resulted in a steady rise in the rate of natural increase. However, the scale and volatility of migration has been such that migration trends have exerted a considerable influence on rates of population change.

14. Figure (i) reveals a broad historical correspondence in the shapes of the population and migration graphs. In the late nineteenth century, for instance, a high rate of outward migration is associated with a high rate (per 1,000 population) of population decline. By way of contrast, the historically modest levels of outward migration in the period 1961-1971, followed by a decade of net *inward* migration, contributed to significant rates of population increase in these decades. The rate of population increase then declined markedly in the 1981-1986 intercensal period, reflecting both a resumption of outward migration and a noticeable fall in the rate of natural increase: the latter deriving, in turn, from an acceleration in the decline in births.

(ii) Recent Trends in Migration

15. Figure (ii) shows the annual net migration figure from 1926 to 1989. In the decades since political independence there has been a substantial and almost continuous net outflow. This peaked in the decade 1951-1961. After the decline in the net outflow (1961-1971) and the subsequent net inflow (1971-1981), the net outflow figure rose again rapidly from 1981 onwards. For 1989, the most recent year for which data are available, net migration was -31,000.

16. The significance of the recent net migration trends can be more fully appreciated if the consultants' data on *gross* outflows, given in Table (ii) below, are examined. From 1981 to 1990 a total gross outflow of 358,000 took place. The annual average *gross* outflow in this period was therefore 40,000 approximately: the figure was appreciably higher in the latter half of the nineteen eighties. It is clear from the table that substantial flows both *into* and *out of* Ireland affect the net migration figures. During the exceptional period of 1971-1981 when the net migration figure was large and positive (+104,000), a gross outflow of 176,000 took place, and this was then counter balanced by very significant *immigration* (280,000). More recently, the very large gross outflows still diverge markedly from the *net* migration figures, indicating an appreciable flow of migration into Ireland.

Figure (ii)



Source: Table 2.5, Chapter 2.

(iii) International/Comparative Aspects of Irish Emigration

17. Table (ii) records the destinations of Irish emigrants in previous intercensal periods. The data are incomplete. However, in the post war period, it is clear that the UK was by far the most important destination country, followed by the USA. The available data for the nineteen eighties indicate a return to the historically more dispersed pattern of migration. From 1986-1989, the UK received 68% of Ireland's outflow, the USA 14% and "others" 18%. Continental Europe, it can be reasonably assumed, would feature in the latter category as an increasingly common destination for emigrants.

18. Ireland's comparative emigration experience is reported by the consultants. As the selective data in Figure (iii) shows, Ireland displays similarities when compared with other less developed economies which, like Ireland, are undergoing industrialisation and which are adjacent to more developed economies. Spain, for example, had a net migration rate (per 1,000 population) of -1.8 in 1966, while Ireland had -4.5. For these economies in 1976, the figures were +1.5 and +3.7 respectively. The consultants' detailed

Table (ii)

Estimated Gross Migratory Flows by Destination and Net Migration in Past Periods (000s)

	U.K	U.S.A.		OTHERS	TOTAL	NET MIGRATION
1926-31	n.a.	104		15	n.a.	–123
1931-36	n.a.	2		2	n.a.	–44
1936-41	n.a.	3		2	n.a.	–57
1941-46	173	–		–	173	–130
1946-51	119	17		8	144	–120
1951-61	n.a.		68		n.a.	–409
1961-71	n.a.		49		n.a.	–135
1971-81	155		21		176	+104
1981-90	245	49		64	358	-208

Source: Table 2.6, Chapter 2.

comparative and time series data (see Table 2.7) shows that structurally developing European countries such as Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal have all experienced substantial net outflows in recent decades. However, Ireland's outflows resumed at a significant level in the 1980s, a factor which distinguishes it from the other developing economies.

19. The association between levels of development and broad migration patterns is confirmed if a comparison is made with a higher income, more industrialised Northern economy. Denmark's experience is one of persistently positive net *immigration:* +0.4 (per 1,000) in 1966, +0.7 in 1976, and +2.1 in 1986. A group of developed, high-income, Northern European economies, including Denmark, have, therefore, been net "recipients" of migrants from less developed European and non-European economies.

20. Finally, in relation to international aspects of migration, comparisons of Ireland with *regions* rather than countries, are relevant. In this respect, as the consultants show, Ireland can be usefully compared with Northern Ireland or Scotland as regions within the UK, or with Southern Italy. These regions display considerable similarities in their migration experience with Ireland.

Figure (iii)

Annual Rates of Net Migration in Selected Countries (per 1,000)



Source: Table 2.7, Chapter 2.

(iv) Who Emigrates – The Characteristics of Emigrants

21. First, in regard to the *sex* of emigrants, the balance of males/females has fluctuated considerably (Table 3.1). These fluctuations are strongly associated with labour market conditions. For instance, in the 1936-1946 period, males predominated among emigrants as the main destination was then to war time Britain. In the immediate post war period, female migration rates resumed at a ratio of 1.365 per male migrant. The much larger absolute decline in male employment in the 1950s is reflected in proportionately higher *male* migration. Similarly, in the 1981-1986 intercensal period male employment in Ireland declined dramatically while female employment rose by 15,000 (approximately). This pattern of recent employment loss is reflected in a proportionately lower female migration rate of 736 per 1,000 male migrants.

22. Second, the *age* distribution of emigrants is characterised by its youth (Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5). From 1943 to 1951 when UK travel permits were being administered, the average proportion of persons in receipt of such permits

who were aged between 16 and 24 was 69%. Over forty years later, an almost identical figure (70.6%) applies to the proportion of gross migrants (all destinations) in the age category 15 – 24. The impact of this pattern of migration on the age structure of the population should be considered in the light of the *differential* age pattern of inward and outward migration. In all of the intercensal periods since 1946 *net immigration* has taken place in the *oldest* age category (65+). During most intercensal periods, this was accompanied by significant net emigration of young adults in the working age groups (15-24 and 25-34). In addition, in the intercensal decades 1961-1971 and 1971-1981, there was large *net immigration* of children (0-14 years). In only two intercensal periods, 1961-1971 and 1971-1981, was there any experience of immigration of adults of prime working age. The demographic composition of emigration and immigration is one which increases the ratio of the economically dependent to the total population.

23. Third, the *geographical and regional origins* of emigrants has recently shifted markedly. The historical pattern of emigration was one characterised by a greatly disproportionate emigration rate from the more rural and Western counties and regions. By the 1980s, however, the pattern was one broadly representative of the regional distribution of the entire population. For example, per 1,000 of the population in the year 1987/1988, gross external migration was 15.9 for the State as a whole, and 17.2 for the Dublin region (Table 3.7). The regional migration rates for this year do not vary significantly.

24. External migration is analysed by the consultants in the light of *internal* migration within the State. Viewed in this light, the recent (1987/1988) higher external migration rate for Dublin is explicable: emigrants from Dublin, the consultants suggest, originated in many cases outside of the Dublin region. Their emigration from Dublin is, therefore, one stage in a two stage process of migration from rural Ireland to Dublin and from there to an external destination. A further important feature of recent migration flows is the effect of external migration *into* certain counties, offsetting internal migration flows within the state *out of* these counties. In County Donegal, for instance, a small external flow of +852 offset an internal migration flow (within Ireland) from the county of -1615.The overall net migration rate for the county was halved as a result of the external flow to the county. This pattern was in evidence in several counties in the 1981-1986 intercensal period.

25. Fourth, as with their geographical and regional origins the *social origins and background* of emigrants has become increasingly representative of the population as a whole. Emigration traditionally was more selective of lower socio economic groups. The consultants' analysis of the 1987/1988 gross outflow data shows that compared with the overall outflow rate of 15.9 (per 1,000) the rates for specific socio economic groups do not diverge markedly.

Respectively, the figures for professionals and employers/managers were 16.8 and 18.1, marginally higher than the overall rate, while the rates for the unskilled working class (15.2) and skilled/semi-skilled working class (15.6) were very close to the overall rate.

26. This pattern derives, in the consultants' analysis, from the *upward* trend in emigration rates among those with professional and third level qualifications. Figure (iv) shows a steeply increasing emigration rate among graduates and school leavers during the eighties: 8.4% of 1980 graduates had emigrated by the following spring, and the corresponding figure for 1988 graduates was 29.4% (Table 3.12). The consultants' examination of unemployment rates over the period indicate a decisive, although lagged, response among graduates and school leavers to a deteriorating labour market situation. Emigration rates among graduates are sharply differentiated by specialty. The 1988 data reported by the consultants shows an emigration rate of 48% among engineers and 43% among architects (Table A3.6).

(v) Why do People Emigrate?

27. The international research on migration patterns suggests that a country will have a high emigration rate if some of these conditions pertain (Chapter 5):

- if its economy is relatively underdeveloped
- if its labour force experiences a rapid growth and/or is undergoing structural change
- if the population has ready access to economies where conditions are relatively favourable
- if there is a tradition of emigration.

28. These conditions pertain to a substantial degree in Ireland. The recent upsurge in emigration is also explicable in these terms. Conventional econometric studies of Irish emigration focus on Ireland-UK migration and measure disparities in levels of economic performance – unemployment rates and relative income levels are the independent variables in such analysis. The consultants' statistical analysis reaffirms the explanatory value of models which use measures of unemployment and relative income levels as independent variables. Specifically, the analysis records high estimated elasticities of the net migration rate with respect to relative wages (of 3) and unemployment (of 2). The consultants observe that:

> These elasticities are high, indicating the sensitivity of Irish migration to cyclical economic factors in Ireland relative to Britain (Chapter 5).

Figure (iv)
Emigration Rates
Per Cent



Source: Tables 3.13 and 3.14, Chapter 3.

29. The upsurge in recent Irish emigration is also easily understood in these terms. During the 1980s, as Figure (v) clearly shows, the Irish/UK unemployment ratio rose sharply, while the ratio of UK/Ireland *net* incomes increased steeply in favour of the UK. Simultaneously, the purchasing power parity of UK unemployment benefit relative to Ireland's declined.

30. Support for the broadly economic motivation to emigrate is contained in the consultants' analysis of a sample survey of the 1981/1982 cohort of school leavers. Of the 1981/1982 cohort who had emigrated by 1987, employment search was given by 86% as the reason for emigrating. However, not *all* emigrants were unemployed. The pre emigration employment statuses of emigrants were as follows:

42% left from a job

7% had just lost a job or completed a temporary one

5% were unemployed or on a State scheme for some time

2% left directly after full time education (higher)

4% were on home duties (Chapter 6).

Figure (v)

Unemployment and Income Differences



Source: Tables 5.1-5.5, Chapter 5.

31. In relation to emigration among those who *had* jobs, the consultants argue that occupational dissatisfaction, *in the widest sense* was an important motivation. For instance, of the Leaving Certificate qualified school leaver emigrants, 44% had (pre emigration) *manual* jobs, 83% in the case of Intermediate Certificate qualifiers. The consultants conclude that:

> a significant reason for emigrating from permanent jobs was dissatisfaction with the greater extent of 'trading down', or the extent of over-certification demanded by employers, that had occurred in Ireland as youth unemployment rates increased rapidly up to the mid 1980s. Of course, almost all of these emigrants also substantially increased their incomes on emigration: so it is not possible to satisfactorily separate out the relative influence of both factors – though in all the 'reasons given' for emigrating, occupational status reasons dominate (Chapter 6).

32. Finally, it is important to recognise the factors which facilitate or constrain specific individuals in their migration choices. For example, those with previous migration experience (from rural to urban, for instance) are more likely to migrate, as are those who are single or married without dependants.

(vi) The Assimilation of Irish Emigrants

33. There are two aspects to the consultants' research: the occupational experience of Irish emigrants, and the absorption problems faced by vulnerable young Irish emigrants in London. On the first issue, the evidence suggests that first generation Irish immigrants in the UK are in relatively low status occupations. The consultants' analysis of British Labour Force survey data shows that the Irish born in the UK are less likely to be in professional/managerial employment and more likely to be in manual and unskilled employment. For example, Table (iii) records 42% of the Irish born in the "other manual and general labourer" category, compared with 29% of the total UK labour force.

34. This aspect of the economic profile of Irish emigrants is associated with their concentration in specific occupational niches. The British Labour Force Surveys show a significant preponderance of Irish immigrants in particular sectors and occupations – construction, hotel/catering/tourism and lower grade clerical employment. The consequences of this occupational profile for the socio economic status of the immigrant Irish can be gleaned from the socio economic status comparisons between them and their UK counterparts. In *all* age groups, as Table (iv) shows, the Irish are markedly more concentrated in the working classes than the British, and conversely much less concentrated in the higher 'service' and 'intermediate' classes. This contrast does not vary greatly by age. The second generation Irish, however, *do* reveal a socio economic profile very similar to that of the British-born population.

Table (iii)

Occupational Characteristics of British, Irish Born in Britain, and other Minority Ethnic Groups in Britain Labour Force (Persons in Employment) 1985-1987 (Aged 16-64)

	Total: All Origins (1985-1987)			Irish Born (Av, % born 1986, 1987, 1988 figures)			Indian	West Indian	All Ethnic Minority Groups		
Occupational Group	Total %	Male %	Female %	Total %	Male %	Female %	Total %	Total %	Total %	Male %	Female %
Non-Manual											
Managerial & Professional	31	35	26	26	23	27	35	19	31	33	27
Clerical and Related	16	5	30	9	3	15	14	18	15	7	27
Other Non-Manual	8	6	10	5	3	8	7	5	7	6	7
Total Non-Manual	55	46	66	40	29	50	57	42	52	46	61
Manual											
Craft & Similar	16	25	4	18	27	3	17	17	15	19	9
Other Manual and General Labourers	29	28	30	42	43	47	25	39	33	35	30
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
No. (000)	23,512	13,593	9,919				277	219	818	495	322

Source: Table 7.1, Chapter 7.

Table (iv)
Socio Economic Status by Age Group and Nationality

Socio Economic Status	20-29 –(%)–		
	British	Irish	Second Generation Irish
Service	22	19	25
Intermediate	34	28	37
Working	44	53	38
Total %	100	100	100
N	8227	65	301
	30-39 –(%)–		
Service	30	23	32
Intermediate	32	27	36
Working	38	50	32
Total %	100	100	100
N	8861	168	217
	40-49 –(%)–		
Service	29	19	29
Intermediate	31	24	36
Working	40	57	35
Total %	100	100	100
N	7245	199	99
	50-59 –(%)–		
Service	25	16	29
Intermediate	30	19	24
Working	45	65	47
Total %	100	100	100
N	5100	154	70

Source: Table 7.18, Chapter 7.

35. The socio economic and occupational experience of Irish emigrants must be viewed in the light of their *educational* qualifications. When analysed in terms of school leaving age and educational qualifications, Irish emigrants have lower educational attainment than the indigenous British population: this disparity is especially marked in the older age groups (Chapter 7, Tables 7.11, 7.12, 7.13). However, even when educational qualifications are taken into account, there is evidence of Irish emigrants being in occupations which have lower statuses than their qualifications would warrant. This 'occupational underachievement' applies to Irish emigrants with second level qualifications. These emigrants are significantly under represented in administrative and junior managerial employment. The consultants' summary of the data on this issue is as follows:

> "This evidence, therefore, strongly suggests that Irish immigrants with second level qualifications are underachieving. This may be because of a number of factors – the pursuit of Irish occupational niches like construction, the pursuit of high paying but low status and low opportunity occupations, the failure of British employers to accept Irish qualifications at their true value and, finally, ethnic prejudice or discrimination. It is not possible to decide amongst these explanations..." (Chapter 7).

36. The consultants investigated the scale of the young – vulnerable – unemployed category of emigrant to the UK (fieldwork refers to 1988). They assess the scale of this problem as being in the order of 15% of all UK emigration from Ireland. Their evidence suggests that these emigrants arrive poorly prepared, financially and otherwise, for the labour market, housing and social context in which they find themselves.

37. A number of features of the socio economic environment in London in particular reinforce their difficulties:

    the drastic shortage of low cost, accessible private rented housing;

    the decline in public housing and the competing demands on available municipal housing;

    the restrictions in the 1980s of social security benefits in the UK as they pertain to young people.

38. These social and economic difficulties arise in what is now a multi-ethnic society with consequently greater cultural contrast between Ireland and Britain. The consultants argue that although this 'problematic' group may be numerically small their situation is so acute as to merit urgent attention.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS – INTRODUCTION

39. In the Council's view, the central point about emigration in Ireland is that it is a *symptom* of relative economic underdevelopment. Therefore, policies which affect emigration are largely policies concerned with the long term development of the economy. This is the first aspect of policy dealt with by the Council, and is discussed in the next section.

40. The *second* aspect of policy is the relationship between migration and the labour market. In particular, it is important to note the relationship between labour force growth, emigration and employment. This relationship can be illustratively quantified in terms of job creation requirements given certain specified targets in terms of the reduction of unemployment and emigration.

41. *Third*, it is essential to formulate general policies in regard to emigrants. The reality of continuing emigration must inform public policy. Specific subgroups of emigrants face serious difficulties in their host country and it is important, therefore, to formulate active policies in relation to this aspect of emigration.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS – ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY

42. The Council considers that the generality of economic and social policies have a direct and critical bearing on the reduction of emigration. In its recent report, *A Strategy for the Nineties: Economic Stability and Structural Change* the Council set out its views on the policies which it considers will maximise medium term economic growth and employment (NESC, 1990).[4] The pursuit of this broad strategy will, therefore, contribute to the reduction of unemployment and emigration and the Council reiterates this broad strategy as the first and essential element in a policy programme directed at the problem of emigration.

43. The Council's policies are derived in the first instance from an analysis of the likely evolution of the economy over the period 1990-1994 on the basis of a continuation of existing policies. Under these conditions GNP growth is expected to average 3% per annum, employment is forecast to increase by 9,000 annually and net migration is calculated to fall toward 16,000 annually by 1994. Unemployment under this *no policy change* scenario is projected to decline by 2,000-3,000 per annum. The public finances will evolve such that the current budget deficit will decline to 0.25% of GNP in 1994 and the EBR likewise to approximately 1% of GNP in 1994.

4 NESC (1990), Report No. 89, *A Strategy for the Nineties: Economic Stability and Structural Change*, Dublin: NESC.

44. In relation to this forecast for the economy, and for employment in particular, the Council has stated that:

> the evolution of the economy to 1994 which is likely if there is no policy change is entirely unacceptable, growth of employment of 9,000 per year implies *continued involuntary emigration* and only a modest fall in the level of unemployment. If the medium term scenario set out above is unacceptable, then the only alternative is to reject the idea of no policy change which underlies that projection. The need to increase employment by much more that 9,000 a year and to reduce unemployment well below 200,000 by 1994 is now a central objective of the Council (NESC 1990: emphasis added).

45. To enhance the performance of the economy and to improve labour market conditions the Council has proposed a strategy for medium term economic and social policy consisting of three elements: macroeconomic stability, structural reform and policies for employment and unemployment.

(i) Macro Economic Stability

46. The Council believes that the progress in the Irish economy in the period 1986-1990 was underpinned by a restrictive fiscal stance. In the future, the Council suggests that this stance should continue. The debt/GNP ratio should continue to be a target of fiscal policy: a ratio of around 100% by 1993 is the specific target adopted by the Council.

47. Over the period to 1993, the budget deficit and the EBR should be maintained on a continuous downward path. The burden of this fiscal adjustment should fall on current public expenditure and not on taxation. There should be no real increase in current public expenditure in the period up to 1993. This policy in relation to public expenditure derives in part from the need to undertake structural reforms in expenditure programmes within existing budgets, and in part from the need to reform the taxation system. The constraint on public expenditure does not preclude *specific* policy initiatives or expenditure increases for equity or efficiency reasons. Increases in some programme areas may be desirable or necessary on policy grounds, but these increases must be accommodated within the overall budgetary constraint through reallocation of resources. The reform imperatives in the tax system may have significant employment implications:

(a) it is desirable to reduce average and marginal tax rates on earned income – such reductions would enhance the efficiency of the labour market and narrow tax differentials between Ireland and the destination countries of Irish emigrants.

(b) it will be necessary to restructure indirect taxation as part of the EC internal market programme – such restructuring should entail a narrowing of differentials between Irish and UK rates with consequent diminution of trade distortions and efficiency and employment gains in the Irish economy.

(c) it will probably be desirable to adjust DIRT Tax to avoid capital movements hased on tax differences between countries and to ensure that financial institutions can compete in a unified financial market.

48. It is important to recognise that the Council is not advocating ad hoc tax reductions. The Council considers that the required changes in taxation noted above must be implemented in the context of an overall programme of tax reform. This is discussed below in sub section (ii).

49. The Council emphasises that the fiscal stance it proposes is part of a wider policy to sustain an appropriate macroeconomic environment. Since 1987, the successful inflation and interest rate performances were secured by commitment to the EMS. Such a commitment should, therefore, continue further. This commitment requires the adoption of consistent policies in relation to the public finances and the national debt, to ensure a continuous maintenance of the exchange rate with EMS.

50. The Council suggests that development of the economy and the creation of employment is dependent, in the first instance, on a stable and appropriate macroeconomic environment. This environment is characterised by low levels of inflation and interest rates and a stable exchange rate.

(ii) Structural Reforms

51. An appropriate macroeconomic framework must be complemented by structural reforms in the economy which will improve its efficiency and employment potential. A number of such reforms have been identified by the Council.

52. The first set of reforms embrace the *taxation system*. As indicated above, the Council supports reductions in taxes on earned income. Such reductions would reduce the disincentive effects of existing marginal rates and would, it should be noted, diminish the differential in *post tax disposable incomes* which can affect levels of emigration. It is important to recognise that the issue of reduced *rates* of income tax is imbedded in the wider issue of the *structure* of taxation. This has direct ramifications for the analysis of emigration.[5]

5 The issue of targeted income tax reductions for the young or for groups with a high emigration propensity is discussed in Paragraph 96.

53. As a matter of mere arithmetic, the counterpart of high marginal tax rates is the limitation on the tax base due to the extensive allowances and exemptions and, in a structural sense, to the virtual absence of property taxation. Emigrants, for the most part, are in the youngest adult age groups and at a stage of the life cycle which is not associated with property ownership or with high take up of discretionary tax allowances (tax reliefs, for example, for mortgage interest, medical insurance or life assurance).[6] In short, the existing structure – a narrow tax base and high marginal tax *rates* – disproportionately benefits those who are less likely to emigrate.

54. In the Council's view, therefore, its programme of tax reform, which has been derived on independent analytical principles directed at a more efficient and equitable taxation system, would contribute directly to a reduction in emigration. If the *structure* of taxation is reformed to allow significant reductions in income tax rates, it will narrow the *disposable income gap* between Ireland and the UK in particular: this factor featured in the consultants' analysis (Chapter 5) as one of the determinants of the recent upsurge in emigration.

55. The Council has also argued that the tax and social security systems should be jointly considered as one area of reform relevant to employment and the labour market. A number of specific changes spanning the *tax benefit systems* would contribute to higher levels of employment and a more efficient labour market:

(a) the incomes of social welfare recipients should not converge unduly closely with the disposable incomes of employees as this may create employment disincentives;

(b) 'Poverty traps' may affect a particular segment of the labour force, i.e. those with children, and child income support must be restructured to diminish this problem;

(c) a profileration of means tested benefits overlaps with the tax and social security system to create disincentives for employees in a range of incomes below average earnings, and this requires *co-ordinated* reforms across the tax/benefit system, including: a restructuring of employee PRSI contributions to lower the rate paid by employees, the inclusion of all short term social welfare benefits in the income tax system, and the rationalisation of means tests to prevent high marginal 'tax' rates on employees and the unemployed.

56. Finally, the Council has pointed out that there is scope for modest real increase in social welfare payments in the period to 1994. Such increases

6 O'Leary J. (1985): *Evaluating Public Spending: The Case of Personal Tax Expenditures*. Paper to Annual Conference of Dublin Economics Workshop, Kenmare.

could help to prevent involuntary emigration among the unemployed and most vulnerable segment of prospective emigrants.

57. Reforms in the tax and social welfare systems have a direct relevance to employment and the labour market. The Council has also pointed to structural reforms elsewhere which would contribute in the long run to the development of the economy and the creation of employment. One set of reforms is crucial in this regard: *industrial policy.*

58. The Council's analysis of industrial policy is based on its published report, *A Review of Industrial Policy.*[7] Sustained economic growth and employment growth is critically contingent on the emergence of a strong indigenous industrial sector. The attraction of foreign companies should also have a role, but a realistic appreciation of their potential contribution to long term industrialisation is necessary. In the Council's view, this analysis should be reflected in a substantial shift in the allocation of resources, within overall industrial policy, away from the attraction of mobile foreign investment and towards the development of the indigenous sector.

59. *Selectivity* should be the primary characteristic of industrial policy. Resources should be allocated to addressing the *specific* competitive disadvantages which indigenous companies confront in competing internationally and the aim should be the development of smaller numbers of *structurally* strong Irish companies. Implicit in this approach is a shift in resources from tax based incentives to direct aid, and a further shift in the type of direct aid towards grants for non fixed investment. Foreign investment attraction should be targeted on companies with high skill requirements, which will locate key functions in Ireland and which have significant potential for sub supply linkages.

60. In the context of the EC internal market[8] the Council's analysis has reiterated this broad industrial strategy, and added two complementary aspects:

the size and scale of firms must be a concern of policy;

the innovation potential of firms and industries must be improved.

61. Industrial policy is central to the development of the economy and to the realisation of employment goals. Accordingly, the Council believes that industrial policy should be implemented within the framework of an industrial policy budget and the application of specific performance criteria to state agencies.

7 NESC (1982). Report No. 64, *A Review of Industrial Policy*. Dublin: NESC

8 NESC (1989). Report No. 88, *Ireland in the EC: Performance, Prospects and Strategy*. Dublin: NESC

62. Finally, in relation to industrial policy, the Council emphasises the essential complementarity between macroeconomic and structural policies. It is essential for industrial development that the broad macroeconomic context (cost competitiveness, inflation and inflation rates, exchange rate) is appropriate. Equally, long term industrial development faces *structural* barriers (the small size of the domestic market, distance from large and concentrated centres of population, technological backwardness), and these barriers require specific long term, developmental policies.

63. Structural reforms advanced by the Council in the taxation, social security and industrial policy areas would bear relatively directly on employment and the labour market. Reforms in other areas of public policy and public expenditure also have significant potential to improve the efficiency of the economy: these areas include housing, health, the management of public expenditure, agricultural policy and the functioning of State enterprises.[9] These reforms, if pursued in conjunction with reforms in the tax system and in industrial policy, would contribute to the long term growth of the economy and of employment.

(iii) **Manpower Policy**

64. The Council believes that specific, targeted labour market measures, over and above macroeconomic and general structural policies, are required if significant inroads are to be made on the problem of unemployment. Specifically, the Council has proposed that special employment measures be devised for the *long term unemployed* for a number of reasons:

(i) a growth in demand for labour targeted on the long term unemployed will not exert upward pressure on wage bargaining;

(ii) general stimuli to demand for labour do not percolate through to the long term unemployed but still tighten the labour market;

(iii) long term unemployment is associated with widespread indirect social costs and social problems, including emigration.

65. The Council, therefore, proposes a programme directed at the long term unemployed and concentrated in areas with a high incidence of long term unemployment and early school leaving. This programme would consist of labour subsidies, direct employment schemes and enterprise schemes. Such interventions do have drawbacks, but these would be minimised if strongly targeted on the long term unemployed.

66. These measures to improve labour demand will be all the more effective if two additional training strategies are implemented. First, if there are specific

9 See NESC (1990), Chapters 8, 9, 11 and 12

skill shortages or mismatches in the labour market, training programmes can help to reduce unemployment. Second, general training and upgrading of skills also has a role if the long term unemployed have lost – or never had – the most rudimentary work related skills. The Council recommends that the resource requirements of a programme directed at the long term unemployed should be met within the overall framework of no real increase in public expenditure in the period to 1993.

(iv) Overall Strategy

67. The Council emphasises the *integrated* nature of the economic and social strategy it has proposed. Each one of the elements – macroeconomic stability, structural reforms, and employment and labour market measures, is essential to the overall strategy. A significant reduction in emigration is likely *only* with the inter-related policies proposed. For example, tax reforms culminating in a reformed tax structure and lower income tax rates will help to reduce emigration rates among those who experience high marginal rates of income tax. Maintenance and improvement of the real value of social welfare payments will contribute to lowering emigration rates among the unemployed, who may have the least resources to cope with the labour market and social demands of emigration.

(v) Cohesion – The Irish Economy in the EC

68. Ireland's economy is becoming increasingly integrated into the EC. This integration, as the Council has documented at length in its report, *Ireland in the European Community: Performance, Prospects and Strategy*, poses significant challenges to the Irish economy. One consequence of a failure to adopt a positive strategy towards Ireland in the EC will be an increasing economic divergence between Ireland and the more developed economies. This would be manifested, in part, in a continuing high level of emigration from Ireland and an increased 'pull' of skilled Irish labour towards the 'core' European economies. The Council, therefore, stresses the relationship between emigration and the need for a positive long term strategy towards Ireland in the EC. The following are the key elements of the Council's proposed strategy:

(i) A considerably enhanced *Community Structural Policy* to counteract the tendency towards greater regional disparities which is implicit in the workings of the internal market;

(ii) Community *co-ordination of macroeconomic policies* geared towards maximising the long term of the community economy;

(iii) A significant role for more *centralised budgetary and taxation arrangements for the Community* to ensure that the fiscal and redistributive dimensions of economic and monetary union are in place;

(iv) Some element of *differential application of community policies* to redress regional imbalances – for example, in the allocation of agricultural quotas, and the distribution of resources for technological research and development.

69. These policies, the Council has suggested, should inform the development of the *Community as a whole*. In addition, *domestic* policies must focus on the development of a strong indigenous industrial sector, the improvement of the transport and telecommunications infrastructure and the introduction of an innovation oriented regional policy.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS – EMPLOYMENT

70. The level of employment in the economy is clearly a very significant factor in determining the level of emigration. It is important, therefore, to set out the framework in which migration and employment are related and to quantify the employment implications of policy objectives in regard to the reduction of emigration.

(i) Migration and Employment

71. The level of employment in the economy is fundamentally an outcome of the *demand* for labour. The difference between the demand for labour and the *supply* of labour is *unemployment*. The supply of labour is determined in part by demographic factors, such as the size and structure of the population, and in part by economic factors such as the participation rate and wage levels.

72. Emigration from Ireland and immigration into Ireland interacts with these underlying demographic and economic forces. For example, if the supply of labour increases due, for example, to an increased number of school leavers, without an equal increase in the demand for labour, then the gap between demand and supply will rise, leading to higher unemployment. In turn, this will tend to increase emigration over time. The rise in emigration will then choke off part of the increase in unemployment. Conversely, if the demand for labour increases at a time of high unemployment and emigration, it will reduce the gap between demand and supply and lead to lower unemployment. However, over time the higher demand for labour may induce an increase in labour supply – immigration back to Ireland among those in the working age groups could rise, women working in the home may resume their labour force participation or emigration would decline. Such a rise in labour supply would counteract the initial increase in labour demand: the *fall in unemployment* would be less than the *increase in employment*.

Figure (vi)
Labour Force Natural Increase
1986/87 – 2006 (000)



Source: Table 4.6, Chapter 4.

(ii) Labour Force Growth

73. The proximate source of emigration and unemployment is the very rapid increase in the size of the labour force (labour supply) in the last decade. Equally, the likely future levels of unemployment and emigration will depend, in some measure, on the future growth of the labour force. It will be clear from the discussion above that it is not possible to forecast the actual labour force: for any given population size and structure the labour force will itself depend on the level of employment and other economic factors.

74. To place past and future labour force growth in context the 'natural' growth of the labour force can be observed. This refers to purely demographic growth, i.e. the growth in the labour force which would be observed on the

assumption of *zero* net migration in all age categories. Figure (vi) below summarises this exercise carried out by the consultants for the period 1986/87 to 2006 (Chapter 4, Tables 4.4, 4.5, 4.6).

75. The figure reveals that in every year since 1986, labour force 'natural' increase has exceeded 22,000 and in 1989/90 is estimated at 25.5 thousand. During the nineteen nineties, this 'natural' growth is projected to continue, initially at a very high level but at a reduced rate of increase from about 1998 onwards. Thereafter, the natural increase falls off sharply and declines to about 7,000 by the year 2006.

76. This analysis reflects a number of important demographic trends. First, for most of the next decade the youth inflow to the labour force will continue at a high level, reflecting the demographic boom of the nineteen seventies. Secondly, and conversely, this youth inflow will taper off as the decade advances towards 2,000, due to the rapid decline in births from 1980 onwards. Thirdly, as the population structure changes, with a higher population in the 45-64 age category, the outflow rate in the age group due to mortality and early retirement will increase. The net effect of these trends is an initial continuation of the very high levels of natural increase in the labour force, followed by a decline in the natural increase which accelerates rapidly after 2,000. Therefore, the long term demographic pressure on labour supply will ease considerably.

(iii) Labour Force Employment and Unemployment

77. The analysis above indicates that if net migration were zero, then the annual labour force 'natural' increase would be in excess of 20,000 in the period to 1998/99. If the zero migration assumption is combined with the further assumption of *no further employment losses in the economy*, the figure of net employment growth in excess of 20,000 per annum would represent a *minimum* employment requirement if unemployment is not to increase. Furthermore, with unemployment already at a very high level of about 200,000 and with policy directed at a *reduction* in unemployment, employment growth would have to be exceptional by historical standards to simultaneously reduce involuntary emigration, and reduce unemployment to any significant extent.[10]

78. Clearly, the assumption of zero net emigration is merely of analytical value. However, the employment growth requirement implicit in this assumption brings into sharp focus the scale of the employment problem which must be

10 In September 1990, the Live Register measure of unemployment was 221,000 and the Labour Force measure for April 1990 was 183,000.

addressed in the future. The ESRI's (up dated) Medium Term Review forecasts annual average employment growth of 17,000 over the period 1989-1994. This forecast also envisages a significant decline in emigration and a reduction in unemployment to a level of 140,000 or 13.8% of the labour force by 1994. The most recent Labour Force Survey records a net increase in employment of 30,000 in the year to April 1990. This represents a significant improvement on the employment trends in the 1980s. A *continuously* high level of employment growth will be required, however, to dramatically alter the unemployment and emigration scenario.

79. To illustrate the arithmetical relationships between population and labour force growth on the one hand, and migration and employment on the other, Table (v) below provides some key data. The top row of the Table shows the official CSO forecast of the labour force in 1996 based on illustrative assumptions of the level of net migration; these assumptions, it can be seen, significantly affect the labour force forecast. These forecasts are combined with a target unemployment level of 150,000, to yield a target employment level. In the lower rows of the table, the employment targets are compared with actual *employment* and an annual average net employment requirement is derived.

80. If the targets of low net migration (-15,000) and lower unemployment (150,000) are adopted they imply net annual employment growth in excess of 20,000. This estimate is correspondingly lower if the medium or high net migration scenarios are envisaged. Employment growth averaged 9.8 thousand annually from 1986-1990: the bulk of this occurred in the year to 1990 (30,000). Clearly, if the employment growth currently being experienced continues in the medium term, it foreshadows the prospect of some lowering of emigration and unemployment. It is important to note, however, that the employment growth calculated is on a *medium term* basis: when the employment targets are expressed as annual averages over a time period they are, by historical standards, demanding targets.

81. This analysis is arithmetical in nature. The calculations are *not* based on a fully elaborated model of the labour market which quantifies the intricate relationships between all the variables. In particular, the level of net emigration is illustratively *assumed*, and the size of the resultant *actual* labour force is then known. In reality, the level of migration is a *dependent* variable, the value of which is an outcome of the various underlying forces at work in the economy – notably in the labour market. Nevertheless, over the short time period in question, the figures are useful illustrations of the magnitudes involved and of their inter relationships.

Table (v)

Labour Force, Employment and Unemployment

Projections for 1996 (000s)

	Net Migration Assumption		
	Low	Medium	High
1996 Labour Force	1,432	1,370	1,320
Target Unemployed Level	150	150	150
Target Employment Level	1,282	1,220	1,172
1990 Actual Employment	1,120	1,120	1,120
Employment Requirement 1990-1996	162	100	52
Annual Average Employment Requirement 1990-1996	27	16.7	8.7
Annual Average Employment Growth 1986-1990		9.8	

Source: 1988 Labour Force Survey; CSO Publication and Labour Force Projections 1991-2021; Secretariat Calculations.

Notes: Low = – 15,000 Annual Net Migration for 1986-1996; Medium = 25,000 and High = 35,000 for 1986-1991 combined with –30,000 for 1991-1996.

82. It is essential, in the Council's view, in considering future employment targets, such as those illustrated above, to appreciate the intricate workings of the Irish labour market. In particular, it should be noted that a gross addition to the level of employment (an increase in the demand for labour) will *not* result in an identical reduction in the level of unemployment. Studies of the Irish labour market show that a rise in the demand for labour will induce an increase in labour supply. For instance, fewer would emigrate than would have otherwise, female participation rates would rise or return immigration would increase. This would result in some of the increased employment being taken up by persons who heretofore were not in the Irish labour force.

83. Finally, *income levels* in Ireland relative to those in the economies to which emigrants depart is a further economic determinant of the level of migration in the consultants' analysis. The significance of income as a determinant of migration raises complex trade offs. There is a labour *market*: Irish labour supply is responsive to income differentials. Therefore, if there is a widening

of income relativities between Ireland and other countries, it will sustain a high level of out migration. On the other hand, in the traded sectors of the economy in particular, wage cost competitiveness is crucial to the maintenance and growth of employment. There is, therefore, a need to balance the imperative of wage moderation against the need to offer incomes which will retain professional and skilled persons in Ireland. A significant loss of persons whose skills are important to the development of the Irish economy, would become an obstacle to growth and development in Ireland.

POLICIES FOR EMIGRANTS

84. In the discussion above, the Council has spelt out an overall strategy for the development of the economy and the creation of employment. If the Council's strategy is fully implemented, it will contribute to a more rapid growth of the economy and a more significant decline in emigration than would otherwise occur. Nevertheless, in the light of historical experience and of future labour force growth, and even on optimistic assumptions about employment growth in the future, the Council considers that some level of emigration will continue.It would be unrealistic, in the Council's view, *not* to formulate policies in recognition of the reality of emigration.

(i) Vulnerable Young Emigrants

85. In the year 1987/88, it is estimated by the consultants that about 15% of Irish emigrants to the UK comprise unemployed, impoverished, vulnerable young persons who emigrate to London. Emigrants face very significant obstacles to the most basic forms of assimilation. London is now a multi-ethnic city, with an acute shortage of accessible, economical accommodation in the private rental sector. Further, changes in the UK social security system in the 1980s have made it more difficult for these emigrants to obtain adequate income support. This constellation of problems has lead to a growth in the demands on emigrant hostels, advice centres and voluntary housing. The Council considers that the problems faced by this group of emigrants are so serious as to merit urgent attention.

86. First, it is imperative that prospective emigrants are prepared: in particular, a strongly *selective* element is necessary to reach the groups who are at risk. For example, schools and FAS offices in areas of high levels of youth unemployment and early school leaving have a particular role in identifying prospective emigrants who may experience difficulties on emigrating.

87. Second, it is necessary to ensure that Irish immigrants in the UK receive their full entitlement to "publicly provided resources in welfare, housing and employment/career advice and counselling" (Chapter 9). The importance of

emigrants' access to municipal housing is central, as the consultants point out. There is scope, in the Council's opinion, for direct inter-governmental liaison to give effect to this policy.

88. Third, the Council supports the consultants' argument that there should be "a much more positive policy of emigrant help (including financial aid)." The Council also endorses the consultants' argument that such provisions should not be used "to displace, or replace, statutory provisions which should be as available to Irish emigrants as to others." On the contrary, a policy of financial aid to emigrant organisations should be clearly envisaged as *complementary* to the responsibilities of the government in the host country. In addition, the Council believes that State funding to emigrant organisations should be *targeted*: the resources should be directed to ameliorating the problems of the most deprived and most vulnerable emigrants.

(ii) Occupational Assimilation

89. The evidence (Chapter 7) on the occupational profile of Irish immigrants in the UK[11] shows that, relative to the UK population as a whole, some Irish immigrants there are in lower social and occupational statuses than their educational qualifications would warrant. There is evidence of 'ghettoisation' in their occupational profile, with large concentrations of Irish immigrants in specific low skill occupational niches.

90. This phenomenon is not easily amenable to solution. However, the Council believes that FAS and other agencies (including the Department of Education) have a role to play in countering this occupational "underperformance." In part, the occupational pattern may be a result of a lack of knowledge among foreign employers of the local equivalents of Irish qualifications. This issue has become more important as the educational attainments of Irish emigrants has increased. In particular, emigrants with full second level qualifications do not appear to be obtaining a proportionate share of administrative/clerical employment. Therefore, mechanisms should be developed to disseminate the actual standards and training on which Irish qualifications are based.

91. The Council recognises, however, that the sociological evidence on immigrant integration reveals an important role for ethnic and kinship contacts in securing employment. Employment 'ghettoisation' may be one of the consequences of the patterns of contact and assimilation adopted by immigrants. Furthermore, it must be appreciated that if policy initiatives improved immigrants' occupational and social integration, this may diminish their rate of *return* immigration into Ireland.

---

11 The data in the consultants' report on occupational assimilation and on assimilation problems of young emigrants was based solely on an analysis of the UK.

92. More generally, the evidence referred to by the consultants of the wider socio medical profile of Irish immigrants should be noted (Chapter 7). For example, they have the highest standardised mortality ratios of all first generation immigrants in the UK and they experience above average levels of psychiatric morbidity, homelessness and other social problems.[12] It is likely, as the consultants point out, that these patterns are the outcome of poor social integration and, in particular, of inadequate *initial* integration into the labour market and the housing system.

93. The Council, therefore, considers that the incidence of social problems among the Irish emigrant population justifies greater attention being given to their assimilation problems and greater resources being devoted to the most at-risk group.

(iii) Emigration of Highly Skilled Personnel

94. The emigration rates among graduates and among persons with high levels of skill increased during the 1980s. Two issues have been raised in this regard in the consultants' report.

95. First, it can be argued that the financing system for higher education should be a *loans* system, as graduate emigration represents a direct economic loss in terms of the public expenditure costs of higher education. The Council believes that the system of financing higher education merits re-examination, independently of the phenomenon of graduate emigration. In its future work programme, the Council will address fundamental aspects of education policy – including financing. There are analytical arguments in favour of a loans system, as studies of the economics of Irish education have shown.[13] However, the Council would not advocate such a policy solely on the basis of emigration rates among graduates.[14] Only a fundamental reappraisal of all of the options for higher education financing in the light of efficiency, equity and cost considerations should determine a change in policy.

96. Second, the Council does *not* support specific reductions in tax rates geared at the young or at first time labour force entrants aimed at reducing emigration. On the contrary, the *overall* programme of tax reform advocated by the Council, which entails continued reductions in marginal rates of income tax and a structural widening of the tax base, would narrow post-tax income

12 Raftery, J. et al (1990). The Mortality of First and Second Generation Irish Immigrants in the UK. *Social Science and Medicine*, Vol. 31, No. 5. Pages 577-584

13 Tussing, A. Dale (1978). *Irish Educational Expenditures – Past, Present and Future*. Dublin: ESRI Research Paper No. 92
Barlow, A.C. (1981). *The Financing of Higher Education*. Dublin: ESRI Research Paper No. 106

14 The existence of high levels of graduate emigration would, of itself, make it extremely difficult to administer a system of loan financing.

differentials between Ireland and other countries and would contribute to reduced emigration.

97. The Council recognises that emigration of highly qualified persons results in significant long term losses to the Irish economy, if the emigration is permanent and does not eventually generate a return flow of immigrants. For the future, the important issue is to maximise the rate of return immigration. Although there is no evidence on the question, some highly qualified persons presumably emigrate to widen professional experience and improve skills. To the extent that this is the case, and to the extent that return migration does take place, then the 'losses' to the Irish economy are temporary and, in fact, may convert into 'gains' at a later point, if immigrants return with capital and improved skills and expertise.

98. In this respect, however, the changing international context of migration, referred to by the consultants, should be appreciated. Ireland's economy is increasingly shaped by developments in the EC. The 'pull' of greater occupational opportunities and incomes in the more advanced EC economies is being reinforced by the removal of technical and institutional barriers to labour mobility. For instance, EC wide procedures to ensure community-wide recognition of qualifications and to facilitate access for citizens of all member States to higher education and training, may increase the rate of migration of skilled personnel from Ireland, and more quickly lead to their integration into other economies. This could lead to a lower rate of *return* migration among such migrants, with correspondingly greater 'losses' to the Irish economy. One final implication of greater European emigration should also be noted. It will be increasingly important for Irish emigrants to be skilled in European languages.

99. Finally, the possible long term implications for the financing of education in a unified economy and labour market should be noted. If EC wide migration increases significantly in the future then the costs and benefits of education will become community wide rather than internalised to member State economies. In this context, the principles and rationale of a community wide budget come into play, as the Council pointed out in its analysis of Ireland in the EC. The Council, therefore, suggests that the scope for enhanced EC expenditure on education should be continuously monitored in the light of the evolving patterns of education and labour mobility and in the framework of the public finance principles appropriate in a more unified economy.

(iv) Labour Market Services

100. The Council suggests that there is scope to improve the labour market services offered by FAS to cope more effectively with the realities of continued

emigration and to maximise the benefits to Irish citizens and the Irish economy of outward migration. First, as the consultants have suggested, FAS should develop its information/advice services on emigration which have been expanding countrywide. Emphasis should be placed on the most at-risk groups, particularly early school leavers.

101. Second, as labour scarcities develop in EC economies, graduates will have increasing opportunities to secure employment which reflects their level of training and offers the potential for professional development. The role of FAS in this respect should be strengthened. In particular, skills and technologies not available in Ireland should be identified and emigrants should be facilitated to procure employment with the most advanced skills and technologies. This would maximise the benefits of any return migration.

102. Third, FAS should develop its labour market services in relation to the UK and actively deal with the problem of employment 'ghettoisation' among Irish immigrants there.

103. Finally, skill shortages may emerge in the Irish economy which can be met by skilled Irish personnel abroad. FAS, in particular, should have a role in facilitating Irish employers to identify suitable Irish personnel overseas and to maximise the early return of such emigrants.

SUMMARY OF COUNCIL'S COMMENTS

104. The Council considers that emigration from Ireland is to a considerable extent a reflection of the relative underdevelopment of the Irish economy. To eliminate involuntary emigration, the Council believes that it will be necessary to pursue an overall strategy consisting of three elements:

- a stable macroeconomic environment;
- a programme of structural reforms; and
- a series of targeted, specific measures directed at an improvement in the labour market, an increase in employment and a reduction in unemployment.

105. In its report, a *Strategy for the Nineties: Macroeconomic Stability and Structural Reform*, the Council spelt out the rationale and content of this strategy. It is only by consistently pursuing *all* of the elements of this strategy simultaneously that a significant growth in employment and incomes, which are necessary to reduce emigration to any great extent, can be achieved.

106. In the context of Ireland's increasing integration into the unified European economy, it will also be essential to adopt active, positive policies to ensure

some convergence between the Irish economy and the more developed economies of the EC. This will entail, in particular, the pursuit at European level of co-ordinated macroeconomic policies, enhanced structural policies, and an enlarged budgetary and fiscal role for the Community.

107. It must be acknowledged, however that some level of external migration is likely in the foreseeable future and four sets of policies are required to cope with the potential losses and problems which will arise:

- there is a need to improve the level of support to the young, vulnerable, deprived emigrants to the UK – support to emigrant groups should, therefore, be targeted;
- educational and labour market services should attempt to ensure that Irish emigrants' qualifications are accorded proper status and that emigrants do not become 'ghettoised' in low status stereotyped "emigrants" employment;
- policies should focus on facilitating return migration among high skill personnel, especially if skill shortages emerge in the Irish economy;
- the financing of third level education should be reviewed in the light of migration patterns in the EC Single Market and the evolving public finance arrangements in the community.

108. It must be recognised that emigration has a significant impact on the Irish economy and on Irish society. Viewed from a narrow perspective, emigration can be seen as an amelioration of the problem of unemployment. However, in the Council's view, the labour market amelioration may be overstated: emigration in the short term reduces unemployment but the long term reduction in labour supply means that the equilibrium effect of a larger labour supply on wage costs is absent. Further, the Council considers that emigration imposes economic and social costs on the community as a whole.

109. For example, the relative age structure of emigrants and immigrants imparts a higher dependency ratio to the population than would naturally occur; extensive depopulation of regions and areas results in higher unit costs for infrastructure and public services; there are indirect, social costs and consequences for families and communities resulting from the loss of the young population. Recently, there has been a high emigration rate among highly skilled personnel – the long term loss of such emigrants, if it continues on a large scale, could become an obstacle to the development of the Irish economy. Finally, the serious social and economic problems faced by the most vulnerable emigrants poses a challenge to Irish public policy.

Part II

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF EMIGRATION

by

J. J. Sexton
B. M. Walsh
D. F. Hannan
D. McMahon

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance received from the following:

(a) Mr G. Danaher and Mr T. McCashin of the NESC Secretariat for much helpful advice and encouragement. Many helpful comments were also received from NESC Council members or from the organisations which they represent.

(b) The Central Statistics Office for the supply of numerous special tabulations from Census of Population and Labour Force Survey records.

(c) Mr Paul Cullen of the Irish Embassy in London; the Directors of the various Irish welfare agencies consulted and Gearoid O'Meachair of CARA for their help in assembling and interpreting the statistics for recent Irish emigrants to London.

(d) Sally Shortall for her invaluable research assistance.

Responsibility for the content of the report lies, of course, solely with the authors.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The primary purpose of this report, as the title suggests, is to describe and analyse the magnitude and nature of current emigration and assess its economic and social implications. This is done not only in historical and current terms, but also in the context of likely developments between now and the turn of the century.

If one takes a longer term historical perspective, emigration has frequently occupied centre stage in political, economic and social debate in this country. The huge population losses through emigration, which occurred between the middle of the last century and the early 1960s, fuelled an ongoing debate as to how the tide might be stemmed. One of the primary influences which underpinned and maintained the drive for independence was a perception that emigration could be eliminated once we had control of our own affairs. Many of the economic initiatives undertaken since Independence involved the elimination of emigration as a primary objective.

The most noteworthy assessment of Irish emigration in recent times is contained in the Report of the Commission on Emigration (1954). This report analysed the emigration situation in great detail. It made recommendations for the alleviation of the problem which centred, *inter alia*, around the promotion of agricultural activity, export oriented industries and various forms of service employment. Numerous references are made to the content of this report at appropriate points in the following chapters.

With the advent of more rapid economic growth in the 1960s, emigration began to decline significantly. By the early 1970s the net external balance was close to zero. As that decade progressed the continuing improvement in economic and social conditions significantly narrowed the gap between conditions here and in other countries. A net inflow of population began to materialise, as many former emigrants began to return home. In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that interest in the question of emigration began to wane.[1] Indeed during this period there developed a rather complacent (but, as it transpired, unduly optimistic) opinion that the Irish emigration problem had been solved. However, this complacency was rudely shattered in the early 1980s as large-scale emigration began to re-emerge in the aftermath of the post-1980 recession. In the year to April 1989 the net outflow

1. Even though the 1970s was characterised by a *net* inflow of population, there was a significant *gross* outflow, particularly of younger persons. In this sense the emigration problem did not disappear during this period, even though the gross outward movements were much smaller than in earlier decades.

reached a level (46,000) which had not been experienced since the deep recession of the mid-1950s. However, the most recent indications are that the net outflow has declined from this high level.

The emigration question began once again to figure prominently in public debate when the realisation began to set in that its re-emergence was not just a transient phenomenon, but arose from more fundamental imbalances in our population and economy which were not amenable to quick and easy remedies. There was also a perception that the renewed exodus was different from earlier outflows in certain respects. Concern began to be expressed at the apparently large numbers of skilled and highly educated persons among the emigrants. Questions arose about the relationship between emigration and unemployment, and in particular concerning the extent to which the fall in unemployment in recent years can be attributed to rising emigration. There were also indications that many of those who left were not adequately prepared and encountered difficulty in finding employment and accommodation in the centres to which they emigrated. In a longer-term context, concern has also been expressed at the impact of continuing emigration on our population, age structure, and the economic and social consequences that would flow from this. The National Economic and Social Council commissioned the present study in order to obtain a systematic analysis of these and other relevant topics.

The aspects of emigration covered in this report may be summarised as follows.

1. The extent of external migration and its historical and more recent evolution (Chapter 2).

2. Characteristics of emigrants and immigrants (e.g., age, gender, region of origin/destination, occupation, educational levels, etc.) and the manner in which these have changed over time (Chapter 3).

3. External migration considered in the context of overall demographic and labour force changes - both now and in the future. Projections of potential labour force supply. Relevant demographic changes here and in other EC countries (Chapter 4).

4. Macro-economic determinants of emigration. The impact on emigration levels of movements in key indicators in Ireland and the UK - e.g., unemployment rates and wages (Chapter 5).

5. The personal motivation of emigrants. Identification of the factors which motivate individuals decisions to migrate: - individual preferences, social background, regional characteristics, educational level achieved, and certain facilitating and constraining factors such as family ties, area of residence, etc. (Chapter 6).

6. The problems faced by recent Irish emigrants to the UK, particularly the unskilled and unqualified. The degree to which Irish emigrants have become integrated into UK society in the longer term (Chapter 7).

7. Economic gains and losses from external migration. Personal and social costs and benefits. The effect of emigration on the economy - human capital losses, short-term benefits in alleviating unemployment, tourism related benefits and associated cash flows, longer-term effects in the form of possible impediments to growth, and effects attributable to changing demographic structures (Chapter 8).

On the basis of these analyses, Chapter 9 contains an overview of the more important findings to emerge from the study, sets out some conclusions and indicates a series of policy approaches and options that might be followed with a view to curbing the migratory outflows.

The report thus provides a comprehensive review of emigration in the context of the economic and social environment in which we now find ourselves. We consider that it has been extremely worthwhile, particularly from a policy development point of view, to bring together and analyse all of the relevant information on the subject in one document.

Chapter 2

A REVIEW OF IRISH POPULATION AND EXTERNAL MIGRATION TRENDS

1. GENERAL POPULATION TRENDS

While the broad features of Irish demographic trends over the last century or so are well known, it is, nevertheless, of interest to begin this report with a brief historical review. This provides an appropriate backdrop against which more recent demographic events can be compared, and perhaps better understood. This chapter is concerned primarily with reviewing overall population trends, but it should of course be borne in mind that external migration has been one of the dominant influences underlying many of the population changes which have occurred in Ireland over much of the last century.

The first attempts to measure the population in Ireland relate to the latter half of the seventeenth century when it was estimated that the population of the entire island stood at just over 1 million.[1] By the end of the eighteenth century (in the 1790s) the population was estimated to have increased to over 4 million and by 1813, when a census was first attempted (not altogether successfully), the population was estimated to have risen to nearly 6 million. The Census of 1841 is considered to provide the first fully accurate measure of the Irish population. This enumeration yielded a total of 8,175,000 persons in the whole island, of which 6,529,000 related to the area which now constitutes the Republic.

The Census year of 1841 represents a significant watershed in Irish demographic history, as shortly thereafter the Great Famine of 1846-47 brought an end to the rise in the Irish population and precipitated a migratory outflow which caused the population to decline almost without interruption up to the beginning of the 1960s. By 1871 the population of what is now the Republic had fallen by nearly 2½ million to just over 4 million persons; by the beginning of this century it had fallen to just over 3.2 million[2] (see Table 2.1). Thereafter the decline continued, but at a slower pace. When national independence was achieved in 1921, the population had

1. Chapter 1 of the General Report of the 1926 Census of Population contains an interesting description of these earliest attempts to measure the Irish population. It should be noted, however, that work by Connell (1950) and O Grada (1989) indicates that these very early estimates probably understated the size of the population.
2. The extent of Irish emigration throughout the last century is vividly illustrated in Garvey (1985) which contains data which indicate that no less than 2½ million of the total Irish-born population of nearly 7 million in the English-speaking world in 1901 were resident outside of Ireland (32 counties). Nearly 1¾ million of these emigrants were in North America.

Table 2.1: Population of Ireland (Republic) since 1841

Year	Population (000)
1841[1]	6,529
1851[1]	5,112
1861	4,402
1871	4,053
1881	3,870
1891	3,469
1901	3,222
1911	3,140
1926	2,972
1936	2,968
1946	2,955
1951	2,961
1961	2,818
1971	2,978
1981	3,443
1986	3,541
1987	3,543
1988	3,538
1989	3,515
1990	3,503

Sources: (1) Census of Population 1986 Volume I.
(2) Economic Series, August 1990

Note: (1) Armed forces excluded.

declined to about 3 million and it remained at or slightly below this level until the early 1950s. The period 1951-61 was again characterised by very high emigration which precipitated a further significant fall in population; the lowest level ever reached, 2,818,000, occurred in 1961.

With the advent of increased economic growth in the 1960s, the pace of emigration began to taper off. During this decade the net outflow declined to a level less than the natural increase in the population (i.e. births less deaths) and the population therefore, began to rise. By 1971 it had risen to 2,978,000. The decade of the 1970s was even more remarkable in that a confluence of events, both economic and social,[3] caused a reversal of the traditional emigration pattern. The outflow of younger emigrants fell significantly and older former migrants began to return in substantial numbers (with their families). There was also a greatly increased inward movement of people from Northern Ireland during this period. As a result, an overall net inflow of population materialised. This, in association with the natural increase, caused the population to rise rapidly. By 1981 the total population had increased to 3,443,000, nearly half a million higher than the level which prevailed

3. These circumstances are described more fully in later chapters (for example in Chapter 5, Section 2).

ten years earlier. By this time the Irish population had thus regained the levels which had prevailed in the early 1890s.

Following the onset of recession in 1979/80 emigration began to re-emerge, gradually at first, but on an increasing scale as the decade progressed. This caused a retardation in population growth. By 1986, the year of the most recent Census of Population, the population of the Republic had risen to 3,541,000, just short of 100,000 higher than the level recorded at the previous Census in 1981. More recent estimates suggest that the extent of the net migratory outflow now exceeds the natural increase, with the result that the population has begun to decline. The most recent population estimate for April 1990 is 3,503,000, which is nearly 40,000 less than the level reached in the Census year 1986.

We are now entering a period during which the rate of economic growth in Ireland appears likely to exceed that in Britain and the United States. This should have a very pronounced effect on the level of net emigration, which is likely to be much lower than it was during the second half of the 1980s.

2. CHANGES IN THE POPULATION STRUCTURE

Fundamental changes have occurred in the structure of the Irish population over the last hundred years or so, many of which are attributable to the effects of emigration. This aspect will be considered under two headings, namely regions and age.

With regard to the regional distribution of the population, in pre-Famine Ireland the population was distributed among the provinces roughly in proportion to their areas. While all areas (with the exception of Dublin County) suffered a decline in population in the immediate post-Famine period, the decreases were particularly acute in Munster, Connacht and Ulster (part of). It is of interest to note that before the Famine, Munster was the most populous province (see Tables 2.2a and 2.2b) with a population of nearly 2.4 million, accounting for nearly 37 per cent of the total population, compared with just over 30 per cent in Leinster. Between 1841 and 1881, however (over which period emigration from Munster was particularly severe), the province lost its dominant position to Leinster which experienced a much smaller population decline. By the early 20th century the population of Munster stood at somewhat less than 1 million, a level which broadly speaking it has retained ever since. In Connacht and Ulster (three counties), however, high emigration levels persisted, causing the populations of these provinces to decline right up to the early 1970s. By the mid 1980s these provinces accounted for less than 20 per cent of the total population of the Republic, compared with one third in pre-Famine times.

Throughout the entire period under discussion, the population of Dublin City and County underwent a rapid increase. Much of this is attributable to a net movement

Table 2.2(a): Population by Province 1841-1986

Year	Leinster: Dublin Co.	Leinster: Remainder of Province	Leinster: Total	Munster	Connacht	Ulster	State
	000						
1841	373	1,607	1,974	2,396	1,419	740	6,529
1881	419	860	1,279	1,331	822	438	3,870
1911	479	685	1,162	1,035	611	331	3,140
1926	506	643	1,149	970	553	300	2,972
1936	587	633	1,220	942	525	280	2,968
1946	636	645	1,281	917	493	264	2,955
1951	693	644	1,337	899	472	253	2,961
1961	718[1]	614[1]	1,332	849	419	218	2,818
1971	852	646	1,498	882	390	207	2,978
1981	1,003	788	1,791	998	424	230	3,443
1986	1,021	832	1,853	1,020	431	236	3,541

Sources: Commission on Emigration Reports (1954)
Census of Population 1986, Vol. 1.

Note: (1) In 1956 a small area within the administrative area of Dublin County (involving about 800 persons) was transferred to County Wicklow.

Table 2.2(b): Distribution of Population by Province 1841-1986

Year	Leinster: Dublin Co.	Leinster: Remainder of Province	Leinster: Total	Munster	Connacht	Ulster	State
	%						
1841	5.7	24.7	30.2	36.7	21.7	11.3	100.0
1881	10.8	22.2	33.0	34.4	21.2	11.3	100.0
1911	15.2	21.8	37.0	33.0	19.5	10.5	100.0
1926	17.0	21.6	38.7	32.6	18.6	10.1	100.0
1936	19.8	21.3	41.1	31.7	17.7	9.4	100.0
1946	21.5	21.8	43.3	31.0	16.7	8.9	100.0
1951	23.4	21.7	45.2	30.4	15.9	8.5	100.0
1961	25.4	21.8	47.3	30.1	14.9	7.7	100.0
1971	28.6	21.7	50.3	29.6	13.1	7.0	100.0
1981	29.1	22.9	52.0	29.0	12.3	6.7	100.0
1986	28.8	23.5	52.3	28.8	12.2	6.7	100.0

Sources: Notes: See Table 2.2(a).

Table 2.3: Age Structure of the Population 1841-1986

Year	0-14	15-24	25-44	45-64	65+	Total
	%					
1841	38.1	45.9		12.9	3.1	100.0
1861	32.5	45.8		17.1	4.6	100.0
1881	35.4	42.7		15.6	6.3	100.0
1901	30.2	46.0		17.3	6.5	100.0
1926	29.2	17.7	25.0	18.9	9.1	100.0
1936	27.6	17.6	25.4	19.6	9.7	100.0
1946	27.9	16.3	26.1	19.1	10.6	100.0
1951	28.9	15.0	26.0	19.4	10.7	100.0
1961	31.1	13.9	22.5	21.3	11.2	100.0
1971	31.3	16.2	21.0	20.4	11.1	100.0
1981	30.3	17.5	24.3	17.1	10.7	100.0
1986	28.9	17.4	26.1	16.7	10.9	100.0

Sources: Commission on Emigration Reports (1954).
Census of Population 1981, Vol. II. Ages and Marital Status.
Census 1986. Summary Population Report.

of population from the rest of the country but, as will subsequently be shown, these inflows have occurred in parallel with significant (but smaller) population losses through external migration. Between the middle of the last century and the mid-1980s the proportion of the total population resident in Dublin county increased from less than 10 per cent to nearly 30 per cent (in absolute terms from less than 400,000 to over 1 million). Interestingly, the intercensal period 1981-86 appears to be the first for which the proportion of the total population accounted for by County Dublin declined (even if slightly). However, the beneficiary appears to have been the rest of Leinster, which indicates that this small but significant shift is, in large measure, attributable to the spread of the metropolitan conurbation to areas outside of the boundaries of County Dublin.

The age structure of the Irish population over the period from 1841-1986 is shown in Table 2.3. The factors underlying the changes here are more complex than those for regions since they relate not only to external migration, but also to changes in aspects such as fertility, infant mortality, expectation of life, etc.

During the latter part of the last century, the child population (i.e., aged less than 15 years), fell significantly in relation to the total population, – from 38 per cent in 1841 to just over 30 per cent in 1901. Contributory factors here would have been the decreases which occurred in both the marriage and birth rates during this period. Over much the same period the proportion of elderly persons in the population (i.e. those aged 65 years or over) rose noticeably – from 3 per cent in 1841 to nearly 10 per cent in 1926. This was partly due to the fact that such persons were survivors from periods when the number of births was much higher, despite the fact that these cohorts were depleted by emigration. However, over the past 60 years, despite the changes in absolute population levels, the basic age structure of the Irish population does not appear to have altered all that much. It will be noted for example, that the proportion of the total population in the "youth" category (i.e. aged less than 25 years) was 47 per cent in 1926 and stood at much the same level in 1986. The same can be said of the age group comprising those aged 15 to 44 years. However, a high rate of emigration combined with a high birth rate has given Ireland the unusual combination of relatively high proportions in both the young and old dependant groups.

3. COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE

Thus far, the discussion of population trends has involved only indirect references to the underlying influence of external migration. Let us now illustrate more explicitly the relationships between population changes and variations in migratory flows. Basically, the population within a specified region will change according as persons are born or die and emigrate or immigrate. Put more simply, variations in the level of the population depend on what is termed the natural increase (i.e. births less deaths) and the net external migratory flow (i.e. the difference between the gross flows in and out). Put in simple arithmetical form the appropriate equation is:

$$P_t - P_{t-1} = (B - D) + (I - O)$$

where P_t is the population at time t, and B and D, are the numbers of births and deaths, and I and O the gross migratory inflows and outflows in the period in question (i.e. from time t-1 to time t). For the periods since records began the natural increase in Ireland has always been significantly positive (i.e. births have exceeded deaths) but for most of this period this contribution to population growth has been offset by much larger net outward (i.e. negative) migratory flows.

Table 2.4 sets out the three components (population change, natural increase, net external migration) for each intercensal period since 1871. It should be noted that while the population changes and natural increase figures are independently compiled, the net migration figures are derived as residuals. The changes in the population level were obtained from successive censuses while the information on births and deaths has been obtained from the registration records of these events.[4] With this form of calculation one can only derive net external migration flows. The

4. An official system of registrations of births and deaths was introduced in 1864.

Table 2.4: Components of Population Change 1871-1990

Intercensal Period	Population Change	Natural Increase (i.e births less deaths)	Net Migration
	Annual Averages		
1871-1881	-18,317	+31,855	-50,172
1881-1891	-40,133	+19,600	-59,733
1891-1901	-24,688	+14,954	-39,642
1901-1911	-8,214	+17,940	-26,154
1911-1926	-11,180	+15,822	-27,002
1926-1936	-357	+16,318	-16,675
1936-1946	-1,331	+17,380	-18,711
1946-1951	+1,119	+25,503	-24,384
1951-1961	-14,226	+26,652	-40,877
1961-1971	+15,991	+29,442	-13,451
1971-1981	+46,516	+36,127	+10,389
1981-1986	+19,447	+33,824	-14,377
1986-1990	-9,500	+24,200	-33,700
	Rates per 1,000 average population		
1871-1889	-4.6	+8.0	-12.7
1881-1891	-10.9	+5.3	-16.3
1891-1901	-7.4	+4.5	-11.9
1901-1911	-2.6	+5.6	-8.2
1911-1926	-3.7	+5.2	-8.8
1926-1936	-0.1	+5.5	-5.6
1936-1946	-0.4	+5.9	-6.3
1946-1951	+0.4	+8.6	-8.2
1951-1961	-4.9	+9.2	-14.1
1961-1971	+5.5	+10.2	-4.6
1971-1981	+14.5	+11.3	+3.2
1981-1986	+5.6	+9.7	-4.1
1986-1990	-2.7	+6.9	-9.6

Sources: Commission on Emigration, Reports (1954)
Census 86. Vol.I. Population classified by Area.
CSO, Economic Series, August 1990.

available information on gross flows (in or out) is less complete and is discussed later in this chapter.

The figures in Table 2.4 (which are expressed in the form of annual averages) indicate that in the latter half of the 19th Century, even though the natural increase was substantial (varying between 15,000 and 30,000), this was completely negated by net outward migrations which varied between 40,000 and 60,000 per year. The net outflow was particularly heavy between 1881 and 1890 (averaging nearly

60,000 per year), a major contributory cause at this juncture being the disastrous crop failures of 1879-80. It can only be a matter of conjecture as to how much larger the net outflows must have been in the immediate post-Famine period, given the huge population falls that occurred at that time.

The net outflows began to diminish somewhat after 1890. In the early years of the present century annual average net emigration had fallen to about 25,000. This downward trend continued until the end of the Second World War, by which time the annual average net population loss had dropped below 20,000. By then the natural increase was approximately equal to net emigration and the population stabilised. The figures in Table 2.4 show that over the 25 years from 1921 to 1951 the total population changed very little.

However, in the 1950s severe recession in Ireland, combined with ample employment opportunities in Britain, caused a rise in emigration. The figures indicate a net annual average population loss of over 40,000 during this period. In fact the net emigration figures for this decade, when viewed relative to the diminished population which then existed, are nearly as high as those for the 1880s. The annual average net outflow per thousand of the population reached a figure of nearly 14, which compares with similar levels indicated for this statistic during the last two decades of the 19th Century.

The net migration figures for the years from 1971 to 1981, when viewed in the historical context of this table, illustrate how remarkable this period was. It stands out as being the only time span among all the periods covered which is characterised by a net inflow of population.

The re-emergence of net emigration in the post-1980 period is also evident, however, the annual average net population loss over 1981/86 being nearly 14,500, much the same level as prevailed in the 1960s. Even though Census-based information is not available for the period since 1986, it is possible to obtain an indication of trends over recent years by using the CSO annual population estimates which now extend to April 1990. The data for the final period in Table 2.4 shows that over the four years from 1986 to 1990 the annual average migratory outflow rose to nearly 34,000. This (and the fact that the natural increase declined) resulted in a population decrease (some 9,500 in annual average terms).

4. MORE RECENT TRENDS IN NET EXTERNAL EMIGRATION

The above-mentioned data allow only a rather general perspective of emigration based on the aggregation of figures for five- or ten-year time spans. In a more detailed vein, Table 2.5 gives estimates of net external migration for individual years from 1926 to 1989. It is necessary to sound a word of caution regarding the use of these data. The figures for individual years have been taken from Hughes

Table 2.5: Annual Estimates of Net Migration 1926-1987

Year (Commencing Mid-April)	Net Migration (000)	Year (Commencing Mid-April)	Net Migration (000)
1926	-31	1958	-32
1927	-29	1959	-41
1928	-25	1960	-40
1929	-26	1961	-15
1930	-12	1962	-8
1931	–	1963	-17
1932	–	1964	-20
1933	-9	1965	-21
1934	-17	1966	-13
1935	-18	1967	-16
1936	-31	1968	-15
1937	-26	1969	-5
1938	-19	1970	-5
1939	+4	1971	+11
1940	+20	1972	+13
1941	-33	1973	+16
1942	-46	1974	+20
1943	-24	1975	+16
1944	-14	1976	+10
1945	-21	1977	+7
1946	-9	1978	+16
1947	-16	1979	-8
1948	-30	1980	+2
1949	-36	1981	-1
1950	-30	1982	-14
1951	-35	1983	-9
1952	-33	1984	-20
1953	-36	1985	-28
1954	-45	1986	-27
1955	-48	1987	-32
1956	-41	1988	-46
1957	-58	1989	-31

Sources: (1) Hughes (1977), Estimates of Annual Net Migration and their relationship with Series on Annual Net Passenger Movement; Ireland 1926-76. ESRI Memorandum Series No. 122.
(2) Central Statistics Office.

(1977) with CSO estimates being used for more recent years. Basically the estimates are of a residual nature, being a by-product of the methods used in compiling the annual series of population estimates.[5] The figures, however, can be taken to provide a reasonable indication of trends.

5. Hughes derived his series by relating the published annual population estimates to annual births and deaths data, i.e. using the identity indicated in this chapter.

The estimates indicate fairly significant net population outflows during the later years of the 1920s. This, it will be recalled, was a buoyant period in the United States, which at this time attracted large numbers of European migrants. However, these flows came to an abrupt end in 1930-31, primarily because of the Great Depression which followed the Stock Market Crash of late 1929. The net migratory outflows from Ireland resumed on a lesser scale during the mid-1930s but the scene changed again with the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. This precipitated a sizeable net inflow to Ireland explained by Hughes (1977) as persons trying "to get out of the firing line". However, large outflows subsequently materialised during the war years when sizeable numbers of Irish persons (mainly males) took advantage of the employment opportunities afforded by the British war effort.

Emigration decreased noticeably just after the end of the Second World War but then rose substantially during the depressed years of the 1950s, particularly late in that decade. The year 1958 stands out as being the year of highest net emigration in recent Irish demographic history, the net outflow reaching a level of 58,000.

Net emigration diminished gradually throughout the 1960s according as the effects of sustained economic growth began to take hold. The early 1970s represents a historic watershed in external migration terms as at that point (in 1971-72) the net outflow was transformed into a net inflow. These inflows increased in magnitude throughout that decade, even during the severe recession of 1975-76. However, in the aftermath of the renewed onset of recession in 1979-80 the tide turned again and emigration re-emerged – slowly at first but on a more substantial scale from 1984 onwards. The estimates in Table 2.5 show that the net outflow reached a level of 46,000 in the year commencing April 1988, but declined somewhat, to 31,000, in 1989/90.

A further notable aspect of the current demographic scene is that the natural increase has been declining since 1980 because of falling numbers of births. Currently the size of the natural increase is about 19,000, compared with about 40,000 at the beginning of the decade. If the net migratory outflow exceeds this figure, a reduction in the total population occurs. It does not, therefore, require as large a net outflow now as in past periods to bring about a fall in the total population. The estimates previously given in Table 2.1 show that this has been happening since 1987. In the year to April 1990, it is reckoned that the population fell from 3,515,000 to 3,503,000.

5. GROSS MIGRATORY OUTFLOWS

Thus far, the discussion concerning external migration has centred on net flows (i.e. the difference between outflows and inflows) because information in this form is more readily available. There is also, however, a certain amount of information available on gross migratory outflows. It must be borne in mind, however, that the sources of these data differ in regard to coverage, accuracy and comprehensiveness

as between periods, and, as a result, it is possible only to obtain a broad outline of the nature of the gross movements in question. The position is summarised in Table 2.6 which sets out estimates of gross migratory outflows from what is now the Republic covering the period since the middle of the last century.

The figures illustrate clearly the huge outflows which occurred in the post Famine period – 11/2 million between 1852 and 1870 and nearly as many again between 1870 and the end of the 19th Century. The extent of the outflow began to decline during the 1890s and it decreased further (to about quarter of a million) between 1901 and 1911. The figures for the period 1911 to 1922 are obviously untypical because of the effects of the First World War (which caused normal migration to all but cease) and the political events which led to the British withdrawal from what is now the Republic in early 1922.[6]

Information on the full extent of the gross population outflow is not available for the period 1921 to 1940, except for that part of it relating to persons migrating to what are termed "overseas" destinations (that is to destinations other than Great Britain). However, it is again possible to assemble a broad picture of the total outflow during the 1940s because of the introduction of a system of travel/work permits in relation to movements to Great Britain following the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939.[7] The information available from the operation of these regulations (which continued in force until April 1952), when considered with the figures for the issue of passports in respect of migratory movements to destinations other than the UK, make it possible to assemble a broad picture of the aggregate outflows over this decade. The estimated gross outward movement between 1941 and 1950 exceeded 300,000, thus surpassing the recorded outward migratory flows for decades earlier in the century.

With the discontinuation of travel restrictions to Great Britain in 1952 this source of flow information ceased, and it is not possible to assess the size of the gross outward movement in the 1950s or indeed in the succeeding decade. However, as already indicated, the size of the net exodus between 1951 and 1960 was very large (over 400,000) and on this basis it is likely that the gross outward movement approached half a million. If the relative size of the net population loss in the 1960s (135,000) is taken as a guide, it is clear that the gross outward flows in that decade were substantially reduced.

---

6. As indicated in the notes to the table, the figures for 1911/21 are based on passenger movements by sea and would not have covered the movement of military personnel and the departure of Crown servants and their dependants prior to the establishment of Saorstat Eireann in early 1922. It is estimated that the outflow of Crown personnel and deaths of Irish soldiers in the First World War led to a reduction in the population of some 70,000 that would not have occurred otherwise (see Census of Population 1926 – Vol X, General Report).
7. These figures in effect represent the total outward movement during the war years, as "overseas" migration was of negligible proportions during this time.

Table 2.6: Estimated Gross Migratory Outflows in Past Periods (000s)

Period	Destination			Total	Net
	Great Britain	U.S.A.	Other Overseas	Gross Outflow	Migration
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			000		
1852-61	-	-	-	792	
1861-71	-	-	-	697	
1871-81	-	-	-	446	-502
1881-91	41	514	62	617	-597
1891-01	17	347	13	377	-396
1901-11	14	240	12	266	-262
1911-22	9	97	10	116	n.a.
1926-31	n.a.	104	15	n.a.	-123
1931-36	n.a.	2	2	n.a.	-44
1936-41	n.a.	3	2	n.a.	-57
1941-46	173	-	-	173	-130
1946-51	119	17	8	144	-120
1951-61	n.a.	68		n.a.	-409
1961-71	n.a.	49		n.a.	-135
1971-81	155	21		176	+104
1981-90	245	49	64	358	-208

Sources: (1) Commission on Emigration (1954). (2) Statistical Abstract (various issues).
(3) Data derived from Censuses and Labour Force Surveys.

Notes: (1) The gross outflow figures for 1852 to 1921 are based on returns made by the Registrar General. The information, which related to persons who were identified as leaving Ireland permanently with the intention of settling elsewhere, was collected by the police at ports of exit.

(2) A new series of statistics was started in 1924 for overseas emigration from Saorstat Eireann. In this context the term "overseas" excludes European and Mediterranean countries. However the numbers emigrating to the latter was negligible. These figures were initially derived from passenger manifests and U.K. Board of Trade returns.
For the post-war period from 1945 to 1975 these "overseas" movements are based primarily on figures relating to new passports issued to those intending to live permanently abroad. This series (which was published in the Statistical Abstract) was terminated in 1975. The figures for the period 1971-81 are thus based partly on the authors' own estimates.
Overseas flows in question here were of negligible proportion during the years of the Second World War.

(3) The figures for gross outflows to Great Britain for the period from 1941 to 1951 are based on records derived from the system of travel and employment permits which were introduced shortly after the outbreak of the Second World War. The controls were maintained in operation until April 1952.
When this source is used in association with that described in (2) above, it enables one to compile broad estimates of the total gross outflow from the State for the period from 1941 to 1951.

(4) The gross outflow figures for 1971-81 and 1981-90 have been estimated by combining net migration figures (see Table 2.4) and annual gross inflow estimates obtained from Censuses of Population and Labour Force Surveys which were held in these periods.

(5) The net migration figures given in Col (6) do not necessarily cover precisely the same periods as indicated in Col (5). However in all cases the periods are approximately the same and involve identical durations.

(6) The distribution of the outflow estimates for 1981-86 and 1986-89 by destination is based on the new data on gross emigration obtained from recent Labour Force Surveys (see Garvey and Maguire, 1989). It is likely that the numbers emigrating to the United States in the early years of the decade (i.e, in 1981/86) would have been somewhat greater than those indicated.

The collection of new information on gross inward migration flows in the Censuses and Labour Force Surveys taken from 1971 onwards makes it possible, when these are associated with related net migration data, to compile some tentative estimates of the gross outward movements in the post-1970 period. These estimates suggest a gross outward movement of about 165,000 between 1971 and 1981, i.e. about 16,500 per year. This is a quite substantial number when it is recalled that this was an exceptional period characterised by a net inflow of population (to the extent of over 100,000). This serves to illustrate the point that net flows cannot simply be taken as indicating the pattern of gross flows.

With the deterioration in economic conditions in the 1980s, outward migration increased significantly. The estimated total gross outflow between April 1981 and April 1990 was nearly 360,000, or, on average, almost 40,000 per year.[8] The scale of the departures was particularly sizeable in recent years; in the four years up to April 1990 the estimated gross outflow exceeded 200,000, or over 50,000 per year on average.

One aspect which is evident from the figures given in Table 2.6 is the increasing incidence of return flows for the more recent periods involved. During the last century, and in the early part of this century, the numerical similarity between the gross outflow and net emigration figures suggests that any inward movements which occurred were of negligible proportions.[9] However, it does appear that as time progressed, the external migration scene has become increasingly characterised by flows in both directions. There were, it would appear, fairly significant flows in both directions between Ireland and Britain during the years of the Second World War (a feature referred to in the 1954 Report of the Commission on Emigration). In the 1970s, while the gross return flow of former emigrants (and their families) amounted to nearly 270,000, there was still a sizeable gross outward movement of about 165,000 persons. The net population loss of 208,000 in the 1981/90 period involved an estimated outward flow of nearly 360,000 which was, however, partially offset by an inward movement of some 150,000. This is basically an indication of the changed character of emigration which, for many at any rate, is not as final an event as it used to be, and does not necessarily involve the near-permanent sundering of familial relationships which it once did.

6. IRISH EXTERNAL MIGRATION CLASSIFIED BY DESTINATION

The gross flow data given in Table 2.6 involve a broad classification by destination, distinguishing Great Britain, the United States and all other countries combined. Even allowing for the qualifications which apply to the figures, the manner in which the geographical pattern of these flows has changed over the years is clearly evident.

8. It should be noted that unlike earlier periods, the estimates for 1981-90 given in Table 2.6 include gross flows to EC and other European countries.
9. Differences between gross and net flows for particular periods should, however, be interpreted with caution in view of the uncertainty surrounding some of these estimates.

Emigration in the last century was dominated by movements to the United States. The figures show that between 1880 and 1921 some 87 per cent of the gross outward movement from Ireland was to that country, with a further 10 per cent going to Great Britain and the remainder to other countries. Even though comprehensive figures covering all destinations are not available for the 1920s, it is clear from a broad comparison of the size of the gross flow to the United States between 1926 and 1930 with the overall net migration figure for the same period (the two are not all that different) that transatlantic migratory flows still dominated the overall external migration scene. However, the position changed abruptly in the early 1930s with the advent of the Great Depression which followed the 1929 Stock Market crash. Emigration to the United States (where the recession commenced and where its effects were particularly severe) all but ceased. The official records indicate that only some 5,000 persons emigrated to the United States between 1931 and 1941 compared with over 100,000 in the five years up to April 1931. However, the 1930s was still characterised by a significant net outward migration (amounting to about 100,000) which suggests that gross outward movements must have continued on a substantial scale. If the emigrants in question were not going to the United States, then they can only have been migrating to Great Britain, despite the depressed economic conditions which also prevailed there. This period is, therefore, also of importance in Irish demographic history as it involved a fundamental shift in the pattern of Irish external migration, away from North America and towards Great Britain. Subsequent events were to reinforce this changed pattern.

Even though the early years of the Second World War saw an uncharacteristically large population flow into Ireland, this soon changed as sizeable numbers migrated to Britain to avail of the opportunities offered by the British war industries. Gross movements to Great Britain between 1941 and 1945 totalled nearly 175,000; the corresponding number in the immediate post-war period from 1946 to 1951 was nearly 120,000. Even though emigration to the United States (and to other overseas countries) recommenced during the latter period, it was on a very much reduced scale when compared with the large transatlantic flows which occurred in earlier times. Between 1946 and 1950, it is estimated on the basis of passport records that some 17,000 persons emigrated to the United States, and about 8,000 to other overseas countries.

Even though information on gross flows to Great Britain is not available for the 1950s, a summary comparison of the large net outflow for this period when viewed in association with the relatively modest extent of total overseas movement (68,000) makes it clear that the great majority of migrants went to Great Britain. A similar pattern is likely to have prevailed during the 1960s, even if the extent of the outward movement was very much less.

The figures suggest that over 85 per cent of the gross outflow in the 1970s was still to Great Britain. There are indications however that the position had changed by the first half of the 1980s. The new information on gross outflows derived from recent

Labour Force Surveys[10] indicates that while Great Britain still attracted the majority of Irish emigrants in the early 1980s, the proportion appears to have fallen to about 60 per cent, with about 14 per cent going to the United States and a further 15 per cent to other countries. However, in the late 1980s the proportion of emigrants going to Great Britain appears to have increased again (see Appendix Table A2.1).

7. IRISH EXTERNAL MIGRATION IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

Part of the reason for the deeply-felt Irish sensitivity to the emigration problem, and the reason why it forms the focus of so much social, economic and political debate, derives from its long-standing historical nature. While the populations of most European countries have increased substantially since the middle of the last century, because of emigration Ireland has been unique in recording a population decline for most of this period. However, it is necessary to recognise that in the post-war period at least, other European countries have also experienced emigration which in terms of its relative extent has matched or even exceeded the levels of net outflow experienced here. Table 2.7 shows annual rates of net migration (expressed per 1,000 of the average population) for the countries which now form the European Community, covering the period from 1960 to 1986.

It will be noted that a number of the southern European countries, particularly Greece and Portugal, experienced net outflows during the 1960s which were comparable to, or even greater than, those which applied to Ireland at that time. In the latter half of that decade the outflow rates for Portugal (which varied between 10 and 15 per 1,000 of the population) greatly exceeded those for Ireland. Spain and Italy were also countries of net emigration during this period, but the relevant levels indicated are significantly smaller than those for the other countries mentioned.

Most of the more industrialised Northern countries were net importers of people during the economically buoyant 1960s. This was, of course, the era of the "guest worker", as millions migrated from the countries of the Mediterranean basin to find employment in the industrial centres of Germany, France and other northern European countries.

This pattern continued on into the early 1970s but the scene changed in the middle of that decade when economic conditions deteriorated following the first oil price shock of late 1973. Not surprisingly, migrant workers, who were generally unskilled and held less secure jobs in the economies concerned, suffered disproportionately through unemployment in the subsequent economic fallout. Many returned to their

10. For more detailed information on this source see Garvey and Maguire (1989), "*The Structure of Gross Migration Flows (Labour Force Survey Estimates)*", ESRI Seminar, November 1989. Appendix Table A.2.1 contains a classification by destination from this source of emigrants who left the country between April 1987 and April 1988.

home countries; indeed, in some countries migrant workers from outside the EC were actively encouraged to do so by various means. These trends are evident from the figures which indicate population inflows in the late 1970s for those countries which previously had experienced population losses; one will also note a reversal or at least a slowing down in the inflows to the more industrialised northern economies during this period.[11]

As explained earlier in this Chapter, Ireland also experienced a reversal of its long-standing migration pattern during the 1970s, but the underlying reasons were different from those indicated above for other European countries. Most of the influx derived from improvements in employment opportunities and enhanced social conditions at home, rather than from a desire to escape from the rigours of recession abroad. Indeed, even though the effects of the mid decade recession in Ireland were as great as they were in other countries, the net inflow of population continued throughout its duration.

Generally speaking, the figures for the 1980s given in Table 2.7 indicate a much lower level of migratory flows for European countries when compared with those for the preceding decades. It is noticeable, however, that those countries which in earlier times were associated with migrant outflows have, in recent years, experienced small net inflows. In this sense, Ireland is rather exceptional in that it is now the only EC country which is continuing to experience a significant net population loss through emigration. Part of the reason for this is, of course, the close proximity to the UK labour market and the underperformance of the Irish economy relative to the UK and other countries throughout the 1980s.

The foregoing analysis does serve to illustrate, however that emigration, when viewed in a wider European context over the post-war period, is not a feature which is unique to Ireland. One must, therefore, when considering the wider context of a deregulated Community labour market, entertain the possibility of continuing intra-European movements, with a likely gravitation towards those centres where economic growth will tend to be concentrated. Differences in demographic structure between EC countries (such as those related to age) are also likely to contribute to such movements, a feature which is discussed further in Chapter 4.

A consideration of particular regions within countries, rather than of countries, may be more appropriate in the context of analysing external migration in a broader European setting. The conditions which apply to particular sub-national regions may well resemble the Irish situation more so than those of any one country. The regions of the United Kingdom are a case in point. Table 2.8 shows net migration

11. The more gradual changes in the migration trends were at times distorted by the effects of significant political events. One will note for example the large influx into France in 1962 when the "pieds noirs" migrated to mainland France when Algeria became independent. Similarly, the figures indicate large migrations into Portugal in 1974 and 1975 when that country withdrew from its overseas territories.

Table 2.7 : Annual Rates of Net Migration (per 1,000 average population) in EC Countries 1960-1986.

Year	Belgium	Denmark	FR Germany	Greece	Spain	France	Ireland	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	Portugal	U.K.
	Rates per 1,000 Average Population											
1960	+0.5	+0.7	+6.1	-3.7	-4.7	+3.1	-14.8	-1.9	+1.7	-1.1	-25.3	+2.1
1961	-0.5	+0.6	+6.5	-2.8	-2.4	+3.9	-7.0	-2.8	+7.6	+0.5	-2.4	+2.8
1962	+1.6	+0.8	+3.3	-5.7	-1.9	+18.3	-3.5	-1.6	+8.7	+1.4	-6.1	+1.3
1963	+3.2	+0.1	+2.4	-6.6	-2.0	+4.5	-4.9	-1.6	+5.0	+0.7	-6.5	+0.3
1964	+4.8	+0.3	+3.5	-5.6	-3.0	+3.8	-6.6	-1.6	+9.5	+1.1	-10.3	-0.8
1965	+2.8	+0.1	+4.2	-4.7	-2.2	+2.3	-7.5	-1.7	+5.3	+1.5	-14.1	-0.8
1966	+1.7	+0.4	+0.6	-0.6	-1.8	+2.5	-4.5	-2.0	+1.9	+1.6	-14.6	-0.6
1967	+1.4	+0.3	-4.6	-3.3	-1.9	+1.9	-5.7	-1.8	-1.2	-0.9	-10.0	-1.1
1968	+0.2	-0.7	+3.0	-4.4	-1.2	+2.0	-5.1	-2.0	+2.0	+0.5	-10.0	-0.7
1969	+0.2	+1.4	+7.9	-7.6	-0.5	+3.0	-2.6	-2.3	+5.0	+1.6	-14.7	-0.9
1970	+0.4	+2.4	+9.2	-5.3	-0.8	+3.5	-1.2	-2.2	+3.1	+2.6	n.a.	-0.3
1971	+2.4	+0.7	+7.4	-1.8	+0.6	+2.8	+2.0	-3.1	+14.9	+2.5	-14.1	-0.4
1972	+1.3	+1.1	+5.4	-0.1	-2.0	+2.0	+4.6	+0.2	+9.4	+1.4	-8.4	-0.2
1973	+1.8	+2.4	+6.3	-4.8	-1.9	+2.0	+5.2	+0.2	+13.9	+1.6	-9.7	-0.7
1974	+2.4	-1.3	-0.1	-2.1	-0.7	+0.6	+5.9	+0.2	+14.2	+2.4	+19.9	-1.2
1975	+2.4	-1.7	-3.2	+6.5	+0.4	+0.3	+5.4	+0.2	+9.7	+5.3	+38.2	-0.8
1976	+0.7	+0.7	-1.2	+6.1	+1.5	+1.1	+3.7	+0.2	+2.9	+1.6	+1.1	-0.2
1977	+0.4	+1.1	+0.5	+6.7	+1.9	+0.8	+2.2	+0.1	+2.3	+1.6	+2.1	-0.4
1978	-0.4	+1.0	+1.9	+7.0	+1.1	+0.3	+4.1	+0.1	+1.7	+2.0	+3.2	+0.1
1979	+0.1	+1.1	+4.0	+4.3	-0.9	+0.7	-0.2	—	+3.2	+3.2	+3.8	+0.3
1980	-0.3	+0.1	+5.1	+5.2	+3.0	+0.8	-0.2	-0.1	+3.7	+3.7	+4.3	-0.7
1981	-0.8	-0.4	+2.5	+0.7	—	+1.1	+0.3	-0.5	+1.1	+1.2	+1.7	-1.5
1982	-0.5	—	-1.2	+0.8	-0.6	+0.7	-3.2	+2.0	-0.9	+0.2	+1.8	-1.0
1983	-0.8	+0.3	-1.9	+0.9	-0.1	+0.3	-2.7	+2.4	+0.1	+0.4	+3.3	+0.3
1984	0.0	+0.8	-2.5	+1.0	-0.2	+0.3	-5.0	+1.6	+1.3	+0.6	+3.3	+0.9
1985	0.0	+1.9	+1.4	+0.6	+0.5	—	-7.3	+1.4	+2.3	+1.7	+2.3	+1.3
1986	0.0	+2.1	+3.2	+0.8	+0.9	—	-7.3	+1.2	+5.4	+2.2	+1.3	+0.5

Source: EUROSTAT (1988). Demographic Statistics.

Table 2.8: Population and Migration Estimates for the Regions of the United Kingdom

Region	Population	Annual Av. Net Migration (000)			Annual Av. Net Migration (Rate per (000)		
	1986 (000)	1961/71	1971/81	1981/86	1961/71	1971/81	1981/86
England	47,255	+8	-23	+28	+0.2	-0.5	+0.6
Wales	2,821	-	+5	-	+1.8		
Scotland	5,121	-33	-15	-14	-6.3	-2.9	-2.7
N.Ireland	1,567	-7	-11	-5	-4.7	-7.2	-3.2
U.K.	56,763	-32	-44	+9	-0.6	-0.8	+0.2
Ireland	3,541	-13	+10	-14	-4.6	+3.2	-4.1

Sources: Central Statistics Office, London:
(1) Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1988 Edition.
(2) Regional Trends (various issues).
(3) Abstract of Regional Statistics, No. 7 , 1971.

figures for sub-periods from 1961 to 1986 for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The figures for Northern Ireland are similar to those for the Republic (apart from the 1971/81 period). This is not altogether unexpected since, historically, the pattern of emigration from Northern Ireland has, broadly speaking, been similar to that of the Republic.

In the case of Scotland, which in many respects – both economic and social – resembles Ireland, the figures are of interest in that they indicate a sustained net outflow of population over the period under discussion. During the 1960s, the population losses through emigration (which presumably related to flows to England) were relatively severe, the annual average rate per 1,000 population being in excess of 6 (33,000 per year when measured in absolute terms) – significantly greater than the rate for Ireland (Republic) for the same period which was 4.6. The net outflow from Scotland was somewhat lower in the 1970s and in the early 1980s, but during these later periods the natural increase also declined with the result that the total population of Scotland fell slightly over this time span. The Scottish experience is all the more notable since employment prospects in some sectors of the Scottish economy were quite buoyant during this period (e.g., in oil-related industries, electronics). However, these gains were clearly offset by the declines which took place in older traditional industries (e.g., shipbuilding).

It is possible to identify regions in other European countries which have suffered very heavy losses through emigration at certain periods in the past. Even though the figures previously quoted for the net outward flows from Italy at national level were not unduly large when compared with the total population, when corresponding measures are applied to individual regions in the South of the country, some of the recorded net outflows are quite enormous, extending to 14 or 15 per 1,000 population (annually) for some of these regions in the 1960s.

8. SUMMARY

The conclusions to be drawn from this review are:

1. Ireland has a long tradition of net outward population movement.

2. The rate of emigration has varied enormously over the years depending clearly on the balance between economic conditions at home and those abroad.

3. Emigration has had a major impact on the regional distribution of the population of Ireland and, to a lesser extent, on its age structure.

4. Ireland's rate of net emigration during the post-war period has been exceptionally high by European standards. There are regions, however, such as Scotland and the South of Italy which at times have experienced even higher rates of emigration.

Chapter 3

CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANTS

The preceding chapter has dealt mainly with assessing external migration in aggregate terms. In this chapter we begin to probe more deeply into the nature of the problem by attempting to shed some light on the characteristics of the emigrants themselves. Four distinct aspects are covered – sex, age, geographical origin within the country and the question of occupation/skills, etc. In discussing external migration in its more general context, it is also appropriate to consider the question of inward migration; the final part of this chapter is therefore concerned with analysing this aspect.

1. SEX OF EMIGRANTS

Even though the evidence indicates that roughly equal numbers of men and women have emigrated from Ireland when the position is viewed over a prolonged period, the balance between males and females has varied significantly for particular sub-periods. The intercensal net migration figures given in Table 3.1 indicate little difference between the sexes from the period from 1870 to the end of the nineteenth century. However, thereafter, depending on the period in question, the figures tend to indicate a predominance of one sex or the other in the net migration flows. In some instances the reasons are readily apparent, such as the excess of males in the 1936/46 period which reflects wartime conditions in addition to other influences. The female/male ratio for this period (i.e. the number of females per 1,000 males in the net migration totals) is relatively low (662) primarily because of the large outflows of males who left to avail of the opportunities presented by the British war effort. However, after the cessation of hostilities in 1945 the female outflows significantly outpaced male emigration, the ratio for 1946/51 rising to over 1,300. The position changed again in the 1950s when males formed the majority among the large outflows which occurred at that time, but the situation reversed itself yet again in the 1960s when the female net outward flows exceeded those for males. One must view the figures for the 1970s in a somewhat different light as this was a period of net inflow; it will be noted that the male aggregates were greater during this period. Since 1980, when net emigration re-emerged, the outflow has been predominantly male, the ratio of females per 1,000 males being 736.

It is of interest to attempt to rationalise the apparent fluctuations in the male/female ratio of emigration flows in the post-war period. The preponderance of females in the net outflow figures in the immediate post-war years was probably due to a "delayed action" phenomenon as many of the women involved probably would have

Table 3.1
Net Migration by Sex 1871-1986

Intercensal Period	Males	Females	Persons	No. of females per 1,000 males
	Annual Average ('000)			
1871-81	-24,958	-25,314	-50,172	1,010
1881-91	-29,257	-30,476	-59,733	1,042
1891-1901	-20,315	-19,327	39,642	951
1901-11	-11,764	-14,390	-26,154	1,223
1911-26	-13,934	-13,068	27,002	938
1926-36	-7,255	-9,420	-16,675	1,298
1936-46	-11,258	-7,453	-18,711	662
1946-51	-10,309	-14,075	-24,384	1,365
1951-61	-21,786	-19,091	-40,877	876
1961-71	-6,236	-7,215	-13,451	1,157
1971-81	+5,806	+4,583	+10,389	789
1981-86	-8,283	-6,094	-14,377	736

Sources: (1) Commission on Emigration. Reports (1954)
(2) Censuses of Population.

left in the preceding years but may have held back because of the wartime conditions. There may also have been a tendency for wives, or intending wives, to join their menfolk who had settled in the United Kingdom following the large male migration from Ireland during the first half of the 1940s. It is understandable that males would have formed a majority among those who left the country during the 1950s as the drastic reductions in employment which occurred at that time applied predominantly to males (See Table 3.2). Over the ten years from 1951 to 1961 the number of males at work in the economy fell by nearly 135,000 compared with a fall of some 37,000 in the case of females (even though, proportionately, the latter decrease was quite significant). With the improvement in economic conditions in the 1960s the employment situation for both males and females stabilised. The figures in Table 3.2 show that aggregate employment for both males and females stood at virtually the same level at the end of that decade as it did at the beginning. However, a more detailed investigation of these data (not given here) suggests that females did not benefit to the same extent as males did as a result of the improved conditions. Between 1961 and 1971 females in employment outside of farming rose by 17,000 (some 7%) compared with 93,000 (21%) for males. This was, of course, a period when significant restrictions and barriers still applied to women entering or seeking to remain in the work-force and it is likely that this was one of the factors which prompted many women to emigrate, thus affecting the male/female balance of the net external outflows.

During the 1970s, which was a period of net inward migration, the predominance of males was principally due to a return flow of older former emigrants (in many cases

Table 3.2
Total Persons at Work 1946-87, Classified by Sex

Year	Males	Females	Total
	'000		
1946	906.3	321.5	1,227.7
1951	905.1	314.6	1,219.7
1961	770.5	278.0	1.048.5
1971	773.9	275.5	1,049.4
1981	809.2	336.7	1,145.9
1988	740.7	350.5	1,191.2

Sources: (1) Censuses of Population 1946, 1951, 1961.
(2) The Trend of Employment and Unemployment 1979-85.
(3) Labour Force Survey 1988.

with families). These were mainly skilled persons, many with occupations associated with the Building industry. This return flow was remarkable in that, in the case of males in particular, it included sizeable numbers in their forties or even older (see next section).

Since 1981, the brunt of the difficulties in the Irish labour market appears to have been borne by the male work-force. Over the period from 1981 to 1988, the total number of males at work has declined by nearly 70,000 while on the other hand, the number of women in employment has actually increased by some 14,000. In these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the recent emigrant flows have been predominantly male, the number of females per 1,000 males in the aggregate net outflow total being 736, the lowest such figure on record apart from the exceptional period covering the Second World War. The fact that the number of females at work rose during this period derives not only from the elimination of restrictions relating to the employment of women, but also from changes in the nature of labour demand, in particular the increase in service-type activities. It should be noted, however, that female unemployment also rose during the period in question (1981-88), as the degree of female participation in the labour force also increased.

It should be borne in mind, however, that the level and structure of employment may be influenced by emigration (i.e. there can be a two-way interaction). While poor economic circumstances here undoubtedly exert a "push", more attractive conditions in the UK and other external labour markets may not only induce workers to leave in a direct sense but may also have an influence through the wage effect as the resulting emigrant outflow causes a contraction in domestic supply. This in turn can contribute to sustaining wages at a level which would not otherwise prevail, thus tending to depress the level of demand for labour.

2. AGE OF EMIGRANTS

(i) Gross Outflows

The available information indicates that Irish emigrants have always been predominantly young, with a particularly high concentration in the 15 to 24 year age group. The analyses contained in the 1954 Report of the Commission on Emigration, in referring to the age distribution of gross emigration flows between 1852 and 1921, indicate that some 40 to 50 per cent of those who emigrated during this period were in this category (see Appendix Table A3.1). In the earlier part of this period (i.e. in the immediate post-famine phase) the emigrant outflows involved sizeable numbers of children (i.e. aged less than 15 years) indicating a greater propensity for whole families to leave the country.

Appendix Table A3.2 shows an age distribution of gross overseas[1] emigration covering the period from 1924 to 1939. When viewed in broad terms, the age pattern is similar to that evident for earlier periods. In excess of 50 per cent were aged between 15 and 24 years, and between 10 and 15 per cent were aged less than 15 years.

As indicated earlier, overseas migration all but ceased at the commencement of the Second World War. However, the system of war-time travel/employment permits provide a basis for analysing the age profile of the migrant outflows to Great Britain in the 1940s. Table 3.3 provides information on the age distribution of these flows for each year from 1943 to 1951. Since the permits in question were issued only to those aged 16 years or over, the overall age pattern derived from this source is somewhat different from those referred to previously.

While the "youth" category (in this instance those aged 16-24 years) again accounts for a sizeable proportion of the flows, the figures for males, in particular, also indicate sizeable outflows of older workers, particularly during the war years. In 1943, for example, some 45 per cent of the males who migrated to Great Britain were aged 30 years or over. With the ending of war conditions, however, the youth proportion increased noticeably. In 1951, the last year for which these figures are available, the proportion of the male outflow relating to the 16-24 year age class had risen to over 55 per cent.

The female outflows during the war years were much smaller than those for males, but involved much higher proportions in the younger age groups, since relatively few older females migrated. As in the case of males, this concentration in the youth category became even more evident in the post-war years. In 1951, for example, nearly 75 per cent of females who obtained work/travel permits were aged less than 25 years, and for the entire nine-year period under discussion, the corresponding percentage was nearly 70 per cent.

1. That is, to centres other than Great Britain and Europe (including the Mediterranean basin).

Table 3.3

Age Distribution of Recipients of Travel Permits, etc., 1943-51

Year	Percentage issued to persons in age-groups					All Ages
	16-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35 years and over	
			%			
Males:						
1943 ...	6.9	26.4	20.9	14.5	31.3	100.0
1944 ...	12.3	28.8	18.1	13.1	27.7	100.0
1945 ...	12.8	33.8	17.9	12.5	23.0	100.0
1946 ...	10.7	34.9	22.3	13.5	18.6	100.0
1947 ...	12.1	35.3	21.6	12.5	17.6	100.0
1948 ...	12.7	35.6	21.6	12.5	17.6	100.0
1949 ...	16.8	40.0	19.0	8.8	15.4	100.0
1950 ...	20.0	39.0	18.1	8.0	14.9	100.0
1951 ...	20.1	35.5	14.1	8.2	22.1	100.0
	12.6	33.4	19.9	12.1	22.0	100.0
Females:						
1943 ...	20.3	39.3	18.5	9.1	12.8	100.0
1944 ...	22.3	38.8	18.1	8.9	12.0	100.0
1945 ...	29.2	40.7	14.7	6.9	8.5	100.0
1946 ...	31.7	41.5	13.9	6.1	6.8	100.0
1947 ...	33.3	38.5	15.0	6.2	7.3	100.0
1948 ...	30.1	35.5	15.6	7.8	11.0	100.0
1949 ...	36.0	36.9	12.5	5.1	9.5	100.0
1950 ...	40.6	33.6	12.0	4.5	9.3	100.0
1951 ...	41.8	33.1	11.2	5.5	8.4	100.0
Period 1943 to 1951	31.1	37.9	14.8	6.8	9.4	100.0

Source: Commission Emigration and other Population Problem Reports (1954).

No further direct information on the gross migratory outflow from Ireland became available until the Labour Force Surveys for recent years. This information (as explained previously) relates to recently departed emigrants, and was obtained from household members included in the Survey. It thus involves an understatement in respect of entire families who would have migrated (see Garvey and Maguire, 1989). This omission clearly affects the age distribution of the estimated migrant outflow, as those aged less than 15 years would virtually all migrate as part of a family. However, this deficiency is not considered to be large enough to create a serious imbalance in the estimated age pattern. The figures, given in Table 3.4, show

Table 3.4

Estimated Gross Migration Outflow from Ireland to Year Ending April 1988, Classified by Sex and Age

Age	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total
		'000			%	
0-14	0.5	0.5	1.0	1.5	2.2	1.8
15-24	22.0	16.8	38.8	65.3	74.0	68.8
25-44	10.3	5.0	15.3	30.6	22.0	27.1
45-54	0.9	0.3	1.2	2.6	1.3	2.1
65 and over	-	0.1	0.1	-	0.4	0.2
Total	33.7	22.6	56.4	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Labour Force Survey 1988 (special tabulation).

that of the estimated 56,500 migrants who left the State in the year ended April 1988, nearly 39,000 or almost 70 per cent, were aged between 15 and 24 years, with a further 15,000, or 27 per cent aged between 25 and 44 years.[2] It will be noted that a relatively higher proportion of female migrants (some 74 per cent) were in the 15 to 24 year age category, as against 65 per cent for males. Broadly speaking, these figures indicate a similar age profile to those evident for earlier periods.

(ii) Net Flows

It is possible to present rather more comprehensive data on net external flows in terms of age for recent intercensal periods. Table 3.5 shows such information for intercensal periods between 1946 and 1986. It should be noted that these figures are obtained by taking the number of persons in an age category at one Census, applying survivorship factors in order to deduce the numbers surviving in that age cohort on the occasion of the next Census[3] and then comparing the results with the independent populations stock figures from the latter census in the appropriate age group. The difference between these two numbers determines whether there has been a net inflow or outflow.

The data given in Table 3.5 confirm the extent to which emigration affects the youth age categories. The figures also indicate, however, that in times of severe recession, net emigration extends to the immediately older age groups. This is evident in the figures for the 1951/61 period which involved large net outflows of roughly equal

2. The estimates do not allow a subdivision of this broad age category, but it is likely that most of the emigrants in this class were aged between 25 and 34 years.
3. For the 1981/86 period, this was done by using the actual number of deaths in the period classified by age, instead of the application of survivorship factors.

magnitudes for both the 15-24 and 25-34 year age classes.[4] This feature also applied (even if to a lesser extent) to other periods and, rather surprisingly, to the 1981/86 period which involved a fairly sizeable net outflow (of nearly 20,000) for the 25-34 year age band. This is in contrast to the position for the 1971/81 period when the net flows for this age category were of negligible proportions. A further aspect of interest is the fact that the sizeable net inflow which occurred in 1971/81 for the 35-44 year age band (almost 40,000) all but disappeared in the first half of the 1980s

Table 3.5

Net Migration classified by Age for intercensal periods between 1946 and 1986

Sex, Age (at end of period)	1946/51	1951/61	1961/71	1971/81	1981/86
			000		
Males					
0-14	-2.1	-11.1	+11.4	+24.4	-3.3
15-24	-27.9	-73.5	-46.8	-4.9	-26.7
25-34	-23.3	-80.6	-34.4	-1.3	-12.1
35-44	-1.4	-25.2	+7.0	+22.7	-1.5
45-64	+0.6	-27.6	-3.8	+8.0	-1.6
65+	+5.8	+7.2	+4.8	+9.0	+3.9
Total	-48.3	-210.8	-61.9	+57.9	-41.4
Females					
0-14	-2.3	-11.8	+11.7	+23.0	-3.0
15-24	-38.4	-73.4	-44.0	-5.3	-21.8
25-34	-20.3	-59.4	-30.3	+0.2	-7.0
35-44	-6.7	-19.3	+1.1	+16.9	-0.1
45-64	-4.3	-26.7	-12.0	+1.8	-1.3
65+	+3.8	+4.3	+2.5	+9.2	+2.6
Total	-68.3	-186.4	-70.9	+45.8	-30.5
Persons					
0-14	-4.4	-22.9	+23.1	+47.4	-6.3
15-24	-66.3	-146.9	-90.8	-10.2	-48.5
25-34	-43.6	-140.0	-64.7	-1.1	-19.1
35-44	-8.1	-44.5	+8.1	+39.6	-1.6
45-64	-3.7	-54.3	-15.8	9.8	-2.9
65+	+9.6	+11.5	+7.3	18.2	+6.5
Total	-116.6	-397.1	-132.8	+103.7	-71.9

Sources: Census of Population 1966, Vol. II, Ages and Conjugal Condition.
Census of Population 1981, Vol. II, Ages and Marital Status.

4. It is inevitable, because of the manner in which the age classification is applied, that there should be considerable numbers in the "post youth" 25 to 34 year age class. Many of those involved would have been less than 25 years at the time of actual emigration. Nevertheless, comparisons between the periods involved illustrate the point at issue.

Table 3.6

Persons at each Census per 100 of those ten years younger at previous Census for selected intercensal periods 1841 to 1986.

Period	Males					Females				
	Age at beginning of period					Age at beginning of period				
	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34
From 1841 to 1851	59	46	50	49	67	65	47	54	50	71
From 1851 to 1861	65	49	53	57	80	68	48	52	58	82
From 1861 to 1871	70	52	55	59	82	80	56	58	61	85
From 1871 to 1881	73	61	65	66	85	77	62	67	66	87
From 1881 to 1891	71	54	56	67	84	68	55	57	68	86
From 1891 to 1901	77	61	62	75	86	79	64	65	72	87
From 1901 to 1911	82	67	68	83	87	78	68	66	76	82
From 1926 to 1936	89	78	76	91	91	83	74	77	88	87
From 1936 to 1946	82	75	77	86	90	81	80	84	91	91
From 1951 to 1961	61	58	71	84	88	61	63	80	86	90
From 1961 to 1971	74	73	96	104	102	75	75	96	100	98
From 1971 to 1981	92	91	108	113	111	93	93	108	111	108
From 1976 to 1986	87	85	97	107	99	90	87	100	108	99

Sources: Commission on Emigration Reports (1954);
Census of Population 1981, Vol. II, Ages and Marital Status;
Census 86, Summary Population Report;
Report on Vital Statistics, 1981.

when labour market conditions in Ireland deteriorated (particularly when compared with those in Great Britain and the United States).

An approach based on survivorship ratios allows one to compare the results of successive censuses in order to determine the rate of attrition due to emigration for specific age groups. Table 3.6 shows the numbers of persons in certain age classes per hundred of those recorded for the same cohort at a census taken a decade earlier. The periods covered (all of which are of 10 years duration) extend back to 1841, the relevant data for the earlier periods being taken from the 1954 Report of the Commission on Emigration.

Looking first at the post-war period, the figures for the ten year span from 1951 to 1961 show that up to 40 per cent of those who were aged 10 to 19 years at the beginning of that decade had left the country by 1961. This rate of attrition is on a par with that which occurred for these age groups in the period immediately subsequent to the Famine of 1847 even though the post-Famine exodus applied equally heavily to the older age groups. The position improved somewhat over the intercensal period from 1961 to 1971 when the population loss for the 10 to 19 year age category was about 25 per cent, and it fell to less than 10 per cent in the 1970s.

In this last mentioned period, the indices for the older age groups of the age spans covered exceed 100, indicating the substantial net inflows of population which occurred for these age categories during this time.

The final row of the table covers the 10 year period of 1976 to 1986. The overlap with the preceding period shown (1971/81) is necessary as it is essential to have a 10 year period in order to achieve comparability vis-a-vis past periods. These figures suggest a rise in the attrition rates for the 10 to 19 year age class over this time span. The relevant population loss is about 12 per cent (compared with 7/8 per cent over 1971/81) this is likely to show a further increase when figures are available for the full 1981/91 intercensal period in view of the evidence of increased emigration in recent years.

3. THE GEOGRAPHICAL ORIGIN OF EMIGRANTS

(i) Gross Outward Movements

When emigration commenced on a substantial scale during the middle of the last century, the geographical pattern of migrant flows was broadly compatible with the population distribution which prevailed at that time. This is evident from the provincial and county data on gross outflows over the period from 1851-1900 as given in Appendix Table A3.3 when these are compared with corresponding population figures for the same time span given earlier in Table 1.6 in Chapter 1. A feature (already mentioned in Chapter 2) which stands out during this period is the relatively heavy migrant outflow from Munster. As time progressed, however, the geographical pattern of the emigrant flows changed. By the early part of the twentieth century, the incidence of emigration from Munster had decreased somewhat, but the counties of Connacht were now losing a disproportionate share of their population through emigration. In the 1911-21 period, for example, Connacht accounted for nearly one-third of the gross emigrant outflows even though it comprised less than 20 per cent of the national population.

The next period for which comprehensive information on the regional origin of external migrants is available covers the years from 1940-1951, during which time the work-travel permit system operated in respect of movements to Great Britain. Appendix Table A3.4 gives the relevant data. The figures (gross outflows) are given for provinces and counties. They portray a somewhat similar picture to that described for the later stages of the period just discussed. Connacht is again shown to suffer disproportionately from emigration, with an annual average rate of nearly 18 external migrants per 1,000 population, which is well above the national average of just over 11. The position is even more extreme for some individual Western counties such as Mayo with a rate of 28, more than twice the national average, and for Donegal and Kerry with rates of 16.

Table 3.7

Gross Migratory External Outflow in the Year to April 1988, classified by Planning Region

Region	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total
	'000			Rate per 1000 population		
Dublin	10.0	7.5	17.4	20.5	14.3	17.2
Rest of East	3.2	1.7	4.8	19.7	10.7	14.9
South West	4.8	3.0	7.8	17.8	11.2	14.5
South East	3.4	2.3	5.7	17.4	12.1	14.8
North East	1.4	1.0	2.4	13.9	10.2	12.1
Mid West	3.1	2.0	5.1	19.5	12.9	16.3
Midlands	2.6	2.0	4.5	19.3	15.7	17.2
West	3.3	1.9	5.1	22.2	13.2	17.4
NW, Donegal	2.0	1.3	3.3	18.6	12.5	15.6
State	33.7	22.6	56.4	19.1	12.8	15.9

Source: Labour Force Survey 1988 (special tabulation).

The figures for males reveal some interesting features. Rather surprisingly, relative to other Leinster counties Dublin is shown to have experienced a significant male outflow, the rate per thousand population being as high as 13 compared with the Leinster average of just over 10. However, for females, the Dublin rate is lower than the provincial average. This may well relate to the fact that Dublin is unique in that it is the only really large urban centre with a sizeable reservoir of unskilled and semi-skilled labour for which the social and cultural environment is similar to that which exists in the industrial centres of the United Kingdom. This would increase the propensity to migrate, as would the proximity of Dublin to these centres, and the relative ease of travel. The fall in male employment, and rise in the male unemployment rate in Dublin during the 1980s should also be recalled when trying to explain the high emigration rate.

The gross male emigration rate for County Mayo for the period in question, which stood at almost 35, was the highest among all counties (nearly three times the national average) the next highest male rates being for Donegal (21) and Kerry (nearly 17).

As already indicated there is no means of assembling a picture of the characteristics or background of emigrants for the period from the early 1950s to the mid-1980s. The new information on gross outflows obtained in recent Labour Force Surveys provides the next opportunity to assess the position (see Garvey and Maguire, 1989). Table 3.7 shows estimated gross outward movements by Planning Region for the year to April 1988 from this source.

The estimates show that in the period in question, outward movement from the greater Dublin area (over 17,000) accounted for over 30 per cent of the gross outflow of 56,000 from the State as a whole. When the position is viewed in terms of migration rates per 1,000 population, the figures show that the highest relative outflows were from the Dublin, Midlands and West regions where in each case the estimated gross outflow rates exceeded 17, compared with a national average of just under 16. The lowest ratio is indicated for the North-East region – just over 12. These figures indicate much less regional variation in the relative incidence of emigration when compared with earlier periods. In other words, apart from what might be termed modest variations, the current emigrant outflows appear to be broadly representative of all areas of the country.

The figures for males suggest somewhat higher than average outflows from the Dublin and West regions, while for females the highest proportionate outflow was from the Midlands region.

(ii) Net Migration by Counties in Recent Intercensal Periods

Even though net migration figures for intercensal periods for different counties (which are readily available from Census of Population Reports) are useful, it must be remembered that the figures relate to all net flows pertaining to each county, including flows with other areas within the State. However, it is possible to compile estimates which purport to isolate, for each county, the external component of the overall net flow aggregates. This can be done (as illustrated in Hughes and Walsh, 1980) by utilising the information on internal migratory movements obtained at each Census of Population. These figures, however, relate only to the twelve month period preceding each Census date and the estimation process involves the assumption that the averages derived from the internal migration figures for each end of the intercensal period can be used to estimate net internal flows by county for the entire period. The internal migration estimates obtained in this manner are then deducted from the overall intercensal net migratory balances for individual counties to yield net external flows.

The process is perhaps best understood by referring to actual data. The relevant estimates for 1971/81 and 1981/86 are given in Tables 3.8 and 3.9 respectively. The overall net migration figures for each county have been obtained from the 1981 and 1986 Census results. The internal flows by county for the first intercensal period are based on annual flows for 1970/71 and 1980/81, while those for the second are based on flows for 1980/81 and 1985/86. As indicated, the net external flows for the two intercensal periods for each county are then obtained as residuals. While one must obviously interpret these figures with some caution because of the assumptions made, it is relevant to point out that the annual pattern of internal net movement between counties for 1970/71, 1980/81 and 1985/86 exhibits a remarkable similarity (see Appendix Table A3.5). This is all the more notable since the three periods in question reflect significantly different economic conditions. This suggests that the form of interpolation used gives an acceptable representation of inter-county net flows for the periods concerned and that, as a result, the residual net external flows by county are reasonably valid.

The actual results indicate some remarkable differences between counties, both in regard to internal and external migration. For Dublin, even though the overall position for 1971/81 involved a net inflow of some 23,000, this derived from a much larger net inward movement from other counties (31,500) which was partially offset by an external net outflow of nearly 9,000. It will be noted that Dublin is the only county for which there was a negative net external balance during the 1970s. These figures are in contrast to those for most other counties which involve sizeable net internal outflows during the 1970s (Dublin being the main beneficiary). However, these internal population losses were counterbalanced by even greater net inflows from abroad. The counties of Kildare, Meath and Wicklow form a notable exception to this pattern, as they involved both internal and external inflows during this period. The internal inflows associated with those counties (which were quite sizeable) reflect the changing pattern of resettlement which has emerged in the greater Dublin area, according to the fringes of the urban sprawl associated with the metropolis expand outwards.

The counties which were associated with the largest net inward migratory flows from abroad during 1971/81 were Kildare, Donegal, Longford and Meath. In the case of Kildare and Meath the heavy external inflows were probably associated with the extent of building activity (particularly housing) in these areas during the 1970s which would have attracted former migrants with related skills. The relatively large inflow into county Donegal could have been influenced by population movements from Northern Ireland.

The 1981/86 intercensal period (see Table 3.9) was a time of substantial net emigration and this aspect emerges as a much more dominant influence for virtually all counties. For Dublin county the net external outflow over this five-year period was 52,000, offset by a net inflow of some 15,000 from other areas within the State, yielding an overall net population loss due to migration of nearly 37,000. For most of the other counties, both the net internal and external flows are negative thus giving rise to significant overall net outward movements. There are exceptions however; as in the preceding 1971/81 period, the counties adjacent to Dublin (Kildare, Meath and Wicklow) again involved net internal inflows. A surprising feature is the fact that the external component of net migration for some Western counties such as Mayo, Roscommon, Leitrim and Donegal is positive (i.e., indicates net inflows); in each case, therefore, the substantial population losses indicated for these counties derive primarily from movements to areas elsewhere in the State. It is important to note that several counties would have experienced population declines due to the magnitude of internal migration flows alone. The tendency to equate rural depopulation with emigration is thus not valid in all circumstances.

The data in these tables, broadly speaking, suggest a migratory pattern involving three distinct elements. In the first place the purely internal flows are quite

Table 3.8

Estimates of External and Internal Net Migration for 1971/81 by County

County	Overall Net Migration 1971/81	Estimated Net Internal Migration 1971/81	Estimated Net External Migration 1971/81	Annual Average Rates per 1,000 Population		
				Overall Net Migration	Estimated Net Internal Migration	Estimated Net External Migration
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Carlow	+488	-1,780	+2,268	+1.3	-4.8	+6.1
Dublin	+22,611	+31,485	-8,874	+2.4	+3.4	-1.0
Kildare	+15,255	+6,120	+9,135	+17.3	+6.9	+10.4
Kilkenny	+3,117	-1,095	+4,212	+4.7	-1.7	+6.4
Laois	+1,324	-820	+2,144	+2.7	-1.7	+4.4
Longford	+613	-1,925	+2,538	+2.1	-6.4	+8.5
Louth	+1,707	-1,180	+2,887	+2.1	-1.4	+3.5
Meath	+11,927	+5,260	+6,667	+14.3	+6.3	+8.0
Offaly	-297	-2,905	+2,608	-0.5	-5.2	+4.7
Westmeath	+1,486	-1,880	+3,366	+2.6	-3.2	+5.8
Wexford	+1,264	-4,755	+6,019	+1.4	-5.1	+6.5
Wicklow	+9,674	+3,865	+5,809	+12.6	+5.0	+7.6
Clare	+5,627	+1,515	+4,112	+6.9	+1.8	+5.1
Cork	+10,076	-895	+10,971	+2.7	-0.2	+2.9
Kerry	+2,020	-3,965	+5,985	+1.7	-3.4	+5.1
Limerick	+2,134	-1,165	+3,299	+1.4	-0.7	+2.2
Tipp. North	-1,191	-2,225	+1,034	-2.1	-3.9	+1.8
Tipp. South	+316	-3,300	+3,616	+0.4	-4.6	+5.0
Waterford	+2,179	+650	+1,529	+2.6	+0.8	+1.8
Galway	+6,260	-385	+6,645	+3.9	-0.2	+4.1
Leitrim	-843	-1,805	+962	-3.0	-6.4	+3.4
Mayo	-426	-7,575	+7,149	-0.4	-6.8	+6.4
Roscommon	+213	-2,370	+2,583	+0.4	-4.4	+4.8
Sligo	+2,164	-1,060	+3,224	+4.1	-2.0	+6.1
Cavan	-2,097	-3,430	+1,333	-3.9	-6.5	+2.6
Donegal	+7,338	-3,165	+10,503	+6.3	-2.7	+9.0
Monaghan	+950	-1,225	+2,175	+2.0	-2.6	+4.6
STATE	+103,889	—	103,899	+3.2	—	+3.2

Source: Censuses of Population 1971, 1981.

substantial, with a noticeable tendency involving a net movement towards Dublin from most other counties (except for those adjacent to Dublin which, it would appear, draw in population from the capital as a result of the continued urban sprawl). A notable feature of these internal movements is that, with few exceptions, they appear to have remained largely constant across counties over the last twenty

Table 3.9

Estimates of External and Internal Net Migration for 1981/86 by County

County	Overall Net Migration 1981/86	Estimated Net Internal Migration 1981/86	Estimated Net External Migration 1981/86	Annual Average Rates per 1,000 Population: Overall Net Migration	Estimated Net Internal Migration	Estimated Net External Migration
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Carlow	-1,384	-720	-664	-6.9	-3.7	-3.2
Dublin Co.	-36,583	+15,425	-52,008	-7.2	+3.1	-10.3
Kildare	+2,761	+3,708	-947	+5.0	+6.6	-1.6
Kilkenny	-929	-150	-779	-2.6	-0.4	-3.0
Laois	-486	-205	-281	-1.9	-0.5	-1.4
Longford	-814	-933	+119	-5.2	-6.0	+0.8
Louth	-1,524	-1,240	-284	-3.4	-2.7	-0.7
Meath	+1,678	+2,218	-540	+3.4	+4.5	-1.1
Offaly	-1,437	-1,685	+248	-4.9	-5.7	+0.8
Westmeath	-1,744	-573	-1,171	-5.6	-1.9	-3.7
Wexford	-1,573	-2,583	+1,010	-3.1	-5.1	+2.0
Wicklow	+1,374	+1,010	+364	+3.0	+2.2	+0.8
Clare	+30	+473	-443	+0.1	+1.1	-1.0
Cork City & Co	-7,480	-1,585	-5,895	-3.7	-0.8	-2.9
Kerry	-2,327	-2,243	-84	-3.8	-3.7	-0.1
Limerick	-4,839	+1,228	-6,067	-5.9	+1.5	-7.4
Tipp. North	-1,994	-1,738	-256	-6.7	-5.9	-0.8
Tipp. South	-2,273	-883	-1,390	-5.9	-2.3	-3.6
Waterford	-1,528	-355	-1,173	-3.4	-0.8	-2.6
Galway	-1,451	+ 2,248	-3,699	-1.7	+1.8	-3.5
Leitrim	-857	- 1,050	+193	-6.3	-7.8	+1.5
Mayo	-2,981	-4,325	+1,344	-5.2	-7.9	+2.7
Roscommon	-755	-1,280	+525	-2.8	-4.7	+1.9
Sligo	-1,157	-285	-872	-4.1	-1.0	-3.1
Cavan	-1,890	-2,158	+268	-7.0	-8.0	+1.0
Donegal	-763	-1,615	+852	-1.2	-2.6	+1.4
Monaghan	-957	-708	-249	-3.7	-2.8	-0.9
STATE	-71,883	—	-71,883	-4.1	—	-4.1

Source: Censuses of Population, 1981, 1986.

Table 3.10

Ordinary Least Squares Estimation of the Relationship Between Net External Migration in 1981/86 and Internal Migration in 1981/86 and Net External Migration in 1971/81

Dependent variable is NEM81/86
27 observations used for estimation from 1 to 27

Regressor	Coefficient	Standard Error	T-Ratio
INTERCEPT	-4.2838	1.0367	-4.1322
DUBLIN	-4.3662	2.2836	-1.9119
NEM71/81	0.4804	0.1719	2.7948
NIM81/86	-0.3773	0.0978	-3.8593

R^2	0.6470	F-Statistic F(3, 23)	14.0530
$\bar{R}^2$	0.6010	S.E. of Regression	1.8417
Residual Sum of Squares	78.0085	Mean of Dependent Variable	-1.4074
S.D. of Dependent Variable	2.9155	Maximum of Log-Likelihood	-52.6346
DW-statistic	2.3635		

NEM 81/86 = Net external migration 1981/86.
NEM 71/81 = Net external migration 1971/81.
NIM 81/86 = Net internal migration 1981/86.

years,[5] despite varying economic conditions. This finding is consistent with those of Hughes and Walsh (1980) who illustrated that the pattern of internal movements in Ireland did not change significantly over the post-war period up to 1971. Thus, changes in the overall net migration pattern for counties tends to be primarily influenced by movements to or from abroad. Secondly, it seems that a sizeable proportion of the internal migration to Dublin is transient in the sense that for many of those involved it is an intermediate step on the way to ultimate emigration. This would explain in part the large internal inflows, and the even larger external outflows, associated with this region. On reflection, this is not perhaps surprising. Dublin has, for example, a large Third Level educational sector which clearly generates many migrations (both internal and external) each year. Given the fact that Dublin is the only centre in the country with a large services sector, it is also likely that many Second Level school leavers migrate to Dublin initially to find employment and emigrate later. The final feature of note associated with these data relates to the county external migratory flows for 1981/86. While most of these now involve sizeable net outward movements, rather surprisingly, the figures indicate net external inflows for some counties on the western seaboard which have been traditionally associated with emigration. In other words, the population losses now associated with those counties derive from outflows to other areas within the State,

5. Galway is an exception in this regard in that it is now characterised by a substantial net internal inflow, whereas previously it lost population through internal movements (see Appendix Table A3.5). This is probably due to the large expansion which took place in Third Level educational facilities in Galway County Borough in the 1980s.

even though these movements may be transient in the sense that many of those involved eventually emigrate.

One aspect which is highlighted by the foregoing analysis concerns the manner in which "origins" and "destinations" are defined in relation to migration. With Census-based material, the emphasis is on place of residence at a point in time. This goes to explain why the figures reflect such large flow movements in relation to Dublin. While migration data derived in this way are definitionally correct, they may not portray a complete picture when viewed in a wider social context. A person may be recorded as having emigrated from Dublin because he or she happens to live there at the time of departure, but the initial movement may have occurred earlier from another part of the State. One means of catering for this phenomenon is to analyse population movements in terms of birth-place, as was done in Hughes and Walsh (1980) and in Geary and Hughes (1970).

A statistical analysis of the data in Table 3.8 confirms that the rate of net external migration in 1981-86 is (i) positively associated with the same variable in the previous intercensal period and (ii) negatively associated with net internal migration during the same period. The second finding suggests that counties that are attracting population from the rest of Ireland are more likely to lose population abroad (or that counties losing population to the rest of Ireland tend to attract an inflow from abroad, perhaps from previous emigration flows). Moreover, these effects persist even when the very significant Dublin effect is allowed for (see Table 3.10).

4. OCCUPATIONS AND SKILLS OF EMIGRANTS

The traditional stereotype of the Irish emigrant characterises a person who is largely unskilled or, at best, possessing rudimentary manual skills. The information available for earlier periods would appear to support this view. Data contained in the 1954 Commission on Emigration Report relating to overseas emigration for the period from 1924 to 1930 indicate that over 70 per cent of male emigrants who left the country in that period were unskilled or came from an agricultural background. Nearly 90 per cent of female migrants were classed as "domestic, hotel etc. service". Further information which became available in the 1940s (see Table 3.11) suggests that for males the position had not changed materially. Unskilled and agricultural workers still comprised over 70 per cent of the outflow during this period. However, the occupational profile of females who emigrated during the 1940s appeared to have altered somewhat. The proportion associated with "domestic service, etc.," had declined to less than 60 per cent and up to 14 per cent of the total outflow now fell into a "nursing" occupation.

It is likely that the occupational profile of emigrants did not change significantly during the 1950s when the severely depressed economic circumstances gave rise to large outflows. However, from the 1960s onwards, when economic conditions

Table 3.11

Number of Persons who received Travel Permits, Identity Cards and Passports in 1940-51 in order to take up employment, classified by Broad Occupation

Occupation	(000)	%
Males		
Unskilled	113.3	53.1
Agricultural	43.2	20.3
Industrial	27.6	12.9
Other	29.3	13.7
Total	213.4	100.0
Females		
Domestic Services	85.5	57.2
Nursing	20.8	13.9
Agricultural	3.8	2.5
Clerical	3.6	2.4
Other (incl. Industrial)	35.9	24.0
Total	149.6	100.0

Source: Commission on Emigration and Other Population Problems: Reports (1954).

began to improve in Ireland, the nature of emigration changed gradually according as a greater element of choice presented itself. The fact that the sex composition of the emigrant flows in this period changed (to involve a majority of females) is indicative of a significant change having taken place. This is not to say that involuntary emigration did not occur during this time – it most certainly did – but the domestic employment situation did not present as bleak a picture as it did previously, and conditions improved consistently as time progressed. Unfortunately, no information on the occupations of emigrants is available for the 1960s or the 1970s and one must move forward to the mid-1980s before further information becomes available, on the basis of the new gross outflow estimates derived from recent Labour Force Surveys.

Even with these data, the position is not altogether precise as information on the actual occupations of those who left was not obtained. However, one can obtain a reasonable indication of the background of these more recent emigrants by classifying them in terms of the social group of the head of the household in which they previously resided. This is, perhaps, a more appropriate way to approach the problem as many emigrants would be so young as to have only spent a brief period in the labour force (some of them would not have even entered it) and, therefore, classifications based on such occupations as they held might not be very meaningful.

The relevant figures for the year ended April 1988 are given in Table 3.12. The rates per 1,000 population, given in the right hand section of the table, suggest that the

Table 3.12

Gross Migratory Outflow in 1987/88 classified by the Social Group of the Household Head in which the Emigrant Previously Resided

Social Group of Household Head	Gross Outflow (000)			Rate per 1,000 Population		
	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females	Persons
Farmers etc.	4.4	3.7	8.1	12.4	12.4	12.4
Professional	3.1	2.4	5.5	19.3	14.4	16.8
Employers, Managers	2.8	2.2	5.0	19.9	16.2	18.1
Salaried Intermediate Non-Manual	3.7	3.6	7.3	15.3	13.4	14.3
Other Non-Manual	4.5	2.9	7.4	21.3	14.5	18.0
Skilled, Semi-Skilled Manual	8.2	4.9	13.1	18.9	12.1	15.6
Unskilled	2.4	1.1	3.5	19.1	10.6	15.2
Unknown	4.7	1.8	6.5	48.8	9.3	22.4
Total	33.7	22.6	56.4	19.1	12.8	15.9

Source: Labour Force Survey 1988 (special tabulation).

current migratory outflow is broadly representative of the structure of Irish society. The data do not indicate a marked predominance by any one particular social group – at least not to the same degree that appeared to prevail in earlier periods. However, there is some evidence of a tendency for the professional and non-manual groups to be overrepresented, and rather surprisingly, for those from farming backgrounds to be underrepresented. However the extent of these variations cannot be regarded as very significant, especially when viewed in terms of the occupational imbalance which applied to the emigrant flows in earlier decades. There appears to be greater uniformity among the different social group categories for males,[6] while for females the figures suggest a somewhat lower propensity to emigrate when the family background is manual or unskilled.

5. RECENT EMIGRATION TRENDS FOR PERSONS WITH HIGHER LEVELS OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

As the foregoing analysis suggests that the educational profile of emigrants has changed, it is of interest to attempt to investigate this aspect in somewhat more detail. It is possible to derive some useful insights into the educational background of emigrants by using the results obtained from the annual HEA Survey of the First Destinations of Third Level Award Recipients and the annual Department of Labour

6. Apart, that is, from the unspecified category "other" which covers instances where information on social background was not available.

Survey of Second Level School Leavers. The former inquiry provides a useful body of information on the early post-graduation experiences for Third Level leavers which includes, inter alia, information on migration trends. This survey covers not only University graduates, but also persons who receive recognised Higher Education awards from Regional Technical Colleges, the Dublin Institute of Technology and other institutions.

Summary information from the HEA reports, which describe the circumstances of Third Level award holders some nine months after graduation, is given in Table 3.13. The figures, which relate only to those graduates who actually left full-time education, indicate that the proportion of award holders who emigrated in order to find or take up employment in the months following graduation has increased substantially in recent years – from just over 8 per cent of those who qualified in 1980 to nearly 30 per cent for the 1988 outflow. Over the same period, the proportion who found employment in Ireland fell from 80 per cent to 62 per cent.

Viewing the position in absolute terms, the figures indicate that of the 11,300 third level award recipients who left full-time education in 1988, some 3,000 had emigrated by the spring of 1989. There are some difficulties in the way of estimating

Table 3.13

Post Graduation Status of Third Level Award Recipients who left full-time education, 1982-1988

Status	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
	%								
At work in Ireland	80.0	77.6	71.9	69.3	69.3	67.4	65.7	60.4	62.5
Unemployed	11.6	14.5	19.9	22.3	17.5	16.9	15.0	11.1	8.1
Emigrated to find work	8.4	7.9	8.2	8.4	13.1	15.7	19.3	28.6	29.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Domestic Unemployment Rate	12.7	15.7	21.7	24.3	20.2	20.0	18.6	15.5	11.5

Sources: (1) Higher Education Authority (1989). First Destination of Award Recipients in Higher Education (1988).
(2) Sexton (1987). "Recent Changes in the Irish Population and the Pattern of Emigration", Irish Banking Review, August, 1987.

Notes:
(1) The years indicated are the years in which the award recipients actually graduated.
(2) Post Graduation Status relates to the position in the Spring of the year following graduation.
(3) The coverage in terms of the Third Level Institutions included was not fully complete during the earlier years of the period indicated.
(4) The figures are based on details of Award Recipients for whom information was actually obtained in from the annual HEA Surveys. The response rate was 82.1 per cent in 1988; it was higher in earlier years.
(5) The "unemployed" category includes those accommodated on manpower schemes.

a precise absolute figure for graduate emigration in the early 1980s, as at that time the annual HEA Survey did not cover all Third Level Institutions. However, the available data suggest that the numbers who emigrated were quite small – perhaps some 600 out of a total outflow of about 8,000.

The figures relating to those who were classified as "unemployed" in these enquiries must be interpreted in association with the emigration estimates. In the early 1980s the proportion of award holders who left higher education and who were recorded as unemployed when the surveys were taken increased rapidly – from less than 12 per cent for those who attained qualifications in 1980 to over 23 per cent for those who graduated in 1983. The rate then declined over the following years, not, however, because of any improvement on the employment front in Ireland but according as greater numbers of award holders began to exercise the emigration option. The figures thus suggest that in the early years of the post 1980 recession, graduates were initially prepared to remain in the country, perhaps in the expectation that labour market conditions would improve; however, in the absence of any significant improvement increasing numbers began to emigrate, particularly from 1985 onwards. One must also bear in mind in this regard the relative situation in the Irish and UK labour markets. The employment scene in the UK was not particularly favourable during the early years of the 1980s, but from 1984 onwards the position began to improve (see Table 5.1 in Chapter 5), whereas in Ireland conditions remained depressed.

The incidence of post-graduation emigration among third level award holders varies depending on the type of qualification involved. The figures given below, which relate to those who qualified in 1988, indicate that the proportion of primary degree holders who emigrated (36 per cent) appears to have been significantly higher than the overall average of 29 per cent for all Third Level award holders. The corresponding proportion is about 25 per cent or slightly higher for those with higher degrees, for persons with the Higher Diploma in Education and for those with sub degree awards. It appears to be quite low (6 per cent) in the case of recipients of the Bachelor of Education (Primary) but it should be mentioned that this qualification is quite specific in occupational terms and would have limited recognition abroad.

Proportion of 1988 Third Level Award Recipients who emigrated according to type of qualification (%)

Primary Degree	36
Higher Degree	27
H. Dip. in Education	27
B. Education	6
Sub-Degrees	25
All Qualifications	29

Table 3.14

Post-Education Status of Second Level School Leavers for those who left full-time education 1980-1988.

Status	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
					%				
At work in Ireland	81.5	75.9	59.5	63.3	57.6	62.5	61.6	62.4	61.8
Unemployed	16.9	22.9	38.7	33.2	39.2	31.7	32.3	27.1	23.5
Emigrated	1.7	1.1	1.8	3.5	4.1	5.7	6.1	10.5	14.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Domestic Unemployment Rate	17.2	23.2	39.4	34.4	40.9	33.7	34.4	30.3	27.5

Source: Department of Labour Annual Survey of Second Level School Leavers.
Notes: (1) The absolute figures on which the percentages in this table are based are given in Appendix Table A9.3.
(2) The status of school leavers is that in the late Spring of the year following leaving school.
(3) The years indicated are the years in which the persons left school.

A closer inspection of the data for primary degrees (see Appendix Table A3.6) reveals very high emigration rates for 1988 degree recipients in some disciplines – 48 per cent for Engineering, 43 per cent for Arts and Social Science and 42 per cent for Architecture.

Even though persons with Third Level awards still only form a relatively small proportion of the total gross migratory outflow (about 6 per cent in 1988/89), the fact that this proportion has increased significantly in recent years can be taken as generally indicative of the changing composition of the outflow, which now involves greater proportions of skilled and better educated persons at all levels. This raises serious policy questions (discussed in Chapters 8 and 9) which relate not only to the need to accelerate employment growth in order to stem the flow, but also to question the benefits of Irish investment in higher education being reaped outside the country.

It is of interest to compare the post education experiences of Second Level school leavers with those of Third Level award recipients. Similar information to that set out in Table 3.13 can be derived from the Annual Department of Labour Surveys of Second Level School Leavers. Such information, given in Table 3.14, charts the early post-school experience of Second Level leavers over the period from 1980 to 1988. The estimates, which again relate only to those who left full-time education, indicate quite a small propensity to emigrate in the immediate post-school period. However, this proportion began to rise significantly towards the end of the period concerned. The proportion of 1988 school leavers who had emigrated by Spring 1989 was nearly 15 per cent, compared with much smaller proportions of some 1 to 2 per cent in the early 1980s. These figures also reflect in the clearest terms the deterioration in the youth labour market which has occurred since the beginning of the decade. Over 80 per cent of the 1980 cohort of second level school leavers had found work within a year of leaving education, but this proportion had fallen to just over 60 per cent for the 1988 leavers; this downward trend in employment was accompanied by a gradual escalation in the proportion unemployed over this period. The factors underlying these changes are discussed in some detail in Chapter 9.

These figures cannot, of course, be taken to imply that few Second Level school leavers have emigrated. It has already been demonstrated that the great majority of emigrants possess at best Second Level qualifications, and a significant number have no formal educational qualifications at all. What the figures do illustrate is that second level school leavers tend to emigrate after some delay – possibly after a period of unemployment, a stint on a manpower programme, or perhaps a spell in a tenuous or unsatisfactory job. The evidence suggests, on the other hand, that those with Third Level qualifications, once they have decided to emigrate, leave quickly without necessarily testing the domestic labour market for any length of time.

One notable similarity which should be noted in relation to Second Level school leavers and Third Level award recipients is that each group appears to have experienced much the same degree of success in obtaining employment. In 1980, about 80 per cent of those in each group found a job in Ireland within the time span covered by those enquiries: in the late 1980s this proportion was still the same for both groups – but had fallen about 60 per cent. The difference in early post education experience lies in the balance between emigration and unemployment, with greater numbers of those with third level qualification opting to emigrate quickly.

6. INWARD MIGRATION

Most of the emphasis heretofore in this chapter has been on analysing external migration in terms of outflows, i.e., relating to those who leave the country. However, inward migration is also a phenomenon that needs to be considered. Every emigrant is a potential candidate for return at some time in the future; in certain past periods (in the 1970s, for example) the inflow exceeded the outward movement and the return of former emigrants (and their families) constituted an important element in these flows. It must also be remembered that there is always some inward migration, even in times when the net migratory balance is highly negative. Throughout the 1980s, despite the scale of the migratory outflows, sizeable inward movements occurred. The estimates contained in Table 2.6 in Chapter 2 indicate that between 1981 and 1990 gross immigration amounted to some 150,000. Such sizeable movements obviously have a significant impact when viewed in economic and social terms and it is, therefore, desirable to try and identify the salient aspects involved.

Some useful information on the characteristics of immigrants can be derived from the annual series of Labour Force Surveys. These enquiries record place of

Table 3.15
Gross Migratory Inflow from abroad 1983-88, classified by Age

Sex, Age	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
			000			
0-14	2.8	2.6	2.4	2.3	3.1	3.0
15-24	3.4	3.7	3.4	3.6	4.9	5.3
25-34	4.5	4.1	3.1	3.3	4.4	5.4
35-44	2.0	2.2	2.4	2.3	1.7	1.9
45-64	2.1	1.8	1.6	1.1	2.0	2.7
65+	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.9	0.9
Total	15.6	15.3	13.6	13.3	17.0	19.1

Source: Annual Series of Labour Force Surveys.

Notes: (1) The figures relate to persons who were resident in the State at the time of the Labour Force Surveys and who were resident abroad one year earlier
(2) Age relates to the date of reference of the Survey

Table 3.16
Gross Migratory Inflow from abroad 1983-1988, by Region

Region	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Total	1983-88
				'000				Rate per 1000 pop.
Dublin	5.6	5.7	4.9	5.2	6.9	6.8	35.1	34.4
Rest of East	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.5	2.2	7.7	25.1
South West	2.3	2.2	2.2	1.7	2.0	2.4	12.8	23.7
South East	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.9	7.6	19.8
North East	1.0	0.6	0.7	0.3	0.6	1.1	4.3	22.2
Mid-West	0.6	1.8	1.0	1.3	0.6	1.2	6.5	21.0
Midlands	1.2	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.8	0.7	4.4	16.8
West	1.4	1.7	1.1	1.3	2.6	1.6	9.7	32.9
NW and Donegal	1.3	0.6	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.2	5.8	27.2
Total	15.6	15.3	13.6	13.3	17.0	19.1	93.9	26.7

Source: Annual Series of Labour Force Surveys.

Notes: (1) The figures relate to person who were resident in the State at the time of the Labour Force Surveys who were resident abroad one year earlier.

residence both at the time of the survey and one year earlier and, therefore, the information relating to those who have changed residence from abroad provides a basis for compiling estimates of gross inward movements. The inflows relating to any one year are not very large and any estimates derived therefrom would be subject to fairly significant sampling variation. However, the data have been extracted for each year from 1983 to 1988, thus providing, in aggregate, a more solid basis for interpretation.[7]

Table 3.15 shows annual estimates of the gross migratory inflow from 1983 to 1988 classified by age. In distributional terms, the figures exhibit a marked stability over the years indicated. Those aged 25 years or over constitute some 55 per cent of the total inflow, with a significant concentration in the 25 to 34 year age band. This latter age class is of course characterised by initial family formation and the significant numbers included under this heading suggest that return migration may be associated with child related events, such as when children begin to reach school-going age. The fact that between 15 and 20 per cent of inward migrants were young children aged less than 15 years, lends further support to the view that many of the return migrants came as family groups. About a quarter of return migrants were in the youth category 15 to 24 years – a very much smaller proportion than that which applied to the gross outflow which was nearly 70 per cent (see Table 3.4).

The return of persons aged 25 years or over with children appears to be a long-standing feature of the Irish migration scene. In his study of Irish migration flows, Garvey (1985) illustrates this aspect by analysing intercensal net migration flows in terms of age and country of birth. These figures, which are reproduced in Appendix Table A3.7, reveal that the sizeable return flows of Irish-born former emigrants with children born abroad occurred not only in the 1970s, but also in the 1960s when significant overall net population losses took place. As for the adult return flows concerned here, many of those involved would have reached a stage in the life cycle when significant employment experience and skills had been accumulated and opportunities present themselves which allow return migration. An interesting feature of the 1970s' data (but not of the 1960s figures) concerns the sizeable numbers of adults in the inflow who were born outside the State. The net inflow for 1971/81 included nearly 27,000 persons aged 25 years or over age who were both in Northern Ireland, Great Britain or elsewhere outside the State.

The gross migratory inflow over the period 1983 to 1988 is analysed in terms of internal region of destination in Table 3.16. In this instance, it is more meaningful to amalgamate the figures for the six years concerned, thus yielding more reliable aggregate indicators.[8] These aggregates, expressed in both absolute terms and as rates per thousand of the average regional populations, are given in the final two columns of the table. The highest rates of migratory inflow from abroad relate to the Dublin and West regions with rates of 34.4 and 32.9 respectively, compared with the national rate of 26.7. The lowest incidence of inward migration was for the South-East and Midland regions with rates of 19.8 and 16.8 respectively. It is, perhaps, not

7. See also Garvey and Maguire (1989) for further analyses of these gross inflow estimates.

8. It is possible, however, that if one were to take "stock" estimates in 1988 of the gross inflow over the proceding six years that the Dublin region might not account for as high a proportion as that indicated because of the exclusion (with such an approach) of previous temporary inflows associated with Third Level Education.

Table 3.17

Immigrants who returned from abroad over the period 1983-1988, classified by economic status subsequent to return.

Economic Status (subsequent to return)	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
				000		
Under 15 years	2.8	2.6	2.4	2.3	3.1	3.0
Over 15 years						
At work	5.4	4.7	4.5	4.0	5.6	6.5
Unemployed	2.6	2.7	2.5	2.3	3.0	3.7
Inactive	4.7	5.3	4.3	4.6	5.3	6.0
Total	15.6	15.3	13.6	13.3	17.0	19.1
Unemployment Rate for Immigrants	32.5	36.5	35.7	36.5	34.9	36.3

Source: Annual Series of Labour Force Surveys.

Notes: (1) The figures relate to persons who were resident in the State at the time the Labour Force Surveys were taken and who were resident abroad one year earlier.

(2) Economic Status relates to that at the reference date of the Survey.

(3) The unemployment rates are the ratios of those unemployed to the total covering those at work and unemployed.

Table 3.18

Immigrants who returned from abroad over the period 1983-88, classified by occupation.

Occupation	At work on survey dates		Unemployed on survey dates	
	000	%	000	%
Agricultural	1.4	4.6	0.2	1.2
Industrial, Transport occupations	5.0	16.3	4.2	25.0
Labourers, Unskilled	0.8	2.6	2.2	13.2
Clerical, Commercial	5.2	17.0	3.1	18.5
Service Occupations	3.3	10.8	1.7	10.2
Professional, Technical etc.	11.8	38.6	1.6	9.6
Other	3.1	10.1	3.7	22.2
Total (1983-88)	30.6	100.0	16.8	100.0

Source: Annual Series of Labour Force Surveys

Notes: The data represent aggregations of annual figures for the period 1983 to 1988 taken from successive Labour Force Surveys. The status categories "at work" and "unemployed" and the occupations relate to the situation as recorded in each of these years and do not necessarily reflect respondent's situation at the end of the period (i.e. in 1988). The figures (particularly the percentages) should, therefore, be interpreted as portraying the "average" position over the period from 1983 to 1988. The data could, of course, be shown for individual years, but in view of the small numbers involved, would be subject to sizeable sampling variability.

surprising to find that the Dublin region accounts for a high proportion of returning migrants as this region has most to offer in terms of job opportunities, particularly for those former emigrants who have acquired specialist skills and experience. The relatively high rate for the West region can perhaps be explained by the fact that this region (which is comprised of the counties of Galway and Mayo) has a long history of heavy emigration which in turn creates a large external reservoir from which return migrants can come. However, the same can be said, even if to a somewhat lesser extent, of many other western seaboard counties. It should be noted however that. there is a consistency between these figures and those given earlier in this chapter in Table 3.9 which indicated that recent net migratory outflows from County Mayo derived largely from movements to other areas within the State (i.e., internal migration) rather than from external flows which were shown to be positive (i.e., inward) in net terms. In fact, both sets of figures purport to show that this region is characterised by substantial gross external flows, both inward and outward.

Figures for recent immigrants classified by their current economic status (i.e., at the time of the relevant Labour Force Surveys) are given in Table 3.17. These results are quite surprising in that they indicate very high unemployment rates among recently returned immigrants. These rates (which are given in the final row of the table) are of the order of 35 per cent for each of the years in question – much higher than those which applied to the domestic labour force as a whole over this period which varied between 14 and 18 per cent.[9] These data suggest that many former emigrants did not have fruitful experiences abroad and face serious problems of reintegration when they return.

It is clearly of interest to probe this situation in more detail. Table 3.18 contains a classification of recent emigrants over the period from 1983 to 1988 classified by occupation, distinguishing those who found work on return and those who were unemployed. The figures show clearly that the occupational or skill profiles of these two groups are quite different. Those who were in employment are heavily concentrated in the skilled areas, with about 40 per cent classified to professional and technical occupations. This is a very high figure when one considers that the corresponding proportion for the total domestic non-agricultural labour force is of the order of 19 per cent. For the unemployed group, on the other hand, there is a much greater spread among the different occupational categories with significant proportions associated with industrial type occupations and unskilled work and with the miscellaneous "other" category.

These results suggest that the migratory inflow consists essentially of two distinct groups. In the first place, there are those with skills and qualifications who appear to readily find employment. A proportion of those may be non-Irish born. This particular inflow can, therefore, be viewed as beneficial to the Irish economy as the

9. A similar result was observed with 1981 Census data in Garvey (1985) – "A History of Migration Flows in the Republic of Ireland", *Population Trends No. 39, Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, London.*

individuals concerned tend to fill vacancies in vital areas of the economy and thus, help to ease bottlenecks in labour supply. However, there is a further significant group (comprising perhaps a third of all immigrants) who obviously had unsatisfactory experiences abroad and who appear to return to Ireland more as a refuge. On the basis of the evidence, they appear to fare no better on return than they did when abroad in the way of acquiring work, and indeed, probably had difficulties even before they emigrated in the first place. While the nature of the estimates does not allow a more detailed examination of the evidence, it is likely that the persons involved are young and unskilled. The particular problems which face such young persons when they emigrate are discussed more fully in Chapters 6 and 7.

7. SUMMARY

The balance between males and females in external migration flows does not appear to be materially different if one views the position over a long period. However, recent emigration flows appear to be predominantly male, principally because throughout the 1980s the prospects for females in the Irish labour market have been significantly better than those for males.

The current migratory outflows involves mainly young people, a feature which has historically been the case. There is evidence to suggest, however, that when economic conditions in Ireland are severely depressed, emigration extends to the immediately older age groups. Inward movements (which consist mainly of returning emigrants) tend to involve older persons, in many instances with young children.

While in previous periods emigrants tended to come from the underdeveloped counties (particularly those on the western seaboard), the indications are that the current migratory outflow is broadly representative of all areas of the country. The greater Dublin area suffered a significant net loss of population during the 1980s, even though this was partly offset by inward migration from other areas in the State.

Whereas in previous periods emigrants tended to be predominantly unskilled, the position appears to have changed in recent times, even when allowance is made for the changed education/skill structure of the Irish population. Emigrants now appear to be broadly representative of the social structure of Irish society, with a tendency for those from the higher social groups to be somewhat over-represented. The emigration of third level award holders has increased significantly in recent years.

Inward migrants basically comprises two groups – those with skills and qualifications who are readily assimilated into the domestic labour market, but also a significant minority of mainly unskilled persons who experience difficulty in finding employment on their return and who, in all probability, decided to return because they could not find work abroad.

Chapter 4

EXTERNAL MIGRATION FLOWS IN AN OVERALL LABOUR FORCE AND DEMOGRAPHIC CONTEXT

Thus far in this report the emphasis has been, largely speaking, on analysing external migration purely in its own right. One cannot, however, acquire a complete understanding of the problem in this way as many migratory movements are directly or indirectly related to a range of socio economic phenomena, particularly those associated with the labour market. It is more appropriate, therefore, to consider external migration in a wider context which embraces a number of relevant demographic and labour market influences, such as the outflow from the educational system and the extent to which the behaviour of other groups (e.g. those withdrawing on retirement) directly or indirectly affect the position. Later chapters will expand further on these themes and consider, for example, the relationship between emigration and relative labour market developments in Ireland and the United Kingdom (Chapter 5) and will also deal with the issue in a broad social setting (Chapter 6).

1. A POPULATION STOCK-FLOW ACCOUNT

The basic framework which will be initially considered in this Chapter is what is termed a "population stock-flow account". This shows, for a specified period, a comprehensive picture of stocks and flows (including external migration flows) under broad headings of the population and labour force. Table 4.1 contains a simple algebraic representation of the methodology involved. This portrays a population accounting matrix distinguishing just three states – the labour force, those in education and the rest of the population. Starting with the "opening stocks" position at year t-1 in the extreme right hand column, one begins the progression to year t by allowing for deaths and emigration as represented by the two adjoining columns. The main body of the table relates to those members of the population who were not subject to any of the specified demographic changes during the interval in question (i.e. births, deaths, emigration) but who may have changed their status in terms of the three broad socio-economic categories identified. The two rows under the central core matrix reflect additions arising from births and gross immigration, which in turn lead on to the determination of the "closing stocks" position at year t, as represented by the bottom row.

Table 4.1

Algebraic Outline of a Simple Population Accounting Matrix

		Classification (time t): Labour force	Education	Rest of population	Resident population	Deaths	Emigrants	Opening stocks
Time (t-1)	Labour force	a_{11}	a_{12}	a_{13}	$a_{1.}$	d_1	e_1	LF_{t-1}
	Education	a_{21}	a_{22}	a_{23}	$a_{2.}$	d_2	e_2	E_{t-1}
	Rest of population	a_{31}	a_{32}	a_{33}	$a_{3.}$	d_3	e_3	ROP_{t-1}
Resident population		$a_{.1}$	$a_{.2}$	$a_{.3}$	a	d	e	P_{t-1}
Births		–	–	b_3	b			
Immigrants		i_1	i_2	i_3	i			
Closing stocks		LF_t	E_t	ROP_t	P_t			

Table 4.2 following contains a population stock/flow account for 1986/87 based on the procedures as described. In addition to the basic demographic flows (e.g., deaths, emigration, etc.) the system distinguishes (i) those in the labour force (ii) persons aged 15 years or over in education, (iii) those engaged on home duties, (iv) "other" persons, (which, in fact, mainly reflects those involved in retirement related flows) as well as (v) the population aged less than 15 years. The main body of flow information contained in this table was derived from the "recall" questions in the series of Labour Force Surveys which seek information on a respondents' situation one year prior to the survey date.[1]

1 There are considerable statistical problems associated with compiling the data required for this exercise. While the disaggregated opening and closing stocks are readily available (from the annual series of Labour Force Surveys), the derivation of the various flow elements presents significant difficulties. It is possible, however, to compile some estimates by using the "recall" questions in the series of Labour Force Surveys. These questions, which seek information on a respondent's situation one year prior to the survey date, when used in conjunction with the knowledge of the respondent's current circumstances, make it possible to identify "flows" or "changes in state" over a twelve-month period. This estimation process can then be used to reconstruct a broad demographic and labour force profile of the population at a point one year earlier, exclusive of the effects of attrition due to deaths and emigration. A comparison of this partial reconstruction with the independently compiled profile obtained from the previous year's Labour Force Survey provides a basis for estimating, in a residual fashion, the extent of this attrition in terms of the various headings used. Since it is possible to compile independent estimates of deaths, the gross external outflows can be estimated separately as residuals. However, these estimates must be interpreted with caution, since the constraints imposed on the system imply that they then bear the brunt of all of the errors arising. Nevertheless, it will be shown that as long as the categories used are not too detailed it is possible to derive some useful insights, not only concerning the size and disposition of the gross migratory outflow, but how it relates to other labour market and demographic phenomena.

The opening stock figure for April 1986 involved a total population of 3,541,000, of which 1,308,000 were in the labour force. The estimates show that over the subsequent twelve-month period the labour force total underwent gross reductions arising from emigration (34,000) and deaths of labour force members (over 9,000); there were further departures of over 11,000 to "home duties" (mainly women)[2] and a similar outflow to the "other" category which, as already indicated, relates mainly to retirement-related movements. These departures were offset by gross inflows, of which entrants from education comprised by far the largest component, some 54,000, if movements into the labour force from the population aged less than 15 years are included. Further labour force inflows of significance relate to women re-entering having previously been engaged in home duties (estimated at about 7,000) and inward migration from abroad which amounted to nearly 9,000. The overall summary position with respect to labour force-related flows in 1986/87 as estimated from this array is indicated in Table 4.3.

Thus, even though the total labour force did not vary very much over the twelve-month period in question (it rose by about 4,000 or less than 1/2 per cent) this apparent stability conceals very significant but offsetting inward and outward flows, of which the two largest were the inflow from education and the migratory outflow. One further aspect that should be borne in mind in interpreting these estimates is that the figures do not include direct outward migratory movements from the educational sector. Table 4.2 indicates that this flow is estimated to have been of the order of 5,000 in 1986/87 and had the individuals concerned opted to remain in Ireland, they would have constituted an additional element of supply pressure in the domestic labour market.

This analysis serves to illustrate the wider demographic and labour market context within which external migration flows need to be interpreted. Over the period concerned, the number of persons who entered the Irish labour market greatly exceeded the numbers who left it for what could be described as "normal" domestic reasons (e.g. retirement, withdrawal to home duties etc.). Since there was no increase in employment during this time span, the inevitable result had to be either a rise in unemployment, or labour force "discouragement" or a substantial migratory outflow, or a combination of these outcomes. The estimates suggest that in the circumstances which prevailed, many chose to emigrate, a relevant future here being the attraction of the U.K. labour market.

The figures also indicate that in the absence of net external migration, the potential for expansion in the Irish labour force is substantial. The exclusion of figures for net external migration from the flow totals given in Table 4.3 suggest a potential net increase of between 25,000 and 30,000 in 1986/87 (about 2 per cent of the total labour force). It is of interest, therefore, to analyse this aspect in more detail in order

2 As indicated later in this chapter, there is evidence which suggests, however, that these family-related inflows and outflows may be understated.

Table 4.2

Population and Labour Force Stock/Flow Account, 1986/87 – All Persons

		1987 Status								
		Labour Force	Education	Home Duties	Other	Population 0-14	Total	Deaths	Emigrants	Population April 1986
			'000				'000	'000		
	Labour Force	1240.6	1.0	11.2	11.4	—	1264.2	9.2	34.8	1308.3
1986 Status	Education 15+	50.1	192.0	0.2	0.3	—	242.8	0.2	5.2	248.2
	Home Duties	7.3	0.1	666.5	0.3	—	674.2	10.6	—	684.7
	Other	1.5	—	0.1	260.9	—	262.5	11.9	—	274.5
	Population 0-14	3.6	68.8	0.1	0.3	947.6	1020.4	0.6	3.7	1024.7
	Total	1303.4	262.0	678.0	273.2	947.6	3464.2	32.5	43.8	3540.5
Births		—	-	—	-	61.8	61.8			
Immigrants		8.6	1.8	2.3	1.3	3.1	17.0			
Population April 1987		1312.2	263.9	680.3	274.6	1012.0	3543.0			

Notes: (1) The estimates contained in this table have been derived primarily from the 1986 and 1987 Labour Force Surveys – in particular those estimates in the core matrix and the figures for gross immigration.

(2) However, some of the flow estimates have been adjusted to ensure consistency with other known totals, e.g., the original estimates for inflows to the labour force from education were adjusted to ensure compatability with corresponding estimates obtained from the annual Department of Labour Survey of Second Level School Leavers and the annual HEA Survey of Third Level Award Recipients.

(3) The categorisation of total deaths was obtained by applying age-related mortality factors (from the 1978-80 Life Tables) to the 1986 totals for the demographic and labour force categories involved.

Table 4.3

Gross Flows Associated with the Labour Force 1986/87

Flow Category	In	Out	Net
		000	
Education[1]	53.7	1.0	+52.7
Home Duties	7.3	11.2	-3.9
External Migration	8.6	34.8	-26.2
Deaths	—	9.2	-9.2
Other[2]	1.5	11.4	-9.9
Total	71.1	67.6	+3.5

Notes: (1) This category includes the inflow to the labour force from the population aged 0-14 years.
(2) These are mainly retirement-related flows.

to understand better the processes involved and, in particular, to try and determine how the labour supply position is likely to develop in the years ahead. This is important as the supply pressures in question will be one of the key factors influencing future levels of emigration.

2. LABOUR MARKET DYNAMICS

Time series on changes in employment, unemployment and net migration also shed light on the dynamics of labour market flows. An approach taken in previous studies has been to relate the changes in unemployment to changes in employment and net migration (see Sexton and Walsh, 1982; and Walsh, 1987). Broadly speaking, it has been found from these studies that an increase of 1,000 in net emigration tends to lower the level of unemployment by between 300 or 400, the remainder of the outflow coming from those who were in employment or not in the labour force. Furthermore, the findings reported in the 1987 Walsh study suggest that most of the reduction in unemployment comes from among the short-term unemployed.

3. LABOUR FORCE FLOWS CLASSIFIED BY SEX AND AGE

Many of the influences relevant to labour force change and external migration are related to age and sex. It is, therefore, useful to analyse in some detail the structure of the population and labour force in terms of these characteristics, and how this structure is likely to change in the years ahead. Appendix Table A.4.1 shows the 1986 population and labour force classified by sex and single year of age, along with associated labour force participation rates. It will be noted that for certain age categories, for example those between 15 and 19 years which relate to the main phase of entry to the labour market, or for those between 60 and 69 years which are associated with retirement flows, the participation rates vary substantially over the single year age categories shown. If, therefore, one, as it were, "projects" or "ages" the population over a period of one year in association with a phased application of the appropriate participation rates, it is possible to obtain a fairly detailed picture of the annual labour force inflows and outflows for each year of age. The actual labour force flow associated with age t is given by the following equation:

$$P_t M_{t/t+1} R_{t+1} - P_t R_t$$

Where Pt is the population at age t, Mt/t+1 is the survivorship ratio appropriate to the progression from age t to t+1, while Rt is the labour force participation rate for age t.

The method takes account of age movements and mortality but no accommodation is made to reflect the impact of net external migration. In this sense, therefore, on the basis that in current circumstances in the absence of external migration the total labour force would increase, the results reflect the overall growth in potential rather than actual labour force supply.[3]

It should be that the results derived from the above formula for individual ages are in fact net flows. However, the level of age-related detail involved is such that it is possible to obtain a reasonable picture of the gross flow position in certain age bands which tend to be overwhelmingly characterised by either inflows or outflows to or from the labour market. For example, while it is true that some young persons would leave the labour force between the ages of 15 and 19 years (to re-enter education for example) the vast majority of the movements associated with this age band are undoubtedly into the work force and the figures derived can thus be taken as providing an adequate illustration of the pattern of gross inflows for this age category. Broadly speaking, a similar position applies in respect of the 20 to 24 year age group, even though the picture is obscured somewhat by the fact that at the upper end of the age band (i.e., 23 and 24 years) a counter outflow emerges as some females begin to withdraw from the labour force for family related reasons. Similarly, those aged 60 years or over, while there would be some labour force inflows, the predominance of outflows is such that the figures can be assumed to provide a reasonable representation of gross retirement or death-related labour force withdrawals. The position is not so clearcut for females in some of the intermediate age classes, as we shall subsequently explain.

Table 4.4 contains the results of the application of this methodology for 1986/87. Observing first the figures for males, the extent of the potential youth inflows from education is evident. The aggregate inward movement to the labour force for ages

3 This would not, of course, apply in a situation of overall net inward migration. It can also be argued that the application of the consecutive participation rates for ages t and t + 1 is not entirely appropriate as the latter rate (for age t + 1) may vary as time progresses. It is unlikely, however, that over such a short period as one year that any changes that might occur would be all that significant. This aspect will be discussed again later in the chapter.

Table 4.4
Labour Force Flows in 1986/87, by Single Year of Age

Age	Labour Force Flows	
	Males	Females
15	2,689	1,731
16	4,507	2,568
17	5,999	4,061
18	7,733	7,255
19	4,178	6,061
20	1,893	2,297
21	1,619	969
22	1,503	537
23	990	-478
24	594	-925
25	228	-1,375
26	174	-1,377
27	53	-1,492
28	-6	-1,254
29	-9	-1,294
30	-14	-1,103
31	-18	-1,012
32	-60	-822
33	-40	-885
34	-32	-402
35	-91	-344
36	-71	-490
37	-47	-261
38	-78	-126
39	-88	-132
40	-198	44
41	12	55
42	-118	-71
43	-151	-72
44	-120	240
45	116	18
46	-182	-188
47	-127	120
48	-124	-66
49	-179	-52
50	-304	-4
51	-164	-197
52	-316	28
53	-213	-226
54	-345	76
55	-402	-151
56	-403	-177
57	-428	-140
58	-529	-184
59	-401	-153
60	-695	-159
61	-701	-301
62	-594	-36
63	-866	-357
64	-958	-109
65	-2,797	-807
66	-1,519	-366
67	-288	-48
68	-286	-99
69	-347	-119
70	-345	-108
71	-354	-51
72	-287	-60
73	-147	-32
74	-318	-69
75+	-1,311	-290
Total	14,986	7,590

Source: Census of Population, 1986.

between 15 and 24 years is over 31,700. The figures show few movements of any significance for the ages between 25 and 44 years, principally because the related single year of age labour force participation rates for males do not vary. However, for ages in excess of 45 years the number of departures from the male labour force begins to rise because of the increased incidence of both retirements and death. Between the ages of 45 and 64 years, the outflow for the twelve month period in question exceeded 8,000. As one would expect, there is a very noticeable escalation in withdrawals (principally for retirement reasons) at age 65 years, the related annual outflow being nearly 3,000. If one considers the aggregation of all ages over 65 years, the total number of departures from the male labour force due to both retirement and death was just under 8,000. However, all retirement and death related flows were much smaller than the potential youth inflow from the educational sector with the result that the potential for increase in the male labour force was just under 15,000 (or 1.6 per cent). In summary, these data indicate that, at present, potential inflows to the male labour force outnumber withdrawals by about two to one.

The figures for females are somewhat more difficult to interpret. As in the case of males, the data can be taken as providing an adequate representation of the inflow to the labour force from education; in overall terms, the size of this inflow (i.e., that relating to the 15 to 24-year age band) was almost 21,700, somewhat less than that for males. A notable feature of these figures is the fact that a particularly large inflow occurs for females between 18 and 19 years (some 6,000 as compared with just over 4,000 for males) which can be attributed to the fact that, on average, girls tend to remain longer than boys in Second Level education.

It will also be noted that for females the flows for the upper extremities of the youth age band (i.e. at ages 23 and 24 years) are negative, i.e., they represent flows out of the labour force. As already mentioned, these figures represent early withdrawals from the work-force for family-related reasons. In a sense, they can be said to distort the picture somewhat in relation to the inflow from education even though it is clear from the data that the aggregate flow figures for females for the entire 20 to 24 year age category is still dominated by education-related movements.

In the immediately older age group (i.e. 25 to 34 years), the influence of labour force withdrawal for family-related reasons is much more evident[4]. The figures indicate a sizeable outflow of over 11,000 females. For the next age group,

4 The extent of domestic related withdrawals by females from the labour force appears to be much greater in Table 4.5 than previously indicated in Table 4.2. As a higher degree of credence can be attached to the estimates in Table 4.5, one must assume that the estimates described earlier in this Chapter in the context of the population stock/flow analysis tend to understate those flows. Since these movements relate primarily to quits from the work-force, this implies that the potential labour force increase of nearly 230,000 for 1986/87 indicated by the data given in the earlier tables overstates the position. It will be noted, however, that a comparison of other flow elements (relating to education, retirement, mortality etc) indicates a satisfactory degree of consistency between the two sets of estimates.

however (i.e. for those aged 35-44 years), this outflow reduces to just over 1,000. In interpreting these figures, it is necessary to take into account the nature of the changes which have occurred in the female labour force over recent years. There has been a large increase in the degree to which women enter, leave and re-enter the work-force according as their domestic circumstances change. This suggests that the figures should be viewed to some extent in net rather than in gross terms, particularly in the case of the latter (35 to 44 year) age band. Women have always, of course, quit the workforce for child-rearing reasons but sizeable numbers now subsequently re-enter when the pressure of these responsibilities begins to ease. Moreover, with the fall in family size, the number of years when there are young children in the household has fallen. The annual gross outflows from the female workforce are, thus, presumably greater than those indicated by the above-mentioned figures, but that these are partially offset by women returning to work after an extended period of absence.

As for the older age groups (i.e. those for 50 years of age and upwards) the pattern

Table 4.5

Estimated Labour Force Inflows and Outflows in 1986/87 for Broad Age Groups, based on the Assumption of nil net external migration in each age group

Age	Males	Females	Persons
15-19	+25,100	+21,700	+46,800
20-24	+6,600	+2,400	+9,000
25-34	+300	-11,000	-10,700
35-44	-1,000	-1,200	-2,100
45-64	-8,000	-2,300	-10,300
65+	-8,000	-2,000	-10,000
Total	+15,000	+7,600	+22,600
Total as percentage of 1986 Labour Force	+1.64	+1.93	+1.73

of retirement flows and mortality-related withdrawals for females is similar to that for males. In absolute terms, the magnitudes of these outflows are smaller than those for males, but these must be viewed in the context of a smaller female labour force. The aggregation of all of the age-related flows for females indicates an annual potential excess of labour force entries over exits amounting to over 7,600, which is equivalent to nearly 2 per cent of the female labour force (higher than the corresponding percentage for males).

The overall position for 1986/87 is summarised in Table 4.5, which shows the flows for broad age classes. The total figures can be broadly interpreted as indicating an annual inflow to the labour force from the educational sector totalling some 56,000 persons. On the other hand, family and domestic related withdrawals (mainly females) amount to about 13,000 (a figure which to some extent should be interpreted in net terms), while quits due to retirals and mortality total about 20,000. This results in an annual net potential labour force increase of about 22,500, or 1.64 per cent.

4. FUTURE LABOUR FORCE INFLOWS AND OUTFLOWS

One of the advantages in using the type of methodology just described is that it provides a basis for indicating the position with regard to future labour force flows. This can be done by compiling single year of age population projections for a specified period and then applying the previously mentioned flow formulation to the projected annual population figures. In carrying out this exercise, the projections, which cover the period up to the year 2006, have been compiled on the basis of nil net migration in every age group. The results thus reflect the potential rather than the actual labour force increase that might be expected for each year indicated. In effect, what the projections show in regard to the labour market flows is the position that would prevail over the next twenty years or so if emigration ceased as from 1986 and if the degree of participation in the labour force remained at its 1986 levels.

The "no net migration" assumption is not an unrealistic one when viewed in practical terms (apart from the fact that the concept of "potential" labour force increase has a use in its own right). It should be remembered that little migration occurs for those aged less than 15 years and, therefore, at any one time, the current age disposition of the child population to a large extent predetermines the position regarding the potential youth inflow to the labour market for many years to come. The word "potential" is relevant in this regard. Even though the "no migration" assumption does not materially influence the position prior to labour market entry, it is an inherent consequence of our assumptions that emigration within the 15 to 24-year age group is not taken account of. This suggests that the projected simulations would tend to overstate the youth labour force inflow, if one were to compare against the position that would prevail if the traditional pattern of Irish emigration in this age category were taken account of.

As for the middle and older age categories (i.e., those aged 35 years or over), assumptions regarding external migration are of little consequence since this group is virtually unaffected by migration flows apart from a small net inflow for the over 65 year category. Thus, it can also be said that the age distribution of the current middle-aged group determines to a large extent the number of retirement or death-related withdrawals from the labour force over the next two decades.

It must be recognised, however, that a "nil net migration" assumption of the kind involved here does have a bearing on the outcome for what one might describe as the "post youth" category covering those aged 25 to 34 years. The elimination of net

external migration from the reckoning (which in an Irish context is largely synonymous with excluding youth emigration) has the implication that the population in this age class would be subject to significantly larger increases than those which would occur if a traditional emigration pattern prevailed. To put it another way, if we conceive of a situation where young people do not emigrate at all, then within a relatively short time this would create a growing population bulge in the 25 to 34 year age category. However, as this age class is characterised by significant labour force withdrawals (of women), the application of the previously mentioned flow formula to the enlarged projected population totals tends to yield somewhat higher outflows when compared to those which would emerge with a more "usual" external migration scenario.[5] This feature is not, however, of such a magnitude so as to significantly affect the global age pattern of future labour force inflows and outflows. Furthermore, since there are offsetting effects, the impact on the overall flow position for all ages combined is not very substantial.

The approach is perhaps best understood by referring to the actual projected flows which are given in Table 4.6. The figures relating to the original single years of age have been summarised into more aggregated age groups. It will be noted that the overall net excess of inflows over outflows rises from an initial level of just under 23,000 in 1986 to reach a maximum of over 25,000 (or almost 2 per cent of the labour force) in the early 1990s. Thereafter, this excess begins to fall, slowly throughout the rest of this decade (the projected level is 22,000 in 1998/99), but then more rapidly in the early years of the next century. The aggregate excess is predicted to fall to a level of just under 7,000 by the year 2006.

The reasons underlying the sharp reduction in the early years of the next century are twofold. In the first place, the numbers of new entrants to the labour force will decline substantially during this time because of the rapid fall in the number of births which occurred from 1980 onwards. Simultaneously however, the number of withdrawals in the older ages will increase according as the current "middle age bulge" in our population ages to the degree that its advance guard will have extended into the "early retirement" stage – thus contributing to an increasing number of exits from the labour force for reasons related to retirement and death. It will be noted that all of the increase in the "retirement"-related outflows over the projected period are attributable to the 45 to 64 year age band, rather than to the 65 year and over category. If one were to extend the projections a few years further on, by which time the "bulge" would have extended beyond the age of 65 years, the retirement and death-related exodus from the labour force would apply to both those under and over 65 years, and it would be substantially greater.

It is of particular interest to observe the projected youth inflows to the labour force as these can be taken as having a more direct influence on the level of net external

5 "Usual" in this sense means the assumption of a net external outflow in the 15 to 24 year age group – a position which has in fact prevailed historically, even in periods when there was an overall net migratory inflow (as in the 1970s).

Table 4.6

Estimated Labour Force Flows by Age Groups 1986 to 2006, assuming nil net migration in all age categories

Age	1986/87	1987/88	1988/89	1989/90	1990/91	1991/92 (000)	1992/93	1993/94	1994/95	1995/96	1996/97	1997/98
15-24	+55.8	+57.3	+58.4	+59.0	+59.2	+58.9	+58.3	+57.9	+57.9	+58.3	+58.9	+59.4
25-34	-10.7	-10.9	-11.1	-11.3	-11.5	-11.7	-12.0	-12.2	-12.6	-12.9	-13.2	-13.5
35-44	-2.1	-2.2	-2.2	-2.2	-2.3	-2.3	-2.3	-2.3	-2.3	-2.4	-2.4	-2.4
45-64	-10.3	-10.3	-10.3	-10.3	-10.3	-10.4	-10.5	-10.7	-10.8	-11.0	-11.2	-11.4
65+	-10.0	-10.0	-9.8	-9.7	-9.6	-9.6	-9.4	-9.3	-9.3	-9.3	-9.1	-9.2
Total	+22.6	+24.0	+25.0	+25.5	+25.5	+25.0	+24.1	+23.3	+22.9	+22.6	+22.9	+22.8

Age	1998/89	1999/ 2000	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06
15-24	+58.9	+57.7	+56.2	+54.6	+52.9	+51.2	+49.5	+47.5
25-34	-13.8	-13.9	-14.0	-14.1	-14.1	-14.2	-14.2	-14.3
35-44	-2.5	-2.6	-2.6	-2.7	-2.7	-2.8	-2.9	-3.0
45-64	-11.7	-11.9	-12.2	-12.5	-12.9	-13.2	-13.5	-13.9
65+	-9.2	-9.1	-9.2	-9.4	-9.2	-9.3	-9.5	-9.6
Total	+21.8	+20.1	+18.1	+16.0	+13.9	+11.7	+9.4	+6.8

migration. The figures in Table 4.6 show that this inflow is currently about 59,000 and, broadly speaking, will remain at this level until the end of the 1990s. Thereafter, it will begin to decline (for the reasons stated earlier), to the extent that by the year 2006, this flow is predicted to have fallen to less than 48,000.

In summary terms, the foregoing analysis shows that, in the absence of net external migration, the demographic pressures are such that between now and the turn of the century, the total labour force currently has the potential to expand by between 22,000 and 25,000 each year, or by between 1½ and 2 per cent. This represents as fast, if not a faster, average rate of potential growth than those which applied in past periods.[6] The position will begin to ease in the early years of the next century according as the number of young new entrants to the labour force declines and retirement and mortality related quits increase.

6 Work by Walsh described in an article in Administration in 1987 indicates that in the absence of net external migration, the population of working age (i.e. aged 15 to 64 years) would have grown by about 11/2 per cent per year between 1946 and 1986. A retrospective simulation of population and labour force growth for the 1961/81 period with net external migration set at zero in all age groups suggests that the labour force would have expanded by just less than 11/2 per cent in annual average terms if 1961 participation rates applied in 1981, and by less than 1 per cent if (then current) 1981 rates are used.

Thus, demographic pressure on the labour market is now at its peak and unless there are significant and sustained net employment gains over the next ten years, the inevitable outcome will be continuing high levels of unemployment and/or emigration. The position may be mitigated somewhat to the extent that some persons may remain in Ireland but withdraw from the labour force.

With regard to the presumption that labour force participation rates will remain constant, there has been, it should be noted, a long term secular trend towards higher participation by women in the labour force. If this continues, the gradual increase in female participation rates for those aged 25 years and over would have the effect of reducing the fairly sizeable outflows from the labour force indicated for the 25 to 34 year age group as shown in Table 4.6.[7] It should also be borne in mind that (for both sexes) the tendency towards early retirement may continue or even intensify if older persons decide to opt out of working life at increasingly earlier ages. This would transfer forward the outflows from the labour force to the 45 to 64 year age group at the expense of the 65 years and over category, thus offsetting to some extent any reduction in female outflows.[8]

It must also be borne in mind that the levels of labour force participation that would exist in a situation where there was no external migration would, in all likelihood, be different from those which apply when the safety valve of emigration operates. For example, involvement in education may increase with a resultant fall in youth labour force participation rates, which would in turn give rise to a reduction in the inflow to the youth labour force.[9] However, for the reasons stated above, any such decrease would be very short-term, as the individuals in question would have to quit the educational system within a few years in any case. It is also possible that female participation rates might fall (or at least stop rising) if domestic labour market conditions were to become disadvantageous to women, if, for example, oversupply were to follow a reduction in emigration.

7 However, any such change represents, as it were, a postponement of withdrawal as the women concerned must eventually quit the labour force and the outflows would then occur at a later stage in an older age category.

8 It should be noted that the flow estimates in question here are dependent on the differences between participation rates rather than on their absolute levels. This implies that changes in these rates, in so far as flows are concerned, not only create offsetting effects which tend to cancel each other out, but result in a postponement of events rather than their elimination. In summary, in these circumstances, changes in participation rates may affect the timing of the arrival or departure of persons in the labour market, but not the very fact of these events, which are primarily dependent on demographic factors. This is not to say that "timing", in the sense described here, is unimportant in estimating the flow pattern in question. The fact that greater numbers of women now tend to remain in the labour force involves, in many cases, a long-term postponement of withdrawal. This implies a consequential rise in participation rates for women aged 25 to 44 years, which would tend to reduce the related outflows in the medium term and thus increase the overall estimate of excess supply. In this sense, therefore (even though there are offsetting effects), the projections given in Table 4.6 can be said to understate the potential labour force excess over the period concerned, and should be regarded as indicating the minimum levels that are likely to arise.

9 Any significant increase in participation in education would, however, place further demands on the exchequer.

5. EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKET CONDITIONS IN THE 1990S

The foregoing discussion serves to highlight what may be termed "push" factors related to future external migration trends. There will also, however, be significant demographic "pull" factors operating in the years ahead in the sense that conditions in external labour markets are likely to become advantageous compared with those prevailing in Ireland. Over the next decade in most European countries, the populations in the youth age groups will fall dramatically because of the sharp decline in the number of births which occurred in these countries from beginning of the 1970s. For the twelve states which now form the European, the population aged 15 to 24 years will decline by about 10 million, from 50 million to 40 million, between 1990 and the year 2000. When this fall is viewed in labour force terms (see Table 4.7), it implies a reduction in the EC youth work force from 27¾ million to just over 22 million – even though the total size of the Community labour force will rise slightly during this time. In contrast, in Ireland during the same period, if one assumed no external migration and constant participation rates, the youth labour force would increase by between 15,000 and 20,000 (from less than 390,000 to over 405,000). The bulk of the youth labour force decline in the EC will occur in what one might call the "developed core" of the Community comprising Germany, the United Kingdom, France, The Netherlands and Belgium, which holds the greatest attraction for would-be Irish emigrants. Thus, the general European youth labour market scene as it unfolds throughout the 1990s will be quite different from that which will apply here.[10] The contraction in the youth labour force in other EC countries will inevitably create demand pressures which are likely to result in more advantageous circumstances vis-a-vis those prevailing here, both in regard to wages and general conditions of employment.

Table 4.7

EC Labour Force 1985 to 2005 (twelve countries)

Age	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005
			'000		
Males					
<25	15,957	15,390	13,591	12,311	11,952
25-44	42,608	45,750	47,692	48,247	46,728
45-64	27,423	27,745	29,077	30,281	31,780
65+	1,003	1,158	1,289	1,321	1,347
Total	86,991	90,042	91,649	92,160	91,806
Females					
<25	12,954	12,377	10,854	9,823	9,556
25-44	26,084	28,025	28,946	28,929	27,744
45-64	14,056	13,983	14,720	15,369	16,110
65+	503	559	602	592	595
Total	52,596	54,944	55,121	54,713	54,006
Persons					
<25	28,911	27,767	24,445	22,134	21,509
25-44	68,692	73,774	76,638	77,176	74,472
45-64	41,479	41,729	43,797	45,649	47,890
65+	1,505	1,717	1,891	1,913	1,941
Total	140,587	144,987	146,770	146,782	145,812

Source: EUROSTAT (1988). Demographic and Labour Force Analysis based on EUROSTAT Data Banks. Population and Social Conditions, Theme 3. Studies and Analyses, Series D.
Note: The projections are based on constant (1985) participation rates.

These factors, when considered with the additional stimulus to intra-Community migration which is likely to emerge as a consequence of the post-1992 completion of the internal market, suggests that the incentive to emigrate to other EC countries will be very strong in the 1990s. The significance of the foregoing analysis for the Irish economy is clear: if a high rate of economic growth is not maintained in this country, and if this in turn does not lead to a significant expansion in attractive employment opportunities for young people, the pressure of a high potential growth rate of the labour force will continue to spill over into a high rate of emigration, particularly of skilled young people. The weakness of the population pressure facing all the countries to which young Irish people emigrate increases the likelihood of this outcome.

6. SUMMARY

This chapter illustrates that in order to obtain an adequate understanding of the phenomenon, external migration must be viewed in a wider context of demographic and labour market related flows.

Projections are presented which indicate that the annual average potential growth in the Irish labour force will be of the order of 20,000-25,000 in the period up to the turn of the century, the net excess decreasing rapidly thereafter as fewer people leave the educational system and as larger numbers quit the labour force for retirement related reasons. This implies that the 1990s is likely to be characterised by continuing net emigration, but at a significantly lower level than in recent years

10 The changing politico-economic situation in Europe has a bearing on labour force projections for the 1990s. The reunification of Germany and the dismantling of the former German Democratic Republic is likely to increase the availability of workers in Germany. The reduction in military manpower that is now underway will moderate the projected decline in the civilian labour force among young males throughout Europe. The wider implications of the changes in central and eastern Europe are impossible to gauge, but the prospect of mass movements from large countries such as the Soviet Union (on the assumption that such migrants would be able to gain entry to Western countries) could transform western European labour markets by the end of the century, and significantly alter the scenario as outlined.

as economic growth and employment expansion are expected to be higher than in the 1980s.

Conditions in other EC labour markets are likely to attract would-be Irish emigrants during the 1990s because of changing demographic structures. However, the rapidly changing situation in Eastern Europe could transform the situation, particularly if large migrations to Western countries occur.

Chapter 5

MACROECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF IRISH MIGRATION

1. INTRODUCTION

In this Chapter we review some general economic considerations relating to Irish external migration, summarise the available data on differentials in income, employment and unemployment between Ireland and Britain, and then present an overview of the econometric evidence on the determinants of Irish migration.

2. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

As shown in chapter 2, since the Second World War the Irish rate of annual net migration has varied between – 20 and + 6 per 1,000 population. The magnitude and volatility of this rate reveal the unusual degree to which the population and labour force of this country are influenced by external factors.

A country might be expected to experience a high rate of emigration when some or all of the following conditions apply:

1. If its economy is relatively underdeveloped.

2. If it experiences wide variations in economic performance and particularly when the economy underperforms relative to neighbouring economies.

3. If the labour force is undergoing structural adjustment due to shifts in comparative advantage or in the pattern of demand is high.

5. If the population has access to countries where conditions are more favourable than at home.

6. If there is a tradition of emigration from the country.

All of these factors have contributed to the very significant loss of population from Ireland through emigration over the past century and a half. The following is a brief summary of the situation under each heading.

(i) Level of Economic Development

Compared with the other countries of northern Europe, the USA, Canada and Australia, Ireland is a low-income country. The level of GDP per person (converted to US$ using a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rate) in 1988 was $7,541 in Ireland, compared with $18,338 in the US, $12,340 in the UK and $13,323 in West Germany. Turkey, Portugal and Greece are the only OECD countries where average living standards are lower than in Ireland. There is, therefore, a major incentive for Irish people to emigrate to higher income countries.

(ii) Relative Economic Performance

The growth rate of the Irish economy did not differ very markedly from that of other western economies during the 1960s and 1970s. During the 1980s, however, the rate of growth of GNP per person was significantly lower in Ireland than in other OECD countries. Between 1979 and 1987 GNP per person declined slightly (by 0.02 per cent a year) in Ireland, whereas it rose at an annual average rate of 1.3 per cent in the countries of OECD Europe and by 1.6 per cent a year in the United Kingdom.[1] The Irish economy went deeper into recession in the early 1980s, and took longer to recover, than was the case in other countries. As a result, employment began to increase and unemployment to fall in Europe and America some years before these improvements were apparent in Ireland. The significant underperformance of the Irish economy during this period played an important role in the re-emergence of large-scale emigration. It is to be hoped that during the 1990s this factor will contribute less, if at all, to the incentive to emigrate from Ireland. The faster pace of growth now occurring in Ireland, and the severe contraction in many sectors of the UK economy, will exert a major dampening effect on emigration during the early years of the 1990s.

(iii) Structural Adjustment

The Irish labour force has had to adjust to three major structural shifts in recent decades. In the first place, Ireland remains more dependent on agriculture than all but a few of the other members of the OECD. Despite the rapid decline of the farm labour force in recent years, a large number of farmers are still under-employed, if not overtly unemployed, on low productivity farms. Recent changes in the Common Agricultural Policy, and the introduction of milk quotas in particular, are encouraging the concentration of dairy farming in a smaller number of enterprises. Secondly, the country has had to adjust from a very high level of protectionism to

1. This comparison is based on GDP data for countries other than Ireland, for whom the divergence in growth rates between GNP and GDP may be ignored. For Ireland, however, GNP is the more relevant measure of welfare, because it takes account of the growing importance of factor payment abroad over this period. An even better index is Gross National Disposable Income, which also takes account of net transfers from the rest of the world, the growth of which in the case of Ireland partially offset the growth of net factor payments abroad.

free trade since the mid-1960s. This involved the loss of most of the employment in the industries that were fostered by tariffs over the period 1932-1965. Finally, in the mid-1980s the expansion of public sector employment, which had been very rapid during the 1970s, was halted and reversed. All of these adjustments have tended to accentuate the unemployment problem and increase the likelihood of emigration.

(iv) Demographic Factors

In the absence of net migration, the Irish labour force would have increased by between 1 and 1½ per cent a year throughout the post-war period.[2] In Chapter 4 it was shown that the demographic momentum will persist in Ireland until the turn of the century, long after the date at which the labour forces of most of the European OECD countries will have stabilised or begun to shrink. Moreover, the rate of labour force participation among women has remained relatively low in Ireland and thus, leaves considerable scope for accelerated growth of the labour force when conditions are favourable. Furthermore, the large stock of recently emigrated Irish people living abroad is a source from which additional workers could be drawn. Thus, the elasticity of labour supply to the Irish economy is extremely high. While the example of the United States illustrates that it is possible to expand employment by more than 1.5 per cent a year over a long period, the rapid potential growth of the Irish labour force has compounded the other problems facing the Irish economy and increased the pressure for emigration.

(v) Access to High-Income Economies

Irish people have traditionally enjoyed free entry to all the English-speaking countries of the world. There is a strong tradition of emigration to Britain, the United States and other New World countries. Recent restrictions on entry to New World countries have not completely closed off access for Irish immigrants. Membership of the European Community guarantees free access to the large and wealthy economies of mainland Europe. The completion of the internal European market by 1993 will increase the ease with which professionals can move to take up employment throughout the EC.

(vi) Migration Networks

The problems facing emigrants have been reduced for Irish people by a familiarity with the English language and the extensive network of Irish emigrants and people

2. A retrospective simulation of population and labour force growth for the 1961/81 period with net external migration set at zero in all age groups suggests that the labour force would have expanded by just less than 1 per cent per year on average in such circumstances. This simulation involved the application of 1981 participation rates in 1981. If 1961 rates had been used in the end year the annual average growth rate would have been almost 1½ per cent. In an article in Administration in 1987 work by Walsh indicates that the annual average growth in the working population (i.e. aged 15 to 64 years) over the period from 1946 to 1986 was about 1½ per cent.

of Irish ancestry living throughout Britain and the New World. While the relatively low level of out-migration during the 1970s weakened these networks, they have been re-established by the heavy outflows of recent years. The fall in the costs of travel, by air in particular, since the mid-1980s has further facilitated emigration. Temporary and seasonal migration has also been encouraged by this development.

In summary, it is easy to understand why the rate of emigration from Ireland has been so high over the past two centuries. Few other countries face the combination of circumstances that have led to such a high long-term rate of emigration from Ireland: a high birth rate and the resultant pressure on the labour force; low average income levels and a long-term rate of economic growth that has not been sufficient to close the gap in living standards relative to other Western countries; the widespread use of English for over two centuries, and free access to Britain and the New World.

However, it is important to note that, despite the persistent incentive to emigrate, there have been periods when favourable conditions in Ireland relative to those abroad led to net immigration. The most important such episode was during the 1970s. As we noted in Chapter 3, net emigration among the 15-24 year olds[3] continued over this period, but was more than offset by net in-migration among those aged 25-44 (and their children). Return migration comprised an important part of this inflow. It is difficult to pinpoint precisely the main reasons for this inflow but certain factors stand out. These are Ireland's accession to the EC, which had a significant impact on the rate of economic growth, a substantial expansion in professional and technical employment (particularly in the Public sector), and finally improvements in welfare, health and educational provision, which brought services in these areas close to parity with those in the United Kingdom and other European countries.

3. RECENT LABOUR MARKET DEVELOPMENTS IN IRELAND AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

The resurgence of large-scale emigration in recent years can also be readily understood with reference to the factors listed above. In the aftermath of renewed recession in 1980/81 in Ireland the rate of unemployment increased more, and remained higher, than in other western European countries.[4] The contrast with the non-European OECD countries was even more pronounced. Moreover, reductions in income tax rates in Britain and the United States widened the gap in after-tax incomes in those countries relative to Ireland.

3. These age groups refer to the population in the middle of the period 1971-81.
4. Honohan (1984) drew attention to the fact that at that time Irish unemployment was unusually high relative to that in the UK, and that the tendency for the gap between the two rates to close might reassert itself through renewed emigration.

Table 5.1

Total Employment in Ireland and the United Kingdom 1980-89

Year	Ireland		United Kingdom	
	Employment (mid-April) (000)	% change	Employment (March) (000)	% change
1980	1,156	+1.0	25,328	-0.3
1981	1,146	-0.9	24,342	-3.9
1982	1,146	–	23,901	-1.8
1983	1,124	-1.9	23,599	-1.3
1984	1,103	-1.9	24,044	+1.9
1985	1,079	-2.2	24,565	+2.2
1986	1,081	+0.2	24,571	–
1987	1,080	–	24,951	+1.5
1988	1,091	+1.0	25,968	+4.1
1989	1,090	–	26,566	+2.3

Sources: CSO (Dublin) Annual Labour Force Estimates.
Department of Employment Gazette (London).
EUROSTAT, Employment and Unemployment Statistics, 1988.

Table 5.2

Unemployment Rates in Ireland and the United Kingdom 1980-89

Year	Ireland (April)	United Kingdom (March)	Difference	Ratio
	%			
1980	7.3	5.6	1.7	1.30
1981	9.9	9.1	0.8	1.09
1982	11.4	10.4	1.0	1.10
1983	14.8	11.2	3.6	1.32
1984	15.6	11.2	4.4	1.39
1985	17.3	11.1	6.2	1.56
1986	17.4	11.9	5.5	1.46
1987	17.7	11.1	6.6	1.59
1988	16.7	9.1	7.6	1.84
1989	15.7	6.9	8.8	2.28

Sources: As in Table 5.1.

As we noted in Chapter 2, the United Kingdom accounts for nearly 70 per cent of the current outflow of population, so it is appropriate to consider in particular the relationship between Irish and British labour market indicators. Table 5.1 shows the trend in employment in the two countries. Employment in Ireland fell by nearly 7 per cent between 1980 and 1985, and is still nearly 6 per cent below the level which prevailed at the beginning of the 1980s. In Britain, on the other hand, while employment fell by almost 7 per cent between 1980 and 1983, it has increased by 12½ per cent since then.

A comparison of unemployment rates also reflects the disparity between British and Irish performance (see Table 5.2). For the first three years of the 1980s the gap between Ireland and Britain was small and narrowing; between 1982 and 1988 it widened again and the Irish rate is now more than double the British. The behaviour of this differential provides a ready explanation for the upsurge in emigration after 1984.

Table 5.3 shows various measures of earnings in Britain and Ireland. The most meaningful comparison is between net-of-tax (and social security) earnings converted to a common currency using a purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate.[5] According to this measure there has been a marked increase in real earnings in Britain relative to Ireland since 1980. The influence of the reduction in the British rate of income taxation is evident from the fact that the gap in net earnings widened much more in 1987 and 1988 than did the gap in gross earnings. Information on relative net earnings at different levels of gross earnings is provided in Table 5.4. It may be seen that the differential has widened most for those on high wages (that is, one and a half times average earnings), for whom PPP exchange rates now indicate an 86 per cent advantage in net earnings in Britain over Ireland, compared with only 27 per cent for those on half average earnings. This reflects the impact of the steeper progressivity of the Irish income tax system on higher incomes.

Table 5.5 shows the level of basic unemployment benefits in Ireland and Britain since 1980. While the British rate rose by 63 per cent between 1980 and 1988, the Irish rate rose by 113 per cent.[6] In 1980 the British rate was 6 per cent higher than the Irish rate (when converted with the PPP exchange rates), but by 1988 the Irish rate was 6 per cent higher than the British. These figures are only indicative of (purchasing power) of the two social welfare systems. A full comparison would require consideration of the details of the range of supplements and benefits in kind available in both countries. In Britain many benefits have been phased out or scaled down during the 1980s, whereas in Ireland some have increased in value. Of particular importance to prospective emigrants are the restrictions on the eligibility of young people for benefits introduced in Britain in 1988.

These figures reveal that during the 1980s the rewards from employment improved more rapidly in Britain than in Ireland, especially for those on above average

5. The PPP rate used is that implied by the OECD national income data for Ireland and Britain. While this index may not fully reflect differences in housing and other costs, it is the best available way of adjusting for differences between the two countries' price levels.
6. The rates of Unemployment Assistance in Ireland (which apply to the long-term unemployed) have risen more rapidly than those of insurance-based Unemployment Benefit payments.

Table 5.3

Average Weekly earnings for adult males at work in Manufacturing Industry in Ireland and the United Kingdom, 1980-1988

Year	Ireland		United Kingdom			Ratio of UK/Irish Net Wage Rates Based on:	
	Gross	Net(1)	Gross	Net(1)	Net(1)	Market Exch. Rates	PPP(2)
	£Irl		£Stg		£Irl		
1980	111.68	79.69	120.30	84.22	94.81	1.189	1.107
1981	131.55	95.74	137.10	93.63	117.01	1.222	1.082
1982	147.36	100.05	152.20	102.80	126.52	1.265	1.218
1983	164.58	105.16	161.20	108.94	132.50	1.260	1.290
1984	184.40	116.42	176.80	119.79	147.27	1.265	1.321
1985	201.98	124.65	192.60	130.57	158.57	1.272	1.333
1986	216.66	135.05	207.80	142.21	155.47	1.151	1.367
1987	227.30	137.87	224.64	156.69	172.40	1.250	1.461
1988	232.60	146.06	234.59	167.68	194.64	1.333	1.441

Sources: Irish Statistical Bulletin and Department of Employment Gazette, London.
Notes: (1) The net earnings, figures which relate to single adult males, exclude income tax, levies and social insurance payments.
(2) The Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rate used is that applied by the OECD to national income data for Ireland and the United Kingdom. While this index may not fully reflect differences in housing and other costs, it is the best available way of adjusting for variations between price levels in the two countries.

Table 5.4

U.K./Irish Net Earnings Ratios at Different Earning Levels for Single Males at work in Manufacturing Industry, 1980-1988

Year	Low Wage		High Wage		Average Wage	
	Market Rate	PPP Rate	Market Rate	PPP Rate	Market Rate	PPP(2) Rate
1980	1.130	1.052	1.248	1.162	1.189	1.107
1981	1.125	0.997	1.308	1.124	1.139	1.009
1982	1.113	1.072	1.371	1.320	1.230	1.187
1983	1.087	1.113	1.386	1.419	1.203	1.231
1984	1.110	1.156	1.415	1.478	1.214	1.270
1985	1.129	1.184	1.426	1.494	1.253	1.313
1986	1.016	1.319	1.274	1.513	1.136	1.350
1987	1.074	1.255	1.372	1.600	1.229	1.435
1988	1.172	1.268	1.484	1.864	1.310	1.417

Sources: Irish Statistical Bulletin and Department of Employment Gazette, London.
Notes: (1) "Low wage" is equivalent to half the average industrial wage for single male adults; "high wage" is one and a half times this wage.
(2) The Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rate used is that applied by the OECD to national income data for Ireland and the United Kingdom. (See Notes to Table 5.3).

Table 5.5

Weekly Rates of Unemployment Benefit (Basic) in Ireland and the United Kingdom, 1980-1988

Year	Ireland	United Kingdom		U.K./Irish Ratios Based on	
	£Irl	£Stg	£Irl	Market Exch. Rates	PPP(2)
1980	20.45	20.65	23.30	1.139	1.061
1981	24.55	22.50	28.12	1.145	1.014
1982	31.65	25.00	30.77	0.972	0.936
1983	34.80	27.05	32.90	0.945	0.968
1984	37.25	28.45	34.98	0.939	0.981
1985	39.50	30.45	36.98	0.936	0.981
1986	41.10	30.80	33.67	0.819	0.973
1987	42.30	31.45	34.60	0.818	0.956
1988	43.60	32.75	38.02	0.872	0.948

Sources: Ireland: Department of Social Welfare. U.K.: Department of Social Security.

Notes: (1) Both the Irish and U.K. levels of payment relate to the basic insurance based Unemployment Benefit rates.

(2) The Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rate used is that applied by the OECD national income data for Ireland and the United Kingdom. (See Notes to Table 5.3).

earnings, while income maintenance payments improved more rapidly in Ireland, especially for the long-term unemployed. At the same time the level of employment grew after 1983 in Britain, whilst no recovery occurred in Ireland until 1988 and even since then growth has been modest. Apart from the evidence these trends provide the strength of the incentives to emigrate from Ireland to Britain, they also suggest that those with high earnings potential will be particularly attracted by the prospects in Britain, whilst those who have been unemployed for some time or are likely to be employed at low incomes in Britain now have less incentive to emigrate. An additional consideration that may increase the incentive for graduates and other qualified workers to emigrate is the possibility of obtaining work experience that is unobtainable in Ireland.

This comparison has been confined to the British situation because most of our emigrants go to Britain. Destinations such as the US, Canada and Australia have also become important in recent years. The contrast between the trends in employment and unemployment in these countries and in Ireland during the 1980s is even more pronounced than between Britain and Ireland. Furthermore, the standard of living is much higher in those countries than in Britain, and the level of direct taxation is generally lower. However, their immigration policies have become increasingly selective of those with skills that are in short supply in the countries involved. This is a cause for concern, since it increases the likelihood that

emigration from Ireland will become more selective of those with high levels of skill and education.

4. ECONOMETRIC MODELS OF IRISH MIGRATION

The general considerations listed above have been incorporated in several econometric studies of Irish migration.

The usual procedure adopted in these studies is to relate the annual rate of net migration, M, (net emigration is treated as negative migration) to measures of Irish and British labour market conditions. The aim of such studies is to try to explain the year-to-year fluctuations in the level of migration. It is valuable to combine the findings of these studies with those of studies of the factors that increase the likelihood that individuals will emigrate, such as those discussed in Chapter 6 of the present study.

Previous econometric studies have used the following variables:

- the Irish unemployment rate relative to the world (British) unemployment rate, U_{irl}-U_{uk}, or U_{irl}/U_{uk} (net outward migration is expected to increase as this variable increases), and
- the Irish wage rate relative to the world (British) wage rate, $W_{irl} - W_{uk}$, or W_{irl}/W_{uk} (net outward migration is expected to fall as this variable rises). These variables can be entered as ratios, differences or separately, in which case, for example, a rise in U.K. unemployment need not have the same effect on Irish migration as a fall in Irish unemployment.[7]

All published studies of Irish migration report evidence that these variables affect migration in the expected manner. This is consistent with the hypothesis that fluctuations in the rate of emigration from Ireland during the post-war period reflect changes in labour market conditions (wage levels and/or employment opportunities) in Ireland relative to those in Britain.

Despite this broad agreement about the main sources of year-to-year fluctuations in the rate of emigration, a number of unresolved issues arise from the econometric evidence. Apart from the inevitable problem involved in formulating a completely satisfactory specification, the available data on annual migration trends are scanty.

7. The only study to test whether the Irish and British variables should be entered separately or as ratios or differences is B. M. Walsh, "Expectations, Information and Human Migration: Specifying an Econometric Model of Irish Migration to Britain", *Journal of Regional Science, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1974, pp. 107-120.* Using separate Irish and British variables doubles the number of regressors and greatly increases the problem of multicollinearity. Walsh found that ratios of the variables gave the most acceptable results and subsequent studies have generally taken this finding as a point of departure.

While the aggregate net flows for intercensal periods are reliable, since they are based on Census totals and vital statistics records, the allocation of this total among individual years could be subject to error. Furthermore, estimates which relate to the period since the last Census are particularly subject to error since there is no control total. The annual series relate to the year from April to April, and hence are not synchronised with calendar year data. The annual net migration data relate to the whole population and not just those in the labour force or of working age. These limitations reduce the reliability of the econometric results.

It is not surprising, therefore, that there has been marked instability in the estimated models between different time periods. Re-estimating equations with extra observations can lead to significantly different parameter estimates.

Another econometric issue that has to be considered is that the Irish labour market has been materially affected by the level of migration. An annual net migration rate that varies between – 2 per cent and + 0.5 per cent of the total population (and about double this of the labour force) should not be regarded as a phenomenon that has had no impact on the level of wages, employment and unemployment in Ireland. It is therefore not appropriate to model migration in a single equation that treats all the right-hand-side variables as exogenous, as has been done in most of the published work.

Keenan reviewed previous research on Irish migration in 1981.[8] He found that equations estimated with data for the period 1954-70 gave very poor forecasts of migration during the 1970s. The conventional models failed to predict the significant net inflow of population that occurred during the 1970s. Geary and O'Gráda[9] replicated these models for the period 1953-82 and found the results unsatisfactory on statistical criteria. They attributed this to the neglect of the importance of tax and social welfare variables.[10] They advocate the use of expected income (Y) and relative expected income (RELY) as the key determinants of migration, where Y is defined as follows:

$$Y = uB + (1 - u)W(1\text{-}t)$$

where u = the unemployment rate (as a proportion),

B = the level of social welfare payments to the unemployed,

W = gross wages,

t = the income tax rate (including social security contributions).

8 J. G. Keenan, "Irish Migration: All or Nothing Resolved?", *The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 12, No.3* (April 1981), pp. 169-186.

9 Patrick Geary and Cormac O'Gráda, *"Post-war Migration between Ireland and the U.K.":in "European Mobility; Trends and Consequences"* (eds. I. Gordon and A.P. Thirwall, 1989).

10 They address the problem of simultaneity between migration and the Irish labour market by using the method of instrumental variables to estimate their model.

Expected income is therefore a weighted average of the income received by the employed and unemployed labour force, using the proportions of the labour force unemployment and employment as weights. RELY is the ratio of Y in Britain to that in Ireland. It combines the influences of both relative unemployment rates and relative wages in a single, composite variable.

Geary and O'Gráda report the following result for the period 1953-82:

$$1.\quad M = \underset{(4.0)}{67.88} - \underset{(4.1)}{0.758}\ RELY + \underset{(1.1)}{0.195}\ M\text{-}1, \quad R2 = 0.852$$

where M = net migration of 15-64 year olds expressed in thousands and RELY = Yuk/Yirl expressed as an index to base 1980 = 100. The t-ratios for the various coefficients are shown in parentheses.

The result implies that the higher is expected income in Britain relative to Ireland, the higher the rate of emigration, which is in line with expectations and broadly consistent with the findings of previous studies. It implies that if RELY = 100 there would be a small net (inflow) of population of working age. The lagged dependent variable captures the tendency of migration to adjust gradually to change in relative incomes, as well as the influences of variables such as the stock of migrants living abroad.

In order to shed more light on the relative merits of the alternative models of migration, we have updated some of the earlier studies using (revised) data for the period 1953-86. This process of updating and replicating earlier studies is particularly important in view of the parameter instability reported by Keenan and by Geary and O'Gráda. In Table 5.6 we report the results from the conventional specification in income and unemployment ratios. Both variables have the expected signs, indicating that an improvement in British relative to Irish labour market conditions leads to an increase in net emigration, and both are generally statistically significant, although not at a very high level of significance.[11] The relatively low t-ratios for the R2s recorded indicates the severity of the multicollinearity between the unemployment and wage ratios.

We have used alternative measures of relative wages (gross and net of tax variables, expressed in local currencies or in a common currency, using market exchange rates or PPP rates). It may be seen that these variations do not make a dramatic difference to the results obtained, but there is some evidence that net rather than gross wages are appropriate.

The results of applying the RELY specification used by Geary and O'Gráda to the 1953-86 data are shown in Table 5.7. It may be seen that RELY has the expected sign and is generally significant at about the 95 per cent confidence level. However,

11. The Cochrane-Orcutt transformation has been applied and a one-order autoregressive model yields results that show no evidence of further autocorrelation.

Table 5.6

Estimated regression equations designed to assess the impact on annual net external migration of relative levels of wages and unemployment in Ireland and the United Kingdom.

Dependent variable = net migration per 1,000 population

	Coefficients (t-values in parentheses)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1. Gross Wage Ratio	-2.143 (-2.02)					
2. Net Wage Ratio		-2.399 (-2.43)				
3. Gross Income Ratio (Exchange Rate)			-1.639 (-1.85)			
4. Net Income Ratio (Exchange Rate)				-2.334 (-2.60)		
5. Gross Income Ratio (PPP rate)					-1.976 (-1.99)	
6. Net Income Ratio (PPP rate)						-1.962 (-2.27)
Unemployment Ratio	1.297 (1.98)	1.178 (1.84)	1.335 (2.10)	1.201 (1.97)	0.993 (1.50)	0.917 (1.40)
Constant	1.248 (0.87)	1.659 (1.20)	0.805 (0.67)	1.783 (1.42)	1.506 (1.02)	1.557 (1.17)
Adjusted R^2	0.804	0.814	0.803	0.819	0.805	0.811
Durbin-Watson	2.410	2.407	2.277	2.288	2.189	2.131
Rho	0.920 (13.70)	0.917 (13.40)	0.830 (8.94)	0.831 (8.72)	0.830 (8.66)	0.813 (8.13)

Notes: (1) Number of observations = 34 (1953-87)
(2) See Notes to Table 5.3 for details of the purchasing power parity (PPP) rates used.

the reported R^2s are lower than recorded in Table 5.6, despite the highly significant lagged dependent variable.

On the basis of these results it seems that the conventional specification is superior to the expected income specification used by Geary and O'Gráda. The interpretation of the former is in any event more straightforward, indicating that a rise in unemployment in Ireland relative to Britain, or a fall in (net) wages, leads to increased net emigration. Using equation number 4 in Table 5.6, the estimated elasticity of the net migration rate with respect to relative wages is about 3, and with respect to relative unemployment about 2 (using end-of-sample values for the variables). These elasticities are high, indicating the sensitivity of Irish migration to cyclical economic factors in Ireland relative to Britain.

Table 5.7

Estimated regression equations designed to assess the impact on annual net external migration of weighted relative levels of income in Ireland and the United Kingdom.

Dependent variable = net migration per 1,000 population

	Coefficients (t-values in parentheses)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1. Expected Gross Income Ratio	-0.439 (-0.94)					
2. Expected Net Income Ratio		-1.374 (-2.52)				
3. Expected Gross Income Ratio (exchange rate)			-1.386 (-2.12)			
4. Expected Net Income Ratio (exchange rate)				-0.498 (-1.67)		
5. Expected Gross Income Ratio (PPP rate)					-1.230 (-1.68)	
6. Expected Net Income Ratio (PPP rate)						-0.469 (-1.53)
Lagged Net Migration (per 1,000 population)	0.737 (5.11)	0.548 (3.75)	0.545 (3.29)	0.744 (6.76)	0.63 (4.06)	0.766 (7.22)
Constant	0.416 (0.75)	1.677 (2.36)	1.605 (1.98)	0.578 (1.39)	1.479 (1.57)	0.564 (1.28)
Adjusted R^2	0.687	0.732	0.718	0.704	0.704	0.700
Durbin-R Statistic	1.633	1.798	1.419	1.846	1.453	1.834
F-statistic	37.13	46.13	43.07	40.26	40.33	39.54

Notes: (1) Number of observations = 34 (1953-87)
(2) See Notes to Table 5.3 for details of the purchasing power parity rates used.

5. SUMMARY

In this chapter we have reviewed the evidence concerning the broad macroeconomic influences on Irish external migration. We saw that Ireland's situation as a relatively low income country, with a rapidly growing potential labour force and with easy access to countries with higher standards of living, gives rise to strong incentives to emigrate. The upsurge in emigration from Ireland from 1984 onwards can be readily understood in the light of the deteriorating labour market situation in this country, reflected in rising unemployment and stagnant real, after-tax incomes at a time when the demand for labour was buoyant in Britain and other countries to which the

Irish could emigrate. Under these conditions, a renewal of large-scale emigration would have been predicted by all the available econometric models of the Irish labour market. We have re-estimated some of these models and found that they do in fact fit the evidence of the 1980s quite well. We have also refined the measures of income used in order to include the effects of recent changes in the Irish and British income tax codes. We found some evidence that these changes have played a part in the increased outflow from Ireland during the 1980s.

The finding that Irish migration is sensitive to labour market conditions in Ireland relative to those in Britain is not surprising. It is significant, however, that both after-tax wages and unemployment rates appear to influence the rate of migration. The evidence raises the possibility that changes in the structure of income tax rates and of social security benefits in Ireland and Britain have disproportionately increased the incentives for those with relatively high earnings potential to emigrate. This finding has important policy implications, which will be considered in later chapters.

Chapter 6

WHY PEOPLE EMIGRATE: THE MOTIVATING FACTORS BEHIND DECISIONS TO EMIGRATE OR STAY AT HOME

Chapter 5 provides an econometric analysis of the correlates of change in Irish emigration rates from the 1950s onwards. It shows some very clear relationships between changes in economic conditions in Ireland and Britain – particularly changes in relative unemployment and income rates – and net emigration rates. This chapter, on the other hand, attempts to provide an explanation of the underlying reasons why some individuals emigrate and others stay in Ireland.

The analysis is based on data from a study of a nationally representative sample of 1981/82 school leavers over a 5-year period from the time they first left school in the early 1980s. The sample of around 2,000 individuals was interviewed on 3 separate occasions – May 1983, November 1984 and post-November 1987. By the end of 1987, around a third of that cohort of school leavers had already emigrated, and another 8 per cent definitely intended to migrate.

Since the period from 1980 to 1987 was one of such rapid economic change, particularly of rapid growth in unemployment and its persistence long after other European economies had resumed rapid growth, (see preceding chapter), this panel study provides us with important insights into individual decision-making by a cohort of young people subject to both high rates of unemployment and emigration. Although not specifically designed as a study of migration decision-making, the interviews do contain rich detail on the educational, training, labour market and residential changes of respondents in the survey over the whole period; as well as detailed information on the migration plans and underlying rationales for migration for that part of the sample who were still resident in Ireland in 1987/88. The chapter, therefore, has two main objectives:

(i) it attempts to explain the underlying motivating factors to individuals' decisions to emigrate or stay; and,

(ii) it attempts to explain why particular kinds of people are more likely to emigrate than others: by gender, socio-economic status, educational level, rural-urban origins, etc.

In the following, we first summarise the research literature on migration decision-making and from this develop a conceptual model of the main variables likely to influence migration. Secondly, we describe how each of these variables is measured, and thirdly, show how they individually and collectively predict both migration intentions and actual migration behaviour. Finally, we illustrate how the process of educational and social mobility – the main underlying social process explaining out-migration – operates in a very selective manner to move people out of smaller and less economically differentiated communities into larger urban, and often foreign, centres of population. The final section provides a summary and conclusion to the chapter.

1. MIGRATION INTENTIONS AND BEHAVIOUR: A REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH LITERATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF A CONCEPTUAL MODEL

Migration is a voluntary and relatively permanent change of residence. This change of residence occurs over such a distance – e.g., from Sligo to Dublin, or Athlone to London – that daily and even weekly fact-to-face interaction with one's family and friends in the community of origin is no longer possible, or can only be done with considerable transport difficulty and expense.

Most research on migration decision-making views it as a rational process, with careful weighing of the various alternatives by a person seeking to maximise his/her utility or achieve his/her expectations/aspirations (Sell and De Jong, 1978). As De Jong, et al (1983) says "migration is seen as (rational) instrumental behaviour, and decision-making is based on a 'cognitive calculus' of costs and benefits that involves a subjective, anticipatory weighing of the factors in attaining certain goals ... (while) subjective expectations about where goals can be obtained are significant determinants of the decision to move" (pp. 473-477). Usually, however, while the process of decision-making is generally assumed to be a rational one, the process itself is not studied; rather what is studied is the set of main influences on the outcome of such decisions: i.e., what predicts the decision to stay or migrate? Individuals' migration decisions in this sense are usually seen as mainly determined by a set of socially influenced expectations and attitudes which, viewed in the context of the number and nature of local opportunities and their capacity to satisfy these orientations, impel the final choice in one direction or the other.

This study is no exception. Our concern is primarily with isolating the main factors that explain why, for any given aggregate level of migration, some people emigrate and others stay – of what the main differentiating motivating factors are. In this task four basic research questions are addressed:

(i) What are the main, directly motivating, factors predicting individual differences in migration decisions?

(ii) Why do individuals' motivations to migrate vary so much? What are the main background or social environmental factors that explain variation in the main migration motives; and, therefore, in migration behaviour?

(iii) The third question is closely linked to the second – to what extent does variation in level of education achieved, and in attendant economic and social mobility aspirations, mediate or express the effects of such background exogenous factors? Educational level achieved, as we shall see, is closely linked both to social background factors as well as to the motivating, social psychological, factors.

(iv) In what way and to what extent do certain facilitating or constraining factors influence the effects of migration motives on migration intentions and behaviour; or to what extent do such migration facilities or constraints operate directly on migration decisions?

The research literature on migration suggests that a very complex and intricate set of interrelationships exist between social psychological, background social structural

Figure 6.1

Conceptual Model of the Migration Decision Process. (Double arrows are the main lines of influence, single arrows secondary, and dotted lines minor influences).



and educational factors, as well as certain facilitating and constraining factors on individuals' migration decisions. Figure 6.1 represents the various migration decision stages that have been shown to occur, and the various factors which intervene to increase or decrease the probability of migration. It is proposed not as a formal research model but as a simplifying conceptual tool to help clarify thinking about migration.

Individuals' motives or reasons for migrating themselves require explanation. They are mainly explainable in terms of individuals' locations in the economic and social structure, and level of educational attainment: that what individuals aspire to, as well as their perceptions of their local and alternative "opportunity structures" within which they can or cannot satisfy their aspirations, are mainly predicted by educational level attained and their socio-economic and socio-cultural characteristics. However, people's beliefs or perceptions about how satisfactory local or foreign communities may be depends also on the nature of the local economy or labour market; mainly, in this case, the rurality/remoteness of the community and its unemployment level. So a direct "causal" linkage (arrow) exists between the nature of the home community's economic structure and satisfying one's economic aspirations locally. Not all of the individual's relevant beliefs, aspirations and attitudes are determinable by such background or environmental factors, however, so a vertical arrow shows that they are partly exogenously determined.

The facilitating/constraining factors are hypothesised to affect migration decisions directly, as well as to affect the probability that the presence of motivating factors will lead to a decision to migrate and, in addition, the probability that once a decision has been taken to migrate that it will be proceeded with. In the following review, we take each of these set of motivating variables in turn.

(i) Migration Motives

It appears from the research available that there are 3 main types of social psychological factors predicting migration decisions.

First are economic and social status, or social mobility, motives. These are primarily beliefs about the extent to which one's occupational status and income aspirations can be achieved in one's present location or in some alternative community (Hannan, 1970; Richardson, 1974; Walsh, 1984; De Jong, et al 1983). Hannan (1970) found that "beliefs about one's ability to fulfil occupational and income aspirations ... were the most closely associated with migration intentions" (p. 166). While Walsh (1984) in a larger replication of Hannan's (1970) study found that such motivating factors were still as influential in the late 1970s as they had been in the 1960s.

Two different aspects of such aspirations are relevant: the level of aspiration – primarily the occupational status and income level aspired to; as well as the belief

that these can/cannot be achieved in the current community but can in an alternative one. Although correlated, these variables may act independently – in the same way as both the number and level of local occupational opportunities varies. Since most migrants are young and at the beginning of their work life, migration is generally proposed as a very important part of a strategy to maximise mobility within the individual "career cycle".

Besides income and occupational aspirations some other important social psychological factors are of relevance, particularly an individual's attitudes toward his/her community or culture: high levels of alienation from it or high attachment to it significantly influencing migration decisions. Hannan (1970) found these "solidarity" motives to be of some importance and, together with "familial obligations" to stay locally, they are the main "solidarity" motives in his analysis. Walsh (1984) also found these to be important – though like Hannan (1970), much less so than economic and social mobility motives. Although some researchers have argued that it is mainly such emotional or attitudinal factors that influence migration decisions, most of the research evidence available indicates that such emotional or attitudinal factors do not outweigh purely rational evaluations of the balance of likely advantages to goal achievement of staying locally or migrating.

The most proximate, social psychological, factors affecting migration decisions, therefore, are hypothesised to be: (i) beliefs about the attainment of important goals or aspirations locally – primarily occupational and income goals for younger people; (ii) solidarity motives – attitudes which either attract or repel people away from their own locality or from local institutions; (iii) certain individual or personal characteristics which are likely to affect people's willingness and ability to migrate – particularly their own extent of self confidence and sense of personal competency, or of being in control of their own lives (De Jong, et al., 1983, pp. 476-479; 1986, pp. 47-49).

(ii) Social Background Characteristics, Educational Achievement, Social Mobility and Migration

The second question is concerned with the main (exogenous) social background factors that account for migration motives. Three different ascriptive characteristics (those with which people are born and over which they have no control) are considered of great importance here: gender; social class of origin; certain characteristics of the community into which one is born – particularly its remoteness, unemployment level and extent of farm dependence. We hypothesise that those from middle class backgrounds, females rather than males, and those from remoter, farm-dependent and high unemployment areas are all more likely to migrate from their communities of origin.

The main differentiating "causal" process at work in translating background environmental factors into migration tendencies – the main one distinguising between "stayers" and "emigrants" – is respondents' level of education. This has a substantial effect on the level and type of occupational, income and social mobility aspirations than young people develop. Although formed both in the context of family expectations and in the process of education, the latter is expected to express or capture most of the social background effects. So, differences in educational achievement, and in the associated level of occupational and income aspirations, are expected to explain the main effects of the background variables (like social class). Differences in family cultural and economic resources are "translated" into educational certificates and qualifications and associated expectations.

It is mainly the "match" between each emerging youth cohort's aspirations/ expectations and qualifications and the local community's opportunity structure that explains differential migration. Both the rate and selectivity of out-migration depends on the match between the relative number and structure of local opportunities and the number and structure of local applicants' aspirations and qualifications.

Within a small community, particularly a less developed one, it is more difficult for the children of the upper middle class to achieve or excell the occupational status of their fathers/parents than it is within a larger more developed system. There are proportionately fewer higher occupational positions in smaller and less differentiated economies. In addition, the social cost of downward social mobility may be much greater. So, in many studies of rural-urban migration, for instance, it has been observed that the children of the middle classes are far more likely to migrate than those from working class or small farm origins.

The classic description of this selective migration process is by Arensberg (1937, pp. 160-168) of a small County Clare rural community. Here he observed the quite clear pattern of out-migration and upward mobility of the sons and daughters of the town's middle class, while their places were taken up by the inmigration of the sons and daughters of the small farmers in the neighbouring rural communities. As he puts it, "the country people flock into the towns and the townspeople all clear out of them" (p.167). In Hannan's (1970) study of a similar rural community almost 40 years later much the same process of social circulation and local replacement was still occurring (op.cit., pp. 137-151).

This process of selective out-migration and local occupational replacement by people from lower social status backgrounds may be generalisable to the national level for such a small country like Ireland which had been integrated into the larger UK labour market for a long period of time. If we conceive of the small Irish economy as being – at least partially – an integrated part of the larger British/New World labour market, then emigration, although not as frequent or as easy as internal movement, has to be considered as part of the total migration/mobility

system. Occupational and social positions in that larger system may well become the object of aspiration for many young people here even when achieving these desirable positions may require leaving one's own country. Obviously, for instance, if a substantial proportion of young third level graduates from middle class backgrounds regard higher occupational positions in the south east of England in the same way as do similar graduates from Scotland, then "emigration" is no more problematic for them than is movement from Scotland. The only difference would be some minor extra costs of movement, the expected return on educational or training investment, and the significance of the ethnic/national identity boundary for Irish migrants. These latter considerations could be very significant – both in terms of the recognition or marketability of Irish educational and training qualifications in Britain, or ethnic biasses in appointments or promotions; as well as the relative value or meaningfulness of achievement within an Irish identity or cultural system as against that of an English one.

Besides social class, gender is also likely to be a very good predictor of migration from such smaller communities: with substantially higher proportions of girls from rural communities receiving better levels of education and being,partly as a consequence, much more likely to migrate (Hannan, 1970). The higher the total rate of out-migration from a community the higher the emigration rate is likely to be.

(iii) Facilitating and Constraining Factors on Migration

The foregoing discussion suggests a relatively straighforward decision-making model. However, significant research evidence exists that: (i) irrespective of most motivating circumstances many people can be effectively prevented from migrating ("constraints"); and (ii) that even in the absence of motivation, many people still migrate ("facilitators"). Desbarats (1983) says that migration "cannot be reliably predicted by simple reference to its antecedent mental processes, no matter how sophisticated our means of eliciting and analysing them" (p.347). The migrant's intentions must be studied in the context of the external forces which may prevent or facilitate their actualisation. Hannan (1970, pp. 157-158) shows clearly that parental expectations, for instance, have a powerful independent effect on final migration decisions even when personal predispositions contradict them (see also O'Gráda, 1986; Fuller, et al., 1986). Besides such familial expectations, marital status, and the presence of children (Fuller et al., 1986; De Jong, et al., 1986) substantially constrain migration, as does the ownership of local household or other property.

To counterbalance such constraints on migration, there are facilitating factors which, even without "adequate cause", may impel people to migrate. Three variables here appear significant: extent of involvement in migration networks, previous migration experience, and a general public opinion "climate" of migration acceptance.

The importance of supportive networks of friends and relatives in the migration process has often been emphasised. Such support is very important in translating even firm intentions to migrate into reality; while their absence can greatly impede migration. Besides such support, their provision of reliable information about alternative locations, (Schwarzweller, et al., 1964, Richardson, 1974; Landale and Guest, 1985) as well as financial resources (De Jong, et al., 1986; Gardner, et al., 1986; Morokasic, 1984) are also important facilitating aspects of migrant networks.

Of course, in the Irish case ease of access to other high employment and high income economies within the same language system, and sharing similar institutional characteristics, constitutes the main facilitating factor in emigration in comparison to other low income countries in Europe, but particularly to third-world countries. However, within Ireland itself such access advantages are not so variable, though the relative advantages to individuals of emigrating may vary widely.

De Jong, et al., (1983) point out also how local social norms about migration are important variables in the decision, including "the socialisation to migration that occurs within families with former members living outside the local village" (p.481). In the Irish case, a climate of migration acceptance has clearly been established (Hornsby-Smith and Dale, 1988) – a climate which is bound to have become much more favourable as the overall level of emigration increased rapidly from the early 1980s. Extensive migrant contacts within family, kin, friend and neighbourhood groups, will not only influence reference group standards, but also one's chances of mobilising help in migrating. So the extraordinary growth in migration in the decade after 1979 would make it that much easier in 1988/89 not only to come to a decision to migrate but also to arrange to emigrate.

We hypothesise that such environmental (constraining/facilitating) factors have both an additive and interactive effect. Additively, we expect that having, for example, close contacts with siblings or friends in destination communities will affect both migration intentions and behaviour irrespective of the level of the background motivating factors. Extended migrant networks both provide reference standards for judging the attractiveness of alternative adult statuses available elsewhere, as well as providing help in migrating. Both effects are likely to increase the probability of migration irrespective of the extent to which occupational or other life style aspirations can be fulfilled locally.

However, it is also plausible that the presence of such supportive migrant networks disproportionately affects people who are already predisposed to migrate – whose most salient aspirations, for example, cannot be fulfilled locally. Those who have little need to migrate to satisfy their more important aspirations may not, on the other hand, be affected greatly by the presence of migrant contacts. In other words the correlation between the predisposing social-psychological factors and migration plans may be quite pronounced for those with extensive migrant contacts, while a much lower (or no) correlation exists for those without migrant contacts: i.e., such effects may be highly interactive.

On the other hand, being married locally, for instance, is expected to have a significant depressing effect on migration intentions and behaviour, irrespective of predisposing motivating factors. These effects of marriage may be both additive and interactive. The additive effect is obvious, but interactively it may well be that single "unattached" people will exhibit a very high correlation between predisposing factors and migration, while for married people this correlation is greatly reduced. Both these additive and interactive effects will be explored in the analyses.

This completes our exposition of the migration model proposed. Since the analyses are based on data gathered mainly for another purpose, not all of the variables are measured satisfactorily, nor can all their effects be tested in this research. Nevertheless, most of them can be. Both the operationalisation of the variables involved, and the method of analysis will be described later. But first we need to provide some information on the sample and methods used in the study.

2. METHODS: SAMPLE AND MEASURES OF VARIABLES PREDICTING MIGRATION

(i) Sample

The Department of Labour surveys of second level school leavers deal mainly with the employment characteristics of school leavers one year to 18 months after they leave full-time education (Department of Labour, Economic Status of School Leavers, 1980 to 1989). The surveys are carried out by the ESRI Survey Unit for the Department of Labour, and are based on national stratified random samples (N = 2,000) of all school leavers from (circa) 200 schools each year. These, or their parents or guardians, are interviewed each May; at least a year after leaving school.

Since a very small proportion of school leavers (less than 5 per cent up to very recently) emigrate within one year of leaving school, these surveys are not a useful source of information on emigration. However, follow-up interviews with the 1981/82 sample of school leavers first interviewed in May 1983, were carried out in November 1984, and again in November 1987. Out of a total of 1,975 school leavers interviewed in the original, May 1983, survey, 1,850 were re-interviewed in November 1984 (Corcoran, O'Connor, Mullin, 1986), and 1,660 were again re-interviewed during the period November 1987 to February 1988 – now 5 to 6 years after they left school.

In addition, a further subsample of all third level entrants in the 1980/81 school leavers' survey was included in the last (1987) round of interviews. These were first interviewed in May 1982 after they had completed almost one year of third level education. This "double sample" of all third level entrants in 1981 and 1982 provides us with a sufficiently large sample of third level entrants in order to compare their

Table 6.1

Details of Sample and Interview Completion Rates – November 1987-February 1988. Interviews of 1981/82 School Leavers' Panel

Characteristic	No.	Per cent
Total Sample Interviewed (of which by Proxy)	1,990 (623)	83.6
Total Refused	127	5.3
Total other unattainable (even with callbacks)	59	2.5
Total deceased, ill or family moved and uncontactable	149	6.3
Other – non-completions	55	2.3
Total Sample Selected (incl., 1980/81 3rd level) (of which 1981/82 School Leavers)	2,380 (1,975)	100 —

progress with that of their peers who had directly entered the labour market upon leaving post-primary schools. Table 6.1 briefly summarises the sample and final interview outcomes.

The completion rate at 84 per cent was quite satisfactory. In order to avoid any sample biases however, the sample was reweighted to fully reflect the original sample characteristics: i.e. by level of education, sex, size and type of school, region, etc. In most of the following analysis, therefore, we use only the fully reweighted 1987 sample from the 1981/82 school leavers' survey (N = 1,658). This is done so that a directly comparable (and weighted) sample of 1981/82 school leavers can be compared at 3 points in their postschool career – May 1983, November/December 1984, November 1987.

(ii) The Main Variables Predicting Migration

This section describes the main variables used in the analysis: their conceptualisation and measurement, as well as how they individually predict migration. First, however, we describe the migration characteristics of the sampled cohort of school leavers.

(iii) Migration Behaviour

A number of variables measure the migration experience of individuals: mainly current migration status and migration status in May 1983 and November 1984. In addition, all school leavers resident in Ireland in 1987/88 were asked a number of questions about their future migration intentions.

Table 6.2

Percentage distribution of respondents (i.e., those interviewed in 1987 sample) by their migration status in 1987, 1984 and 1983

Migration Status	Migration Status 1987/8	Migration Status Nov. 1984	Migration Status May 1983
		%	
1. Staying in original home	48	72	82
2. Left home but staying in original county	14	4	4
3. Left, migrated to other Irish counties	14	14	13
4. Left, has emigrated	24	10	1
Total (n)	100 (1,630)	100 (1,630)	100 (1,630)

Table 6.2 summarises the migration position of respondents in 1987/88, November 1984 and May 1983.

Migration, and particularly emigration, increases markedly with time left school – from 1 per cent of the sample by 1983, to 10 per cent by November 1984, to 24 per cent by late 1987. Equally, within county migration, or local residential movement, increases from 4 to 14 per cent over time. Inter county movement within Ireland (at 14 per cent) stablises very soon after leaving school. Those living at home, however, decline markedly and progressively from 82 to 48 per cent over the 4½ years involved. The liberation of older children from direct parental control appears then to increase rapidly after 2 to 3 years at home upon completing second level education – mainly through emigration but also through local residential change.

Besides current emigrants, a significant proportion of respondents had previously emigrated and then returned and stayed: 7 per cent of the total sample in fact. And of the 24 per cent of current emigrants, one in eight had also emigrated, then returned to Ireland, then subsequently emigrated again. So, a considerable amount of to and fro movement occurs which is underestimated by current emigration status.

Not all of those still resident in Ireland, however, intend to stay here. In order to estimate these respondents' migration intentions, three different linked questions were asked:

(i) whether they had "considered leaving this part of the country to live and work elsewhere" [(Yes ( ), No ( )].

(ii) whether they "intended to leave?" Responses allowed ranged from "definitely yes", to "definitely no", and

(iii) whether they had "made any definite plans to leave".

Using the responses to these three questions the following scaled "migration intention" variable was constructed, and the scaled responses to this are given below.

Table 6.3:

Percentage distribution of respondents by their migration intentions

Migration Intentions	Responses (%)
1. Will "definitely" stay locally: have not considered migrating, or definitely do not intend to do so if have ever considered it:	51
2. Have considered migrating but probably will not leave: ("Probably No"); and have not made any definite plans to leave:	37
3. "Probably" or "definitely" intend to leave but have yet made no definite plans to:	4
4. Intend to leave, and have made definite plans to do so:	1
5. As (4) and intend to emigrate	7
TOTAL	100 (N = 1,106)

Intentions vary widely. Only around half definitely intend to stay locally. Although over a third had considered migrating, all of these said they probably would not and had not made any plans to do so. Twelve per cent, however, did intend to migrate, though only 8 per cent had made definite plans and arrangements to do so – most to emigrate. In total, therefore, of the total cohort, almost 40 per cent had either already emigrated at some time or had made definite plans and arrangements to do so.

The following two sections describe the main social-structural and social-psychological variables used to explain this migration behaviour.

(iv) Social Background Factors Predicting Migration

Seven social background variables are used: including socio-economic status of origin, gender, farm or non-farm origin, remoteness or rurality of place of origin, and unemployment rate of county of origin. Each variable is broadly defined below with specific details given in Appendix Tables A6.2 to A6.8. Although we give some details of the relationship between these individual variables and migration

behaviour below, this is for illustrative purposes only. The precise significance of these variables' relationships to migration will be interpreted later by using multivariate analysis.

Three main socio-economic variables are used: father's occupational status, and his and mother's educational level. Occupational status is coded using the new 6 category "social class" occupational codes published by the Central Statistics Office (Census of Population, 1986, Classification of Occupations, Social Class codes). The scale values range from 1 for Higher Professional and Higher Managerial positions to 6 for Unskilled Manual and Service positions. Farmers are assigned to occupational status levels on the basis of farm size. Education level of parents is measured using an ordinal 5 value scale: from 1 for those with a primary education to 5 for those with a university degree. (See Appendix Table A6.1).

In both cases there is a clear, though not a substantial positive correlation, between respondents' socio-economic status of origin, educational level of parents and migration behaviour and intention to migrate (see Appendix Table A6.1). Since these three variables are highly correlated with each other and their effects are generally co-linear, we constructed a joint variable – "socio-economic status" (SES) – to represent their joint effects.

"Remoteness" of respondents' community of origin was measured by using a modified "size/distance" measure, based on: (i) the size of place in which the post-primary school attended was situated; (ii) the estimated road distance of that place from the nearest town of greater than 3,000 population, divided by the adjusted size of that place; and (iii) the estimated road distance of the mid point of that county from Dublin, or nearest large regional (25,000+) centre of population, divided by the "adjusted" size of that place. (See Appendix Table A6.2).

The measure decreases with size of home place and size of nearest town, and increases with distance to nearest town(s) as well as with remoteness of counties from Dublin and from local regional centres of over 25,000 population. Although a somewhat crude "size-distance" measure, it does provide a good approximation of the relative size and remoteness of places of origin of respondents. The final figure ranges from a score of 1 for Dublin, 3 for Cork and Limerick City, to a "top score" of 750 for Geesala, Co. Mayo.

There is quite a high correlation between remoteness and migration behaviour (See Appendix Table A6.2). Those born in Dublin and other large urban centres are least migratory – with almost two-thirds still living at home. This proportion declines to less than one-third in the most remote rural areas. Within county residence movements are rather equal – around 15 to 20 per cent in most counties, except the least urbanised. There is a slight tendency – though not consistent – for both intercounty migration, and emigration, to increase with remoteness; with almost no intercounty migration from Dublin. If people leave Dublin they emigrate.

Emigration is most marked from the most remote localities, varying from around one fifth for the larger urban areas to over a third from the most remote areas. These high total out-migration figures – both emigration and internal (intercounty) migration – (at between 50 to 60 per cent) for the most remote rural communities conform relatively closely to those found in a number of recent regional studies (Brennan, 1988); though it should be noted that internal migration is almost as important as emigration in reducing local youth populations.

A closely correlated variable to remoteness is the extent of farming dominance in the local county. It is measured using the percentage of the county labour force in farming in 1981. It also has a low correlation (r = .10) with migration – the most farm dependent counties tend to be the most migratory ones, having relatively fewer off farm opportunities than the more urbanised and economically more differentiated counties.

Equally, the unemployment rate in a county has a low positive correlation (r = .11) with migration status in 1987. The county "unemployment rate" used was the 1981 rate of first time job seekers unemployed for the age group 15-19. This was the most appropriate measure available. Both the total unemployment rate for the county in 1981 (Census), or the estimated county unemployment rate from the combined 1986 + 1987 national Labour Force Surveys gave much lower correlations with migration tendency.[1]

There is a clear but unexpected gender effect (see Appendix Table A6.3). Although sons are less likely to have left the parental home than daughters, they are more likely to have emigrated. On the other hand, daughters are more likely to have left home, though much more likely to be living locally. Combined, however, home and local county residence is roughly equal for both sexes.

These are the main ascribed, or given, social background factors that are hypothesised to influence migration or emigration. Most of these effects, however, are expected to be mediated through – or operate through – their effects on educational level achieved.

(v) Educational Level Achieved, and Level of Aspiration

Educational level achieved is measured using an ordinal scale from 1 = early school leaver without qualifications, to 9 = postgraduate degree. There is a clear overall correlation between level of education achieved and actual migration by 1987 (r = .20), as well as between it and intended migration (r = .16). The higher the level of education the greater the actual emigration and internal migration rate, as well as the intended migration rate. (See Appendix Table A6.4).

(1) The "youth unemployment" rates for each county could not be calculated for later years as the sampling errors were too large for the data from the Labour Force Surveys.

Level of occupational aspiration (LOA) is measured by coding respondents realistically aspired to occupations, or current occupations if satisfactory, according to the ordinal "social class" scale already described: from 1 = higher professional, managerial, to 6 = unskilled manual/service occupations. Level of income aspiration (LIA) is measured using the net weekly income aspired to or currently satisfied with – net weekly take-home wage/salary. Since level of aspiration is only measured for these respondents resident in and interviewed in Ireland, it is only relevant for predicting migration intentions. Both have low to moderate correlations with migration intentions in the predicted directions (r = -.16 for LOA, and r = .08 for LIA): the higher the level of aspiration, the greater the tendency to migrate – with occupational aspiration being the more predictive variable.

This completes our description of the main background variables, as well as the intervening educational attainment and associated occupational and income aspiration variables. We next describe how we measured the motivational variables, as well as how they individually relate to migration.

3. MOTIVES UNDERLYING INTENTIONS TO MIGRATE

Five direct migration motivating factors have been proposed: beliefs about the local attainability of (1) occupational, and (2) income aspirations; (3) degree of attachment to or alienation from one's local community or society; (4) the individual's own sense of self-confidence or personal initiative; (5) attitudes towards important local institutions – in this case the adequacy of educational preparation for employment.

Questions about these issues could only be asked of respondents interviewed in Ireland and are only relevant to their intended migration behaviour. Since almost all of those who definitely intended to migrate had made plans to emigrate, and since it appears that most internal migration movements had already occurred by late 1987 for this cohort, the "migration intention" variable can be generally taken as measuring "emigration tendency" – and is so interpreted here.

Beliefs about local occupational and income attainability are measured by combining the answers to two separate questions: (a) "How satisfied are you with your present employment (unemployment)/income?". Responses ranged from "Very Satisfied" (1), to (4) "Very Dissatisfied". If "dissatisfied", respondents were asked: (b) "Do you think it is likely you would get this type of job (or "this level of income") – while living in this area"? Responses again ranged from (1) "Very Likely" to (4) "Very Unlikely".

The final two scales for "Occupational" and "Income Satisfaction", with respondents' distributions, are given in Appendix Table A6.5. The level of satisfaction is very high. with three out of four respondents at least satisfied with their employment/occupational status, and two out of three with their current income status. But 11 to 15 per cent are very dissatisfied and do not believe that their aspirations can be achieved locally – though, again, more so with income than occupation. There is a moderate correlation between "migration plans" and "occupational satisfaction" (r = .36). This is slightly greater than the correlation with income satisfaction (r = .27). There is quite a high correlation (r = .63) between both economic "satisfaction" variables, however, so that their joint effects will not be as great as their individual correlations suggest.

Satisfaction with one's society ("Soc. Sat.") is measured using a set of 5 typical attitudinal items which referred both to respondents' beliefs about responsibility for their own employment situation – self or societal; and questions about their own and their friends employment prospects. Combined, the 5 scaled responses to these questions formed a highly intercorrelated and reliable attitudinal scale (Alpha = .76). This measures both respondent's general attitude towards societal causality for his/her poor economic position, as well as associated beliefs about local employment chances. (See Appendix A.1). The attitude ranges from general personal and societal optimism (1 = highly satisfied) to extreme pessimism (4.0 = highly dissatisfied). The average attitude is one which tends to take personal responsibility for one's own fate, and one which is on average economically and socially optimistic. It is predictive of migration planning (r = .11): the higher the societal dissatisfaction, the greater the tendency to emigrate.

The attitudinal scale used to measure personal initiative/self confidence is a highly reliable (Alpha = .78) attitudinal scale constructed from the scaled responses to 7 attitudinal type question. These are, to some extent, the mirror image of the questions used for "Soc. Sat." (see Appendix A.2). The final scale varied from: 1 = highly lacking in self confidence, to a maximum score of 4 = highly self confident, or positive feelings of self competency and effectiveness. The higher the score, the greater the self confidence. There is a negative correlation (r = -.10) between "Self Conf." and migration planning: the more self confident one is the less likely one is to plan to migrate. However, "self confidence" is highly correlated with local occupational and income satisfaction, as well as with level of aspiration. So, such feelings of self competency may be fully mediated through "economic motivations". Later multivariate analysis will decide this issue.

The final social psychological measure is one of satisfaction with, or alienation from, local educational (institutional) provision – specifically its adequacy in preparing respondents for work life. This is felt to be the most important and relevant dimension of educational provision for our purposes. This scale is constituted by a 6-item attitudinal scale. The scaled responses to the 6 questions are highly intercorrelated and form a highly reliable Likert scale (Alpha = .81; see Appendix A.3).

Variation in attitudes to education is, as hypothesised, correlated with migration plans (r = .11): the more negative the attitude the greater the tendency to plan to

move. However, again, such attitudes are correlated with other more economically related attitudes, so that only multivariate analysis can determine its relative affect.

This completes our description of the main predictive variables. The individual correlations with migration decisionmaking suggest that the main social-psychological variables of significance are cognitive rather than emotional, and more economic rather than social. Appendix Table A.6.6 provides a summary of the main variables individual relationships to migration intentions – showing clearly the greater importance of occupational and income considerations in migration decisions.

However, most of these independent migration prediction variables are moderately to highly correlated with each other. We need, therefore, some multivariate method of analysis, like multiple regression, to sort out their individual or joint effects on migration planning. This is attempted in a following section. However, before we examine the joint effects of these variables on migration planning we first examine the more direct, though more naive, reasons that people give for migrating.

4. EXPLAINING MIGRATION DECISIONS

(i) Reasons for Leaving

The set of reasons given by respondents, or their parents – if emigrated, for emigration decisions is examined in this section. We particularly examine the reasons underlying the emigration decisions of those who had a job in Ireland before emigrating; and who, on face value, did not have a clear "economic push"to their migration decision.

Of course, such "reasons" given for any behaviour already carried out are particularly subject to post-factum rationalisation. Nevertheless, a detailed examination of them is very revealing, particularly where one can compare them, as here, to the predictive power of respondents' attitudes and beliefs which pre-date actual migration behaviour.

First, where school leavers had already emigrated and could not be contacted, their parents were asked: "What was the main reason why (the person) left the country?". Five possible reasons were pre-coded – although the responses were open-ended. (See below). The pre-coded "main reasons" do exclude – except as a residual "other" – many non-occupational and non-income reasons. This will have to be kept in mind in our conclusions.

For those emigrated in 1987 the following reasons were given:

		%
1.	To take up employment, previously arranged:	33
2.	To look for work, not previously arranged:	53
3.	To continue further education:	5
4.	Because family or spouse was emigrating:	1
5.	Low Incomes or High Cost of Living in Ireland:	4
6.	Other	4
	Total	100 (n = 485*)

* Total number ever emigrated.

The predominant reasons given are to do with employment and to achieve satisfactory occupational positions – almost 90 per cent, not because of low incomes in Ireland as such; though obviously both are linked.

Of the 92 local respondents who had made definite plans to emigrate, the following slightly different set of reasons were given. As can be seen the two optional response sets are different, so direct comparisons have to take this into consideration. Nevertheless, even with the introduction of more frivolous answer categories employment and occupational attainment reasons still dominate. But more frivolous reasons like "adventure" or societal dissatisfaction become important for over one in four would-be emigrants.

	Reasons for Deciding to Emigrate	%
1.	To get a job (unemployed), or get a better job:	45
2.	Sense of adventure, would like to see the world:	23
3.	Inadequate income level or cost of living too high:	9
4.	Further education:	2
5.	Can't stand living here – even with good job:	3
6.	Other reasons:	15
	Total	100 (n = 92)

The predominant rationales given for having migrated or for planning to migrate, therefore, are to do with employment or the achievement of a satisfactory occupational status. For those now planning to migrate, however, although employment is still the dominant motivating reason given (45 per cent), it is clear that a range of other rationales are of significance: particularly a "sense of adventure" or ambition to "see the world". Inadequate incomes and high cost of living locally do not appear to be of any great importance in either case once, of course, a satisfactory job had been secured.

For those already left, emigration rationales vary somewhat by educational level. For all levels the dominant one is employment, varying from 80 per cent of those emigrants without any qualifications to 91 per cent for those with a Leaving Certificate. But the tendency to emigrate without an arranged job, in fact to go and search for one, holds for 60 to 73 per cent of those with an Inter. Cert. or lower qualifications; but declines to between 40 to 50 per cent of those going with a Leaving Certificate or higher. The lower the level of education, the greater the tendency to leave without any arranged job.

For those planning to migrate, on the other hand, "adventure" is only an important rationale for those with high levels of education; while going to search for a job – not having one arranged, is the predominant rationale given (from 52 to 67 per cent) for those intending to leave with poor levels of education. For those with poor education and poor employment prospects at home, therefore, their emigration appears to be primarily employment-driven, with a disproportionately high number going with poor pre-planning. For those with better education, not only is their emigration less likely to be employment-driven but when they emigrate they are much more likely to have pre-planned their movement.

(ii) **Reasons for Emigrating – Those With Jobs in Ireland**

Since many emigrants had left directly from jobs, employment "push" factors are not the only important factors in migration decisions. The following shows the Irish employment status characteristics of all emigrants just previous to emigration.

	Pre-emigrant Employment Status	Responses %
1.	Left from a job (80 per cent of which were permanent full-time jobs)	42
2.	Had just lost job or temporary job completed	7
3.	Unemployed or on State Scheme for some time	35
4.	Directly after full-time (third level) education or after holiday having completed education	12
5.	Home duties, etc.	4
	Total	100 (n = 488)

A relatively high proportion (around a third) of emigrants left from full-time permanent jobs, with an additional 8 per cent or so leaving from temporary or part-time jobs. A slightly higher proportion (42 per cent) left from unemployment. The remainder usually left soon after completing full-time education (mostly third level). Eighty-four per cent of emigrants had, therefore, been in the Irish labour force for some time before leaving, and only a small minority had left directly upon completing education – mostly third level.

Many pre-emigration jobs had not been very satisfactory, however. A high proportion of previously employed emigrants gave reasons which related to seeking better jobs elsewhere. Almost sixty (58) per cent of the last Irish jobs these emigrants had were manual jobs, over a third (37 per cent) being semi- or unskilled manual or service jobs. Even taking the 1984 job status of all resident respondents – at an earlier stage in the labour market experience of this cohort and before most third level entrants had left college – only 46 per cent were in manual jobs in Ireland. So the job level of "Irish employed" emigrants was low even by their peers' standards. Bettering oneself", or getting a job higher in status and income than the one secured in Ireland, appears to have been an important reason for emigrating in many of these cases.

Although income level is one important aspect of such job evaluations, other aspects are also very important, e.g., general job quality and conditions of work, career or promotion prospects, general "status" of the job. Many Leaving Certificate respondents were in manual or low-paying service jobs – such as shop assistant – before emigrating: jobs below the "expected level" for their educational qualifications. It is clear, for instance, from comparing pre-emigration occupational status with post-emigration status that for those emigrants with Leaving Certificate or higher qualifications (around 70 per cent of all emigrants), over a third were upwardly mobile – or improved their occupational status – on emigration and only 12 per cent were downwardly mobile. As a result, the number of emigrants in semi- or unskilled manual or service jobs with these qualifications more than halved on emigration. Improvements in income levels were equally dramatic.

So, it appears that a significant reason for emigrating from permanent jobs was dissatisfaction with the greater extent of "trading down", or the extent of overcertification demanded by employers (Breen, 1984; Hannan, 1986), that had occurred in Ireland as youth unemployment rates increased rapidly up to the mid-1980s. Of course, almost all of these emigrants also substantially increased their incomes on emigration; so it is not possible to satisfactorily separate out the relative influence of both factors – though in all the "reasons given" for emigrating, occupational status reasons dominate.

Examining the reasons given for leaving their last job in Ireland, or the reasons given and arrangements made for emigration supports the "occupational status" interpretation of migration motives for those who left a job in Ireland. Of those with manual last jobs in Ireland, 40 per cent are said to have left them either because they lost the job or because of clear dissatisfaction with it, or to get a "better" job abroad. This is a proportionately higher level of dissatisfaction than amongst those who left from non-manual jobs (25 per cent). Such "occupational push" factors appear to be greater amongst those who had manual or service jobs here. The lesser significance

of "push" and the greater relevance of "pull" factors for those who were more advantaged locally is also indicated by their pre-emigration planning. While almost two-thirds (61 per cent) of the former – who had manual/service jobs – left having to "look for work" on arrival, only one-third (35 per cent) of the latter – with white collar jobs – were so badly organised.

Summarising this complex of underlying reasons for migration amongst those with jobs in Ireland, therefore, it appears that economic "push factors" are strongest amongst those with lower status manual or service jobs, and amongst the more poorly educated. In addition, they are less likely to have pre-planned their migration movement. This is clearly illustrated in the Table 6.4.

As one can see (from Row 1) a lower proportion of emigrants with a Leaving Certificate or higher qualification had entered the Irish labour force before leaving. This is particularly true for those with third level education. But of those with third level education who did have a job, a surprisingly high proportion had manual or service jobs – in general, ones below their peers' level of achievement. Although not strictly comparable, if one compares third level emigrants with locally employed graduates in 1987 – emigrants had roughly twice the proportion in manual jobs before leaving. Amongst the more highly educated emigrants, there appears, therefore, to be a significant proportion of disappointed achievers in Ireland. As we shall see in the next chapter, those with lower levels of education also achieved significant upward mobility on migration.

The probability of pre-emigration unemployment is highly correlated with educational level – one quarter of third level compared to half of those leaving without an Inter Certificate. However, even this understates the employment "push" factor for the more poorly educated. An estimated 70 per cent of the most poorly educated emigrants had, in fact, either been unemployed for some time or had just lost their jobs prior to emigrating, compared to about a third of those leaving with some third level educational achievement. But in the latter case, besides mobility or failure to enter the Irish labour force at all, occupational underachievement appeared to be an important underlying factor in a significant proportion of cases.

The extent to which the most poorly educated were "employment pushed" is clearly evident from their high unemployment levels but also from their poor "emigration preparation" arrangements – only a very small proportion had arranged jobs prior to emigration. On the other hand, those leaving with Leaving Certificate or higher qualifications appear not only to have been less subject to such directly impelling unemployment pressures in Ireland, but also appear to have left with much better emigration arrangements; although, even in their case less than a half had arranged jobs before emigrating.

The dominant consciously expressed reasons for migration, therefore, are economic or employment ones. However, such reasons given for migration, or for any other

Table 6.4

Percentage emigrants who were in labour force, unemployed, and who had arranged jobs before emigrating

Employment Characteristics of Emigrants Before Leaving Ireland	Level of Education Achieved			
	Pre-Inter Cert	Inter Cert	Leaving Cert	Third Level
	%			
1 Total Sample:				
% in Labour Force	97	97	91	62
% Unemployed	55	45	30	26
% Employed	43	51	59	36
(N – total)	(63)	(83)	(191)	(146)
2 Employed Emigrants:				
% in Manual Jobs in Ireland before emigrating	94	83	44	35
3 Total Emigrants:				
% Arranged Jobs before leaving	14	26	41	34
(N)	(58)	(83)	(188)	(151)

kind of uncustomary behaviour, can rarely be taken at face value. People tend particularly to "dress up" socially unacceptable motives – like trying to escape parental control, alienation from local, culturally conservative, institutional arrangements, or from locally unsatisfactory relationships. Such non-economic motives, of course, cannot be very important in explaining the recent upsurge in emigration – though they might be important in "normal" emigration.

For these rationalisation reasons, therefore, the normal research approach to discerning such underlying motives is to check independently the presence or strength of likely "motivating factors", and correlate these to decisions to migrate or stay. This is done in such a way as to avoid, as far as possible, having the respondent make any "logical connection" between the questions on likely "motives", and the questions on "decisions" or "intentions". Of course, we can use this procedure only with those respondents resident in Ireland whom we interviewed – so it is a somewhat biased sample of the total original cohort. If those already migrated, for instance, had left for more economically pressing reasons than amongst the residual sample who now intend to migrate, our procedure would obviously underestimate the effects of basically economic motivations. So in the following, we first analyse the combined or joint effects of the proposed objective background variables on

actual migration behaviour, and secondly, their effects – combined now with respondents' relevant motivating beliefs and attitudes – on migration intentions. If both results support the preceding analysis of emigration reasons, then we are in a much stronger position to generalise about "migration motives".

(iii) The Joint Effects of all Independent Variables on Migration Behaviour and on Migration Intentions

So far, we have examined only the relationship between individual variables and migration. Since these predictor variables are correlated with each other, however, we need to examine their combined effects. In this way, we can examine both the extent to which individual variables retain their effects when the influence of others are held constant, as well as the extent variables combine to have cumulative additive effects.

Since emigration, however, is a dichotomous variable, we first use Discriminant Analysis to estimate the predictability of the decision to emigrate (or not) by 1987/88 from information available on individuals from 1983 – the point of first interview. By 1987/88 31 per cent of all individuals had emigrated at some stage – though some subsequently returned, but 24 per cent were still emigrants.

In this two group case, therefore, Discriminant Analysis (DA) tries to find the best linear combination of independent variables, measured at some point preceding emigration (in this case 1983), to predict who will emigrate and who will not by 1987/8. Given these two groups and a set of k predictor variables, DA attempts to form a linear function of these k variables that best discriminates between the two groups. Once derived, these linear functions can be used to classify each individual into one or the other of the estimated groups on the basis of his/her sum of weighted scores on each of the predictor variables. The relative success of the method can be estimated by the degree of success in predicting group membership. So, the method both allows us see which of the variables actually discriminate between emigrants and stayers – when one has controlled for the effects of all other confounding variables, as well as allow us to, some extent, predict group membership in 1987/88 from information available in 1983.

Since we need to measure the predictor variables before emigration, the most appropriate time appears to be May 1983, when less than 5 per cent of this cohort had emigrated. Table 6.5 gives the results of this Discriminant Analysis using 8 predictor variables: 4 social background variables, level of education achieved, and 3 facilitating-constraining variables. The following table shows the joint effects of these variables in 2 separate analyses: the first showing the effects of the social background and educational variables acting together, and the second all 8 variables simultaneously.

The first analysis shows that all of the background and educational variables have significant effects, including gender. The size and sign of the coefficients broadly

Table 6.5

Two Stage Discriminant Analyses: Standardised Canonical Discriminant Coefficients for 8 independent variables (measured in 1983) predicting variations in Emigration Status in 1987/88

Independent (Predictor) Variables	I Effects of background and education variables (Std. Canonical Discriminant Coefficients)	II Effects of background and education variables, and facilitating/ constraining factors (Std. Canonical Discriminant Coefficients)
Background Variables		
1. Socio-economic status of origin	-0.45	-0.26
2. Gender	-0.23	-0.17
3. Remoteness	0.26	0.26
4. Farming percentage in county of origin	0.33	—
Education Variable		
5. Level of education	0.59	0.26
Facilitating/Constraining Variables		
6. Migration experience by 1983[1]	—	0.58
7. Marriage by 1984	—	-0.34
8. Unemployment experienceby 1983[2]	—	-0.16
N =	1556	1556
Canonical Correlation	0.147	0.187
Wilks Lambda	0.978	0.965
Chi Square	33.8	54.9
(P)	(<.001)	(<.001)
Percentage "Emigrated" by (1987/88) correctly classified:	54%	49%
Percentage total cases correctly classified:	59%	64%

1. Migration experience by 1983 is a Dummy Variable. 1 = had previously moved internally or had emigrated temporarily – mainly while on college holdiays; zero otherwise.
2. Unemployment experience by 1983: 3 = never employed, 2 = unemployed but previously employed, 1 = other.

indicate the relative magnitude and the direction of effects when one controls for all the other variables' effects in the equation. By far the greatest effect is that of educational level – the higher this is,the more emigration-prone the respondent. After education SES has significant additional effects – within each educational level, gender, and level of remoteness/rurality, the more middle class the social origin of respondents, the more likely they were to emigrate. And the more remote

the community and more rural, or farm dependent, the county of origin, the greater the emigration tendency. Interestingly, once the effects of all other variables are controlled for, females are significantly less likely to emigrate than males. This occurs despite the fact that females get a better education than males and overall are, therefore, more likely to emigrate, but within each level of education/remoteness/SES, females are less likely to emigrate than males.

Combined, however, the joint predictive ability of these 5 variables is very modest, with the canonical correlation only reaching .15. However, if we measure the proportion of actual emigrants correctly predicted, then we predict 54 per cent correctly. Given that we started from 0, this is quite an improvement. However, the total percentage of correct predictions only equals 59 per cent – so that quite a high proportion of non emigrants are also predicted to emigrate.

The addition of the three facilitating/constraining variables adds significantly to the explained variance, and reduces significantly the relative effects of the other, preceding, variables. The facilitating influence of previous migration experience is by far the greatest effect of all. And its relationship to educational level (third level educated having both moved internally and emigrated temporarily to a far greater extent than others), as well as to SES of origin, reduce substantially their independent effects on emigration behaviour. Besides previous migration experience, early marriage has a substantial negative effect, while unemployment experience also is negative – although its effect is not statistically significant.

With all other variables' effects being controlled, therefore, migration experience (by 1983), marriage, educational level achieved, socio-economic status of origin, and remoteness of community of origin all have significant independent effects on emigration. The most emigration-prone respondents are those who had previously emigrated, those who are single and unattached, with better levels of education, from higher socio-economic backgrounds, and from the more remote communities. At the other extreme the least likely to emigrate tend to be urban working class youth with very poor levels of education and with the poorest employment prospects in Ireland. Obviously, in this latter case, such serious economic "push" factors must be counteracted by other, primarily resource and opportunity, factors in emigration decisions. Gender, the unemployment rate in the county of origin, and the person's own unemployment history (by 1983) do not have independent predictive power. Their effects are mainly mediated through other variables – primarily through the higher levels of education of girls and their greater tendency to marry early; the higher remoteness/ rurality of farming origins and high unemployment counties, and the high correlation between poor educational attainment and unemployment.

These results relate to emigrating/staying – an either/or choice. Migration, however, is much more differentiated – from moving locally, to intercounty movement in Ireland, to emigrating to Australia. From all the evidence available so far, it appears that emigration can be safely regarded as a more extreme, or more final and more difficult movement than any local move. That is, that emigration expresses in a more extreme form those tendencies or pressures, and relationships to predictive or explanatory variables, observed for internal migration. "Difficulty" in the above sense refers to both the increasing costs involved in moving, the increased probability of having to create and cope with new relationships and novel circumstances, as well as the increased difficulty experienced in so doing. In addition the increased difficulty and costs of keeping in touch with one's family of origin and other local primary groups, as well as the associated psychical costs of coping with such breaks in important primary group relationships would be equally important. Given these circumstances, it seems reasonable to regard migration as an ordinal, more differentiated, variable. The following trichotomous variable is proposed: 1 = stayed locally, 2 = internal inter-county migrant, 3 = emigrant. Given such an ordinal variable, although we break some of the assumptions of the ordinary least squares regression procedure, it is sufficiently robust to use to estimate the same set of relationships between our set of 1983 predictive variables and overall migration behaviour by 1987/8. This is attempted in the following table.

All of the variables, as before, are measured at a set point preceding emigration – May 1983, and refer only to that part of the sample (over 98 per cent) that had not emigrated by that time. Since people emigrated or moved internally at different times over the whole period of observation, it was necessary to take one point at which both potential movers and non-movers could both be observed, and so that their differentiating characteristics could be measured before anybody had emigrated. Unfortunately, since a lot of the cohort – particularly those in third level education – had not yet entered the labour force by 1983, we cannot use occupational status achieved as a predictive variable. However, this is highly correlated with educational level achieved. The results from three separate regression equations are given in Table 6.6.

The first equation provides the results for the joint effects of the four social background variables proposed. Unemployment rate was dropped as it was highly correlated with remoteness, etc., and gave no additional discrimination. Three of these factors significantly affect migration behaviour: socio-economic status, remoteness of place of origin, and farming percentage in the county of origin. The higher the socio-economic status of origin, the more remote the community of origin, and the higher the proportionate importance of farming in the local economy, the greater the migration tendency. Once other factors are controlled for, like remoteness and farming percentage in the community, where females are disproportionately migratory (Hannan, 1970), gender itself has no independent effect on migration. Combined, these background variables explain a very modest 4 per cent of the variance in migration behaviour.

Adding educational level achieved to the equation (in equation 2) adds a further (significant) 2 percentage points to the explained variance. Controlling for all other variables, education adds moderately to the explained variance, while it barely

Table 6.6

Three Stage Multiple Regression of the Effects of 9 Independent Variables on Migration Behaviour by 1987

	Equation 1	Equation 2	Equation 3
Independent Variables	Effects of Social Background	1+Effects Educational Level	(1+2) Effects Facilitating and Constraining Factors
Social Background Factors		(Standardised Betas)	
1. Socio-economic status of origin[1]	-0.18**	-0.10**	-0.09**
2. Gender	-0.03	-0.05	-0.04
3. Remoteness of place of origin	0.08**	0.06*	0.06*
4. Farming percentage in county of origin	0.09**	0.08**	0.06*
Level of Education Achieved			
5. Level of education	—	0.16**	0.12**
Facilitating and Constraining Factors			
6. Migration experience by 1983	—	—	0.10**
7. Marriage by 1984	—	—	-0.07**
8. Unemployed 1983	—	—	-0.04
N =	1500	1500	1500
R^2 =	0.043	0.062	0.077
F =	16.98	19.8	15.63
P	<.001	<.001	<.001

* Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.

** Statistically significant at the 1 per cent level.

(1) SES is a composite variable, ranked from 1 to 6, which includes father's occupational status, his level of education, and mother's level of education. The weights used are those given in a principal components analysis on which these three variables loaded very highly on the first factor.

reduces the independent effects of any of the other significant variables. Education, therefore, does not fully mediate, or express, the effects of the background variables, both are significant: the higher the socio-economic status of origin, the more remote and the higher the farming proportion in the local economy and the higher the level of education, the greater the migration tendency. Two of these factors index familial and individual achievement factors (supply of labour) and two the local community's opportunity structures (demand for labour).

The third equation adds in the 3 "facilitating" or "constraining" factors – but only 2 of these prove to be significant: marriage and the extent of migration experience of respondents by 1983. This, in fact, has the strongest overall influence on migration behaviour after 1983: the greater the previous experience of moving, the greater the tendency to move again. Interestingly, both remoteness and "farming percentage" drop in importance once educational level and such migration experience is controlled for, though the relationships do not disappear. Obviously, people from remoter communities who had moved either for educational (third level) or occupational mobility purposes up to 1983 were more likely than others to migrate again: their experience and confidence in moving now likely to be the important variables, not the "push" factor of remoteness itself. Educational level also drops in importance in equation 3 – primarily because third level education itself requires migration, particularly from the most remote and most farm dependent counties.

Besides such previous migration experience, a person's marital status in 1984 had a significant effect. The single were much more migratory. Being unemployed in 1983 has no independent effect, however, on subsequent migration behaviour – once other factors are controlled for.

When tested, there is no evidence of (additional) significant interactive effects of these "facilitating" or "constraining" factors on migration. The effects appear to be primarily additive.

Because the research was not set up to test for migration decision-making preceding such actual migration, we have to work with a very limited set of variables. We have no measure of any motivational variables, or, indeed, of some of the constraining/facilitating factors that are likely to effect migration behaviour. Nevertheless, the discriminant Analysis and above regression results do allow a test of the effects of some crucial variables on both emigration and overall migration behaviour and they have given some very clear results; socio-cultural status of origin, remoteness and rurality, level of education achieved, previous migration experience and pre-migrant marriage status all have significant effects on migration behaviour. While gender, unemployment levels in county of origin, as well as unemployment experience of the individual, have significant univariate effects, these are, however, fully mediated through other variables in the multivariate analysis. Both multivariate analyses give similar results – showing that the same variables, by and large, operate in much the same way to predict emigration and overall migration experience; with some evidence, however, that previous migration experience plays a more important role in emigration than in total – particularly internal – migration.

(iv) Migration Intentions

The three multiple regression equations in Table 6.7 test for the effects of three different sets of predictor variables on migration intentions, from the most proximate social-psychological variables, to background social structural and associated educational achievement factors, to the facilitating/constraining factors. The possible interactive effects of the latter with the basic social-psychological variables are also tested. The regression equations do not fully test all the elements of the conceptual model of migration decision making presented in Figure 1, but for

Table 6.7

Three Stage Multiple Regression of the Effects of 16 Independent Variables on Explaining Variation in Migration Plans.

	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 3	Simple
Independent Variables	Proximate Social-Psych. Factors	+ Social Background Factors	+ Facilitating and Constraining Factors	Correlation "with Migration" Plans" (Pearson r)
A. Socio-Psychological Variables	(Beta)	(Beta)	(Beta)	(r =)
1. Occupational Dissatisfaction	.42**	.39**	.44**	.36
2. Income Dissatisfaction	.04	.06	.08*	.27
3. Level of Occupational Aspiration	-.17**	-.10*	-.09*	-.16
4. Level of Income Aspiration	.09*	.07	.07	.08
5. Societal Dissatisfaction	-.01	-.01	-.00	.14
6. Self-Confidence	.09*	.06	.04	-.12
7. Satisfaction with Education	.03	.05	.04	.06
B. Social Background & Educational Achievement Variables				
8. SES*		-.12**	-.08*	-.14
9. Level of Education		.09*	.04	.16
10. Gender		-.07*	-.07*	-.07
11. Remoteness/Rurality of original place of residence		.04	.02	.09
12. Unemployment in Co. of origin		.12**	.09*	.12
C. Faciliting/Constraining Factors				
13. Size of Migrant Network			.13**	.26
14. Married			-.20**	-.18
15. Extent of Previous Migration Experience			.16**	.19
16. Whether Unemployed (= 1)			-.15**	.14
N =	750	750	750	
R^2 =	.18	.22	.30	
F =	23.4	17.6	19.8	
P	<.001	<.001	<.001	<.001

Notes: * = p< 0.05
** = p< 0.01

our purposes they are more than adequate. "Migration Intention" is defined and measured as described earlier in Table 6.3 - except that scores 4 and 5 are combined: (1 = definitely staying; 2 probably staying; 3 = probably migrating; 4 = definitely emigrating). As previously indicated, this variable primarily indicates emigration tendency, not internal migration tendency.

Equation 1 shows the effects of the seven social psychological variables already discussed on migration planning. Combined, these seven variables explain 18 per cent of the variance in migration plans – but only four of these are statistically significant. And of these four, two dominate: beliefs about the local availability of aspired to occupations, and the status level of these occupations. The greater the extent to which respondents believe that they cannot achieve their occupational aspirations locally, and the higher the status level of these occupations, the greater the tendency to migrate. Level of income aspiration has some additional effect: the higher the income aspired to, the greater the tendency to migrate – irrespective of beliefs about the attainability of such incomes locally. "Income dissatisfaction" has no independent effect, it is fully mediated through its high correlation with "occupational dissatisfaction". The effects for "self confidence", when one controls for the effects of all other variables to which it is related, are as predicted: the higher the level, the greater the tendency to migrate.

Clearly, occupational/employment considerations are much more important than income per se in migration decisions – though the level of income aspiration is still important. But in general, income aspirations and beliefs are less predictive than, and are so highly correlated with, occupational aspirations and beliefs, that they play a much less substantial role in migration decision making.

It is clear from equation 2 that the migration effects of social background variables and educational level achieved are not fully mediated through their relationships to the above social-psychological variables. The causal path from them, proposed in Figure 1, is much more substantial than hypothesised. The addition of five such variables adds 4 percentage points to the explained variance: respondents' socio-economic status of origin, educational level, gender and the youth unemployment rate of the county of origin have significant additional effects on migration planning. In other words, over and beyond respondents' level of aspiration and beliefs about the attainability of their aspirations locally, those from upper middle class backgrounds, those with higher levels of education, males and those from counties with high youth unemployment rates, are more likely to plan to migrate. Indeed, far from fully mediating the effects of background variables when one controls for the latter's effect, the original effects of level of income aspiration and "self confidence" lose significance.

It appears from this, therefore, that aspirations for occupational (status) achievement, as well as actual local opportunities for employment and upward mobility, appear to be two of the main underlying forces in the migration process.

Besides the perceived absence of local employment opportunities, the higher the level of occupational aspiration, the higher the status of origin, the better the level of education, and the poorer the local opportunity structure, the greater the tendency to migrate. All of these have significant independent effects on migration planning. Educational level not only does not fully mediate social background factors but, albeit to a limited extent, the reverse holds: when all relevant – mainly social-psychological factors – are controlled for social background factors (SES) more fully explains education effects.

The effects from the addition of the 4 "facilitating/constraining" factors in equation 3 are surprisingly large. They add substantially – by 8 percentage points – to the explained variance, now up to 30 per cent. And, with one exception ("occupational satisfaction"), in relative terms they have larger independent effects on migration planning than any of the other variables. In other words, it appears as if the facilitating migrant network contacts of respondents and their own previous experience of migration – internal or external, have more predictive effects on migration planning then any other set of variables except for "occupational satisfaction". Clearly, large scale migration creates much of its own dynamic and is to some extent self-perpetuating. In addition, such "constraining" factors as marriage, and being unemployed have almost equally large effects. So, judged purely in terms of their direct additive effects on migration planning, such facilitating/constraining factors are extremely important.

The one surprising result is the effect of unemployment. Its direct effect was positive (r = +.14), as might be expected. However, when one controls for the effects of all other variables this effect becomes negative. All other things being equal, the unemployed are less likely to plan to migrate. The main mediating variables influencing the effects of unemployment on migration are the social psychological ones – the depressing effects on level of aspiration, and on beliefs about the attainability of these locally. Although the unemployed have lower levels of education and aspiration, they have substantially more negative beliefs about local economic opportunities. Once the effects of the latter variables are controlled for, however, the effects of unemployment per se – remain significantly negative. Obviously, both resource and other personal constraints operating on the unemployed, including lower network resources, combined with their generally lower level of self confidence, etc., significantly militates against migration; but also, the likely effects of expected eligibility for housing assistance and social welfare income maintenance payments, etc., must also be considered as possible factors here.

Besides such direct additive effects on migration planning, it was hypothesised that such facilitating and constraining factors would have additional interactive effects: that, for instance, "occupational dissatisfaction" would have a much greater effect on migration where the individual had extensive migrant contacts, or where he/she had already some migration experience. However, a number of additional equations testing for these interactive effects proved negative – there is no evidence of any significant interactive effects, and no additional variance is explained by adding in a set of interaction terms. This curious result – given the strength of the additive effects of the four constraining/facilitating factors – indicates clearly the cumulative facilitative effects of previous migration on current migration planning. In addition, it is clear that marriage and "settling down" has significant local commitment effects which impede migration. Again, here there is no evidence of significant interaction effects. The results also demonstrate clearly the negative effects that unemployment – particularly long-term unemployment – has on migration planning.

Besides the apparently dominating effect of economic and social mobility motives on migration planning, evident from equations 1 and 2, therefore, the results from the equation 3 regression demonstrate the quite significant effects that an increasingly favourable emigration climate has on emigration plans, as well as the dampening effect of assuming adult familial roles, or of suffering the resource-depleting effects of prolonged unemployment.

In conclusion then, it appears that it is mainly employment and social mobility motives that predict most of the explainable variation in migration intentions. The above, and the preceding, results clearly support the conclusions from our analysis of the reasons given for, or lying behind, emigration behaviour; and they even more strongly support the conclusions about the selective role that upward social mobility plays in migration. In both multiple regressions, however, with all relevant variables controlled, educational achievement plays mainly a mediating role. This is particularly obvious in equation 3 (Table 6.7) where it drops out of significance.

The effects of migrant facilitating and constraining factors are, however, much more important than was expected. Obviously, the cumulative growth in migration contacts and experience that has occurred since the early 1980s has itself generated an additional migration impetus.

Given the importance of education and social mobility motives in migration the following and final part of the results section attempts to illustrate, and provide an understanding of, the way it operates to increase migration.

5. EDUCATION, SOCIAL MOBILITY AND MIGRATION

What is clear from the foregoing is that both educational level achieved, and socio-economic status of origin are two of the main predictive variables in migration. Both variables have independent effects on migration – with the educationally mobile middle classes appearing to be the most migratory, while the stable working class appear to be the least migratory. This is particularly true for respondents born outside Dublin. So far, however, we have not dealt with the likely effects of actual occupational achievement.

For those respondents – the great majority – who have entered the labour market, we

Figure 6.2

Percentage Emigrated by (aggregated) Class of Origin (father's occupational status) and by Social Mobility Experience (current occupational status).



have detailed information not only on their status of origin (their father's occupational status) but also on the occupational status level they had themselves achieved by 1987/88. This latter tends to underestimate their eventual achievement levels, as first job, or job achieved within the first five years of entering the labour market, is usually the minimum achievement level over the life cycle. Nevertheless, the data are quite revealing of the underlying relationship between migration and social mobility. Since both occupational statuses (father's and respondent's current status) are measured on the same scale (1-6), already described, upward mobility is presumed to occur when current occupation is of a higher status than that of father's original status; "stable" when it is equal to his status, and "downwardly mobile" when it is lower than his status. Figure 6.2 summarises the relationships found with emigration rates.

The upwardly mobile middle class have the greatest tendency to emigrate – while the stable working class are the least migratory: the former being more than twice as migratory as the latter. The downwardly mobile working class – those from skilled and semi-skilled manual, and small farm, backgrounds who "moved down" the occupation status scale by one or two steps – are, however, slightly more migratory than other working class respondents. Clearly, therefore, upward mobility leads to greater emigration propensity only when the positions aimed at or achieved are quite elevated, and these are proportionately less plentiful in small economies. Interestingly, the social cost of downward mobility for the middle class do not appear to be so great that they force out-migration. In fact given the increase in the extent of "trading down" in job status achieved which was observed (Breen, 1984; Hannan, 1986) amongst school leavers from middle class and upper working class families that occurred as youth unemployment grew over the 1980s, the slightly greater emigration levels of downwardly mobile working class respondents may well be due to them being pushed out of the local labour markets.

There is no significant difference between the Dublin and non-Dublin born in these respects. However, as we have already seen, the emigration rate does not tell the full story about migration and social mobility. If we look at total ex-county of origin migration (including emigration), an even clearer relationship between social mobility and migration emerges:

	Percentage Total Migration from County of Origin
1. Upwardly mobile middle class	56% (113)
2. Stable middle class	45% (170)
3. Downwardly mobile middle class	37% (365)
4. Upwardly mobile working class	36% (444)
5. Stable working class	25% (188)
6. Downwardly mobile working class	28% (149)

Around half the stable and upwardly mobile middle class have migrated out of their county of origin compared to around one quarter of the stable and downwardly mobile working class. The educational and social mobility process is, therefore, quite predictive of out-migration. Of course part of the reason for the lower migration propensity of poorly educated working class respondents is their inability to find employment in any location, home or emigrant. These relationships are much more pronounced for the non-Dublin born respondents – primarily because so little inter-county migration occurs from Dublin (see Appendix Table 6A.2).

Clearly, therefore, educational and social mobility and migration are closely related processes, with the upwardly mobile middle class being the most migratory, the stable and downwardly mobile working class the least migratory. These relationships are most marked amongst people from the non-Dublin communities – but are, nevertheless, quite marked for Dubliners.

6. SUMMARY

Expectations and beliefs about employment and occupational attainment are the main motivating factors behind migration decisions. It is the expected or actual failure to achieve employment (occupational) aspirations locally that is the main personal motive explaining migration intentions and behaviour. Although other motives, like income aspirations and level of individual self-confidence, are also important, they drop out of significant once other factors are controlled for. Income dissatisfaction, though much less important than occupational attainment, does however, constitute an independent source of migration motivations.

Although failure to attain the occupational status wanted holds for all educational and status levels, it is most marked for those from middle class backgrounds with better education. But, even irrespective of occupational attainment possibilities locally, the better educated middle class respondent, particularly the upwardly mobile, are most dissatisfied with the Irish opportunity system and are most likely to emigrate. In fact, the upwardly mobile middle class are about twice as likely to have emigrated as those from stable or downwardly mobile working class or small farm origins. In addition, males are consistently more likely to have emigrated, or plan to emigrate, than females.

Remoteness and farming dominance in respondents' community of origin, as well as the associated level of unemployment in these communities, are also correlated with emigration and internal migration. Almost two-thirds of respondents from the most remote rural communities had left them within five years of leaving school: but in this case almost half of such migration was to larger urban places in Ireland rather than to emigration. Nevertheless, emigration itself does increase with remoteness of original place of residence – increasing from around one in five of those from the most urbanised communities to around one in three from the most remote rural communities.

The most surprising result, however, was the importance for emigration decisions of previous migration experience and of involvement in migrant networks. These were almost as predictive of emigration decisions as employment and occupational attainment motives. Their effects also are primarily additive, not interactive. It is not that they facilitate the implementation of emigration decisions already taken, but rather that they act independently to increase the probability of making an emigration decision. The extraordinary increase over the 1980s in the incorporation of young Irish people into interpersonal networks of emigrant friends and relatives has meant that most of them are not only well informed about labour market and living conditions in Britain, the United States, Australia and, to a limited extent, in some continental European countries, but that their own expectations are significantly influenced by these contacts and they can also use them in actual migration movements.

Nevertheless, irrespective of such migrant network contacts, the great majority of emigrants left only after a substantial period in the Irish labour force. Over 40 per cent left out of unemployment, about one in six from temporary or part time jobs, but somewhat over a third from permanent full time jobs. Only 12 per cent left on completing education without any Irish labour force experience. These were mostly third level graduates. Indeed, with the latter exception, the dominant picture is one where the great majority of emigrants had spent a lot of time in searching out opportunities in Ireland before taking up the emigration option.

In general, therefore, economic "push" factors appear to dominate the migration decisions of the more poorly educated, while occupational status and "pull" factors are much more important in the decisions of the better educated middle class. The extent of this "push" can be clearly seen in the very high proportion of the poorly qualified and unskilled emigrants who left home with very poor preparations made for emigration.

For many of the better educated middle class, on the other hand, emigration appears to be seen more as a normal option in career planning. Here the larger and better opportunity structure of the combined Ireland – UK – EC., and even US, labour market appears to be seen as almost equally accessible as that of Ireland's own, and emigration not much more problematic than internal movement within Ireland. Both the expectation about and, as we shall see later, the experience of emigration among the poorly educated and generally poorer younger people makes emigration a much more problematic and difficult option.

The significance of life cycle factors in emigration is very obvious, with the gradual assumption of adult roles, like marriage and children or housing investment, gradually choking off emigration tendencies.

Chapter 7

IRISH IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN BRITAIN

1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we deal with the social integration and economic performance of emigrants in Britain, the only country for whom adequate information is available.

Integration has many dimensions, and only some of them are addressed here. First, and most significantly economic integration refers to the experience of immigrants in terms of employment, income and economic activity. Secondly, social integration encompasses the entry of immigrants into the social, civic, organisational and institutional activities of the receiving country. Thirdly, cultural integration includes the adoption of the manners, lifestyle, customs and values of the host society.

These dimensions, although analytically distinct, are inter-related. For example, a recurrent theme in both popular perception and social research is the "melting pot" notion: assimilation gradually occurs across all dimensions through contact, accommodation and absorption. More recent analyses tend to emphasise the persistence of ethnically distinct groups, contributing to cultural pluralism in modern industrial societies despite substantial economic integration. Common to all views of the integration process, however, is the observation that a significant degree of economic participation (such as employment, self employment, ownership of assets or homes) underpins the wider process of integration. In our analysis we focus, for the most part, on economic integration, and specifically employment.

Clearly, immigrants' economic integration is a long term process and a proper understanding of it must incorporate three different elements:

(a) A detailed account of the "critical case" of acute migration problems affecting very young (16-20 year olds) emigrants, to understand the barriers to their minimal economic integration and participation;

(b) An analysis of the particular occupational entrees used by younger migrants, to determine how migrants commence their careers and enter the labour market;

(c) An analysis of the occupational and socio-economic attainments of emigrants, and second generation immigrants, across all age groups to ascertain the longer term outcomes of migrants' labour market and economic experience and how these compare with the indigenous population.

Each of these elements is contained in the chapter in a separate section and each is based on a distinctive data set which is described at the appropriate point. The different elements in the analysis, it must be emphasised, are inter-related as they all reflect the patterns and processes of economic integration of Irish immigrants in the UK. Recent public discussion of emigration has tended to be fragmented – focused either on the "problems" of young unemployed migrants in London seeking employment and housing, or on the issues raised by high levels of graduate or highly skilled emigration which may be partly induced by high marginal tax rates. The objective of this chapter, therefore, is to develop a comprehensive approach to the discussion of migrants' economic/employment experience. From this approach policies affecting both the specific categories of migrants and the elements of a general policy strategy are more likely to emerge. The policy conclusions and recommendations arising from this chapter are incorporated into Chapter 9.

2. IRISH IMMIGRANTS IN THE UK

Before proceeding to the main sections of this chapter it is useful to place Irish immigrants in the UK in context. The data in Appendix Table A7.1, from which Figure 7.1 was compiled, shows that Irish immigrants have historically constituted the single largest immigrant group in the UK. This has been the case since the first UK Census of 1841. In recent decades, however, both African – Caribbean and Indian – Pakistani immigrants have come to equal the Irish in significance.

In the period 1971-81 Irish-born immigrants declined by about 14 per cent, and at that point were only the top third or so largest immigrant group in the UK. This was a very substantial change from the 1950s. The relative size of these groups has probably been affected by substantial Irish emigration since the last UK census in 1981, so the Irish immigrant population may therefore have resumed its numerical dominance since then.

A second feature of Irish immigrants in the UK is their sex ratio. Details of the sex ratio (males per 100 females) of selected immigrant categories, classified by age, are given in Appendix Table A7.3. The summary of those figures, for all ages, is presented in Figure 7.2 below. Relative to the indigenous UK population and to other immigrant groups the Irish sex ratio is low: 92 per 100 in 1971 and 88 per 100 in 1981. This feature of Irish emigration has been explained by Coleman (1983) in terms of very wide disparities between Ireland and the UK in the general opportunities available to women.

The geographical concentration of Irish immigrants in the UK is their third notable feature. As Figure 7.3, and the full data in Table A7.2 on which it is based reveals, a very significant proportion of Irish immigrants reside in the South East region. It is by no means clear what the basis of this concentration is: it may reflect perceptions

Figure 7.1

UK IMMIGRANTS

Country of Birth



of employment opportunities, the operation of kinship contacts and migrants' networks, or other factors.

In marked contrast to the demographic and social significance of Irish immigrants stands the absence of comprehensive, authoritative research on the subject. The most comprehensive study, J.A. Jackson's *The Irish in Britain*, was published over 25 years ago (Jackson, 1963). Rex and Moore's classic study *Race, Community and Conflict* contained some material on the Irish, but the study was of one local area in Birmingham and dealt with the interaction of the Irish with the local community (Rex and Moore, 1967). Hughes and Walsh's (1976) work provides invaluable statistical information on the characteristics and economic status of recent Irish immigrants to Britain in 1966 and 1971. Contemporary sociological studies include O'Brien's, whose field work was undertaken in 1972/3, and which reported that the

Figure 7.2

SEX RATIO

Immigrants and UK Population



better educated Irish integrated more rapidly and more successfully and were less reliant on an Irish social network (O'Brien, 1981). O'Donovan's recent study of cultural integration compared Dublin and Birmingham Irish in respect of attitudes, and religious and moral beliefs. She found that there were no substantial differences in religious practise or educational aspirations, but that the Birmingham Irish actively sought to resist cultural assimilation and displayed significant differences in respect of moral attitudes, cultural activities and attitudes to the media and other issues (O'Donovan, 1984). The need for definitive and representative research is now urgent.

Figure 7.3

PERCENT RESIDENT IN SOUTH EAST

Country of Origin 1981



3. THE INTEGRATION OF RECENT IRISH IMMIGRANTS IN LONDON

This section reports the first part of our analysis of integration. It documents the experience of recent emigrants to London – their main destination, the nature and scale of their adjustment problems, and their labour market performance. This analysis is based on a number of data sources:

- statistical data kept by emigrant welfare agencies;
- the results of extensive interviews with relevant personnel in emigrant welfare agencies in London and in Ireland;
- data on the characteristics of the total flow of young Irish born immigrants into the British labour force - who would have gone to Britain in the 1980s. (FAS/ESRI 5 year follow-up survey; special tabulations from the British Labour Force Surveys.)

It is estimated that an annual gross outflow of Irish emigrants of 53,000 to 55,000 occurred in 1987 (see Chapter 2). With an estimated two thirds of these going to Britain, and two thirds of the latter going to the London area, this gives us a total of around 24,000 emigrants who would have gone go London in 1987. We estimate from agency records that around 6,000 new, or first time, Irish emigrants sought help from the main Irish community care or service centres in London in 1987/8 (in Camden, Hammersmith, Harringey, Brent, Wimbledon), as well as in the main central London advice centres or nightshelters. Since we do not know how many of these sought help from more than one centre (only a minority of centres provide this information), we assume that over a third did so. This gives us a total of between 3,500 to 4,000 first time Irish emigrants who sought out and received some help from Irish centres or from emergency agencies in London in 1987/8. This suggests that a total of between 15 to 17 per cent of recent Irish emigrants to London encountered sufficiently serious difficulties as to seek out help from these agencies. The great majority of these did so during their first month in London (See annual reports of the Camden and Hammersmith ICCs).

There is one research study (Connor, 1985) of the characteristics of, and problems faced by, Irish emigrants who have come in touch with the main Irish and British welfare agencies in London. This study, in combination with the main data sources noted above, provide a good picture of the most serious problems faced by Irish emigrants in the London area, as well as of the relevant characteristics of these emigrants.

It is necessary to enter two disclaimers at this point, however:

(i) We have no information about that small proportion of emigrants – probably the poorest and most at risk who are so poor financially and psychologically that they end up homeless and sleeping rough almost immediately on arrival in London, and who do not even get in touch with these caring agencies;

(ii) The information available also does not refer to that unknown proportion of other emigrants who encounter serious problems but who are amongst that 80 to 85 per cent who use the 'normal' emigration network procedures, and do not seek help from the emigration welfare agencies.

It should be noted, of course, that in most of what follows we are dealing only with that 15 per cent or so of Irish emigrants to Britain who experience sufficiently acute problems as to seek help from these welfare agencies. Other sections of this chapter deal with the total sample of emigrants – 80 to 85 per cent of whom do not seek such welfare help. Nevertheless the number of such emigrants with serious problems – at around 4,000 per annum – is so high that it requires separate analysis and serious policy consideration.

This figure of one in six or seven of Irish emigrants who experience particularly acute problems from migration, however, indicates that up to 6 out of 7 emigrants

make their own way without coming into contact with such helping/caring agencies. This does not mean that they have no difficulties. The information on the housing situation of the Irish in London suggests that on average they have more serious difficulties with accommodation than their British-born equivalents. They are also more likely to have less satisfactory housing conditions in some respects than most immigrant ethnic groups.

Consistent with the growth in overall emigration levels all of the emigrant welfare centres reported rapid growth in numbers since 1983. The experience of the main Irish centre in Camden appears to be typical – with the number of new arrivals jumping from 1,010 in 1983 to 3,300 in 1986. Numbers increased again in 1987 but appear to have stabilised by 1988, with some centres showing a decline.

Three main problems troubled emigrants who approached these centres: (i) lack of accommodation, (ii) difficulty in finding suitable employment, and (iii) difficulty in securing social welfare payments. Underlying these presenting problems, however, were certain persistent or structured features of the London housing and labour markets, as well as welfare arrangements. In addition certain distinguishing characteristics of clients were important, as these affected their ability to negotiate satisfactory accommodation, welfare and employment arrangements in London.

First, underlying the accommodation problem is a serious housing crisis in London, and the problem of emigrants coming to London without adequate planning and preparation, and with inadequate resources. Given the accommodation crisis in London, a first time emigrant needs at least Stg400 alone to secure a flat or bedsit: for a security deposit and one month's payment in advance. For various reasons private rented accommodation is very scarce and has been a declining sector in the housing market for some time. In addition to these direct accommodation expenses emigrants need money to live on while they wait to get a job and their first wage/salary payment. So, unless resident relatives or friends can help to secure satisfactory accommodation, a new emigrant needs to bring around Stg600 to get satisfactorily established. Most people turn up at welfare centres with less than Stg100, many with less than Stg30, and some penniless. Since many of these emigrants come from relatively poor families in Ireland, and have been unemployed themselves for some time before emigrating, it is difficult to see how they could build up such resources before going abroad. In addition, most of those in touch with the welfare agencies appear to have limited migrant network support in London.

The most serious employment difficulties were faced by those with very poor educational or training qualifications. But many other emigrants with quite good qualifications were also having difficulty finding suitable and adequately remunerated employment. Besides the fact that access to well paid non-manual (white collar) jobs takes longer to negotiate, and requires more preparation and resources than access to manual or service jobs, the recognition of Irish educational and training qualifications/certifications emerged as a serious problem faced by Irish emigrants in most of our interviews. And this difficulty in realising the full value of educational qualifications is supported by much of the research and statistical data available (Hornsby-Smith et al., 1988). Obviously any lack of knowledge by applicants, or bias in the beliefs and expectations of employment agencies or employers, could play a crucial role in translating Irish educational or training qualifications into labour market opportunities.

Underlying the difficulties with social welfare payments were a number of problems such as, the recent introduction of more stringent application procedures and criteria, people coming with inadequate identification and inadequate understanding of the structure and nature of entitlements in the British social security system. In addition, however, even where personal identification appears to have been adequate (in terms of statutory regulations) the identification offered is often not accepted as sufficient by social security staff. There are persistent reports of apparent prejudicial attitudes being expressed by some DSS officials, so making it much more difficult for Irish than British migrants to London in claiming benefits. The most serious difficulties, however, arise with most young people under 18 who now have no social welfare entitlement other than access to the Youth Training Scheme.

Having noted the general problems in relation to employment, housing and social security we deal more fully with the following aspects of Irish immigrants experience: (a) the main background characteristics of the immigrants who seek help, (b) the most serious problems that they face; (c) the extent to which prejudice and discrimination exists against Irish immigrants in Britain; (d) the general integrational or acculturation problems that immigrants face in Britain; and (e) the issue of the recognition of Irish qualifications.

(i) The Characteristics of Emigrants Who Have Sought Help

As we have seen already, young Irish emigrants to Britain tend to be better educated than the national average. However, the evidence available from the Irish community care agencies in London show that those emigrants who sought their help and had experienced greatest difficulties of access to jobs, accommodation or social welfare payments tended to be from the most poorly educated part of the total stream of emigrants, to be disproportionately male, to be somewhat more likely to come from urban areas, and to have come much more poorly prepared than others. To be successful there, in other words, the economic system normally assumes a good education, the housing system a good income, and the social welfare system that one be a well informed resident.

The information available from the London Irish centre at Camden, the biggest and best resourced of all the centres, for instance, indicates that one third of all their new

clients in 1987 and 1988 (over two thirds of whom had been less than one month in the UK) had left school before 15, and 45 per cent of those had no educational qualifications (n = 2078 in 1988). Since less than 5 per cent of each youth cohort leave school before 15 and less than 9 per cent leave without taking any examination (Department of Education, Statistical Report, 1985/6; Hannan, 1986) there is obviously a disproportionate concentration of emigrants facing difficulties who have minimal or no educational qualifications.

Around three quarters of Camden emigrant welfare clients were male and over one third were from Dublin or Cork. Most of the remainder appeared to come from urban rather than rural areas (London Irish Centre, Annual Reports, 1987, 1988). Only 14 per cent of the new clients were 18 or under in 1987, and only 7 per cent in 1988 – a figure that has been decreasing for some years; but particularly after April 1988 when the severe restrictions on social welfare payments for those under 18 came into force. The information from Hammersmith and Harringey care centres show somewhat the same pattern – a clearly disproportionate concentration of emigrants with poor educational/training characteristics, a low and decreasing proportion of younger emigrants – under 18, and a clear male bias (over 70 per cent) amongst those seeking help.

The very poor educational qualifications of those seeking help in the Irish centre at Camden is not, however, a universal finding. Connor's (1985) study of a sample of Irish users of advice agencies, night shelters or hostels in 1985, showed, for instance, that 28 per cent had not sat for any examination at all, 42 per cent had taken the Group or Intermediate Certificate, while 34 per cent had taken the Leaving Certificate or higher. These are somewhat better educational qualifications than those for Camden for 1987/88. If, however, we concentrate on the higher level qualifications, Connor's figures are close enough to those of the Camden centre – 28 per cent of whom had Leaving Certificate or higher qualifications. It may well be then that differences in reported educational levels are due to differences in questions asked rather than to any actual differences in qualifications: for example, those giving 'no qualifications' in the Camden study may have taken, but not passed, the Group or Intermediate Certificate examinations. Since, however, over two thirds of recent Irish cohorts reach at least Leaving Certificate levels, and since emigration is selective of the more highly educated, both figures show the highly selective flow of poorly educated clients to these agencies.

The previous employment and occupational histories of emigrants facing difficulties is equally revealing. The great majority had previously taken, or were seeking manual (mostly unskilled and semiskilled) or service occupations. And a high proportion had been unemployed before leaving Ireland. In Connor's (1985) study over 70 per cent had been unemployed at some time and almost two thirds had been unemployed before coming to London.

(ii) The Migration Decision and Migration Preparation

The decision to emigrate does not appear to have been taken lightly or on the spur of the moment by the majority of emigrants, even by those who had encountered sufficiently serious adjustment problems in London to seek help from advice/welfare centres. This becomes clear in the research carried out by Connor (1985): over two thirds of their clients had thought over the decision for some time – around half for over a month before leaving. Around one third, however, had made a very hasty decision and departure from Ireland. These figures clearly overstate the quality of preparation, however: over a third of the clients of these helping agencies had come to London with less than £30 in their pockets, and 60 per cent had no accommodation arrangements made before leaving. The rest had made arrangements to stay temporarily with relatives or friends. At the time of seeking help, however, only 13 per cent were staying with relatives/friends and only 11 per cent in a bedsit/flat, while 60 per cent were staying in temporary accommodation in lodgings, boarding houses or hostels: a clear majority in unstable, temporary accommodation. With their poor education and poor employment history and prospects, the serious difficulties evident in the private rented and public sectors of the housing market in London makes it very difficult for such youth to get established.

The main motivation for leaving Ireland given by clients of these agencies was an economic one: around half to find work, over half being unemployed at the time of emigration. However, other motivating factors were almost equally as important: being depressed with Ireland and prospects here (21 per cent), and escaping from familial and personal problems (19 per cent) were the main additional motives given (op. cit., p. 33). For many people a number of factors coincide: underlying difficulties – particularly being unemployed or under employed – combine with the familial and personal pressures which accompany such economic under-achievement.

Where people feel that they have to emigrate for economic reasons many go to England with negative images or feelings about Ireland – in that it has failed them and many of their peers. But they have migrated to a country where, in many respects, an Irish identity is forced upon them in ways which reinforces that negative image. This may be very direct as in personal experience of anti-Irish media outbursts etc., which accompany the Northern Ireland troubles or IRA atrocities perpetuated in Britain. Where people also come with false ideas of how easy it is to get a job, or to find accommodation, or to get social welfare and public housing support, they may be quickly thrown into crisis. This is likely to be particularly true for those from less advantaged backgrounds and with poor levels of education. As a result, it was alleged in some of our London interviews, young emigrants – a small minority – succumb to persistent unemployment, homelessness, and a street-wise life of petty crime and poor health. This, although it may be a small minority, is the most deprived group amongst all our emigrants, and sufficiently small to be open to positive policy intervention.

Since, however, many of the most seriously disadvantaged emigrants to Britain come from familial and communal backgrounds in Ireland where there is substantial alienation from both religious and State institutions, they cannot be absorbed easily into the stable older Irish community in Britain; and they are not easily "accessible" to policy interventions before they leave Ireland. Their deprived status is so low in Britain, however, that they clearly deserve serious policy attention.

(iii) Housing

Getting suitable, good quality accommodation is one of the most important and most difficult tasks faced by new emigrants to London. There is a major housing shortage, so that it is both costly and difficult to get good quality accommodation. Where migrants do not at least have Stg400 to spend on getting accommodation when they first go to London, and have enough money in addition to live on while they seek work, or have substantial help from relatives/friends, housing remains an extremely serious problem for them. When poorly qualified young people emigrate with inadequate resources and poor preparation, and have difficulty in getting jobs, their housing problems quickly escalate. As a result many such young Irish people end up in temporary hostel accommodation or in squats or, worst of all, sleeping rough.

The housing characteristics of the total Irish population of London in 1981 (special tabulation from the 1981 Census; Connor, 1987, p. 43) showed a considerable under representation in owner occupation (35 per cent against an average of 49 per cent), an equal over representation in local authority housing (39 per cent as against an average of 31 per cent) as well as in private rented furnished accommodation. The latter is the lowest quality housing of all with the poorest level of facilities. The main under representation, however, is in privately owned housing where the Irish have the lowest representation of all ethnic groups, except emigrants from Bangladesh. Except for the higher proportions in poor quality rented private accommodation there is no direct evidence in these figures of under representation of Irish people in public housing provision. However, one would need detailed information on the income position and living conditions of Irish and other ethnic groups in order to come to firm conclusions on the existence of any discrimination in public housing allocation (see Connor, 1987, pp. 44-5).

Over all the London boroughs, therefore, the housing conditions of the Irish born tend to be significantly poorer than the average, particularly in their concentration in poor quality private rented accommodation, in overcrowding levels, and in the provision of basic household facilities like a private bath or WC. The Irish have substantially worse amenity provision in the private (furnished) rented sector than all others, and they have a much higher proportion living in households which are not self contained – even higher than all new Commonwealth emigrants (Connor, 1987, p. 46).

The most serious housing problems are obviously faced by the most deprived. There are many aspects of the accommodation crisis that affect these migrants who are unable to establish a foothold. Given their poor economic position they would normally be prime targets for local authority housing. However, because of the serious cutbacks in local authority funding in London these predominantly young and single migrants have a low priority in public housing. If unemployed, over 18 and less than 25 they can get a boarding or lodging allowance for 8 weeks – primarily for bed and breakfast accommodation, but have little hope of getting permanent local authority flats. The new housing regulations effectively mean, therefore, that such public housing provision is no more than a short term provision. Indeed because of the fact that they are not treated as a separate ethnic group they appear to have lower chances of such housing than migrants from the newer Commonwealth countries.

The housing problem is particularly acute for poorer families. Even where families are accepted as meeting all the criteria for local authority housing, for example, they may have to wait in bed and breakfast accommodation for over one year before they can be rehoused. And because of the severe pressure on local authority housing, criteria like that of 'intentionality' (of leaving a local authority house in another area voluntarily, as being voluntary homeless) are now being used by most London boroughs. Any nascent anti-Irish feelings amongst harassed housing officials will mean that such Irish housing applications do not receive a very positive reaction.

Given the high Irish concentration in poor quality rented accommodation and some limited evidence of official discrimination against poorer Irish in public housing provision (e.g. the behaviour of Camden Council in 1988 in repatriating "intentionally homeless" Irish people, a treatment not extended to other emigrant ethnic groups), pressure to ensure fair and equal access to public housing provision must be a first priority in emigrant housing.

Many of the studies of the homeless single in London show that the Irish are disproportionately represented: over a quarter of those in short stay hostels and emergency housing projects being Irish in one survey (O Meachair et al., Irish Homelessness, 1988) and over a third in another (SHIL, Move on Housing, 1988). Even in these cases access to 'move on' housing – in those hostels with provision for the gradual normalisation of accommodation arrangements for their clients – is disproportionately biassed against Irish participation: the Irish being 6 per cent of those nominated for permanent housing in one study whereas over a third of their temporary housing residents were of Irish origin (ibid., p. 6).

Squatting in temporarily vacant but generally poor accommodation is an alternative which some young people adopt. But with overcrowding, often inability to choose one's flat mates, sometimes difficulty with the law which may lead to criminalisation, it is an option that is not advised by welfare agencies except in extremes.

The Irish and other voluntary hostel associations do provide temporary accommodation and some of these operate a programme of long term settlement (into bedsits and from there into private accommodation) but they have resources to do this for only a minority of their clients. There are some inherent dangers of long-term dependence and institutionalisation for the provision of long-term hostel accommodation. So in any such hostel developments in future, provision for resettlement into independent, secure and long-term private housing should be ensured. Besides the obvious institutionalisation dangers of such long-term hostel accommodation there is a more basic policy issue involved in expending Irish funded voluntary hostel provision: – the danger of reducing the pressure on British local authorities to provide qualifying Irish migrants with housing on the same basis as their British born equivalents. So the main policy response should first be to ensure that Irish emigrants are treated fairly in the share out of local authority and State funded housing.

However, it is clear that in London there will persist a strong need for voluntary housing provision, given the growing problem of homelessness and poor quality of private rented accommodation for migrants. There are now a small number of Irish housing associations (like CARA, An TEACH, Innisfree) which are attempting to tackle the problem of homelessness or long term hostel dependence, by developing and expanding the provision of "move on" secure housing for young Irish people. (See, CARA, Irish Homelessness: The Hidden Dimension, 1988; Brent Irish Advisory Service, Irish Homeless Families in London, 1988). Any further investment in immigrant housing should place priority on this issue of "move-on" housing. The specific policy implications of these housing issues are spelt out in Chapter 9.

(iv) Under Age Emigrants

The serious problems faced by young (under 18 years) emigrants, particularly those coming without any qualifications, have already been adverted to. We need to stress, however, that a significant minority of those now coming who are under 18 years are from the most deprived families – with high unemployment and poverty, and often with high levels of family stress. In addition children who have been in care up to 16, or young people in trouble with the law etc., appear to form a significant proportion of such emigrant youth (see Randall, 1988, pp. 18-23). A high proportion of these have no safe and secure place to go back to . It was pointed out by a number of youth workers that, compared to similarly deprived emigrant Scottish youth for instance, advice and support services and housing provision in Britain for such at-risk youth is substantially better than in Ireland. As a result, in many cases these deprived Irish youths have to be retained in London despite all the problems that are involved.

A very high proportion of deprived early school leavers face persistent unemployment in Ireland. By the time such young people reach 18 many will have been unemployed for 2 to 3 years, many (up to a third) never having been employed. Given the very deprived family backgrounds from which many of these young people come and the inevitable family tensions that occur with persistent unemployment. many such children face enormous pressure to leave home and escape from the almost continuous tensions of family life. A squat in London would appear to be quite attractive to many of these youngsters. Now, however, with no right to income support, and limited "YTS" support available to them, they face extremely difficult employment, accommodation and welfare access problems in London. Effectively YTS funding assumes that young people are still living and being supported from home: although there are now some adjustments to the scheme for the most vulnerable minority without secure homes. Effectively therefore the balance of advantage has shifted strongly toward such youth remaining at home here till they are 18. Nevertheless a significant minority of these still emigrate.

These young unqualified migrants are, therefore, the most vulnerable and need most attention. The question of why these young people cannot find support and secure accommodation away from their homes in Cork, Dublin or Limerick was raised by a number of welfare agencies in London. If we could only deal with some of these problems before these vulnerable teenagers leave Ireland it would be much easier to prevent a downward spiral to acute homelessness, unemployment, and the many attendant problems and dangers that can face young homeless people in London. Randall (1988, p.33) reports that almost one in five of single young people using night shelters in London had been approached to become involved in prostitution since going to central London. As Randall puts it, "the risks to a group of young people who are homeless and who have no money must be considerable" (op. cit., p. 33).

There appears, fortunately, to have been a decrease in both the number and proportion of such young migrants over the past 2 years. Nevertheless there are still between 7 to 13 per cent of welfare centre clients who are less than 18 (Camden and Hammersmith annual reports, 1988) and many of these come from the poorest and most deprived backgrounds in Ireland. In many cases it is not possible to send these young people back to Ireland since they have no family or place to go back to; some, for instance. having come out of public care (Randall, 1988).

Some children come out of public care in Ireland at the age of 16 – with few housing or welfare rights (O'Higgins and Boyle, 1988) and many of these appear to emigrate to London. Around one hundred such children reach the legal age limit and are released from care each year in Ireland, or otherwise leave care without adequate provision (ibid.). A number of the welfare agencies, but particularly Centrepoint, mentioned the difficulty of dealing with this problem for such Irish children. Eleven per cent of the clients of one of the night shelters in London came from public care, (Randall. 1988. p. 18). If such "at risk" young people are British, and if they come from an insecure, unsafe home background, or from public care, there exist a

number of British public care provisions and facilities that can be used for their housing and welfare, even provision to send such young "at risk" people back to secure public care provision within their own communities. However, except by using occasional voluntary provision, it is not possible to do this for equally at-risk Irish children who have come out of public care here, or from family homes to which they cannot be safely returned. Such a serious and obvious lacuna in public child care provision in Ireland needs to be urgently corrected.

(v) Income Maintenance

We have already dealt with the most serious problems in gaining access to social security entitlements. Besides the problem of having insufficient identity, there is often a problem of unreasonable demands by officials for additional certifications of identity. In addition, the recent decline in the accommodation costs provision and its phasing out for under 25s after 8 weeks, as well as the change to paying social welfare payments in arrears, all create very serious problems for unemployed migrants. Finally, there appears to be some serious problem of anti-Irish prejudice amongst some frontline staff. This has been too frequently mentioned by Irish social workers and by night shelter administrators to be just a minor issue.

The problem of unreasonable demands for identity papers was clearly illustrated in a study of young Irish clients in 10 London advice centres by the Action Group for Irish Youth following the April 1988 social security changes. Over a third said they had experienced great difficulty in proving identity – with 37 per cent saying they had to produce passports to prove identity. Of those who had successfully provided identity, many faced serious financial problems while they waited for their first welfare payments to be paid. Over 40 per cent of claimants had applied for "crisis loans" while they awaited the first welfare payment, now paid 2 weeks in arrears; – but 90 per cent of these were unsuccessful ("Young and Irish, The Experience of the Social Security System", 1988, AGIY, London). (vii) Acculturation and Prejudice

There are substantial, cultural differences between Irish and English people. These have to do mainly with identity – its symbols, values, and associated feelings. In addition, however, there are some important differences in cultures and in style of life. Because of our different paths of development, as well as current differences in community size, English culture is much more institutionally differentiated and, in the public sphere, more formal. Because of our smaller population size and more intimate communal structure there is less distinction between informal social interaction and formal "public" interaction in Ireland: of the way people present themselves to each other and relate to each other in everyday work and social interaction in both public and private settings. Perhaps the more subtle and almost unmeasurable dimensions of this cultural distinctiveness can be best summed up by the almost universal complaint amongst young emigrants of how much they "miss the craic" at home.

Given the centuries of Irish/English interaction most of these cultural differences are, one could assume, more easily accommodatable than distinctions with African or West Indian culture for instance. But these "centuries of interaction" were not based on equality of cultures – but of attempted domination by one culture and avoidance of submission by the other. If there were no implicit prestige differences involved one need not worry too much about such intercultural contact. But for obvious historical reasons such a status ranking obviously exists – with Irish identity and culture being much more problematic and having a lower status in Irish/English intercultural contacts. It is likely that this prestige distinction is most pronounced for working class and poorly educated Irish people – those with clearly stereotyped accents and social mannerisms. Given the absence of research on these issues of cultural accommodation and conflict one can only point to the significance of these issues in most other studies or immigrant adjustment (Eisenstadt, 1954; Shuval, 1963; Gordon, 1964).

The reality of London as a metropolitan polyethnic city with a highly diverse and highly secularised culture proves quite a culture shock for many Irish first time emigrants. This apparent multicultural reality is, however, often counteracted by the expectations of many English people of cultural conformity to conventional English cultural standards. So in many respects, despite the polyethnic character of most British cities, for the ordinary Irish emigrant there is felt to be a significant pressure to conform to English standards.

Negative stereotyping of the Irish has been historically imbedded in British culture as has antagonism toward Irish emigrants. This had occasionally spilled over into open conflict, particularly in periods of rapid growth of Irish emigration to Britain in the nineteenth century (Jackson,1963; Miles, 1982, pp. 135-48). Although such prejudicial sentiments may have been functional for British expansionist imperialism – in helping to justify political domination, for instance, and although out of date in an era of rapid European integration, the residues of such latent antagonism still appear alive and well in many sectors of British life, particularly in the mass media at times of Anglo-Irish stress. The other side of the coin, of course, is the persistence in the use of anti-British violence by Irish nationalists to gain political ends – albeit by a very small minority – which maintains and stimulates anti-Irish prejudice. And, in addition, many Irish people go to England with negative attitudes toward the host culture – which strongly militates against successful integration.

This continuity of original cultural imperialism and subsequent immigrant-native interaction in the dominating society is also characteristic of France and its Algerian emigrants, for instance. The same native-emigrant prejudice also exists, however, without a previous history of imperialism, in German and Swiss relationships to other, poorer, generally southern, European emigrants (Castles and Kossack, 1985, pp. 450-460). So, in general, anti-immigrant and anti-Irish prejudice should not be unexpected. Given the continuing unresolved political differences between both countries, and the traditional ethnocentrism and even xenophobia of sections of the

popular British press, a high proportion of the Irish in Britain – particularly those who are less confident in their identities – feel their very identity as being almost continuously under threat. Unlike those in the United States, being Irish in Britain is not generally felt to be a positive advantage: at best neutral, at worst clearly negative – particularly at times of conflict in Northern Ireland. The more usual expressions of such prejudicial behaviour appear to be associated with an Irish presence in particular endemic 'problem contacts' with State agencies – like police relations with squatters and travellers, or alcoholics and down and outs; or DSS or housing department contacts with "problem clients". The addition of Irishness to the problem obviously can touch off any nascent prejudices in an already troubled encounter. For police contacts the existence of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and its apparent overuse creates particular difficulties for some Irish people in Britain.

There appear, however, to be substantial differences between the more "successful" middle class Irish and the working class or downwardly mobile Irish in their perception of the existence and the importance of anti-Irish prejudice. Most of the youth workers with the more disadvantaged Irish report serious anti-Irish prejudice: in the mass media – particularly the tabloid press, among the police, and amongst functionaries in the DSS and the housing departments, as well as amongst the ordinary English public, particularly when some Northern Irish atrocity occurs. On the other hand, most of the better educated, particularly professionalised, Irish do not appear to generally experience this prejudice. In their case tolerance, liberalism and cultural openness appear to characterise most of their relationships in British social life.

In this whole discussion, of course, we have concentrated rather myopically on the Irish-British contacts of our immigrants since this is the focus of the study. We would wish, however, to make no judgement that in an equivalent British-Irish situation for potential British immigrants in Ireland – if that situation were ever to arise – would be any less stressful or difficult for British immigrants, or that Irish society and culture is in any way more open, tolerant or liberal than English society. Indeed in any objective comparison it is likely to be found less tolerant. However, having stated this, the absorption problems of the Irish in Britain have still to be faced in their own right, and these problems are very real, immediate and serious.

A number of models or types of acculturation appear then to be prevalent amongst the Irish. The two most extreme are the following:

(a) Passing – adopting fully the host culture and its characteristics: accent, speech and life styles, values and identities; as well as membership of English social networks. This can occur amongst all class and educational levels. It is likely, however, to build in significant instabilities or insecurities to most people's identities and consciousness. It is not possible to forget or erase one's identity so conveniently and completely. So, over identification pathologies may occur at either an intrapersonal or interpersonal level; e.g., some of the second generation Irish active in the National Front, for instance, may be explained on this basis. This model is close to what Abramson (1976) calls a "convert" strategy, or of total cultural and structural assimilation in Gordon's (1964) analysis of immigrant assimilation.

(b) At the other extreme one finds the ghettoised, over identified Irish; more Irish than the Irish themselves, seeing little good in English culture. This is the "traditionalist" response in Abramson's (1976) model, where both culturally and in terms of social relationships emigrants attempt to transplant their home culture.

Both forms of adaptation have serious negative effects on individual and group integration in the developing polyethnic British culture. These two adaptations are mutually exclusive at the individual level, but at a family or collective level both may be present. So, the classic parent/child conflictual identities can emerge – overidentified "Irish" parents and overidentified "English" children. English schooling in this respect often has a strong anglicisation function. This is both direct through the curriculum and pedagogy – which shows little respect for Irish history or culture, and indirect through dominant peer group pressures.

(c) A third possible adaptation is that of the "temporary exile" – the individual remains rooted in her/his own culture but interacts mainly with people from the other. The main strategy pursued in this mode is the emigrant who sees herself/himself as only temporarily exiled, and who attempts to build up resources as fast as possible so that she/he can return home with these resources and build a well funded future in Ireland. This is a very frequent strategy pursued by many migrant groups in modern Europe, where this "myth of return" sustains people through hardship (Myles, 1982, pp. 66, 186; Castles and Kossack, 1985, p. 55). However, perhaps for most people who initially adopt this strategy, returning tends only to be temporary and exile permanent.

Some observers suggest, for instance, that a significant proportion of Irish emigrants to Britain never "unpack" (Gilmore, 1989). Even though they may be very successful economically – they always see themselves as "coming home" at some stage, after they have built up a sufficient stake and can sell out and move back. Even after 20 or 30 years many still talk of "going home" – either on their annual holidays or permanently some time in the future. So, many do not make the necessary commitments for successful adaptation such as registering to vote; becoming politically involved, buying a house; or developing strong local commitments.

(d) A fourth possible adaptation, and the most likely to be effective, is a selfconfident Irishness – adapting to and finding major bases of identification with both traditional aspects of English/British culture as well as contributing selfconfidently to the emerging multicultural reality that is becoming modern Britain. Given the richness and variety of English culture it is easily possible to find such bases of identification; and within the rich variety of political, civic and cultural activities and groups, also find creative and participative associations that do not require a diminution of Irish identity. Indeed, to most insightful and knowledgeable observers from outside both cultures, substantial differences in ways of life are not as easily observed as most native insiders think it is; the symbols and cultural context of ethnic identities being the most distinct.

Nevertheless, such a strategy does require a selfconfident rationality that is difficult to adopt except for well educated middle class emigrants; or perhaps for activist trade unionists. Such an approach, if merged with easily accommodatable aspects of English culture, would clearly lead not only to the emigrant's own personal satisfaction but would also contribute to the multicultural richness of modern Britain.

In terms of Abramson's (1976) and Gordon's (1964) model of cultural adaptations by emigrants, this would initially require the capability to be an "exile" – securely rooted in one culture while actively participating in another. It is only where this pattern is well worked out and is widely practised that its personal and social costs would become generally bearable and worthwhile. The innovators would pay a significant price, though the investment would be more than worthwhile.

Our research does not allow us to generalise on the actual models of adaptation chosen by Irish immigrants, but our fieldwork and analysis suggest a number of observations. First, in relation to the communal and civic life of Britain, (a) and (d) adaptations are the most involved: voting and political activity, participating in local neighbourhood and communal activities, cultural participation and creative engagement. However, the Irish-born in Britain appear to have rather low participation in these aspects of British life; a substantial proportion appear to have become ghettoised or, while successful in their economic life, show little participation in the civic, social and cultural spheres of life in Britain. Secondly, for many working class and lower middle class Irish it is difficult to make such a commitment to British society – symbols, identities and even values are not only strange but are often experienced as hostile to their original identity. Many such emigrants also carry a sense of resentment about Ireland and its failures and inadequacies – having been forced to leave for economic reasons, and, perhaps, having also internalised some negative images of Irish culture from those present in the host society. Thirdly, however, this failure of many to integrate is counterbalanced by the very positive commitments of many other emigrants who have integrated in economic, social, political and cultural life – although no general pattern of assimilation is clearly discernible.

This analysis of immigrant integration is based on very limited research. Its focus has been on the problems faced by recent Irish emigrants – and they are serious and need urgent attention. A comprehensive overall study of Irish emigrants in Britain is, however, now urgently required. Since such a high proportion of Irish people born since 1922 now reside in Britain, it is necessary to undertake the basic research required to analyse their immigrant experience and to formulate policies and strategies for positive immigrant adaptation.

Policy initiatives to address the issues raised in the analysis need not await this primary research however. A range of policies affecting in particular emigrant preparation and education and training, as well as other policies to help immigrant integration in Britain, should and could now be instituted. These are discussed in Chapter 9.

4. LABOUR MARKET ENTRY AND EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS

In the previous section we looked at the difficulties faced by the young Irish immigrants who typically request help from emigrant agencies. These difficulties must be viewed against a wider background and in particular against the general labour market experience of Irish immigrants. Access to employment and patterns of employment are a central aspect of the adaptation of immigrants in the UK. Their employment experiences have significant consequences for their income, social status, health and general well being. We therefore analyse the patterns of entry into employment of immigrants and examine their occupational profile. This analysis is based on the British Labour Force Survey and it entails comparisons between Irish born immigrants and other groups in the UK population. Additionally, we make some comparisons between young Irish immigrants and their counterparts who remained in Ireland. The data used in the latter are derived from the FAS/ESRI School Leavers Survey.

(i) Occupational, Employment Profile of Irish Immigrants

An analysis of British Labour Force survey data suggests that Irish emigrants tend to be concentrated either at the top or the bottom of the occupational structure. Statistics available from the British Labour Force Surveys from 1986 to 1988 show that around a quarter of all Irish nationals are in managerial, professional or semiprofessional occupations, plus another 8-10 per cent in clerical and related white collar occupations. These figures, as Table 7.1 shows, are significantly lower than for British born workers or for the total working population. Overall, only 40 per cent of the Irish are in non-manual occupations compared to 55 per cent of the total population – and slightly higher proportions for the British born (see also (Hughes and Walsh, 1976; Walter, 1988; Connor, 1987).

Table 7.1

Occupational Characteristics of British, Irish Born in Britain, and other Minority Ethnic Groups in U.K., Labour Force (Persons in Employment) 1985-1987 (Aged 16-24)

	Total U.K. All Origins (1985-1987)			Irish Born (Av, % born 1986, 1987. 1988 figures)			Indian	West Indian	All Ethnic Minority Groups		
Occupational Group	Total %	Male %	Female %	Total %	Male %	Female %	Total %	Total %	Total %	Male %	Female %
Non-Manual											
Managerial & Professional	31	35	26	26*	23*	27*	35	19	31	33	27
Clerical and Related	16	5	30	9*	3*	15*	14	18	15	7	27
Other Non-Manual	8	6	10	5*	3*	8*	7	5	7	6	7
Total Non-Manual	55	46	66	40*	29*	50	57	42	52	46	61
Manual											
Craft & Similar	16	25	4	18*	27*	3*	17	17	15	19	9
Other Manual and General Labourers	29	28	30	42*	43*	47*	25	39	33	35	30
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
No. (000)	23,512	13,593	9,919				277	219	818	495	322

Sources: Employment Gazette, December 1988. Irish data from special tabulations from U.K. Labour Force Surveys 1986, 1987, 1988. (Average of percentages.

* Est. > 10,000.

At the other extreme 42 per cent of the Irish born are in labouring and "other manual" – primarily semiskilled manual and service occupations, compared to 29 per cent of the general population. There are substantial differences between Irish born males and females in these respects – with substantially more females in lower "white collar" occupations and more males in craft and similarly skilled manual occupations. Compared to the British born, however, Irish males are the most substantially disadvantaged – particularly in upper non-manual occupations, and are substantially over represented in semiskilled and other manual, including unskilled occupations. Irish females are under-represented in clerical and similar other non-manual occupations and are clearly over represented in semiskilled manual and service occupations.

The occupational concentration of Irish emigrants is further reflected in the data on industrial distributions in Table 7.2: one third of Irish born males being in construction nationwide. Over half the females are in "other services" and almost a quarter are in distribution, hotel and catering in the national data, while almost half are in the latter industries in the London region (see Walter, 1988, pp. 34-36). A disproportionately high number of women are in the healthcare professions. Since

Table 7.2

Employment by Sector
Total U.K. Population 1985 to 1987 and Irish Born (Average 1986, 1987 and 1988)

Sector.	Total U.K. Population			Irish Born (Av. of % in 1986 1987, 1988)		
	Male	Female	Total	Total	Male	Female
		%			%	
Agriculture etc.	3.3	1.0	2.3			
Energy/Water	2.7	0.7	1.8	4	6	3
Extraction of Minerals	4.2	1.7	3.1			
Metals/Engineering	12.8	4.4	9.2	8	12	4
Other Manufacturing	9.5	8.6	9.1	8	8	8
Construction	10.3	1.3	6.4	39	59	17
Distribution						
Catering, etc.	10.6	25.7	21.5	16	10	22
Transport etc.	8.7	2.8	6.1	6	8	2
Banking/Finance, etc.	10.5	11.9	11.1	8	9	7
Other Services	9.6	42.0	29.4	61	42	83
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100
No. (000)	14,176	10,915	25,089	241.0	135.0	106.0

Source: Employment Gazette, December 1988. Irish data from special tabulations from UK Labour Force Surveys for 1986, 1987, 1988 – average of percentages.

Table 7.3

Estimated Average Occupational Status Distribution of Young (16-24) Irish Born Persons in British Labour Force in 1986, 1987, 1988. (Av.) In comparison with Equivalent Age Group in Total British Labour Force.

Occupational (Status) Group	Irish Nationals aged 16-24 (Av. of %'s 1986, 1987, 1988)			U.K. Total aged 16-24, 1987		
	Male	Female	Total	Total	Male	Female
		%			%	
Managerial and Professional	29*	29*	28*	16	16	16
Clerical and Related	20*	7*	36*			
Other Non-Manual						
(Total Non-Manual)	(49)	(36)	(64)	(49)	(34)	(68)
Craft and Similar	21*	35*	3	18	28	5
General Labourers and Other Manual	30*	29	31*	31	36	26
Other	1	–	1	1	1	1
Total all occupational Groups %	100	100	100	100	100	100
(Estimated Population) No.	24,000	13,500	10,500	5,167,000	2,789,000	2,378,000

Source: Special tabulations from the U.K. Labour Force Surveys of 1986, 1987, and 1988. Percentage figures for the Irish are averaged over the 3 years as is the estimated number of workers – the sampling errors and variations being too large to use data from any single year.

Note: * > 10,000 (est.).

the educational or training qualifications of Irish born women appear to be little different from the native born (Walter, 1988, pp. 37-38) these overall lower occupational and industrial statuses cannot be accounted for by their educational qualifications.

Irish born men, on the other hand, have a substantially higher proportion without any qualifications so that they appear to be much more poorly educated than their emigrant sisters. However, since there is some doubt about the recognition of Irish qualifications in the British coding schemes, the very high proportion of Irish men (76 per cent), and particularly 16-29 year olds, reported as having no qualifications is open to considerable doubt (Walter, 1988, pp. 37-38).

For younger Irish emigrants educational levels show quite a dramatic improvement, but also a clear bipolar distribution in educational attainment: a higher proportion than the British average with higher level (A level or higher) qualifications, but also a higher proportion without any qualifications. A number of British observers and researchers have pointed out the high level of education of the new Irish emigrants, but have also pointed out their apparent difficulty in getting jobs which reflect their educational or skill levels (Guardian, September, 2, 16, 1987; Walters, 1988, p. 38).

In order to analyse the occupational patterns of young Irish emigrants we have averaged the distributions for the 16-24 year age group for three British labour force surveys. Although this analysis shows a substantial improvement in occupational attainment levels, the same pattern of polarisation in occupational status categories is evident amongst younger workers. As Table 7.3 shows, there appear to be substantially more Irish nationals aged 16-24 in managerial, professional and semi-professional occupations than in the total British population; but substantially fewer in clerical and other non-manual occupations. The latter deficit is particularly obvious for females. It appears as if many well educated younger emigrants, mainly those without professional or third level qualifications, are not able to enter lower non-manual or middle management occupational niches. With suitable third level qualifications they can much more easily enter professional or semi-professional occupations. At the other extreme the concentration of younger emigrants in semiskilled manual and service occupations is almost equally as pronounced as in the total Irish-born employed labour force, and is substantially greater than the British born (Walters, 1988).

It appears from these figures as if those with professional and similar third level qualifications are able to find suitable professional/managerial occupations; but that those with Leaving Certificate qualifications are not realising the full value of their certifications, with far too many emigrants – relative to their educational qualifications – in manual occupations (almost two thirds of males). For instance, Table 7.3 indicates that over half of the total (and more of British born) female labour force aged 16-24 are in clerical and other non-manual occupations but only 36 per cent of Irish females are in similar white collar jobs: Nevertheless around two thirds of Irish females are in non-manual occupations, where about 3 out of 4 would have taken the Leaving Certificate. With only slightly lower educational attainments, however, almost two thirds of Irish males are in manual occupations. Clearly access to junior non-manual occupations is serious for both sexes but particularly for Irish males.

The employment distribution by industrial sector given in Table 7.4 clearly shows a disproportionately high concentration of Irish males in construction – almost a third. This is more than twice the national figure. Irish females are somewhat more concentrated in transport and communications and "other services" – including personal and retail services, as well as in "other manufacturing". Proportionately fewer are in Banking and Finance, as they are also in clerical and related occupations. So, it appears as if young Irish men are disproportionately concentrated into manual occupations in construction – not enough finding their way into white collar or junior managerial positions in industry and services. On the other hand, young Irish women are disproportionately concentrated in manual type work or relatively unskilled service work, while too few are finding their way into clerical and junior managerial positions.

However, the 16-24 age group disproportionately excludes third level graduate emigrants and also disproportionately includes very recent younger emigrants with little British work force experience. If we compare the 25-29 year old national distribution with that of 16-24 year olds, we find substantially more workers in professional and higher non-manual occupations and fewer in semi- and unskilled manual occupations. Tables 7.5 and 7.6 include the combined 16-24, 25-29 age group distribution for the Irish and the total work force.

First, compared to the total Irish labour force in Britain, younger emigrants are much better placed, with substantially greater proportions in managerial/professional occupations, as well as in clerical and related occupations (compare Tables 7.1 and 7.5). There are correspondingly fewer in lower manual occupations. So, there has been a substantial upward shift in occupational attainment.

As can be seen by comparing Tables 7.3 and 7.5 there is a substantial growth in professional and managerial occupations, as the age group advances from 16 to 29, from 29 to 35 per cent of Irish born and from 16 to 22 per cent for the total. From this comparison it is also apparent that the Irish are substantially more likely than the average to have taken up such high status and paying occupations early in their careers. Their under-representation in clerical and other lower non-manual occupations persists however – for both males and females, though it is most marked for females. For males and females there are roughly equal proportions to the average in manual occupations – though at slightly lower levels than 16-24 year olds. Given, however, that recent Irish emigrants to Britain have significantly higher proportions completing second level and third level courses than the British born, these figures do appear to indicate significant underachievement by Irish emigrants.

Table 7.4

Industrial Classification of Young (16-24) Irish Nationals in U.K Work Force in 1986-1988 Compared to Total Work Force Distribution, 1987.

Occupational (Status) Group		Irish Born 1986-1988 (Av.)			Total Population		
		Male	Female	Total	Total	Male	Female
			%			%	
Agriculture etc. / Energy & Water		2*	1	2	4	5	1
Extraction, Mining, Metals		2	3	–	3	2	2
Metal Goods, Engineering		8*	10	5	11	13	6
Other Manufacturing		9	7	13	12	11	10
Construction		20	31	3	8	14	2
Distribution, Hotels, etc.		16*	9	25*	27	25	30
Transport and Communications		8	7	9	5	6	4
Banking and Finance		15	18	12	12	9	16
Other Services		20*	13	30*	21	14	29
Other		1	–	1	1	1	1
Total	%	100	100	100	100	100	100
	No.	24,000	13,500	10,500	5,171,000	2,781,000	2,390,000

Source: Special Tabulations from U.K. Labour Force Surveys 1986, 1987, 1988.

Table 7.5

Estimated Average Occupational Distribution of Irish 16-29 Year Olds in U.K. Work Force in 1986, 1987 and 1988, compared to total Work Force Distribution. 1987

Occupational Categories		Irish 16-29 Year Olds, 1986-88			Total 16-29 Year Olds, 1987		
		Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
			%			%	
Professional, Managerial		35.2*	32.9*	36.8*	21.7	21.6	21.8
Clerical and Related / Other Non-Manual		18.2*	5.6*	33.7*	20.4 / 10.1	8.0 / 8.8	36.3 / 11.9
(Total Non-Manual)		(53)	(39)	(71)	(52)	(38)	(70)
Craft and Related 20.4*		32.5*	3.6*	17.8	28.0	4.7	
Labourers and Other Manual		25.5*	24.7*	25.2*	29.4	33.0	24.7
Others		0.4	–	–	0.7	0.8	0.6
	%	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total	No.	123,200	71,600	54,500	8,124,800	4,555,900	3,567,300

Source: Special Tabulations from U.K. Labour Force Surveys 1986. 1987, 1988.
Note: * > 10,000 (est.).

Table 7.6

Estimated Average Industrial Distribution of 16-29 Year Olds for Irish and Total Work Force in 1986, 1987 and 1988 in U.K. Work Force, compared to total workforce 1987.

Industries		Irish 16-29 Year Olds, 1986-88 (Av.)			Total 16-29 Year Olds, 1987		
		Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
			%			%	
Agriculture etc.		4	6	1	4.0	5.8	1.7
Energy & Water							
Extraction, Mining, etc.					2.9	3.6	2.1
Metal Goods, Engineering		7	9	3	10.1	13.3	5.9
Other Manufacturing		8	6	10	10.2	10.8	9.5
Construction		18	30	3	7.8	12.8	1.4
Distribution, Hotels, etc.		17	10	25	24.1	21.6	27.4
Transport & Communications		5	4	7	5.3	6.4	3.8
Banking and Finance		17	17	18	11.9	9.1	15.5
Other Services		23	15	17	22.7	15.5	32.0
Other		1	–	–	0.9	1.0	0.8
	%	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total	N	123,200	68,700	54,500	8.125.000	4,557,000	3,567,000

Source: Special Tabulations of U.K. Labour Force Surveys 1986-1988.

It would particularly appear that those going with a Leaving Certificate qualification have failed to penetrate into white collar occupations – clerical and lower non-manual or junior management occupations and positions. They appear to have disproportionately entered manual occupations – craft and semiskilled manual occupations for males and lower status service occupations for females. The main "deficit", however, occurs for males.

A comparison of the industrial distributions in Tables 7.4 (16-24) and 7.6 (16-29) supports that interpretation. Irish males, particularly, continue to be disproportionately concentrated in construction – at over 2½ times the proportion in the national population. Females, however, show a significant "improvement", or growing similarity to the general population in their industrial distributions with a significant relative decline in "other services".

On the whole there appear to be two major employment and labour market problems amongst Irish emigrants in Britain. First, there is significant concentration of Irish emigrants in a narrow range of occupations and in insecure sectors of the labour market. Secondly, and perhaps underlying this problem, are the general difficulties recent Irish emigrants appear to experience in realising the full potential of their education and training qualifications.

(ii) Irish Emigrants and their Non-Emigrant Peers

In the previous section we documented the occupational profile of Irish immigrants and contrasted their positions with those of the UK population in general. It was shown that their occupational attainments, initially at least, are less than their educational qualifications would merit. However, Irish emigrants may be doing substantially better than their co-nationals who remain in Ireland for a number of reasons. First, there are the much higher youth unemployment rates in Ireland – which have persisted for much longer than in Britain. Secondly, there have been severe cutbacks here in public service employment and in publicly supported employment – as in teaching and medicine. These cutbacks have disproportionately affected non-manual – particularly professional and semi-professional – employment. Thirdly, the overall reduced labour demand, combined with its disproportionate impact at non-manual level had led to more severe competition for jobs than was normal, and consequently greater "trading down" than had been the case previously (Breen, 1984; Hannan, 1986).

So, it could well be that while Irish emigrants to Britain are doing as well, or better, compared to their peers who remained behind, they could nevertheless be doing much worse than their British born peers. We therefore analyse, in the tables below, data from the FAS/ESRI five year follow-up survey of School leavers: these data allow us to compare these school leavers who emigrated with those who did not.

Table 7.7 summarises the migration characteristics of the sample up to 1987 by educational level. It shows first of all a very clear relationship between level of education and total migration tendency: the higher the level the greater the tendency. This pattern is amplified by the much greater tendency of the more poorly educated to return home. As a result, the current emigration rate varies from one in six of those with less than an Intermediate Certificate qualification to almost a third of those with third level qualifications.

Half of the most poorly educated emigrants (with less than the Intermediate Certificate) had, in fact, already returned to Ireland at some stage – though some of these had again re-emigrated. Nevertheless the total level of return migration – whether temporary or permanent – is substantially higher amongst the more poorly educated: around 40 per cent of whom had returned and remained, compared to less than 25 per cent of those with third level qualifications. So, the proportionately greater emigration tendency of the better educated is even further increased by the apparent failure of the more poorly educated to establish themselves securely in Britain.

That it is mainly a failure to establish oneself in the host country that leads to such prompt return migration is clearly suggested by the unemployment rates of the returned migrants as seen in Figure 7.4 and Table 7.8. Here the unemployment rates amongst returned migrants are even higher than amongst the permanently resident

Table 7.7

Percentage Emigration Experience of 1981/82 School Leavers' Cohort (Sample) by their Level of Education

Emigration Experience of 1981/82	Educational Level								
	Group Cert.	Group Cert.	Inter Cert.	Post Inter Cert.	Leaving Cert.	Failed Third Level	Diploma /Cert.	Degree	Total
	%								
Never Emigrated:	75	74	76	70	70	58	63	64	70
Ever Emigrated	25	25	24	30	30	42	31	36	30
Currently Emigrated	16	16	19	22	23	38	29	27	23
Total Number	115	131	236	95	637	80	111	199	1602
Of Ever Emigrated:									
Percentage Returned at Some Stage	55	44	30	31	32	37	43	28	35
Returned and Stayed at Home	45	35	21	29	21	9	21	24	23
Total Number Ever Emigrated	29	34	57	28	188	35	42	72	481

Source: 1981–1982 School Leavers Follow-Up Survey (1987).

population at every level of education. But in both cases rapid declines in unemployment occur with increasing levels of education. Around 40 per cent of those with less than an Intermediate Certificate qualification are unemployed compared to somewhat over 10 per cent for those with a third level qualification. However, unemployment rates amongst current emigrants are less than half that of Irish residents for those with poor qualifications – though still high at 19 per cent. And the foreign rate is around a quarter of the domestic rate for those with any third level qualifications. So, early return migration does not generally appear to occur for occupational advancement reasons; and for those with very poor qualifications appears mainly to occur because they fail to establish themselves satisfactorily abroad.

The level of educational qualification plays a crucial role in emigrant adjustment, as Table 7.9 clearly demonstrates. For those with a Leaving Certificate or higher qualification, British emigration has, in general, been highly successful. These emigrants have consistently achieved a higher occupational status level than their peers who remained at home. (Of course many of the unsuccessful did return home). For instance, over 60 per cent of those emigrants with a university degree were in professional, managerial or higher executive positions, compared to 27 per cent of those who remained in Ireland. Over half of those with some minimal third level education were in higher non-manual positions in Britain – compared to about 10 per cent less in Ireland. And for those with a Leaving Certificate almost 40 per cent

Figure 7.4
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES



Table 7.8

Unemployment Rates Amongst Permanent Irish Residents, Returned Emigrants and Current Emigrants by their Level of Education.

Emigration Status	Level of Education Achieved			
	Pre-Intermediate Certificate	Intermediate Certificate	Leaving Certificate	Third Level
Permanent Residents	36.7% (169)	23.9% (222)	12.5% (416)	10.4% (201)
Returned Emigrants	42.9% (21)	26.3% (91)	13.2% (38)	33.3% (27)
Current Emigrants	18.9% (37)	8.2% (62)	4.9% (142)	2.9% (104)

Source: 1981–1982 School Leavers Follow-Up Survey (1987).

of the emigrants had achieved upper non-manual positions, compared to 12 per cent in Ireland. And whereas over 30 per cent of those with a Leaving Certificate in Ireland were working in semi- or unskilled manual occupations this was true of less than 18 per cent in Britain.

On the other hand for those with very poor levels of education occupational achievement levels in Ireland tend to be higher than in Britain. Overall then there appears to be – for those with jobs – a higher return to educational investment in the British labour market than in the Irish one: better rewards for the more highly educated and poorer ones for the more poorly educated. The latter result is very surprising – given the disproportionately high unemployment rates amongst the poorly educated in Ireland as well as the extent to which they have had to compete with the better educated for the manual and service jobs available (Breen, 1984). Besides occupational attainment levels income levels also tend to be significantly higher in Britain for each level of educational attainment. We do not have sufficient information to know whether this is due to higher gross wage or salary rates, or lower income tax levels, or both.

The comparisons made here, however, are between Irish emigrants and their peers who remained in Ireland – not with their English born peers. For the sample of recent emigrants dealt with here, it is likely that their most relevant comparison group on emigration is their peer group at home. For the better educated this comparison shows them to be doing very well abroad. The more poorly educated, on the other hand, are at least more likely to be employed in the UK – although their occupational achievement levels are somewhat lower than those employed at home. Overall, recent emigrants' economic satisfaction levels should be high – when they compare themselves to their peers in Ireland. However, the comparisons with the indigenous UK population in the last section showed that Irish immigrants display relative occupational underachievement. Put crudely, they fare better than their peers at home but not as well as the native UK population.

As we saw in Chapter 6, migration can be seen as part of a strategy to maintain or increase one's social and economic status. To examine this issue Table 7.10 classifies the sample by respondent's occupational status of origin and whether they had stayed locally, migrated internally within Ireland, or emigrated; as well as by respondents' family status of origin. Controlling for both variables simultaneously we are interested in whether internal migration or emigration, leads to greater levels of social mobility than staying locally.

Looking across each row, those who have migrated from their community of origin have achieved greater upward mobility than those who stayed locally. And, for those from middle class origins, those who have emigrated have achieved greater levels of upward mobility than those who have migrated internally. Although the differences are minor they are consistent. For working class respondents internal migrants have been more socially mobile than emigrants or local "stayers". The

Table 7.9

Percentage Occupational (Status) Achievement Levels by 1987/88 of Irish Respondents and UK Emigrants by their Level of Education Achieved – 1981/82 School Leavers Follow-up Survey

	Educational Level (%)													
Occupational Status Achieved	Pre-Group and Group Cert.		Inter. and Post-Cert.		Leaving Cert.		Some Third Level		Cert. and Diploma		Degree		Total	
	Irl	UK	Irl	UK	Irl	UK	Irl	UK	Irl	UK	Irl	UK	Irl	UK
Professional/ Managerial	–	–	0.6	2.8	3.8	5.8	16.8	17.9	6.7	20.0	27.0	60.6	5.6	15.3
Executive/ Administrative/ Teacher	1.7	–	2.4	5.6	8.6	32.6	21.2	32.9	41.8	40.0	59.3	35.3	14.2	26.6
Clerical	12.7	16.0	24.6	22.2	44.9	26.7	35.7	30.9	23.9	12.0	8.6	3.0	31.3	20.5
Skilled Manual	25.4	12.0	23.4	27.8	12.0	17.5	17.2	6.4	14.9	8.0	1.2	6.1	14.8	14.4
Semi-Skilled Manual and	48.3	28.0	88.3	16.7	27.0	11.6	14.7	7.2	11.9	8.0	4.9	–	28.3	10.9
Unskilled Manual	11.0	48.0	10.2	25.0	4.3	5.8	6.4	4.7	3.0	8.0	–	–	5.9	12.3
Total Percentage	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total Number	118	25	167	36	407	86	46	23	67	25	81	33	888	229

Source: As Table 7.7.

Table 7.10

Percentage "upwardly mobile" (occup. status achieved higher than parental occupational status) or "stable" by status origin and migration experience

	Migration Status 1987/8		
Social Status	Stayed in County of Origin	Internally Migrated	Emigrated
Father's Occupational Status	% Upwardly Mobile (+ stable)		
1+2: Upper Middle Class	2.7% (17%) (N=182)	4.9% (23%) (N=61)	12.9% (24%) (N=93)
3: Lower Middle Class	22.8% (33%0 (N=189)	38.6% (32%0 (N=44)	42.9% (21%) (N=77)
4: Upper Working Class	38.8% (22%) (N=227)	77.4% (3.2%) (N=31)	46.2% (23.1%) (N=65)
5+6: Lower Working Class	64.2% (30%) (N=299)	87.0% (22%) (N=50)	64% (18.7%) (N=107)

Source: As Table 7.7

overall differences between emigrants and internal migrants, however, are small: but the relative "advantage" of emigrants consistently increases with social class of origin. Internal migration, however, becomes an increasingly more attractive option as social (occupational) status of origin declines.

The most relevant finding from this table, however, is that, for middle class respondents particularly, emigration has been a relatively attractive option during the particularly economically depressed period around the mid 1980s.

5. OCCUPATIONAL ASSIMILATION OF IRISH IMMIGRANTS

In this section we examine the longterm economic integration of the Irish in Britain, focusing on their relative occupational attainments. Unlike earlier analyses, however, we compare first generation Irish (the Irish born) and second generation Irish, with the indigenous UK population. Such comparisons allow us to assess whether the apparent obstacles and underachievements of the Irish identified in earlier analyses diminish over time. Whether the occupational underachievements of Irish immigrants persist into the next generation, or whether the educational and occupational attainments of the second generation Irish converge with the UK population is the main question explored in this section.

We examine the factors which might explain the differences between Irish immigrants and the native population; in particular, the likely impact of differences in education levels and socio-economic backgrounds are examined. The data source for this analysis is the nationally representative UK General Household Survey (GHS). This survey collects a wide range of social, economic and demographic data – including data on ethnic background and country of birth. Data from the surveys for 1980-83 were pooled; a total of 784 first generation Irish immigrants and 1303 second generation immigrants were identified. "First generation Irish immigrants" are those born in the Republic of Ireland and are simply designated "Irish" in the tables which follow. "Second generation" Irish immigrants refer to those with a mother and/or father born in the Republic of Ireland. Throughout the analysis these two sub-sets of the UK population are identified and are contrasted with the balance of the population, designated "British" in the tables.

(i) Educational Attainment

The analysis in earlier sections has revealed a concentration of Irish immigrants in the UK in semi-skilled and unskilled occupations. Differences in educational attainment may, of course, explain the occupational underachievement of the Irish. Before presenting data on the relative educational attainments of immigrants, however, the differential evolution of the educational regimes in Ireland and the UK should be noted. The Irish education system was modernised in the period following

the Investment in Education Report in 1966: the system was expanded to broaden the access of lower socio-economic groups to second and third level and the institutions and curricula were re-oriented to the needs of the developing Irish economy. Irish immigrants in the UK in our sample who arrived in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s came, therefore, from the "pre-reform" education system and are likely to have had modest educational attainments. Conversely, those in the younger age groups who arrived in the 1970s and later are likely to have enhanced educational attainments, reflecting the more developed educational system of the later decades.

The British educational system, by contrast, has had a longer tradition of vocational training and a much earlier initiative (the 1944 Education Act) to equalise access to the upper reaches of the education system. We should expect to find, therefore, some significant disparities in the educational attainments of the British and Irish – although Halsey, Heath and Ridge (1980) indicate that the British working class still suffer from substantial inequalities in opportunity and attainment.

Table 7.11 summarises the relationship between school leaving age by age group and nationality, and Appendix Table A7.4 gives details for the total population aged 16-49. The total sample data reveal two trends: first, a far greater proportion of Irish born left school before 15; secondly, there is a noticeable difference between Irish born and second generation Irish – the majority of the latter stayed on until 16 or later. Within this total sample, however, there are significant variations between age-groups, as Table 7.11 shows. As expected for the British control group, the pattern of school-leaving ages varies with age-groups. The raising of the school leaving age in 1972 is reflected in the increased number staying at school until 16 in those now aged 20-29. Similarly, the impact of free education and its opportunities for greater participation is seen in the three successive age groups. Two comments may be made about the Irish data. The earlier school leaving age of 14 up to 1972 accounts for the higher proportion of early school leavers in the 30-39 and 40-49 age groups. In those age groups also, it appears that a marginally higher proportion of second generation Irish stayed at school beyond 15 years of age but like the British born most had left school at the age of 15, the official school leaving age until 1972. The gap between the British and Irish born seems to be narrowing over the age groups, however. The data in Table 7.11 suggest many complex differences in school leaving ages among the three ethnic groups, over the different age groups. The relationship between the variables becomes a lot clearer when the information is modelled statistically. (See Appendix AB.1.) The results show, however, that it is age group and not ethnicity that mainly determines school leaving age.

Educational qualifications obtained are an alternative measure of educational attainment, and in the G.H.S survey all respondents list their highest educational qualifications. While it is difficult to make reliable and valid comparisons between British and Irish qualifications the result is nevertheless highly revealing. The three main school examinations in Ireland can be compared with their British equivalents by using Muller's Casmin standardisation. In terms of standards, the Group Cert would approximate to the CSEs, the Intermediate to O Levels and the Leaving Certificate to A Levels . In the case of the latter, however, seven subjects are usually studied and so the standards would arguably be lower, or a better approximation would be the Scottish Highers. For the purposes of the G.H.S, Irish respondents have their qualifications listed under the "Foreign" category, although some are recorded in A level-CSE categories. In their work, Hornsby-Smith and Dale approximated all Irish qualifications to an "Intermediate" level, that is, below A level (Hornsby-Smith and Dale, 1988). This has led to an under representation of Irish educational qualification levels in their work and suggests that the qualification gap between the British and the Irish is much larger than it actually is, particularly in the younger age groups where the Irish will have had access to free education.

For the purpose of this study educational qualifications have been classified into three groups. Third level qualifications include University Degrees, higher National Certificates and Diplomas and Nursing qualifications. Second Level includes A Levels, O Levels, CSEs and apprenticeship qualifications. The "Foreign Qualification" category is included in this group. Although it includes a wide range of qualifications it was felt that it was more appropriate to do this rather than conferring some arbitrary British equivalent upon the "Foreign qualifications" category as Hornsby-Smith and Dale had done. The third group includes all respondents who had no qualifications.

The most interesting feature of the data on education and qualifications in Table 7.12 is the number of respondents with no qualifications. A greater number of the Irish have no qualification when compared with the British or second generation Irish. It should be noted that the percentage of Irish with no qualifications is lower than that found by Heath and Ridge, (Heath and Ridge, 1983), or by the Investment in Education Report (1966). The latter looked at the educational qualifications of the Irish in Britain and found that 82 per cent had no qualifications, a very high figure. Reference to the unqualified levels in Ireland sets the above figures into a broader context for comparison. Rottman, Hannan et al., (1982) suggest that the figure was approximately 60 per cent in the 1960s and falling to around 30 per cent in the mid 1970s. The figures in Tables 7.12 and 7.13 are higher than would appear to be true of the Irish at home (Rottman, Hannan et al., 1982) and one could conclude, therefore, that the Irish in Britain differed educationally from those who remained at home. Again, the number of British respondents with no qualifications is considerably lower than Heath and Ridge suggested and is also approximately 5 per cent lower than that suggested by Hornsby-Smith and Dale.

An analysis of higher educational qualifications by age groups reveals (Table 7.13) that successive generations have become better educated, but that this is less true of Irish immigrants. Those with no qualifications, although a considerably lower proportion in the younger age groups, comprise a higher proportion among the Irish than the British. This supports the data in Table 7.11 of the proportion of 14 year olds who left school at the minimum age with no qualifications.

Table 7.11

School Leaving Age, by Nationality and Age Group

Age: 20-29

	School Leaving Age						
Nationality	14	15	16	17	18	Total	N
British	1.6	30.0	41.2	10.7	13.2	100	8705
Irish	10.0	20.0	58.0	7.5	.7	100	70
Second Generation Irish	0	26.8	36.2	11.8	19.7	100	318

Age: 30-39

	School Leaving Age						
Nationality	14	15	16	17	18	Total	N
British	2.6	58.4	18.8	7.7	9.5	100	9237
Irish	31.1	18.0	19.7	10.0	9.8	100	179
Second Generation Irish	5.2	49.0	27.1	7.3	8.3	100	230

Age: 40-49

	School Leaving Age						
Nationality	14	15	16	17	18	Total	N
British	21.2	49.8	14.2	5.5	5.7	100	7620
Irish	43.8	15.6	10.9	14.1	4.7	100	219
Second Generation Irish	31.1	37.8	13.3	6.7	6.7	100	110

Source: U.K. General Household Surveys, 1980–83.

Table 7.12

Highest Educational Qualification (Percent).

Nationality	3rd Level	Secondary	None	DK/NA/MI*	Total
British	15	38	42	5	45502
Irish	7	33	56	4	751
Second Generation	17	42	33	8	1080

Source: As Table 7.11.
* Don't Know
No Answer
Missing Information
This question was asked of all respondents aged 16-69.

Table 7.13

Highest Educational Qualifications by Nationality and Age Group.

Nationality	3rd Level	Secondary	None	DK/NA/MI	Total
Age: 20-29					
British	14.4	51.1	27.6	6.6	8754
Irish	8.0	43.0	43.0	6.0	70
Second Generation	14.0	53.0	26.0	7.0	320
Age: 30-39					
British	17	36	42	5	9237
Irish	8	35	50	7	174
Second Generation	16	42	36	6	226
Age: 40-49					
British	13	30	52	5	7614
Irish	10	22	62	5	207
Second Generation	17	22	56	5	103
Age: 50-59					
British	9	23	64	4	5647
Irish	7	18	67	7	163
Second Generation	14	24	58	4	71

Source: As Table 7.11.
This table excludes respondents aged 16-20 and 60-69.
[Cases excluded from analysis 14484].

The cross tabulations in Table 7.13 are detailed and do not necessarily give a clear picture of the inter-relationship between the variables. To distil the key results a multi-variable model was applied (See Appendix B.2), and two basic questions were asked: (1) Is there any difference between the British, Irish and Second Generation Irish in gaining qualifications? and (2) where the three groups do have qualifications, (i.e. excluding the lower qualified) is there any difference in the level achieved? In the first case, in addition to clear age differences, ethnicity does make a difference to obtaining any or no qualification, with the Irish being more likely to have no qualifications. In the second case, however, once qualifications had been obtained, there were no statistically significant differences in the level obtained between the three groups.

One final question needs to be looked at with reference to educational qualifications. Walsh, as noted earlier, suggested that the better educated Irish

women emigrated in order to utilise their education and fulfil career ambitions (Walsh, 1968). This hypothesis may be usefully tested by looking at higher educational qualification according to sex.

Overall, there is evidence in Table 7.14 of different attainments between men and women. More Irish women have third level qualifications than Irish men, although this can largely be accounted for by Irish women in Nursing. This would partially substantiate Walsh's claims (above) that better educated Irish women emigrated. It should be noted, however, that fewer Irish women have second level qualifications compared with Irish men and are also almost equally likely to have no qualifications. Both British and second generation Irish men and women were better qualified although there were some gender differences. Women with second level qualifications were concentrated in Group 6 which included those with 1-4 O Levels plus clerical/commercial qualifications (mainly secretarial skills). It is to be expected that more women would be recorded in this group. As Payne et al., have noted the "occupational needs" of modern capitalism (i.e., the growth of non-manual and tertiary occupations) can be supplied by men or women. However, the hiring of women for office jobs has been dictated by gender attitudes, and as women moved into the public domain they were channelled into a subset of occupational roles (Payne et al., 1983). This channelling may well have led to a similar process in education. Female students might be oriented to subjects which would provide gender specific employment.

(ii) Occupational Attainments of the Irish in Britain

In the early 1950s, almost half of the Irish male labour force was in occupations which depended on "property ownership", mainly farming. Only 5 per cent of the workforce could be described as professional/managerial, 11 per cent were skilled manual workers and one quarter were engaged in semi-skilled or unskilled occupations. By 1971 only 30 per cent of the labour force depended on farming for their living. The proportion of professional and managerial employees in the labour force more than doubled to 11 per cent; the development of manufacturing industry led to an increase from 11 to 17 per cent in the proportion of the population who were in skilled manual occupations. Although the proportion in semi-skilled and unskilled jobs outside agriculture remained constant, the number of agricultural labourers dropped by more than half to 4.9 per cent of the labour force. (Rottman, Hannan et al., 1982).

The changes in occupational structure outlined above reflect the changing pattern of employment by industry. Agriculture declined from 48 per cent of the male labour force in 1951 to 32 per cent in 1971 and 24 per cent in 1979. Employment in the professional services doubled its share of employment by 1979. Public administration also increased its share although the most rapid growth in this sector occurred during the 1970s.

Table 7.14

Highest Educational Qualifications by Sex

Males %

Nationality	3rd Level	Secondary	None	DK/NA/MI	Total %	N
British	14	41	40	4	100	22220
Irish	7	30	60	3	100	360
Second Generation	15	46	31	8	100	526

Females %

Nationality	3rd Level	Secondary	None	DK/NA/MI	Total %	N
British	12	37	46	5	100	23282
Irish	12	26	58	4	100	391
Second Generation	16	43	34	7	100	550

Source: As Table 7.11.

The changes in the Irish industrial structure were characterised by a switch from the agricultural to industrial sector, from "traditional" (agricultural) industries to more "modern" ones. The changes were also characterised by a substantial expansion in the predominantly white collar sectors such as the professional services and public sector. Recruitment and promotion procedures became more formalised with a greater emphasis on qualifications in either technical or clerical skills. Overall, one can say that the society which the Irish migrants were leaving was becoming industrialised and modernised, with a growth in the professional services and public sector. The process was a gradual one, as the 1951/1971 figures indicate. Such changes in Irish economic life, however, do not necessarily mean that migrants were becoming better equipped for a more industrial and urban society such as Britain.

Information on the jobs and sectors in which migrants worked before leaving their native country and after they had established themselves in their new country is of great importance if one is to understand the forces which influence the migrant in their search for a better life. To date, the only official information which is available on the Irish refers to persons who were issued with new passports to go to jobs or permanent residence outside the UK. Apart from this limited source, one can gain an insight into the occupational characteristics of migrants from Ireland to all countries including the UK by using the net mobility data for broad occupational categories. The data for 1966-70 suggested that in the younger age groups 15-19 and 20-24, males who had been in agricultural occupations and females who had been in service occupations formed a significant part of the total migrants in these age groups. These Census tables would also suggest that a large proportion of the male and female migrants were not employed before they left Ireland. On the basis of the

net mobility data, one can conclude that the majority of Irish migrants in the years 1960-1971 were either working in unskilled jobs before they emigrated or were engaged in agriculture.

This conclusion is supported by a special, detailed tabulation from the 1971 Great Britain Census which looked at the occupational, industrial and socio-economic status of one year and five year migrants from Ireland who were living in Britain in 1971. (See Hughes and Walsh, 1976.)

One of the most important features of the one year and five year Irish migrants in Britain is their concentration in a few occupational groups. Almost 60 per cent of the one year and five year male migrants were in the skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled manual socio-economic groups, with the majority being concentrated in the construction industry. This concentration in certain socio-economic groups also occurred for Irish female migrants. Over 80 per cent of female migrants in 1966 and 1971 were found in the "intermediate non-manual", "junior non-manual", "personal service" and "semi-skilled manual" socio-economic groups. These census data suggests that Irish female migrants had higher occupational status than Irish male migrants. However, when compared with the British Labour Force, Irish migrants, both male and female, had a lower occupational status. The British Census data, therefore, support the occupational concentration thesis revealed in our earlier analysis of the Labour Force Survey.

Since the 1971 Census established that the Irish were more economically active – albeit in different socio-economic group concentrations to the British labour force, it is important to look at the G.H.S data and see whether any changes have occurred in the intervening period. The threefold class schema used in this paper is based on that recommended by Goldthorpe and it is utilised as being the most simple means of explaining often complex socio-economic changes. The schema are based on an amalgamation of the socio-economic classifications used by OPCS. The three fold socio economic classification is a composite representation of the socio-economic hierarchy: the service class includes proprietors, owners, managers, professionals and so on; the intermediate category contains other white collar and certain technically skilled employees, and the working class incorporates all manual employees.[1]

Table 7.15 suggests that the major differences between the Irish and British/Second Generation Irish lies in the intermediate and working class categories. In the former, the Irish record 8 per cent less than the British and 11 per cent less than the Second Generation Irish. These differences are largely accounted for by the disproportionate concentration of the Irish in working class occupations, and particularly in the "Personal Services" and "Unskilled Manual" Workers group.

1. Further details of this classification can be obtained on request from the authors.

Table 7.15
Socio Economic Status by Nationality

Socio Economic Group	British %	Irish Born %	Second Generation Irish %
Service	24	18	25
Intermediate	31	23	34
Working	45	59	41
Total	100	100	100
N	39,992	744	898

Source: As Table 7.11.

Perhaps three processes underly this undue Irish concentration in working class occupations: their higher proportions with no qualifications; their "crowding" into Irish immigrant occupational and industrial niches, like construction; and finally, the role that "unequal treatment" by employers may play – by underrating Irish educational qualifications, for instance, as well as the role of ethnic prejudice. However, before any charge of ethnic discrimination can be properly examined, a much more searching and elaborate investigation would need to be carried out.

Why are the Irish under-represented in the Intermediate and over-represented in the working class? One possible explanation is that the Irish may have eschewed higher status non-manual work in favour of better paid lower status jobs (Heath and Ridge, 1983). Therefore, it might be expected that the Irish would work in the skilled/unskilled sectors of the "working class" which would provide better pay – like construction. There does appear to be some truth in this suggestion if one looks at the concentration of Irish in these groups. And, in Appendix Table A7.6, which reports the weekly earnings of the three groups, it is apparent that there is little difference in their income levels. However, the suggestion of better pay as an explanation does not deal with the concentration of the Irish in the more poorly paid "Personal Services" sector; although a large proportion of these were Irish women since this sector is primarily female dominated.

Hughes and Walsh indicate that there was a large scale concentration of the Irish, almost 60 per cent, in the skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled SEGs in 1971 (Hughes and Walsh, 1976). Table 7.16 shows that 43 per cent of the Irish were concentrated in these three groups by the early 1980s, a drop of almost one fifth on Hughes and Walsh's figures. It is important to note that 37 per cent of the British and 34 per cent of the second generation Irish were also recorded in these groups. One can conclude that there were similar numbers of the three ethnic groups in the skilled and semi-skilled groups, although the proportion of the Irish in the Unskilled group was significantly higher than that for the two other ethnic groups. The data also suggest that there was some Irish concentration in "Personal Services" and significant underrepresentation in junior non-manual positions.

Table 7.16
Percentage Distribution by Socio Economic Group

SEG	British	Irish	2nd Gen
Emp 25+	1	0	0
Man 25+	4	3	4
Em <25	2	2	3
Man <25	3	2	3
Self Em	0	0	0
ProWork	2	1	1
Ancil/Art	9	9	9
ForSupNo	3	1	4
JnNonMan	22	11	27
PerServ	8	16	7
ForSupMa	4	6	3
SkillMan	15	13	14
SemiSkill	14	16	13
Unskill	8	14	17
NonPro	5	6	4
FarmEm	1	0	0
Farmers	0	0	0
AgriWor	1	0	0
	100	100	100

Source: As Table 7.11.

Table 7.17
Socio Economic Status of Males and Females by Nationality

Males

Socio Economic Status	Ethnic Origin		
	British %	Irish Born %	Second Generation Irish %
Service	29	17	27
Intermediate	23	22	23
Working	48	61	50
Total	100	100	100
N	19,065	361	420

Females

Service	19	19	22
Intermediate	39	24	44
Working	42	57	34
Total	100	100	100
N	20,927	383	478

Source: As Table 7.11.

The Irish concentration in the Personal Services group suggests significant differences in occupational attainment. Table 7.17 indicates significant differences in socio economic status between the sexes. Irish males are less well represented in the Service class. Levels in the Intermediate Class are similar but in the working class a sharp gap opens between the Irish, British and Second Generation Irish males. The largest concentrations occur in the Skilled to Unskilled manual groups. Overall, they account for 48 per cent of the British males, 61 per cent of the Irish and 50 per cent of the Second Generation Irish. These figures for Irish males are quite similar to those suggested by Hughes and Walsh, and confirm the above conclusions for the occupational underachievement of the Irish.

An examination of the figures for the British and Second Generation Irish allow us to test Hornsby-Smith and Dale's suggestion that Irish men are nearly twice as likely to be in skilled or unskilled manual work as the British. Appendix Table A7.7 supports this conclusion. However, Hornsby-Smith and Dale indicated that second generation Irish men were located in lower SEGs than British men, being more concentrated in the skilled and unskilled manual groups; suggesting that substantial occupational assimilation had still to occur. Evidence from Appendix Table A7.7 would not support this. Only 4 per cent more Second Generation Irish are recorded in these groups, with the largest difference occurring in the Skilled Manual group. Overall, one can conclude that there was substantial assimilation in the Second Generation by Irish men although the levels which they achieved did not fully equal the levels achieved by the British.

Coleman and Hornsby-Smith and Dale amongst others have suggested that Irish female migrants had a higher level of occupational attainment than Irish males. Appendix Table A7.7 does not altogether support that conclusion. In the case of the first generation, there is little difference between the class distributions of the males and females. In the case of the Second Generation, there is a larger difference, but we must be careful in interpreting this. The majority of the women are located in the Junior Non-Manual and Personal Service groups. Although their status or attainment level may well be regarded as higher, by Hornsby-Smith and Dale, compared with the Skilled-Unskilled groups, they were not necessarily better paid. It is also important to note the differences which have occurred over the age groups.

The evidence in Table 7.18 suggests that the main areas of difference between the three ethnic groups lies in the Intermediate and Working Class groups. However, the gap between the Irish and other two ethnic groups in class location has declined for the 20-29 cohort.

The Irish are the most heavily concentrated of the three ethnic groups in the semi- and unskilled manual and personal service groups across all age groups, followed by the British and Second Generation Irish respectively. It must be remembered that those recorded in the 20-29 and 30-39 cohort will not have reached their full career potential and so there may be some movement into the skilled manual group.

Table 7.18

Socio Economic Status by Age Group and Nationality

Socio Economic Status		British	Irish	Second Generation Irish
20-29 (%)				
Service		22	19	25
Intermediate		34	28	37
Working		44	53	38
Total	%	100	100	100
	N	8227	65	301
30-39 (%)				
Service		30	23	32
Intermediate		32	27	36
Working		38	50	32
Total	%	100	100	100
	N	8861	168	217
40-49 (%)				
Service		29	19	29
Intermediate		31	24	36
Working		40	57	35
Total	%	100	100	100
	N	7245	199	99
50-59 (%)				
Service		25	16	29
Intermediate		30	19	24
Working		45	65	47
Total	%	100	100	100
	N	5100	154	70

Source: As Table 7.11.

Overall, one can conclude that the Irish were more concentrated in the personal services, semi- and unskilled manual groups while the Second Generation Irish were more concentrated in the Ancillary and Junior Non-Manual groups. This level was higher than that recorded for the British. This consistent improvement in occupational status of the Second Generation Irish – particularly in the Ancillary and Junior Non-Manual groups – across cohort and sex requires some explanation.

Table 7.19

Socio Economic Status by Highest Qualifications and Nationality

Socio Economic Status	British	Irish	Second Generation Irish
		Third Level %	
Service	82	90	83
Intermediate	10	5	10
Working	8	5	10
Total	100	100	100
		Second Level %	
Service	22	27	23
Intermediate	44	31	43
Working	34	42	34
Total	100	100	100
		No Qualifications %	
Service	11	6	9
Intermediate	29	22	31
Working	60	71	60
Total	100	100	100
N	34,642	658	804

Source: As Table 7.11.

One possible reason may lie in the initial importance and subsequent demise of the "myth of return". Heath and Ridge, as noted previously, suggested that Irish immigrant men may have taken the lower "status" but better paid semi- and unskilled manual jobs. They provided them with an opportunity to save money to return to Ireland at a later date. To the second generation, however Ireland was not "home" and there was little incentive to save money to return to what was essentially a foreign land. This concentration of second generation Irish in the Intermediate class may be the result of other factors also. It is certainly worthwhile considering to what extent differential occupational mobility will have occurred. Indeed, Heath and Ridge's own work has shown that second generation Irish will also have been educated in the British system and so their qualifications would not be discriminated against by employers, as Irish qualifications might well be. The possession of British qualifications and the loss of perceptible Irish characteristics leaves the second-generation less open to occupational discrimination.

Educational qualifications clearly have an important bearing on one's occupation. Factors such as the influence of father's socio-economic status are strong determinants also, but initially we shall examine the broad issue of educational impact on occupational destination. The previous section on education noted that the percentage of Irish with no qualifications was greater than that of the British. It is likely these Irish without qualifications, will be found mainly in semi- and unskilled manual occupations. Breen's study on education and the labour market (1984) would confirm this view for Ireland, whilst Heath and Ridge would confirm it for the Irish in Britain (Heath and Ridge, 1983). It has previously been shown that once the Irish remained at school to gain qualifications, there was little difference in the level of qualifications that they and the British obtained. One would, therefore, expect that there would be little difference in the level of occupational attainment between the British and Irish at this level. Table 7.19 looks at the relationship between socio-economic attainment and highest educational qualifications, and it can be seen that the data confirms the relationship between socio-economic group and qualifications. The Irish with third level qualifications are more likely to be found in the Service class than either the British or Second Generation Irish. Similarly, the Irish with Secondary Level qualifications are slightly more likely than the British/Second Generation Irish to be found in the Service class, but they are, however, less likely to be found in the Intermediate class – suggesting some occupational underachievement. Secondary level qualifications include those with clerical/commercial skills and it would explain the heavy British/Second Generation Irish concentration in the Junior Non-Manual groups. The Irish with second level qualifications also record a higher percentage in the working class group. This consists of an excess in the Personal Services and Skilled/Unskilled manual groups. One must remember that there is often very little difference in Junior Non-Manual/Personal Services work and the dividing line between the two classes is often a grey area. Therefore, differences between the ethnic groups at this level should not always be regarded as significant.

The Intermediate/Working class divide between the Irish and British/Second Generation Irish is also apparent amongst those with no qualifications. The larger total of Irish with no qualifications recorded in the Working class is accounted for largely by the disproportionate number of Irish in Semi- and Unskilled Manual work.

Overall, one can conclude that where the Irish have third level qualifications they record a greater percentage in the highest socio-economic group. With Secondary qualifications, more Irish than British/Second Generation Irish are likely to be found in the Service class. Thereafter, they are more likely to be found in the working class whether they have Secondary or no qualifications. This evidence, therefore, strongly suggests that Irish immigrants with second level qualifications are underachieving. This may be because of a number of factors – the pursuit of Irish occupational niches like construction; the pursuit of high paying but low status and low opportunity occupations, the failure of British employers to accept Irish qualifications at their true value and finally ethnic prejudice or discrimination. It is not possible to decide amongst these explanations with this data set. The Second Generation Irish are very much like the British in their pattern of class attainment. In this respect, at least, it can be said that they have assimilated to the British pattern.

The relationship between socio-economic group, ethnicity and qualifications is complicated, but the data in Table 7.19 may be modelled statistically, giving a clearer picture of the relationship between the variables (See Appendix B.3). Although none of the models provided a satisfactory fit, the residuals show that the relationship between ethnicity and class does vary with educational level – the most serious discrepancies being for those with "no qualifications" or with secondary qualifications.

To summarise, therefore, two main points need emphasis. The second generation Irish, in terms of their occupational attainment, do appear to have assimilated to the British pattern. Analysis here suggests that they are particularly concentrated in the Junior Non-Manual sector. The First Generation Irish are disproportionately concentrated in the semi- and unskilled manual groups. However, the above analysis does show that they are well represented in the other SEGs – particularly for the third level qualified but also for a significant proportion of those with second level qualifications.

(iii) The Impact of Social Origins on Occupational Attainment

Social origins, as well as education may influence occupational attainment and in assessing the relative importance of these factors one may initially refer to Duncan's model of the attainment process (Heath, 1981). It shows that an individual's social origins and family circumstances influence his educational achievement. Social origins and educational achievement in turn affect the kind and quality of job which an individual may get. Although Duncan's model and subsequent developments of it are primarily concerned with measuring the levels of mobility between generations, it does nonetheless provide one with a useful starting point for analysis: do social origins and educational achievement influence the occupational/ socio-economic attainment of the Irish, British and Second Generation Irish; and do they do so equally?

For the purposes of this first point, it is important to refer to the emergence of Ireland as a modern industrial society. The process is still incomplete and there has been some debate as to whether Ireland can actually be called industrialised; though certainly not "post-industrial" like many previously highly industrialised societies which have now become highly service based economies. Until the late 1950s Ireland was a less developed society where both secondary and higher education were beyond the reach of many. In such a traditional society one of the main methods of transferring status from father to son was the inheritance of property.

The advantages of property inheritance, however, did not have the same transferrable value as educational credentials in Britain. The latter have become a major means of transferring status from parent to child. Educational qualifications, argue Blau and Duncan, "assume increasing significance for social status in general and for the transmission of social standing from fathers to sons in particular". The emergence of Ireland as an industrial society has meant that qualifications have assumed increasing importance. The later growth in the awareness of the utility of qualifications and the later impact of free education could, therefore, account for some of the differences in class/occupational attainment between the Irish, British and Second Generation Irish.

Analysis of the GHS data has shown that there were differences in the educational qualifications obtained by the Irish, British and Second Generation Irish. When one asked whether people got any qualifications or no qualification, the Irish were the least likely to have any. However, once the Irish had obtained qualifications, there appeared no significant difference between them and the other two groups in terms of the level of qualifications obtained. Modelling the relationship between class and qualifications has suggested that once educational differences have been accounted for, some differences still remain between the three groups (Appendix B.3). In particular, First Generation Irish with no qualifications are more likely to be found in the working class than would be predicted from their educational qualifications. The combination of high proportions with no qualifications and their disproportionate working class location underlines the Irish crowding in particular occupations.

Apart from the exceptions noted above, one could conclude that the impact of education on class attainment was relatively similar for the three groups. This suggests that at the occupational level, the Irish with some qualifications were, in general, assimilating to the British pattern of education/class attainment. The Irish with no qualifications were clearly more disadvantaged than either the British or Second Generation Irish, while those with second level qualifications were also less likely to achieve the intermediate non-manual positions.

Educational achievement is not the sole influence on occupational/class attainment and in order to put the above analysis into perspective, one must consider father's class (social origins). Two research questions may be examined. Are Irish fathers able to pass on their class advantages to their children to the same extent as the British have been able to do? If they have not been able to do so, then the education/class attainment pattern outlined above should be qualified. The Irish may be underachieving relative to the British. Secondly, in order to clarify the picture further, one can examine the relationship between origins, education and occupational attainment. Although ascribed characteristics like social origins may or may not affect first generation Irish occupational attainment, their ethnicity may well effect their level of attainment.

Before undertaking any analysis it is important to note the problem that one has in utilising the GHS. The survey does not ask questions about father's education, nor does it ask questions about the respondent's first job. Further, not all respondents will have achieved their ultimate class level. Therefore, for some respondents, social origins/ education may have a greater impact on their class location than one can determine from the GHS; i.e., their class location may ultimately come to match that of their father.

To begin with, it is important to first examine the relationship between social origins and educational achievement. (See Table 7.20). Where one's father was Service class there were differences between the ethnic groups in the number of those who obtained qualifications. Service class Irish fathers do not appear to influence their children's education to as great a degree as the British and the second generation Irish. However, this is not so for Intermediate class fathers – where Irish fathers influenced the children's' education to a greater degree than either of the two other groups. The pattern of attainment for those with working class fathers was much the same for the three groups. One can also suggest that the Second Generation Irish

Table 7.20

Father's Socio Economic Status by Respondent's Education and Ethnicity.

Socio Economic Status	Qualifications	No Quals	*Total	N
British				
	%			
Service	82	12	100	
Intermediate	61	34	100	25,085
Working	51	40	100	
Irish				
	%			
Service	75	24	100	
Intermediate	70	25	100	472
Working	58	39	100	
Second Generation				
	%			
Service	79	12	100	
Intermediate	67	26	100	693
Working	55	37	100	

Source: As Table 7.11.

*Totals may not add to 100 due to missing data.

had accommodated to the British pattern of Father's Class influencing levels of educational attainment.

Taken with earlier results these results would appear to support Blau and Duncan's suggestion that in some countries, and at certain stages of development, educational qualifications were not as important for the transmission of social status from father to son. This suggestion does seem to be confirmed by the higher levels of immigrant Irish with no qualifications. It should be remembered, however, that free secondary education was not available to the great majority of the Irish immigrants in Britain, thereby accounting for their under-representation in the qualified group. The growth of free secondary education and the growing link between origins and education would suggest that the Irish situation, in the younger age groups, would be similar to that of the British and Second Generation Irish.

In Duncan's model of the attainment process it is suggested that an individual's social origins and educational achievement influences their own class location. Detailed cross classifications of the GHS data by father's socio economic background, respondents' level of education and respondents' socio-economic status and nationality are given in Table A7.5. In this table there are a number of empty cells and there are small numbers in others. The data should, therefore, be interpreted with caution. Subject to this caveat a number of key patterns emerge in the data.

First, where an individual had a Service class father and Third Level qualifications, there were no differences in the class location between the three ethnic groups. However, where the respondent's father was in the Service Class, and they had not got a third level qualification the Irish were twice as likely as the British to be found in the working class. This suggests again that Irish fathers were not as likely to pass on their class advantages to their emigrant children – except through third level education.

Secondly, in relation to those with working class fathers the second generation Irish with Third Level qualifications were less likely than the British to be found in the service class, but more likely to be found in the Working Class. However, with second level qualifications, the second generation Irish were more likely to be found in the intermediate class than the British and less likely to be found in the working class. Differences between the two, where the individual had no qualifications, were negligible. Thus, British individuals from a Working Class background with Third Level qualifications were more likely than the Second Generation Irish to achieve a Service class position, but British respondents with Second Level qualifications were less likely to achieve an Intermediate class position. In summary, the second generation Irish seem more likely to be in the middle of the social class hierarchy: those with third level are less likely to attain the highest class and those with second level are less likely to descend to the working class.
The data in Appendix Table A7.5 can be statistically modelled using loglinear

models (See Appendix B.4.) These models allow one to conclude that ethnicity does have an impact on the class attainments of Irish immigrants in Britain, i.e., that the Irish are occupationally disadvantaged relative to the British born, controlling for education and class background. However, in comparing the British and second generation Irish the link between social origins and current socio economic status is not significantly affected by nationality.

(iv) Overview of Occupational Assimilation

The analysis of the G.H.S data above has allowed us to analyse some of the factors affecting educational and occupational assimilation. A number of key findings emerge. First, the Irish born in the 30-39 and later age groups left school at an earlier age, are less educationally qualified, and are substantially more likely to be found in manual work than others.

Secondly, the educationally qualified Irish do not in general achieve the same occupational levels as the second generation Irish and the British born with similar educational attainments.

Thirdly, nationality affects socio-economic achievement once differences in educational attainments are controlled for. The Irish with limited or no qualifications are proportionately more likely than others to be in the working class groups. By contrast, the Irish with third level backgrounds have a similar pattern of occupational attainment to the British. Among those with second level qualifications, however, the Irish do not attain the socio-economic status which their qualifications should allow them to. In short, there is evidence of significant occupational underachievement among the Irish with second level qualifications. This evidence is consistent with the data in previous sections from the Labour Force Surveys, and from the information about recent young Irish immigrants in the UK.

Finally, the GHS data suggests that the second generation Irish have achieved a significant level of educational and occupational assimilation.

6. OCCUPATIONAL UNDERACHIEVEMENT – CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS

Consistently throughout this chapter, evidence has arisen of occupational underachievement: that is, of Irish immigrants in the UK failing to enter occupational categories appropriate to their qualifications. This finding reflects the conclusions of Heath and Ridge in their analysis of the social mobility and occupational patterns of Irish immigrants in The Oxford Social Mobility Study (the sample comprised adults of 20-64 in England and Wales in 1972). They found evidence of "downward mobility" among the Irish – these with fathers in the upper

socio-economic groups did not retain their social status. Lack of qualifications was not found to be the basis of this downward mobility. Heath and Ridge argued that the Irish patterns of attainment were attributable to their economic motivation: they may have chosen occupations which were well paid and which would allow them to begin an accumulation of savings (Heath and Ridge, 1983). This argument was presented as a plausible interpretation but it could not be proven or disproven with the Oxford Social Mobility Study. Nor could the GHS data utilised in this chapter offer an empirical test of this motivational/income explanation for Irish occupational underachievement. The pattern of underachievement recorded in this chapter is so consistent and substantial, however, as to suggest a somewhat more serious and less individually motivated set of causes.

(i) Sources of Occupational Underachievement

In the first instance, Irish immigrants in the UK, as our discussions with key personnel suggest, do not always have an adequate knowledge of relevant job opportunities and appointment procedures. Where people go to Britain with inadequate preparation – without, for instance, having arranged a job or accommodation and with inadequate resources – they will not be in a position to spend the 4 to 6 weeks needed searching for a suitable non-manual or white collar job which will establish them in a profitable career. We found in our own study a very peculiar pattern where better educated immigrants who had been employed in Ireland before emigrating, and who had not arranged a job before leaving, were more likely than others to be unemployed for some time in Britain (or elsewhere) after migration. The reason was that an adequate job search for a suitable non-manual job took much longer than for a manual job. People emigrating with inadequate resources or with no clear job search outcome in mind usually take up manual or service work which is much more easily acquired, and indeed may initially pay a higher wage. Where, in addition, immigrants depend on informal networks for support, information and advice they will tend toward entering the more usual occupational niches of the immigrant group: in construction, retail, hotel or catering service work, nursing, etc.

Additionally, besides lack of knowledge about or inadequate resources to sustain an effective job search some of our informants also said that the different "style" of interpersonal interaction characteristic of Irish people is often misinterpreted by English people. It is too tentative, neutral, too dependent on the responses of the interviewer; and in general not as assertive as English styles of self presentation. As a result an English person with even less qualifications than an Irish one may be appointed purely on the basis of self-confidence differences displayed in interview.

If young Irish people, therefore, do not assert strongly enough the real value of their educational qualifications – do not "sell themselves" well – to English employers who do not know, or may be sceptical about, the relative value of Irish educational qualifications, it may well be that they frequently get pushed back in the queue behind British applicants with lower certifications.

This problem of lack of knowledge is compounded by the "equivalence" problem. Irish second level qualifications tend to be under rated in the occupational market. The Leaving Certificate – even at honours level, for instance, tends to be equated with "O" Levels rather than "A" levels. Equal equivalence problems are also said to exist for RTC Certificate and Diploma courses and qualifications. So there is a problem of lack of knowledge of, and of possible bias involving, Irish educational qualifications. But in addition such cultural distinctions as exist between Irish and English people in interpersonal interaction patterns may also play a role in, at least, initial employment decisions. More generally, access to non-manual or white collar jobs, or even service jobs. in large bureaucracies is usually through formal, objective methods of assessment: various tests, formal methods of evaluation and interview, and usually a longer time period for decisions. The means used to recruit are usually also formal: advertisements, formal interviews, use of recruitment agencies etc. In most cases, therefore, particularly where the prospective employer is large and bureaucratised, personal factors, such as ethnic prejudice, should not play a significant direct role in recruitment. However, ethnic stereotypes and attendant prejudices have a persistent reality in most European countries – particularly those with an imperialist or colonialist past, and with large immigrant populations (Castles and Kossack, 1985). The underestimation of the level of education of Irish people, and the lack of equivalence in the recognition of educational or training qualifications noted above, could well be a function of such ethnic stereotyping and might well be important in both advertising and appointment procedures. It was pointed out, for instance, that the range of jobs advertised by London local authorities in the Irish Post newspaper tended to be biassed toward the more stereotyped "Irish" occupational niches – in service, construction and nursing jobs for instance. Clearly also, Irish people are disproportionately concentrated in low skilled jobs in public authority employment in London.

On the other hand, recruitment to manual and many service jobs is substantially through interpersonal contacts and networks. Leaving aside the possible role of ethnic prejudice in such appointments, however, a lot of Irish people go to London with the sponsorship or support of relatives or friends and seek access to the labour market through their own informal contacts. As a result they tend to be directed towards occupational niches – like construction. In addition it generally takes much longer to negotiate access to non-manual or white collar jobs than to manual or lower status jobs. So, if emigrants go with few resources they will not initially be able to afford the cost of waiting for non-manual or professional jobs.

These labour market problems result in young Irish men with good Leaving Certificate qualifications obtaining employment in manual work in construction, for instance; and young women in lower status service work in hotels, restaurants, shops

etc. Since men get a relatively high starting income for casual work in construction many of them get caught up in an almost inescapable, highly ghettoised labour market, working well below their qualifications. Equally, many young women with a good Leaving Certificate record, for instance, who may not have immediately saleable clerical, typing or computer-aided documentation skills, get access only to poorly paid service work in hotels or retail trades etc., where no career ladder exists. In this sector, as in construction, mobility into non-manual occupations from such lower paid and lower status service work may prove very difficult.

Of course the information we have on employment access problems was obtained from people who are in touch mainly with Irish immigrants with problems, not with the majority who are presumably more successful. However, this qualitative information is fully consistent with the statistical analyses of the Labour Force Survey and the General Household Survey. Among Irish immigrants there is a significant level of occupational underachievement and segregation. This is due to an interrelated and mutually reinforcing set of problems – lack of information among emigrants, differences of culture and style of interaction, under recognition of Irish qualifications, the use of informal methods of employment access among emigrants; and, finally, an unknown level of ethnic discrimination. The amount of research work done on those issues is so meagre that we cannot determine the relative priority of "causes" of the occupational underachievement of Irish people in Britain. The facts of substantial underachievement seem clear enough. Its seriousness is self evident. We urgently need to tackle the underlying reasons for it – but to do so effectively will require significant additional research work.

(ii) Occupational Underachievement and Social Integration

There is, in our view, a wide range of implications of the occupational underachievement of Irish immigrants. Occupational aspects of immigrants' integration are related to their more general social integration. In particular, it is unlikely that there is no relationship between such occupational underachievement and the reportedly high level of social problems among the Irish in Britain. Official statistics and various studies record a disproportionate incidence of social problems among the Irish born relative to the indigenous population. For example, there is a higher than average incidence of homelessness among adult Irish born men than in other groups of the population. Data on the ethnic background of psychiatric hospital in-patients show a rate of hospitalisation among the Irish higher than among the British population especially for alcohol-related diagnoses. Similarly, the prison population is also over-representative of the Irish. This pattern is more pronounced among men than women.

The interpretation of these patterns offered in our interviews is that they represent the eventual outcomes, for some Irish immigrants, of the difficulties and obstacles they encounter to occupational and social integration as well as the particular employment and housing strategies and choices they adopt. Among men, many immigrants pursue manual and unskilled employment – particularly in construction, offering, for many, little hope of long term, secure lifestyles. Young male immigrants may choose unskilled employment which may offer (in construction, for example) generous pay but which brings with it significant employment and locational instability, and in later years greater susceptibility to illness, injury and unemployment. This syndrome of short-term adjustment culminating in long-term difficulties is perhaps a more widespread, although less obvious pattern of maladjustment amongst Irish immigrants. It may affect not only those who initially experience difficulties and who, for example, request help at emigrant centres, but also those who initially succeed in getting good employment and accommodation. A central aspect of this long term pattern of maladjustment is the labour market avenue chosen by, or available to, emigrants. The relatively poor occupational profile of the Irish, therefore, also implies generally lesser prospects in terms of housing, health and economic security.

7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

There are some clear conclusions from the results presented in this chapter which require urgent policy attention. Discussion of the required policy responses is provided in Chapter 9 – here we summarise the main policy relevant results.

There are almost a million Irish born persons in Britain, a substantial proportion of whom this State has in many respects failed. The resident Irish population at home have generally gained from their emigration – but have done very little to ease their difficulties of absorption into British society, or to advance their interests. The recent upsurge in emigration there, and elsewhere, has brought their plight back into public awareness. If the emigration rate now declines again this growth in awareness will quickly evaporate – but the long-term difficulties of our emigrants will remain. The process of European integration not only raises the possibility of our peripheral location increasing our economic difficulties, but also increases the possibility, and the responsibility, of developing effective policies on international labour mobility and migration which previously would have proved impossible.

First the position of young, poorly qualified and poorly prepared Irish emigrants need urgent attention. At least 4,000 per annum appear to experience serious difficulties in integrating into the British labour market, housing and welfare system. The initiatives under the DION committee have been of considerable help but this initiative needs significant further development.

Secondly, there appears to be a much more general or widespread set of problems of immigrant economic integration which needs urgent attention: the very serious housing problems of Irish immigrants in London, the disproportionate extent to which Irish immigrants concentrate on particular occupational and industrial niches

in the British labour market, the difficulties young immigrants have in harvesting a satisfactory return on their educational and training qualifications – particularly for second level qualifications, and the particular difficulties faced by those seeking entry to junior non-manual or white collar occupations which provide people with good promotion possibilities or a career structure. The clear evidence of Irish occupational underachievement at a time when labour demand is quite high for such white collar positions, suggests that policy intervention here would be very fruitful for both societies.

Thirdly, unlike the United States Irish immigrant integration in Britain contains few clearcut success models. In some historical respects this could be ascribed to the essentially polyethnic ("melting pot") nature of American society – always in a ferment of becoming; and to a dominant mono-ethnic cultural bias in British society and culture, in which "success" for Irish people required almost full-scale cultural absorption. With many new immigrant groups, and now an integral part of a new Europe, the new Britain being constructed today offers many positive possibilities for the development of an Irish-British identity and culture which could act in much the same way as the Irish-American experience. A positive Irish emigration policy which would help develop such a positive immigrant absorption model in Britain would help repay the debt we owe our emigrants and the hurt which our previous neglect might have occasioned.

Chapter 8

ECONOMIC GAINS AND LOSSES FROM EXTERNAL MIGRATION

1. THE SETTING

The effects of migration on the Irish economy should be evaluated in light of the reasons for the persistence of high rates of net emigration discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. In particular it is important to bear in mind the influence of certain economic considerations, such as a low rate of economic growth, and high unemployment, on the level of emigration.

Even though the high rate of emigration from Ireland may readily be understood as a rational response to the economic options facing the population, attitudes towards the phenomenon have been consistently unfavourable. A review of policy pronouncements throughout the post-war period reveals that emigration has been regarded as a symptom of the failure of the Irish economy to develop rapidly enough to provide sufficient and/or acceptable employment opportunities for all its young people. Far from acknowledging the possible benefits that may have flowed from the existence of the opportunity to emigrate, the consensus has been that strenuous efforts should be made to minimise the outflow. For example, the Majority Report[1] of the Commission on Emigration (1954) stated:

> The ways in which the Irish people have reacted to their environment have always been intelligible and have clearly been designed to improve their standard of living, irrespective of domicile. The raising of living standards has been achieved not through intensive economic development within the country but by the ruthless method of emigration, and the rationality of this reaction of the individual to his environment, extending over a long period of years, is a measure of the difficulty of changing the trend. Further evidence of the difficulty of changing the trend is that, for the past thirty years, emigration has continued and the most that has been achieved is a stable population, although the country has had self-government, and economic development has been a major item of policy during that period. [para. 471]

It went on to conclude:

> In our view a steadily increasing population should occupy a high place among the criteria by which the success of national policy should be judged. [para. 473]

1 More positive attitudes towards emigration were expressed by some members of the Commission in Reservations and Minority Reports.

The Commission also addressed the question as to whether Irish emigration should be regarded as the result of "excess" population in the sense that, in the circumstances which then prevailed, the country could not reasonably have been expected to accommodate in employment all who required it or whether emigration derived from an insufficient development of the economic and social potential that we possessed. The Commission took the latter view. The Majority Report stated that:

> Emigration removes from the country a proportion of its potentially productive manpower and it is important to ascertain whether the effect of this is to deprive the country of services which cannot be used at home, or alternatively to provide an outlet for those people whom the economy cannot absorb. It is only in the light of the economic background of the country that this question can be satisfactorily answered, and it is our opinion that the country has the capacity to produce greater wealth and provide more employment than it does at present. [para. 306]

and went on to conclude (para. 307)

> In so far as there is scope for their development, emigration is not an outward movement of excess population; it is rather an emigration of people whose productive capacity is not being used, but could be used if resources were developed.

In the Commission's view, population growth depended crucially on raising output and incomes in the Agricultural sector, which it was anticipated would raise the overall level of economic activity and lead to employment creation in industry and services, even if the numbers retained on the land did not increase significantly. A "large-scale and long-term development programme, involving not only demographic considerations but far-reaching decisions in the economic, social and political spheres" was called for, but it was admitted that it was "far outside the function of a Population Commission to attempt to indicate the order of priorities" [para. 476]. Among the specific recommendations included in the Report were the establishment of a land utilisation body, schemes for the Congested Districts, tax relief where domestic help is employed, and the establishment of an Investment Advisory Council.

During the four years after the publication of the Reports of Commission emigration from Ireland reached the highest level recorded for over seventy years. The Department of Finance document Economic Development published in May 1958 cited this as a legitimate reason for the widespread sense of anxiety about the country's economic future that prevailed:

> After 35 years of native government people are asking whether an acceptable degree of economic progress is attainable in this particular political and economic entity. The common talk amongst parents in the towns, as in rural Ireland, is of their children having to emigrate as soon as their education is completed in order to be sure of a reasonable livelihood. To the children themselves and to many already in employment the jobs available at home look unattractive by comparison with those obtainable in such variety and so readily elsewhere. [p. 5]

This thinking was reflected in the Programme for Economic Expansion introduced by the Government in November of the same year:

> Production has not been increasing fast enough to provide employment and acceptable living standards for growing numbers of our people; large-scale emigration has been accompanied by a high level of unemployment. Emigration will not be checked nor will unemployment be permanently reduced until the rate of increase in national output is greatly accelerated. [p. 7]

The Programme contained detailed proposals designed to increase the rate of economic growth and reverse the decline in population. In line with the recommendations of the Commission on Emigration, the emphasis was placed on agricultural development as the main engine of economic growth.

A similar concern about the level of emigration is evident in subsequent exercises in economic planning, culminating in the 1970s in estimates of the number of jobs that would have to be created to attain a full employment target incorporating a low rate of emigration.[2] An important illustration of the influence of this thinking on the formulation of economic policy is contained in the White Paper National Development 1977-1980 (January 1978). The thrust of this document was the urgency of achieving a net increase of about 25,000 or 2.3 per cent, a year in the numbers at work in order to provide for the projected growth of the labour force and to reduce the level of unemployment. The required number of jobs was projected on the assumption that "the rate of inward movement would fall off and the estimated downward trend in the outward movement would continue" (p. 13), in other words, that the rate of net migration would be low.

Independent commentaries on the Irish economy have also endorsed the target of a low rate of emigration or zero "involuntary" emigration. The Study Employment and Unemployment Policy published by The Economic and Social Research Institute in 1984[3] argued against relying, either implicitly or explicitly, on emigration as a means of reducing the labour force and expressed the view that as long as the major part of the Western world remained in recession there would be little scope for emigration. The NESC document Manpower Policy in Ireland

2 These calculations were based on the National Economic and Social Council reports dealing with the topic.

3 Denis Conniffe and Kieran A. Kennedy, eds., *Employment and Unemployment Policy for Ireland.* The Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, 1984.

Table 8.1

Industrial and Regional Financial Aid in Certain EC Countries, 1981-84

Country	Industrial and Regional Financial Aid (1981-84) as a percentage of	
	Gross Value Added in Industry	Total Public Expenditure
Ireland	13.8	13.9
Italy	16.1	13.1
Luxembourg	3.5	16.4
Belgium	6.8	8.9
Denmark	7.3	4.6
France	8.3	9.0
UK	6.8	6.8
Germany	7.3	7.3
Netherlands	4.6	2.4

Sources: EC Commission. Unpublished data on State Aids to Industry.
Note: Excluding aid to Steel and Shipbuilding.

(December 1985) assumed net emigration of only 7,500 a year between 1986 and 1991 (p. 56).

In keeping with thrust of these commentaries, over the years Irish economic policy has been strongly influenced by the desire to curb the rate of emigration. This may be seen by looking at our record on industrial, manpower, incomes and fiscal policy.

The move to trade liberalisation in the 1960s was accompanied by the development of a very active industrial policy, designed to try to increase the overall rate of growth of industrial employment and to improve its regional distribution. A very wide range of incentives, consisting of both grants and tax concessions, was introduced. The result was that by the 1980s the level of State financial assistance to industry was proportionately higher in Ireland than in any other member state of the EC except Italy (see Table 8.1).

The number of manpower programmes has grown and expenditure on them has reached a high level. Furthermore, despite the exceptionally high rate of unemployment, the level of unemployment benefits has been increased relative to after-tax incomes. As may be seen from Table 8.2, our expenditure on "active" labour market programmes, relative to GNP, is surpassed only by Sweden among OECD countries, while our expenditure on income maintenance is surpassed only by Denmark.[4]

4 Spending on income maintenance for the unemployed reflects (a) the unemployment rate and (b) the relative generosity of unemployment benefits. The high Irish figure reflects an exceptionally high rate of unemployment combined with relatively high "replacement ratios", that is, ratios of benefits to after-tax income.

Table 8.2

State Expenditure on Labour Market Programmes in 1987 in Selected OECD Countries, taken as a percentage of GNP

Country	Labour Market Expenditure on Programmes in 1987 as percentage of GNP	
	"Active" Measures[1]	Income Maintenance[2]
Ireland	1.45	3.66
Italy	0.46	0.81
Luxemburg	0.50	1.02
Belgium	1.10	3.25
Denmark	1.14	3.89
France	0.74	2.33
UK	0.89	1.68
Germany	0.99	1.35
Netherlands	1.08	2.90
Austria	0.41	1.48
Canada	0.57	1.68
Greece	0.59	0.39
Japan	0.17	0.42
Spain	0.76	2.54
Sweden	1.86	0.80
USA	0.24	0.83

Sources: OECD Economic Survey of Sweden, 1988/89.
Note: (1) That is, employment services and administration, labour market training (adults), special youth measures, direct job creation and employment subsidies, and special measures for the disabled.
(2) Unemployment compensation and early retirement.

A great deal of effort has also been invested in attempts to reach agreements between trades unions, employers and government on the evolution of incomes in Ireland. These agreements have taken various forms – National Wage Agreements, National Understandings, and most recently, The Programme for National Recovery. The main objective of these agreements has been to moderate the rate of increase in money incomes so as to minimise domestic wage inflation and to protect the competitiveness of employment in the internationally traded sectors of the economy. A high degree of "corporatism" has been achieved in Ireland, clearly surpassed only by a handful of other countries in the OECD, such as Austria and Sweden.[5]

Finally, as a direct response to the perceived need to create additional employment, direct recruitment to the civil service and state-sponsored bodies was increased and

5 The degree of corporatism of 15 OECD countries has been measured by L. Calmfors and J. Driffill, "Centralisation of wage bargaining and macroeconomic performance", *Economic Policy, April 1988*, but Ireland is not included in their study.

an expansionary fiscal policy implemented during the years 1978-82. As a result of pursuing these policies in the face of a world recession, Irish national indebtedness had risen by the early 1980s to the highest level, relative to GNP, of any country in the OECD. The expansionary stance of policy was changed after 1982 only because retrenchment was dictated by financial considerations. Initially, the attempt to bring the public finances back into balance took the form of increasing the burden of taxation relative to GNP, rather than cutting the level of public expenditure. Since 1987, the volume of public consumption has been falling slowly. Despite the adjustments that have been made. However, the level of the Irish public sector deficit remains high by international standards.

It is clear, therefore, that in Ireland, emigration has not been welcomed as an alternative to promoting greater employment creation. Indeed, very active industrial, manpower and fiscal policies have been implemented over the years in the hope of accelerating the expansion in job opportunities and thereby reducing the rate of emigration. While the levels of unemployment and emigration remain unacceptably high, this is not because these problems have been ignored, but rather because of a failure to identify policies that would reduce them. In fact, there may not be a menu of policies that would lead to the desired outcomes under Irish conditions and in particular in view of the power of the macroeconomic factors listed in Chapter 5 as conducive to emigration.

2. THE PURPOSE OF AN EVALUATION

It is important to clarify the purpose that is to be served by an evaluation of the gains and losses or costs and benefits of external migration. A good deal of the international research on migration has been devoted to general issues, such as the overall impact on the receiving and sending countries.[6] These studies have some relevance to policy, as for example, when the question of restricting entry to a country is being debated. However, countries that are losing population through emigration can only hope to reduce the outflow through broad-based programmes of economic development. In this context, the main value of a general discussion of the gains and losses from emigration is to create an awareness of the need for such programmes where it does not already exist. Some of the literature on emigration addresses the question whether a country should condone or even encourage emigration as a substitute for domestic development. For example, a recent survey of international migration examined the impact of a large-scale emigration from Italy, Greece, Turkey and Portugal and concluded:

> Employment abroad has been regarded as a safety value for relieving the employment situation in labour surplus countries and has been encouraged by several LECs (Labour Exporting Economies). Not only has it transpired that, with the onset of less dynamic conditions in the LICs (Labour Importing Countries), this effect has been only temporary, there are indications from the emigrant workers' characteristics that the loss of manpower has not been entirely beneficial to the LECs .... In concluding her study of Turkey, Paine characterised that country's experience with the operation of a labour export policy up to the end of 1973 as being closer to the adverse end of a favourable-unfavourable spectrum of the economic effects of emigration. This conclusion is borne out by the evidence from other countries. On balance it is probable that the labour importing countries have benefitted more from labour migration than have the labour exporting countries.[7]

This passage is based on an implicit comparison between the alternatives of attempting to stimulate domestic development and employment creation, on the one hand, and encouraging an outflow of population to relieve pressure on the labour market, on the other. These were regarded as alternative development strategies in Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia, where official policy condoned emigration at least until the recession of the early 1980s reversed the outflow of population and made the need for domestic employment creation more urgent. In those countries, a critical evaluation of the impact of emigration on the domestic economy gave rise to the following recommendations:

> large scale emigration] masked the need to deal fully with the structural problems of industry and give rise to a wider-based industrial sector, better product diversity and a faster pace of endogenous growth [OECD Economic Survey: Greece, July 1978, p. 34]

> the authorities], recognising that emigration can no longer provide an outlet for surplus labour, have now taken measures to expand employment opportunities [OECD Economic Survey: Yugoslavia, May 1978, p. 31]

We noted above, however, that in Ireland there has been virtual unanimity about the desirability of not relying on emigration as a way of coping with the potential growth of the labour force. The need for effective development policies has been generally accepted, even if there has not been notable success in identifying them, as is evident from the long-run decline in employment.

Bearing these points in mind, it would seem that the most useful function that could be served in Ireland by an evaluation of the gains and losses from emigration would be to identify specific issues that need to be addressed so that the country can reduce the costs and increase the benefits associated with the flows out of the country that are likely to continue for some years to come.

6 There have been numerous studies of this type. See for example K. Jones and A. D. Smith, *The Economic Impact of Commonwealth Immigration*, Cambridge University Press, 1970 and R. C. Blitz, "A Benefit-Cost Analysis of Foreign Workers in West Germany", *Kyklos, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1977.*

7 Malcolm J. Macmillen, "The Economic Effects of International Migration: A Survey", *Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. XX No. 3, March 1982, p. 267.*

3. PRIVATE AND SOCIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS

A study of migration should distinguish between those costs and benefits that accrue to the individuals making the decision to migrate, and those that accrue to the economy as a whole. The latter are particularly significant from a policy point of view, because they may warrant corrective action to bring private and social costs into line. Private costs are generally taken into account by those who emigrate and hence are less relevant to policy. However, as shown in Chapter 7, Irish emigration to Britain involves a contingent of young people who have little or no financial resources and who are ill-equipped to cope with life in a foreign city. Their decision to emigrate is based on very inadequate knowledge of the situation that awaits them abroad. The risks associated with illegal entry to the United States may, also, have been underestimated by some of those deciding to go there from Ireland in recent years. Thus the availability of visas for Irish emigrants to the United States is an important issue at present. Policy interventions in regard to such groups are relevant.

Emigration entails public costs if, for example, the decision by well-educated young people to leave involves the loss to Ireland of a return from the public funds invested in their education or if the exodus is on a scale that reduces the capacity of the economy to increase the living standards of those remaining in Ireland. Clearly, under such circumstances emigration should be of concern to policymakers.

4. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF MIGRATION

A thorough examination of all the economic repercussions of migration lies beyond the scope of this report. However, to the extent that the effects of migration on the economy resemble those of population growth (of which it is a component), some relevant insights can be gained from a survey of the literature on the economic implications of population growth.

Population growth may have both positive and negative effects on the rate of economic growth. On the positive side, rapid population growth may raise aggregate demand and by increasing the size of the domestic market allow an economy to benefit from economies of scale. The urgency of providing for an expanding population may generate increased dynamism and innovativeness and accelerate the rate of technical progress. On the negative side, however, rapid growth of the labour force lowers the ratio of capital to labour unless there is an offsetting increase in the ratio of savings to income. A rapidly growing population has a higher proportion of young people in the total and hence finds it more difficult to maintain educational standards. Thus a rapid population growth may result in a decline in the average productivity of labour. Diminishing returns to labour could arise in agriculture due to an increased dependence on less fertile land. Much of the increase in the labour force may have to be accommodated in low productivity service jobs.

Unemployment, disguised and overt, is also likely to increase. Rapid population growth could also lead to a decline in the quality of life not reflected in national income statistics by exacerbating the problems of environmental degradation and urban congestion.

The net effect of population growth on economic welfare depends on the balance between these effects. Despite the considerable research that has been devoted to the topic, it is difficult to obtain reliable estimates of the magnitude of the individual effects. However, it is now widely acknowledged that the simple correlation between the rate of growth of income per person and the rate of population growth is virtually zero, either over time or across countries. Going behind this simple correlation and drawing on the wealth of empirical studies of the individual channels through which population growth affects economic growth, a recent review[8] concluded:

> Economic growth (as measured by *per capita* output) in many developing countries would have been more rapid in an environment of slower population growth, although in a number of countries the impact of population was probably negligible, and in some it may have been positive. (p. 1715)

Other studies have shown that rapid population growth retards the growth of modern sector employment in developing countries and that rapid labour force growth has a dampening effect on the rate of increase of real wages.[9] A recent review of the implications of the ageing and zero population growth in developed countries concluded:

> The secular decline in population growth rates and the consequent shift towards an older population have generally coincided with long-run improvements in standards of living in industrialised countries. Thus, the "long" view suggests that slower population growth is at least partially associated with strong economic growth, measured in per capita terms. "[10]

A rapidly growing population tends to be younger, that is, to have a lower median age, than a slow growing or stationary one. For example, West Germany has only 18 per cent of its population aged under 15, and 15 per cent aged 65 and over, whereas Turkey has 36 per cent under 15 and only 4.5 per cent in the older age group. The low or zero population growth that is now in prospect in many developed countries will increase the proportion of the population over 65 years to 25 per cent or more, and lower the proportion under 15 years to 15 per cent by the year 2030. These

8 See Allen C. Kelly, "Economic Consequences of Population Change in the Third World, *Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXVI (December 1988), pp. 1685-1728.*

9 See Lyn Squire, Employment Policy in Developing Countries: A Survey of Issues and Evidence. *New York, World Bank and Oxford University Press, 1981, p. 184.*

10 Robert P. Hagemann and Giuseppe Nicolette, "Population Ageing: Economic Effects and Some Policy Implications for Financing Public Pensions", *OECD Economic Studies, Spring 1989, p. 84.*

changes in age structure have important and definite implications for the structure of economic activity and for the financing of pensions. As population growth slows down, proportionately more resources have to be devoted to health care and fewer to education, for example. On the other hand, rapid population growth tends to stimulate the building and construction sector because increasing the stock of housing to cater for new household formation requires a much larger output of new houses than would be required merely to update and maintain the existing housing stock. The exceptionally rapid population growth recorded in the 1970s in Ireland was one of the reasons for the expansion in the share of the building and construction industry relative to GNP, and the slow-down in household formation during the 1980s led to a sharp reduction in this share. The net impact of these structural changes on the overall rate of economic growth are not clear.

The conclusion reached in the international literature that population growth of itself has an uncertain, but probably negative, net influence on long-run economic performance cannot, however, be applied without modification to migration. In particular it is important to bear in mind that a given change in the rate of population growth will result in a different population age structure depending on which component of population growth (the birth rate, the death rate or the rate of migration) has changed. For example, a reduction in the rate of population growth due to a rise in the emigration rate has less effect on the age structure of the population than that caused by a fall in the birth rate. Furthermore, migration involves a transfer of human capital from one economy to another, and while this may raise global output and productivity, it may reduce the share of the labour exporting country in this total. An outflow of population from a country may generate a return flow of capital and foreign exchange. These factors have to be taken into account in an evaluation of the impact of migration on economic growth, making it even more difficult to generalise about the economic consequences of migration than is the case for population growth.

5. COUNTERFACTUAL HISTORIES

Many discussions of the impact of emigration on the Irish economy fail to specify which alternatives are being compared or what would have happened in the absence of emigration. Sometimes it is implicitly assumed that an alternative or counterfactual history could have been created in which a higher rate of economic growth was achieved, the rate of unemployment was lower and, as a result, involuntary emigration was averted. Obviously, this would have been a more attractive prospect than one in which a low rate of growth caused high unemployment and emigration. But this attractive alternative might not have been achievable. A more relevant alternative with which to compare the actual outcome might be one in which the economy underperformed and there was no opportunity for emigration. These alternatives are stylised as Scenarios A, B and C in Table 8.3. It is clear that B dominates both A and C. The difficulty arises in trying to compare

Table 8.3

Different Economic and External Migration Scenarios.

Indicator	Scenario		
	A	B	C
Rate of Economic Growth	0%	4%	0%
Level of Employment	Falling	Rising	Falling
Rate of Emigration	1%	0%	0%
Rate of Unemployment	Static	Falling	Rising
Income per Person	Static	Rising	Falling

A and C. How much would we be willing to accept in terms of higher unemployment and lower living standards if this were the price that had to be paid to reduce the rate of emigration?

A philosophical issue arises in choosing the criterion on which these scenarios should be compared. Income per person, which is usually used, gives no weight to the absolute size of the population. Total income, on the other hand, would give weight to the size of the population as well as the level of income per person. While recognising the relevance of this philosophical point, we shall concentrate on income per person.

We can gain some insight into the question of how much of a reduction in living standards would be traded off for a reduction in emigration by studying the behaviour of those who emigrate and those who remain in Ireland. The fact that so many school-leavers are prepared to emigrate to satisfy their income and occupational aspirations shows that they are not predisposed to accept a fall in living standards as the price of remaining in Ireland. (The nature of this response was discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.) Those who remain in Ireland are frequently exhorted to make sacrifices, such as moderation in their wage demands, so that more employment opportunities may be created and the rate of emigration reduced. These exhortations do not appear to impinge, to any marked degree, on the Irish wage bargaining process, however, which may be sensitive to the rate of unemployment but does not appear to be affected by the rate of emigration. There is, therefore, a lack of evidence of a willingness to trade-off improvements in living standards for lower emigration.

The question of a trade-off between lower emigration and higher unemployment and/or reduced living standards can, however, be side-stepped if it is assumed that there is no need to choose between these objectives. This would be the case if Scenario C could be ruled out because reduced emigration would raise the rate of economic growth. Whether this is in fact the case is an empirical question. We examine the available evidence on this issue in the next section.

6. THE EFFECTS OF EMIGRATION ON THE IRISH ECONOMY

There have been several previous commentaries on the costs and benefits of emigration in an Irish context, but little empirical research on the magnitude of these effects.

The most extended discussion of Irish emigration is contained in the Reports of the Commission on Emigration. It is worth summarising the views contained in the Majority Report at some length because they touch on all the major themes.

As we noted earlier, the Commission argued that emigration represented first and foremost a loss of productive resources that could be used at home if the economy were more intensively developed. Thus emigration was a reflection of "the failure of the economy to provide the rising living standards which are increasingly sought, particularly in the rural areas" (para. 306).

The Commission provides a classic statement of an optimistic counter-factual view of history:

> It is relevant to consider whether emigration has been so convenient an outlet for population that it explains the absence of that sense of urgent necessity to develop resources rapidly and resolutely which would have arisen if the pressure of an increasing population were operating to force the pace of development. If that outlet did not exist, the country would have been compelled to resort to intensive development .... it seems a reasonable presumption that, in such circumstances, the will to make greater use of national resources would have been strengthened and the means of developing these resources would have been more eagerly sought after. Instead, the ready outlet of emigration has provided the remaining population with a reasonably satisfying standard of living and this has been responsible for an acquiescence in conditions of under-development which are capable of considerable improvement. (para. 310) [emphasis added]

These views notwithstanding, it is of interest to note that the Commission appeared to believe that emigration did not necessarily inflict long-term damage on the economy. While it was felt that it was within our capacity to generate higher levels of output which would result in more employment opportunities and thus reduce the migratory outflow, it was noted that even in periods when emigration was high there appeared to be an ample supply of labour in Ireland. Nor was it believed that the emigration flows, which then involved mainly unskilled persons, deprived the country of the best of its people. The Commission also believed that

> if at any one time part of this (i.e. manpower) asset is not being utilised there is no immediate economic loss if it is removed by emigration, and there is, in fact, a gain in the sense that there is a smaller claim on available resources. In short, it is no immediate economic loss to be deprived of productive power which is not being utilised and which can be retained only at expense to the community at large. (Para. 317, p. 141.)

The Report goes on to state however that:

> this is a short-term view, and what may be an economic gain in the existing state of the economy may well prove in the long run to be a serious loss of economic potential.

The Commission also believed that most emigrants enjoyed an improvement in their standard of living. The notion that emigration had been selective of the best in each generation was rejected. The economic loss from emigration was discussed in terms of the cost of raising and educating young people who then contribute to another economy, but it was acknowledged that if these emigrants had remained unemployed in Ireland they would have been a burden on the economy. However, it was considered idle to pursue further this approach to quantifying the costs and benefits of emigration. An analysis of the effects of emigration is contained in Professor Meenan's book on the Irish economy.[11] He pointed out that the most obvious consequence of emigration on the scale that had occurred in Ireland was that it brought us face to face with the economics of a declining population, which "restricted the opportunities for Irish manufacturers who cannot use the advantages of large-scale production unless they engage in the export trade" (p. 345). However, he pointed out the positive features on emigration:

> Granted the fact that the economy did not develop at any rate remotely capable of absorbing the natural increase (and still lags behind even in the late 1960s), emigration has prevented the emergence of an immense surplus of labour and an inevitable driving down of all wages and salaries ... but when all that has been said, it remains true that emigration blunts the edge of initiative ... The true cost of emigration to the community is perhaps more correctly assessed in terms of its effect on blunting initiative and weakening the determination to make the best of what opportunities lie to hand ... (pp. 347/8)

Finally, in their recently published book Kennedy et al.[12] discuss various aspects of the impact of emigration on the economy. They emphasise its tendency to increase the burden of dependency by lowering the proportion of the population in the active age groups. The effect of this is not only economic but also psychological because it makes society "conformist and conservative" (p. 147). Moreover, "the absence of population growth in Ireland exacerbated the disadvantage of what was in any event a small home market" (p. 148). While they mention some possible benefits from

11 James Meenan, The Irish Economy since 1922, *Liverpool University Press, 1970.*

12 Kieran A. Kennedy, Thomas Giblin and Deirdre McHugh, *The Economic Development of the Ireland in the Twentieth Century*, Routledge, 1988.

emigration, they believe that on balance it impaired the long-run development of the Irish economy.

Two of the recurrent themes in this literature, the effect of emigration on the size of the population and on its age structure, can be readily quantified.

If there has been no net migration since 1841, and if despite this the rate of natural increase had remained at the level actually recorded, the population of the 26 counties, instead of falling to 3.5 million, would have increased from 6.5 million to somewhere in the region of 18 million by 1986. There would have been an annual growth rate of about 0.75 per cent a year, instead of the decline of about 0.4 per cent a year that was experienced.

It is difficult to say how such population growth would have affected the development of the Irish economy. Clearly, it would have been of little benefit unless it represented a potential market backed up with effective purchasing power. A growing population dependent on subsistence farming, or crowded into urban slums, would have done little to stimulate economic development, as may be confirmed by the current plight of hundreds of millions of people in the Third World today. Moreover, if there had been no emigration, the population of Ireland today would be small even by European standards, and firms would still be unable to achieve economies of scale catering exclusively for the domestic market. However, Irish exports have enjoyed free access to the British market since 1966 and to the market of the European Community since 1973. If by 1993 the European Community achieves the objective of a unified internal market, Ireland will be part of an economy of 320 million people, with a combined GDP more than 150 times that of Ireland. Thus, whatever its relevance to Ireland's economic history, the size of the national market has little economic significance under the circumstances that obtain in the 1990s. Cost competitiveness, rather than the size of the domestic market, is crucial.

The role of emigration in the depopulation of rural areas of Ireland should also be clarified. Rural depopulation has occurred in most western countries over the last two centuries. Ireland is no exception to this general trend. The population of the rural areas of the 26 counties declined from 5.5 million in 1841 to 1.5 million in 1986.[13] What is unusual about the Irish experience is the fact that so much of the movement between countryside and towns involved both emigration from the country and, at times, significant inward flows from abroad. (The evidence in Chapter 6 showed the important role played by migration in the process of occupational mobility for the educated rural population.) None the less, the effect of internal migration has been significant relative to the low rate of natural increase in the least urbanised Irish counties. We have seen from data in Chapter 3 (Tables 3.8

13 These figures are taken from the Commission on Emigration, Table 3, and *Census of Population 1986, Vol. I, Table G.* The demarcation between "rural" and "urban" is settlements of 1,500 inhabitants.

and 3.9) that the population of counties such as Leitrim, Mayo, Roscommon and Cavan would have declined in the 1970s and 1980s but for significant net inflows from abroad.[14] If the pace of Irish urban development had been faster, it is possible that the rate of rural depopulation would have been higher. The experience of the United States illustrates that large regions of a country can be depopulated even when the national population is growing rapidly.[15] The decline of population in the rural areas raises many issues regarding the provision of social services and infrastructure, but these are not directly relevant to an evaluation of implications of migration at the national level.

In evaluating the impact of emigration on the economy is important to bear in mind that, despite the high rate of emigration, the population of the urban areas of the 26 counties has increased without interruption since 1891. From a low point of 853,000 in 1891, the urban population rose to just short of 2 million in 1986. Even during the 1950s, when the rate of emigration was exceptionally high, the population of the urban areas continued to expand.

In our view, therefore, the increasing integration of Ireland into a larger international market, on the one hand, and the fact that since the end of the last century the decline in population was confined to the rural areas, on the other, make it inappropriate to apply general theories of the impact of declining population without considerable modification to the Irish experience.

The impact of sustained emigration on the population's age structure can be quantified by comparing population projections or simulations based on alternative migration assumptions. When this is done using Irish data it emerges that high rates of emigration have relatively modest effects on the population age structure even if they are sustained over the long-run. For example, Walsh (1970) found that the stable "age structure that emerged from simulating the effect of a sustained high rate of emigration did not differ very markedly with that resulting from the assumption of no net emigration. The main difference between the two outcomes lay in the fall in the proportion in the 'young active' (25-44 years) age group as a result of emigration. Much more dramatic effects follow from varying the assumption about the birth rate". A lower birth rate leads to a markedly older population structure in the long run. However, the combination of a high birth rate and a high rate of emigration produces the unusual result that a relatively high proportion of the population is in the "young dependent" (under 15 years) and in the "old dependent" (over 65 years) age groups. This has been a striking feature of the Irish population

14 This is also true for the period 1966-71: see J. G. Hughes and B. M. Walsh, Internal Migration Flows in Ireland and their Determinants, *The Economic and Social Research Institute, Paper No. 98, January 1980, Table 2.1.*

15 "The simultaneous urbanisation and metropolitanisation of the population has led to massive depopulation of the rural areas. Between 1950 and 1960 a total of 1,536 counties actually lost population at a time when the nation was growing rapidly." Donald J. Bogue, *Principles of Demography*, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, 1969, p. 534.

age pyramid for many years in the past. The level of young dependency is now falling sharply due to the decline in the birth rate since 1980.

Turning to the question of how emigration affects aggregate economic performance, it is difficult to detect from the cyclical behaviour of Irish GNP whether emigration has had lasting effects on the rate of economic growth. After the exceptionally high rate of emigration during the 1950s, the country experienced rapid economic growth in the 1960s; the significant immigration of the 1970s did not help sustain economic growth during the 1980s; despite the resumption of large-scale emigration in the mid-1980s, there was a return to relatively rapid economic growth after 1988. These facts cast doubt on the belief that emigration has a dampening effect on future economic performance.

Measuring the feedback from emigration to the performance of the economy with any degree of precision is a difficult task and has been attempted in only a few studies in the international literature.[16] One study of the Irish experience explored the association between the rate of economic growth (income per person) and the rate of net migration over the years 1947-86.[17] This study paid particular attention to testing for the existence of feedback from migration to economic growth, but found no evidence that it was significant. This casts further doubt on the validity of the view that emigration has impaired the economy's development, measured in terms of the growth of income per head of the remaining population.

In Chapter 5 we saw that over the years emigration has been associated with reducations in unemployment, that is, other things being equal, a higher level of emigration causes a fall in unemployment. This conclusion was based on the findings of a single-equation study of the relationship between these variables. An econometric model may also be used to explore the effects of changes in the rate of migration on the economy. The most elaborate model available is HERMES-Ireland[18] in which migration is modelled as a response to Irish/UK relative earnings and employment (in some variants, only relative employment is used.) According to the model, a rise in UK unemployment causes a decline in emigration from Ireland, which increases the supply of labour. Initially, this increases the level of unemployment, but because the rate of increase in wages is moderated by higher unemployment, there is also some increase in employment and output.

When using the model to estimate the magnitude of these effects, it is important to note that the authors state that their estimates of the migration equation "proved to

16 Most of these have been concerned with regional, rather than national, migration: see, for example, A. Dahlberg and B. Holmlund, "The Interaction of Migration, Income and Employment in Sweden", *Demography, Vol. 15 (1978), No. 3, pp. 259-266,* who conclude that there is evidence that out-migration creates a vicious circle of slow growth and further emigration.

17 B. M. Walsh *"Testing for the Existence of Macroeconomic Feedback from Large-scale Migration"*, The Economic and Social Review.

18 John Bradley, John FitzGerald, Liam O'Sullivan and Andrew Storey, *"HERMES-Ireland: The EC Medium-Term Policy Model of the Irish Economy: Structure and Performance"*, The Economic and Social Research Institute, 1989.

be very unstable, particularly with respect to the more recent observations" (p. 48) (that is, the years immediately before 1984). The results obtained must therefore be regarded as tentative.

The authors have kindly provided us with the results of a simulation that tracks the impact on the economy of an increase in UK unemployment of 4 percentage points. This leads to a falling-off in emigration from Ireland. The simulation consists in projecting the level of output, employment, unemployment and many other variables over a five-year period, comparing benchmark levels with those that are obtained when the higher rate of unemployment in the U.K. is assumed. The following are the projected changes in the levels of certain variables five years after the rise in UK unemployment:

Net emigration	-35,000
Population	+3.8%
Real GDP	+0.9%
Real GNP	-0.6%
Real GDP/Population	-2.8%
Real GNP/Population	-4.3%
Unemployment Rate	+2.6 percentage points
Industrial employment	+1.7%

Emigration is reduced, population, employment and output rise, but unemployment increases. The most striking prediction, however, is the sharp fall in real income per person.[19] The conclusion of this exercise is thus that a sudden drop in emigration from Ireland, caused by developments outside our economy rather than any improvement in its performance, would depress living standards and raise the rate of unemployment. In fact in reality the position would be even more disadvantageous than that indicated since it is inconceivable that such a sharp rise in UK unemployment could occur unless there was a parallel deterioration in general UK (and even world) economic conditions. This would imply a reduction in the external demand for our goods and services leading to greater decreases in income levels; it is unlikely in these circumstances that there would be any increase in domestic employment. The conclusion that a reduction in emigration leads to a rise in unemployment is consistent with the findings, summarised in Chapter 4, from earlier studies of the dynamics of the Irish labour market.

Finally, it is relevant to consider the country's experience during two periods when the possibility of emigration was virtually removed due to adverse economic conditions in the rest of world. During the 1930s net emigration from Ireland declined significantly because of world recession (see Chapter 2, Table 2.5). The statistical evidence for this period is deficient, and its interpretation complicated by

19 The fall in GNP reflects the rise in net factor payments to the rest of the world when industrial production increases. This feature of the model may not be entirely satisfactory from the perspective of simulating the effects of migration.

Table 8.4

Economic Trends in 1980/84 and 1984/88

Indicator	1980-1984	1984/88
Net Emigration	22,000	107,000
Numbers at work	–53,000	–12,000
Numbers unemployed	+113,000	+15,000
Real GNP/person	–2.3%	+5.8%

a variety of extraneous events, but it would be hard to maintain that the reduction in emigration during the 1930s stimulated the long-run development of the Irish economy. It was recognised by the mid-1950s that the protectionist policies espoused during the 1930s offered no prospect of generating the employment opportunities needed to satisfy the aspirations of the population. Most of the industries fostered by these policies disappeared after trade was liberalised in the 1960s.

Early in the 1980s global recession once again virtually shut off the emigration option. The years 1980-84 resembled Scenario C, above: despite falling employment and the sharpest rise in unemployment ever recorded in Ireland, emigration remained at a relatively moderate level. The population continued to grow and income per person declined sharply. This was the most difficult episode in Irish economic history since the Second World War. Summary date are contained in Table 8.4.

Between 1984 and 1988, on the other hand, the fall in employment was much less marked, unemployment increased less rapidly, and there was a modest rise in real income. Emigration, however, was five times what it has been in the previous four years. The combination of events during these years resembles Scenario A, outlined in Table 8.1. If the recession in Britain and other OECD countries had persisted and emigration from Ireland had been constrained to the level of the previous four years, the supply of labour would have increased by about 60,000 between 1984 and 1988, instead of remaining virtually static. It is difficult to see how the Irish economy would, in response, have generated a commensurate increase in employment opportunities. Moreover, in the longer run, any such response would have been contingent on a decline in real incomes. Thus, the absence of the emigration option would have led to increased unemployment and/or declining living standards.

During the 1950s the rate of emigration reached a level that had not been recorded since the 1880s. The numbers at work declined by nearly 15%. But it is striking that the rise in unemployment was relatively modest (the rate never reached 10 per cent of the non-agricultural labour force) and that real GNP per person rose by a quarter between 1951 and 1961. Had the option of emigration not been open during this

decade, due for example, to high unemployment in Britain, it seems inevitable that income per person would have declined and unemployed soared.

This review has not uncovered any firm evidence that high emigration leads to lower economic growth. Time series causality tests, simulations based on a large-scale econometric model, and an examination of certain key episodes during the twentieth century do not show that emigration has had lasting adverse effects on the economy. In fact, there is evidence that the rise in population that would have followed the cessation of emigration would have had adverse repercussions on living standards.

7. ASSESSMENT OF SPECIFIC GAINS AND LOSSES

The foregoing discussion centred on the question of whether emigration was economically beneficial or harmful. However, we suggested in an earlier section of this chapter that this may not be the most useful question to pose. It is more valuable to focus on more specific issues relating the costs and benefits associated with the current pattern of emigration from Ireland.

The following issues are relevant:

i. The sensitivity of migration to domestic economic conditions.

ii. The selectivity of migration and in particular the extent to which a "brain drain" can be said to exist.

iii. The extent of return migration from the emigrant stream and the characteristics of this return flow. The extent to which the return migrants bring additional human and financial capital into the country.

iv. The effect of migration on the population age structure and dependency.

v. The impact of migration on the balance of payments through emigrants' transfers and tourism.

We discuss these issues one by one.

(i) Sensitivity of migration to domestic economic conditions

As we noted in previous chapters, emigration from Ireland is very sensitive to domestic economic conditions and especially to the difference between the performance of the Irish economy and that of the countries to which the Irish emigrate. Because the rate of emigration rises during periods of rising unemployment, and can quickly turn into a net inflow when the domestic demand for labour improves, it acts as a buffer between fluctuations in the level of output and in the level of unemployment. Without emigration the rate of unemployment would have been higher in the 1950s and the late 1980s than actually was the case. On the other hand, without immigration the population and economic growth recorded during the 1970s would not have been as rapid as they were. The nature of this cyclical responsiveness increases the benefits to Ireland of emigration.

The possibility of emigration limits the size of the differential that can be sustained between the incomes of skilled labour in Ireland and abroad. For this reason, shortages of skilled and qualified labour are likely to arise in Ireland when they exist throughout the western world, as is at present the case for many types of graduates and professionals (e.g. engineers, computer scientists, accountants, certain kinds of medical practitioners, etc.). Under these circumstances, emigration of graduates and skilled workers should not be taken to imply that we are producing a surplus of them. Graduates in these areas may be emigrating while at the same time there is difficulty in filling vacancies in Ireland.[20] Nor should the evidence of emigration among graduates, and resultant shortages in Ireland, be used to buttress the case for expanding the provision of places for these students. Very little can be said about the appropriate provision of places in third level education simply by looking at the migration data. Policy recommendations should be reached by carefully considering the costs and benefits of state expenditure on each type of education.

(ii) The Composition of the Migration Flows

This has been the subject of much debate in the past, but the absence of data has made it difficult to draw firm conclusions. Chapter 3 of the present study contains a considerable body of new information on this topic. The outflow of population from Ireland contains a preponderance of young, unmarried people. The data in Chapter 3 shows that the median age of emigrants is currently 20.3 years. This is probably higher than it was in the past. The return flow is older and contains more people who are married with young children. Our data also show that although there is significant emigration in all socio-economic groups, the rate appears to be higher among the better qualified and those in the higher socio-economic groups. There is evidence of a "brain drain" in the 30 per cent overall emigration rate among graduates from Third Level education who enter the labour market and the considerably higher rates among graduates from professional and technical faculties. Clearly, this type of selectivity increases the potential loss to the economy due to emigration.

Large-scale emigration that is selective with respect to skill level has implications for the distribution of income in the sending country. A reduction in the supply of

20 An important instance of this phenomenon is the high rate of emigration among Irish medical graduates at the same time as there is immigration of foreign graduates to fill certain vacancies in Ireland.

one category of worker tends to raise its income and lower that of complementary categories. Under contemporary Irish conditions, this implies that emigration tends to raise the incomes of well-qualified personnel who remain in Ireland, relative to other groups, while lowering those of the unskilled, thereby tending to increase the inequality of the distribution of income. This too, is a disadvantageous aspect of Irish emigration.

(iii) The Return Flow and its Characteristics

The typical returning emigrant is about 10 years older than the typical emigrant. He or she is more likely to be married and have children. It is also probable that (s)he has accumulated some financial capital, work experience and skills during the stay abroad. All of these are benefits to the Irish economy that help offset the loss of human and financial capital that occurs when people emigrate. However, it will be recalled that Chapter 3 revealed the existence of a significant return flow of emigrants with low educational attainment who appear to fail to adjust to living abroad. The significant rate of return migration among this group implies that the selectivity of the net migration flow is even greater than is suggested by the data for the gross outflow.

The proportion of each emigrating cohort that returns to Ireland has been very variable over the years.[21] Few of those leaving early in the 1950s returned because of the prolonged under-performance of the Irish economy in the 1950s. Those leaving during the late 1950s and during the 1960s, on the other hand, were more likely to return because of the improved performance of the economy in the 1960s and early 1970s. It is not possible to anticipate what proportion of the present outflow will return during the 1990s. This will depend on how rapidly the Irish economy grows, on how this translates into employment expansion and on the labour market situation abroad. However, the fact that there is a return flow and that this flow is sensitive to Irish labour market conditions tends to increase the benefits, or reduce the costs, of emigration to the Irish economy.

(iv) Effect of Migration on Age Structure and Dependency

A further feature of significance in regard to the impact of external migration on the socio-economic situation in Ireland relates to the variations in age structure which migration can cause. It is appropriate to consider this issue in terms of the age patterns which would emerge between now and the turn of the century under different external migration scenarios. Table 8.5 shows 1986 population totals and population projections to the year 2001 according to age groups under two sets of external migration assumptions. The first set of assumptions is the "medium"

21 This may be gauged from the age-related net migration rates discussed in Chapter 3 (Table 3.5).

Table 8.5

Population projections to the year 2001 based to different net external migration assumptions

Age	1986	2001 Assumption (1)	2001 Assumption (2)	1986	2001 Assumption (1)	2001 Assumption (2)
		000			%	
0 to 15 years	1,024.8	781.0	825.4	28.9	22.5	21.5
15 to 24 years	617.5	558.5	670.2	17.4	16.1	17.5
25 to 34 years	501.1	465.1	673.5	14.2	13.4	17.6
35 to 44 years	421.6	502.2	536.1	11.9	14.9	14.0
45 to 64 years	591.4	770.3	766.9	16.7	22.2	20.0
65 +	384.4	395.1	359.2	10.9	11.4	9.4
Total	3,540.6	3,472.4	3,831.3	100.0	100.0	100.0

Notes: *Assumption (1)* is identical with the "medium" migration variant (with the F2 fertility option) as used in the 1988 CSO publication "Population and Labour Force Projection 1991-2021". This involves an overall annual net outflow of 25,000 between 1986 and 1996 and of 20,000 between 1986 and 2001.

Assumption (2) involves nil net migration in all age groups after 1986 (again with the F2 fertility assumption as used in the above mentioned report).

Note: The rise in the numbers aged 65+ under assumption (1) reflects the incorporation of a net inflow of retired people in this scenario. This might occur even if net migration in other age groups fall to zero.

migration variant (M2) included in the 1988 CSO Population Projections Report.[22] This assumption involves an overall net population loss of 25,000 per year between 1986 and 1996 and 20,000 per year between 1996 and 2001. The second set of projections included in the table is based on the premise of nil net migration in all age groups over the entire period. Both sets of assumptions use the CSO "F2" fertility variant under which the Total Period Fertility Rate would fall to 1.98 by the year 2001 (it was 2.44 in 1986).

The most notable change indicated by the figures on either assumption about migration is the decline in the child population due to falling fertility. The population aged 0 to 15 years is predicted to decrease by about 200,000 between 1986 and 2001, from 1,025,000 to about 800,000. As a proportion of the total population, the child population will fall from nearly 29 per cent to 22 per cent over this period – irrespective of how external migration develops. There will be a large increase (in both absolute and relative terms) in the 45 to 64 year age group according as the current middle-age bulge ages as its numbers begin to reach the pre-retirement stage. This development, which is also largely independent of migration trends, means that the 45 to 64 year age group will account for 20 per cent or more of the total population by the year 2001, compared with less than 17 per cent in 1986.

22 Population and Labour Force Projections 1991-2021, Central Statistics Office, 1988.

Figure 8.1





Source: Population and Labour Force Projections 1991 and 2021. Central Statistics Office, 1988.
Note: The projected population pyramid is actually based on the CSO F1 fertility assumption which involved a slower rate of decrease in fertility than the alternative F2 assumption used in Table 8.5. A pyramid based on this latter assumption would have an even narrower or more condensed base, as the projected child population would be lower.

Migration does, however, also influence the outcome, most notably in the age groups 15 to 24 years and 25 to 34 years. If migration at the rate assumed in the CSO medium variant actually occurs, these age groups will suffer a substantial decline in population up to the year 2001, amounting in aggregate to nearly 100,000 persons, with most of the impact of it falling on the older of the two age groups (25 to 35 years).

Thus the combined effect of continuing emigration and the fall in the birth rate implies a fairly rapid progression to a significantly older population structure. The figures given in Table 8.5 show that the population aged 35 years and over would increase from 39.1 per cent of the total population in 1986, to nearly 49 per cent in the year 2001, a dramatic shift by any standard. The extent of the change is illustrated by the population pyramids for 1986 and 2001 set out in Figure 8.1. The more "normal" pyramid shaped age configuration for 1986 is replaced in 2001 by what may be called a "beehive" shaped display due to depleted numbers in the younger age classes due to the likely fertility and migration trends.[22]

The following conclusions can be drawn concerning the impact of emigration between now and the end of the century on the age of structure of the Irish population. If emigration continues at close to the rate recently recorded the proportion of the population in the 25-34 year age group will be about 4 percentage points, and the number more than one quarter, lower than they would be by the end of the century if there were zero net migration. Emigration would also cause a smaller fall in the proportion and numbers in the 15-24 year age group. Conversely, the proportion in the 45-64 year age group would rise. Significant as these changes are in terms of their socio-economic impact, they are unlikely to be as important as those which will follow from the dramatic fall in the proportion of children in the total that is now occurring due to the decline in the birth rate since 1980. These findings, which take a relatively short-term perspective are consistent with those based on the much longer-run simulations described in Section 6 of this chapter.

(v) Impact on the Balance of Payments

There are two important headings under which the level of emigration may affect the Irish balance of payments, namely, tourism and transfers. We shall examine these in turn.

Tourism. Table 8.6 summarises some statistics relevant to the contribution of emigrants to tourism to Ireland. It may be seen that visits to relatives increased by 65 per cent between 1982 and 1988, at which date they accounted for almost 40 per cent of all tourist visits and a third of total tourist expenditure. The corresponding percentages for 1982 were 32 and 27 respectively. On the basis of Bord Failte survey data it can be estimated that about 30 per cent of all overseas visitors to Ireland were born in Ireland, and a further one-third have some ethnic link with the country. Only

some 40 per cent of visitors have no personal link with Ireland.[23] Broadly speaking therefore emigrant-related tourism generated between 170 and 340 million in 1988 (depending on how inclusively it is defined).

In 1987 there were 22,500 visitors from overseas by people born in Ireland who had left Ireland within the year. In 1988 this increased to 64,700, due to an extraordinary rise in the number of this type of visitor from Britain. This very high figure includes multiple visits. In fact, data collected since 1985 reveal that a very high proportion of Irish born visiting Ireland from overseas made multiple visits within the year.

A picture emerges from these tourist statistics of Irish emigrants who visit home frequently, especially in recent years. This has been facilitated by the decline in the cost of access transport to this country. In addition to the benefits of this pattern of emigration in terms of export earnings, it also implies, as suggested in earlier chapters, that the degree of isolation and separation which emigration entails has diminished.

However in considering increased "export" earnings attributable to emigration one must also take account of offsetting outflows because of a greater number of induced visits abroad by Irish residents (by parents, relatives etc. of emigrants). It is worth noting that the incidence of "visits to relatives abroad" has increased markedly in recent years, the proportion of such visits rising from 25 to 32 per cent between 1982 and 1988 and the related expenditure (expressed as a proportion of total expenditure abroad by Irish residents) from 17 to 25 per cent.

Transfers. Emigration generates transfers across the foreign exchanges in addition to the revenue from visits to Ireland by the Irish born living abroad. In the past emigrants' remittances and pensions were an important element in the current account of the Irish balance of payments. In OECD countries such as Turkey, Yugoslavia and Portugal they are still a very important source of foreign exchange.[24]

Data in Ross (1972) reveal the importance of emigrants' remittances and overseas pensions in the 1960s.[25] This item amounted to 3.2 per cent of personal income in 1960 but declined to 2.5 per cent in 1965 and 1969. Its importance varied considerably from region to region, being much less important in Dublin and the eastern counties than in Connacht and the western counties, in some of which it assumed very significant proportions as may be seen from the data in Table 8.7.

---

23 These percentages relate to numbers of visitors, but similar proportions apply to expenditure: although the visitors to families and relatives spend less per day than other categories of tourists while in Ireland, they tend to stay longer and spend about the same per visit.

24 For a survey of this topic see *OECD Employment Outlook 1985, Chapter III.*

25 Miceal Ross, *Further Data on County Income in the Sixties*, The Economic and Social Research Institute, 1972.

Table 8.6

Estimated Numbers of Overseas Visitors to Ireland and Their Associated Expenditure, 1982-88

Characteristic	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
				000			
Visits							
Business	356	357	319	290	315	354	438
Tourist	691	720	704	792	641	710	810
Visits to Relatives	556	566	722	712	700	836	919
Other	154	135	127	117	156	139	178
Total Visits	1757	1779	1873	1912	1813	2039	2345
				£ million			
Expenditure							
Business	58	59	49	53	65	76	93
Tourist	140	164	194	238	183	196	235
Visits to Relatives	80	90	115	131	138	177	194
Other	19	16	14	21	34	34	44
Total Expenditure	297	328	373	443	417	483	566

Source: Tourism and Travel 1988 (Statistical Release), Central Statistics Office, May 1989.
Notes: The expenditure figures do not include international travel fares.

Table 8.7

Emigrants Remittances and Pensions (including foreign remuneration of employees) as Percentage of personal incomes in certain counties

County	1960	1965	1969
		%	
Mayo	10.5	8.1	8.5
Donegal	7.0	5.5	5.8
Longford	6.3	5.3	5.5
Leitrim	6.2	3.9	4.4
Roscommon	4.7	4.5	5.0
TOTAL (26 counties)	3.2	2.5	2.5

Source: Ross (1972) Tables 1, 2 and 3.

With the decline in the population outflow from Ireland in the 1960s and 1970s, the Central Statistics Office discontinued the publication of separate data for emigrants' remittances, which are now included in the current account of the balance of payments under "International Transfers". This heading also includes the large amounts received as European Community transfers and some other items that have no bearing on emigration. Separate totals for the Credit and Debit flows are

obtainable. The debit item includes "Migrants' Transfers". This contains an estimate of the effect of the transfer of ownership of an Irish asset from a resident to a non-resident when, for example, the owner of a farm moves abroad, as well as to the actual transfer of funds abroad by emigrants who sell their assets in Ireland before leaving.[26]

When the EC components are subtracted from total Private Transfers it appears that the components due to emigrants are (i) relatively small and (ii) on balance positive.[27] The net inflow is now in the region of only about 1 per cent of national disposable income. It is interesting to note that the Debit item increased markedly in 1987, reflecting the higher level of emigration and the growing importance of asset transfer out of the country at the time of emigration.

Other Considerations. There are some other, relatively minor, channels through which emigration may affect the balance of payments. These may be briefly mentioned:

- The large Irish-born population resident abroad creates a market for exports of Irish products. A number of Irish firms, including the main banks, have taken advantage of the opportunities presented by this "ethnic market".
- Some Irish firms have been helped to diversify abroad by the existence of a pool of Irish workers overseas. The main examples are in the construction industry.
- The emigrant population may invest some of their savings in Ireland. The extent to which this occurs would be sensitive to expectations regarding exchange rates and rates of interest, but the tax treatment of deposit interest is also relevant. Non-resident accounts are not liable to Deposit Interest Retention Tax. However, remittances by temporary emigrants (who have not established non-residence for Irish tax purposes) are chargeable to income tax in Ireland. In view of the enormous volume of short-term movement between this country and abroad, it would be sensible to remove any disincentive to the repatriation of savings into Ireland.

8. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

This review of the economic implications of migration in the Irish context reveals the broad range of complex issues that has to be taken into account and our limited knowledge of the nature of some of the key interactions. The evidence does not

26 This item has become very significant in the United Kingdom as people realise the capital appreciation of their houses and emigrate. It has been estimated that the capital outflow per emigrant from the U.K. was as high as £42,000 in 1988: see John Muellbauer and Anthony Murphy, U.K. *House Prices and Migration: Economic and Investment Aspects*, London: Shearson Lehman Hutton, September 1988, p.19.

27 These data are not published. The summary in the text reflects the level of generality on which the Central Statistics Office wishes to maintain this information.

warrant drawing firm conclusions to the effect that migration has on balance harmed or benefitted the Irish economy. In any event, the practical implications of such conclusions are not clear. There is broad agreement that a faster rate of economic growth is highly desirable and would lead to a reduction in the rate of emigration. There remains the question of what specific policies should be implemented to reduce the net loss to the Irish economy (or increase the net gain) from emigration.

Some of the issues raised above have specific implications for policy. Perhaps the most important of these relate to the financing of higher education and the structure of income taxes.

There will be an incentive for the highly qualified to emigrate as long as the net advantage of working in Ireland is less than that available abroad. This fact should be taken into account in the framing of Irish educational policy.

One of the traditional arguments for tax-supported subsidisation of higher education is that the existence of a stock of highly qualified people bestows benefits on the economy as a whole that are separate from the private gains to those who are educated. Among these benefits are the possibilities that:

- graduates become high income earners and contribute heavily to the economy's tax receipts.
- graduates start up businesses and provide employment.
- the existence of a pool of graduates attracts technologically sophisticated industries to locate in the country.

The importance of these arguments is an empirical question on which we have little evidence. There is likely to be enormous variation in their validity from subject area to subject area. But it is clear that if a substantial part of the graduate population emigrates, these benefits are likely to be greatly diminished. They would only be realised to the extent that some of the graduate emigrants return at a later stage in their careers.

The high rate emigration that is currently occurring from Ireland therefore raises important questions about the manner in which higher education is subsidised from general tax revenues. However, the increasing involvement of the European Community in the financing of Irish post-secondary education has an important bearing on this issue. To the extent that the cost of the emigrants' education is borne by taxpayers outside Ireland, the loss to the 'rest of the economy' due to emigration is reduced. The increasing flow of European Social Fund financing for third level education will reduce the level of Irish tax-financed subsidy received by future Irish graduate emigrants.

A number of possible ways of addressing the "brain drain" issue have been debated. This debate owes much to the writings of Jagdish Bhagwati and his proposal that

less developed countries should tax the income of their non-resident citizens as a means of recouping the loss of human capital due to the brain drain. The experience of the Philippines with a tax of this type has been evaluated on behalf of the World Bank.[28]

Most countries, including Ireland, regard residency as the relevant criterion for income taxation. Since almost all emigrants would qualify as non-resident for Irish income tax purposes, it is unlikely that the income of emigrants could be taxed as long as we rely on the residency jurisdiction. However, the United States, the Philippines and, until recently, Mexico have levied an income tax on the worldwide income of their citizens, both resident and non-resident.[29] While none of them instituted this tax as a response to the Brain Drain problem, their experience with it is relevant to a country facing the situation that has emerged in Ireland in the 1980s.

The problems of administering a tax on non-resident income are formidable. No country possesses a register of the names, addresses and employers of emigrants. The most effective method of tax enforcement that a government can use in this area is to require that a tax clearance certificate be presented when a passport is renewed or when a citizen leaves after a visit to his native country. However, the United States Internal Revenue Service found it could not enforce the requirement that citizens living abroad file a tax return on renewing their passports and this requirement was discontinued in 1979. The Filipino authorities believe that many non-resident citizens do not renew their Filipino passports or return to the Philippines at all, or, if they do return, they do so on a foreign passport. Moreover, it is difficult to verify the returns made by those who do file an income tax return. Thus, while the tax yields significant revenue, it is believed that only a small proportion of non- resident income is in fact taxed.

The most efficient way, perhaps the only effective way, to tax the non-resident income of emigrants would be for the host country to do so on behalf of the country of origin, essentially operating the tax as a surcharge on their income tax. While this would be an equitable proposal in relation to Irish residents in the United States and Britain, where the income tax rates are now relatively low compared with those that apply in Ireland, it is improbable that these countries would undertake to collect such a tax on behalf of the Irish government. Moreover, if such a levy on non-resident income were introduced, it would create an incentive for emigrants to renounce or conceal their Irish citizenship. A significant number of those living in the United States are believed to be in an irregular situation with the US Immigration and Naturalization Service. They would hardly disclose their Irish citizenship to the US tax authorities!

28 See Richard D. Pomp, "The Experience of the Philippines in Taxing its Non-resident Citizens", *International Law and Politics, Vol. 17: 245 (1985), pp. 245-286*, on which the account in the text draws heavily.

29 They also tax the income of resident noncitizens, so that either citizenship or resident is sufficient for taxation.

A modified version of the Bhagwati proposal would concentrate on the emigrants who have received the largest subsidies from their native country, namely, university graduates, professionals and graduates of technological courses. Instead of trying to collect a tax on all non-resident income, it would be administratively more feasible to change the mechanism of funding this type of education. Rather than subsidising the institution that provides the education, as is done now, the state could provide students with educational vouchers to the value of the cost of the courses on which they were enroled. These vouchers would be given to the institution which could obtain cash in exchange for them. The student, however, would have a debt in the amount of the vouchers to discharge. Some proportion of income tax paid in Ireland might be offset against this debt as a way of discriminating in favour of those who remain in the country.[30]

The administrative problems that seem insuperable in connection with the citizenship tax are not entirely absent from this proposal. But because the scope of the tax would be narrower, and those liable to it would be a well-defined population of graduates, with a legal obligation to pay arising from having accepted education on the specified terms, it should prove less intractable to administer. As was noted in chapter 5, the widening gap between Irish and foreign rates of income tax has increased the returns to emigration in recent years, especially for such well-qualified young people. The proposal to collect repayment of the subsidy to higher education from emigrant graduates would at least partially counteract this incentive by in effect raising the rate of tax facing an emigrant, but leaving that facing a non-emigrant unaltered.

How to respond to the high rate of emigration among graduates from courses that involve substantial subsidies from public funds is one of the major policy issues raised by the current wave of emigration from Ireland. The proposal to tax the non-resident income of these emigrants on the basis of their Irish citizenship does not seem administratively feasible. The alternative of treating the subsidy element in their education as a repayable advance is more practical. However, it would not be easily enforced. There would be far less than 100 per cent repayment among emigrants. But whatever rate of repayment could be achieved should be compared with the present situation which is tantamount to zero repayment!

9. SUMMARY

There is a consensus in Ireland that emigration represents a failure of economic policy and is to be deplored. It is also agreed that what is needed is an accelerated rate of economic growth that would generate a much higher rate of increase in employment and wages that would be acceptable to young job seekers. Over the

30 One could also allow previous repayments to be set against tax on return to the country after a period abroad. This could act as an inducement to return, but might weaken the effectiveness of the proposal in inducing persons to remain in the country subsequent to graduation.

years a variety of policies have been proposed and implemented to try to achieve these goals. The result is that a very high proportion of national income is now devoted to industrial and manpower programmes; considerable effort has been devoted to incomes policies, and expansionary fiscal policies have been pursued to the limits of financial solvency. But, despite these initiatives, the rates of unemployment and emigration have remained high.

Despite the negative view taken of emigration in most commentaries on the Irish study, the existence of positive benefits is also widely acknowledged, in particular, the short-term tendency for emigration to reduce the level of unemployment and to mitigate the decline in living standards during recessions. There is no evidence that emigration has impaired the long-run development of the economy, measured in terms of the growth of income per person.

Emigration alters the age structure of the population, particularly by depleting the proportion in the 25-39 year age group and by tending to increase the combined level of young and old dependency. However, much more dramatic changes are now occurring in this age structure due to the ageing of the populations attributable to the recent sharp decline in the birth rate.

Emigration may aggravate the inequality of the distribution of income by increasing the relative scarcity of highly qualified personnel. In particular, it would be expected that the earnings of qualified people remaining in Ireland have been raised relative to those of the less mobile unskilled population, by the high rates of emigration among the former.

The large number of Irish-born people resident abroad has contributed very substantially to tourism to Ireland. However, the relative importance of emigrants' remittances has now declined to a very low level. There has been a growth of financial transfers out of Ireland associated with emigration.

The high rate of emigration among skilled and qualified people raises policy issues related to the financing of higher education and the taxation of Irish citizens living abroad. The increasing role of the EC Social Fund in financing third level education will however reduce the importance of this issue in the future. There are no easy-to-implement responses to cope with the problem created by the international mobility of skilled labour, but some possibilities are discussed in this chapter.

Chapter 9

OVERVIEW: CONCLUSIONS; POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we summarise the material presented in our study and derive some policy conclusions from our findings. As we do so, we are conscious of the wide range of issues involved in the analysis of Irish emigration, which is a response to an intricate set of socio-economic forces. It is not possible in the confines of a single study to explore in detail all these issues. In the present overview, we attempt to present a relatively self-contained review of the study which draws attention to the salient factors behind the recent upsurge in emigration from Ireland, the social and economic implications of a high rate of emigration in an Irish context, the likely level of emigration between now and the end of the century, and the policy issues raised by this outlook.

2. REASONS FOR THE RECENT EXODUS

Basically, the analyses set out in the earlier chapters have indicated that recent Irish emigration derived not only from depressed conditions in the domestic labour market per se, but was also closely related to the relative performance of the Irish economy with reference to those Western countries to which most of our emigrants go. During the 1980s, Ireland languished in recession long after a marked recovery in output and employment occurred in the United Kingdom and other EC countries and in the United States.[1] Not until 1988 was there evidence that the level of employment in Ireland had stabilised. Part of the reason for the depth and prolongation of the recession in Ireland during the 1980s derived from unsustainable fiscal and monetary policies followed in the late 1970s which, even if they created boom conditions at the time, left the country singularly ill-equipped to deal with the rigours of the post 1980 global recession.

The scale of the employment crisis which befell the Irish economy after 1980 does not need to be recounted in detail in this Report. Between 1980 and 1987 the number of persons at work in the Irish economy fell by 76,000 (almost 6 per cent). Apart from the ongoing secular decline in agriculture (which involved a decrease of

1. In most of these countries both output and employment began to rise from 1983 onwards.

45,000 over the period referred to), manufacturing employment fell by 39,000, the numbers in building and construction by 32,000, even though these declines were partially offset by a rise of 40,000 in service activities.

(i) The Impact on Emigration of Employment Trends in Different Sectors

It is of interest to attempt to gauge the relative extent to which sectoral employment trends contributed to unemployment and emigration. It is unlikely that the ongoing decline in the numbers engaged in agriculture contributed much to the emigrant flows (at least in any direct sense). A great deal of this decline now relates to a form of demographic attrition, whereby, for example, elderly farmers who retire or die are not replaced because the farm is sold and absorbed with other holdings – or where the demise or retirement of an elderly assisting relative does not give rise to the need for a replacement worker.

It is likely that the fall in manufacturing employment contributed more to accelerating unemployment rather than to encouraging emigration. The sharp fall in this sector reflected a shake out of many older traditional industries which, in many instances, involved the closure of whole enterprises. This inevitably led to the displacement of many older workers for whom the prospects of re-employment were poor and who subsequently drifted into long-term unemployment. Because of domestic and familial ties, and the age factor, emigration was not really an option for them. While the building and construction industry was similarly affected in the early 1980s, it is likely that this contributed significantly to both emigration and unemployment. Building workers tend by tradition to be younger and more mobile and the existence of strong links with the building industry in the United Kingdom (which was then entering an expansionary phase) probably led many to migrate.

One might have expected the significant rise in services employment which occurred throughout the 1980s to have had more of an impact in curbing youth unemployment and emigration. However, the nature of this increase was such that it did not impact significantly on the youth labour market. Most of this increase occurred in private services and the employment mainly involved women aged 25 years or over who re-entered the labour force to avail of these opportunities, or else remained in it when in previous times they might have left. Appendix Table A9.1 shows that even though male employment fell substantially between 1981 and 1988 (by as much as 75,000), the number of females at work actually rose, by over 15,000. However, a closer inspection of these figures shows that the number of females at work aged 25 to 44 years rose by no less than 50,000 during this period – an increase which in relative terms far outstrips the corresponding population rise of this age category. It will be noted from the table that the employment/population ratio for this age class rose from less than 30 per cent to over 37 per cent between 1981 and 1988, the only such sex/age category for which

an actual rise was recorded. Apart from any impact which this upward trend in female employment may have had on youth unemployment or on aggregate emigration, it is likely that it also affected the sex composition of the emigrant flows in the 1980s which, it will be recalled, involved a significant majority of males (see Chapter 3, Table 3.1).

Other factors contributed to the deterioration in the youth labour market in the 1980s. Most notable among these was the decline in clerical-type opportunities. This applied across all sectors but was accentuated by the sharp fall in the intake into the Public sector, which traditionally had been a source of employment for Second Level school leavers. The extent of this decline can be gauged from Appendix Table A9.2 which illustrates the early labour market experiences of Second Level school leavers for the period from 1979/80 to 1988/89 according to broad occupational categories. The estimates (which are based on annual Department of Labour Surveys) show that while the total annual intake into employment fell from 43,000 to 28,000 over the period in question, this was in large part attributable to a virtual eclipse in clerical and related opportunities for which the intake fell from nearly 20,000 in 1979/80 to as low as 5,000 in 1988/89. The numbers entering manual employment also fell (from 14,000 to 11,000), while the flows into service activities appeared to remain at a more or less constant level of about 8,000.

The intake into employment of Second Level school leavers by sector is given in Appendix Table A9.3. The most notable feature of these data is the sharp fall in the Public sector[2] intake. This inflow, which stood at nearly 10,000 in 1979/80, had fallen to about 2,500 in 1988/89. The decreases for the other sectors were smaller. The only sector for which a rise (of modest proportions) was recorded over the period in question was in the area of personal services.

Among those leaving Second Level education, unemployment rose rapidly until the middle of the 1980s (from 5,000 in 1979/80 to over 17,000 in 1984/85) and then began to decline – not because of any rise in employment but because of the re-emergence of emigration and the increasing numbers entering further education. The inflow into further education rose from just over 14,000 in 1979/80 to more than 22,000 in 1988/89. This contributed significantly to easing the pressure in the youth labour market throughout this period.

While one cannot assemble similar comprehensive information for the outflow from higher education, it is important to recognise that Public sector employment was, in the past, of even greater significance for this group than was the case for Second Level school leavers. It is possible to deduce from estimates given in Sexton (1987) that no less than three-quarters of the annual graduate outflow from the University

2. The Public sector in this context is broadly defined and includes not only Central Government, Defence, etc., but also the Health and Education areas and non-commercial semi-state bodies.

sector who found work in 1979 procured jobs in the Public sector broadly defined[2] (some 2,400 out of a total of about 3,300). Data for later periods taken from the annual HEA Survey of Third Level Award Recipients indicate that by 1988, even though the total intake of university graduates into employment had not changed very much, this proportion appears to have fallen to just over one-third. The evidence suggests that the inflow into private services increased substantially over this period, from less than 10 per cent of all graduates who found work in 1979 to over 40 per cent in 1988 (the actual intake into this sector rose from a few hundred in 1979 to nearly 1,500 at the end of the 1980s). There are also indications of an increased inflow to manufacturing industry, but on a much more modest scale. Throughout the period involved, however, the total outflow of graduates from the University sector rose substantially, with the result that, even though the absolute employment take-up remained constant, unemployment and emigration rates increased (see Chapter 3, Table 3.12).

An indication of the manner in which the post 1980 economic crisis impinged on different groups in the labour force can be obtained by observing the changing age pattern of the registered unemployed over this period (see Appendix Table A9.4). The early phase of the recession (between 1980 and 1983) saw an escalation in youth unemployment. This slowed somewhat in the middle of the decade and since 1987, the figures indicate a considerable decline in the numbers of young people on the Register. Even though some of this recent reduction would be attributable to advances on the employment front, the relationship between this trend and the evolving pattern of net emigration is striking. The buildup of youth unemployment in the early part of the decade took place at a time when net emigration was very low (i.e., this option was not being availed of), while the fall in the numbers of young people on the Register later in the decade occurred when emigration really escalated. Over the entire period in question, it should be noted that the numbers of "older" unemployed (those aged 35 years or over) continued to rise – even in recent years when the overall Live Register total began to fall.[3]

The conclusion from the foregoing commentary is that the main pressure, insofar as emigration is concerned, derives not so much from the displacement of existing workers from what were previously considered to be secure jobs, but from young persons in transition from education who cannot secure a foothold in the labour force. Even though such young persons do not necessarily emigrate immediately on leaving education (with the exception of Third Level graduates), the evidence suggests (see Chapter 6, Table 6.2) that in recent years substantial numbers eventually emigrate, either because they cannot find work at all, or else because the jobs they do acquire are unsatisfactory relative to their aspirations and what they believe they can achieve abroad.

3. There is evidence that many of the abler long-term unemployed have effectively withdrawn from the labour force and are unlikely to either emigrate or become re-employed. See Walsh, 1987 "*Why is Unemployment So High in Ireland*". Perspectives on Economic Policy.

(ii) The Influence of Incomes on Emigration

The aggregate regression analysis presented in Chapter 5 indicated that earnings differentials between Ireland and the United Kingdom (particularly when considered net of tax) influence the overall level of net migration. Even though incomes as such did not emerge as an explicit factor influencing emigration in the analyses of personal motivation presented in Chapter 6, we may interpret unfulfilled occupational aspirations (which were evident) as being, to some extent, also related to dissatisfaction with income levels. Furthermore, the results of the longitudinal analysis of 1982 Second Level school leavers (also presented in that chapter) revealed that of those from this educational cohort who subsequently emigrated, no less than 42 per cent (and up to 60 per cent in the case of those who attained Leaving Certificate standard) held jobs before they left.[4]

While scarcity of jobs is clearly a factor contributing to emigration among those with third level awards qualifications, the relative attraction of higher incomes and better conditions abroad appears to exercise a substantial "pull" effect, particularly for those with scientific, technological and business oriented qualifications. This seems to be borne out by the exceptionally high incidence of emigration evident among graduates in disciplines such as engineering and commerce. The extent of the greater "pull" effect in the case of those who can command higher incomes was also indicated in Chapter 5, where it was demonstrated that the differential in net earnings between Ireland and the United Kingdom is substantially greater for those with higher pay levels, and this differential appears to have widened considerably in recent years.

In discussing incomes, it is also appropriate to consider whether relative differences in the conditions governing entitlement to unemployment benefits between here and the United Kingdom influence migration flows. It was illustrated earlier (Chapter 5, Table 5.5) that during the 1980s, the cash value of basic Irish unemployment benefits showed a modest increase relative to corresponding U.K. rates and it could be argued that this would tend to reduce the emigrant outflow (but at the expense of higher domestic unemployment). However, the extent of the differential hardly suggests that this effect could be significant. It is unlikely that many unemployed persons in Ireland would be motivated to leave because of such a small differential, but it could be argued that this would provide an inducement to return in the case of unemployed emigrants in the U.K. It must also be borne in mind that in assessing this issue, there are considerations other than the cash value of the benefits received. The rules relating to entitlement to benefits were significantly curtailed in the United Kingdom throughout the 1980s. It can thus be argued that some of these changes, such as the restriction of the housing/lodging allowances, the raising of the age of eligibility and the extension of the waiting period before any benefits can be

4. In many instances, however, the status of these jobs was not commensurate with the qualifications held.

obtained, would have deterred intending emigrants. However, one must also take cognisance of the fact that many unemployed would be constrained from migrating (either internally or externally) because of demotivation or lack of resources or because of domestic or familial ties.

(iii) Emigration: the Traditional Aspect

Apart from the specific causative factors just discussed, it must be borne in mind that there is a traditional aspect associated with Irish emigration. It should not be overlooked that even in the 1970s, when there was a sizeable net inflow of population, an estimated 165,000 persons migrated out of the country (see Chapter 2. Table 2.6). Garvey (1985) showed that there was a net population loss between 1971 and 1981 for those aged less than 35 years who were born in Ireland of as much as 60,000, but this was more than offset by inflows of persons born outside the State, particularly of children aged under 15 years. There are many reasons for the persistence of outflows, even during relatively buoyant periods. As a result of previous large migratory outflows, a worldwide network of Irish communities has evolved (particularly in English speaking countries). These tend to attract would-be emigrants, provide help in receiving them, and assimilating them into the societies concerned. Others, especially those with qualifications, leave to pursue further education or in order to obtain relevant experience in centres abroad where levels of innovation are more advanced than in Ireland. Still more would leave for reasons which may only be described as sheer "adventure seeking" (see Chapter 6). Above all, the relatively easy access enjoyed by young Irish people to English speaking countries with relatively familiar cultures where standards of living are so much higher than in Ireland exerts a powerful attraction.

(iv) Summary

In summary, the evidence for the period since the beginning of the 1980s suggests that both a scarcity of jobs and unfulfilled occupational-income aspirations led to a resurgence of net emigration, These, more or less permanent features of the Irish labour market, operated as very powerful forces during the 1980s when the Irish economy underperformed relative to other Western economies. There are indications that the unskilled and those with lower or middle grade levels of educational attainment were "pushed", primarily by the absence of employment opportunities. A feature of considerable social concern arising from this is the evidence that many unskilled and unqualified emigrants appear to make the least adequate preparations prior to their departure. While the lack of job opportunities has also caused many of the well qualified to leave, the attraction or "pull" of higher net incomes and generally better employment conditions abroad exerted a stronger influence, particularly for those with technological or business oriented skills.

3. ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT MIGRATORY OUTFLOW

(i) Who Leaves?

While over the long run one of the features of Irish emigration has been the relatively equal proportion of men and women in the outflows, there has been a noticeable predominance of males in the recent migratory outflows. This may reflect the fact that the employment prospects for women were better in Ireland during the 1980s than those for men.

As in previous periods, there is an overwhelming concentration of young people in the current outflow from Ireland. At the end of the 1980s, more than two thirds of all those leaving were in the 15-24 age group. It is also likely that the vast majority of those leaving are unmarried. The return flow of immigrants to this country, on the other hand, has a higher proportion of people in the 25-34 age group, as well as of young children, presumably reflecting a tendency for emigrants to return to Ireland after marrying and starting a family.

The statistics which we have assembled indicate that, broadly speaking, the social and occupational profile of the current migratory outflow to a large extent reflects the existing composition of Irish society. If there is any apparent imbalance in this regard (and it does not appear to be substantial), it is that the outflows may be weighted in favour of those from the higher social groups. However, the outflow rate among those with third level educational awards, and in particular graduates from some degree programmes (including many of the professional courses), is significantly above the national average.

Even when allowance is made for the fact that the social structure of Irish society has altered over the years, the current occupational mix of emigrants represents a significant change from past periods when the migratory outflows involved mainly the unskilled and less well educated.

It should not be presumed, however, because of the developments just described, that the general body of emigrants is now so well equipped that they do not encounter difficulties in their respective host countries. The migratory outflow still includes a significant proportion of unskilled and poorly educated persons who are singularly ill prepared for what awaits them, and who encounter serious problems of social and labour market integration in the countries to which they go. This aspect has been amply documented in Chapter 7 and is considered further later in this chapter.

(ii) Where from?

The rates of emigration from the different regions of Ireland are now more uniform than in previous periods, when much higher rates were recorded in the poorer rural counties than in the rest of the country. In the last intercensal period, the rate of net external migration from Dublin was more than twice the national average and by far the highest recorded in any county (see Chapter 3, Table 3.9). While this may reflect a tendency for country-born emigrants to move to Dublin (to attend school or university or take up a first employment) before leaving Ireland, none the less, it is clear that there has been an important shift towards a situation in which the propensity to emigrate is now much more equal in the eastern and western, and the urban and rural counties, than was previously the case.

4. THE EFFECTS OF EMIGRATION, BOTH SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM

(i) Economic Consequences

Even though the achievement of a zero or low rate of emigration has always been given high priority among the goals of Irish economic and social policy, account has also to be taken of the trade-offs that exist between this and other objectives, such as securing a high and rising standard of living for the population. Our knowledge of the magnitude of the trade-offs between emigration and such other factors is limited, but there is evidence that in the short run. emigration provides relief from the problem of unemployment and serves to increase or at least maintain levels of per capita income. While this must be regarded as very much a second-best way of coping with the challenge posed by the rapid potential growth of the Irish labour force, the relief afforded during the periods of recession in preventing an accumulation in Ireland of growing numbers of young unemployed people has been acknowledged. The word "relief" must, of course, be viewed in the context of those who remain in the country, and there is no escape from the wider social consequences of emigration which bear heavily on those who have to leave.

The longer term effects of large-scale emigration are much more uncertain, but if one views the position in conventional economic terms, it is difficult to pinpoint any significant evidence that emigration has impaired the development of the Irish economy. In Chapter 8 we reviewed the results of a range of approaches to the question of how migration affects the economic development of the economy. We found little evidence to support the view that even very high rates of net emigration have had a lasting adverse effect on the subsequent growth of the economy.

It will also be recalled from Chapter 8 that the 1954 Report of the Commission on Emigration also appeared to accept that emigration did not necessarily inflict long term damage on the economy. While the Commission felt that it was within our capacity to generate higher levels of output which would result in more employment opportunities and thus reduce the migratory outflow, it was noted that even in periods when emigration was high there appeared to be an ample supply of labour in

the country. Nor did it consider that the emigration flows, which then involved mainly unskilled persons, deprived the country of the best of its people.

The essence of the argument, as set out in the preceding paragraphs, is that emigration, despite its attendant economic and social disadvantages, does not, heretofore, appear to have deprived the country of the potential or capacity needed to initiate the process of economic regeneration. After periods of high emigration, the country was able to retain the human and other resources required to subsequently achieve quite rapid economic growth.[5] In particular, the recovery from the recession of the late 1950s was strong and sustained, despite the enormous loss of young people that the country had experienced. The question now is whether a similar position applies in the context of the population losses which we are now incurring.

Basically the question at issue is whether, in spite of continuing emigration, we can retain a sufficiently qualified body of persons in the country who, given the right circumstances, can contribute effectively to stimulating economic growth and to maintaining its momentum. In this regard achieving high rates of expansion over an extended period would probably require a return flow of former emigrants with strategic skills. Sectoral or occupational growth patterns are relevant in this context. Significant changes are occurring in the sectoral and skill mix within economies, with a consequential risk of the emergence of skill bottlenecks. Such problems would be accentuated in Ireland if the potential pool from which such skills tend to be drawn were to be diminished by the emigration of qualified young persons, or by the failure of former emigrants with the appropriate skills to return. Thus the existence of a large body of well qualified recent emigrants who could return to Ireland is an important factor to bear in mind in the context of achieving sustained economic growth.

In this context, certain features of the current migratory outflow are worrying, not least of which is the disproportionate number of skilled young persons involved, which represents a significant change from earlier experience. This of itself might not constitute a long-term disadvantage, but it could turn out to be so, when viewed against the background of moves towards economic integration in Europe. Economic activity may tend to be concentrated to a greater degree in the larger, more developed and more innovative centres in Europe.[6] If this were to materialise then the Irish economy could suffer from the twin problems of a growing outflow of talented young people combined with a diminution in the tendency for such persons to eventually return. In these circumstances our potential for achieving higher levels of growth could be adversely affected.

5. Indeed, it can be argued that in strictly economic or monetary terms the "slimming down" process attributable to emigration facilitated subsequent economic regeneration. The costs are borne in human and social terms by those who emigrate – costs which are not overtly evident within the country.
6. This scenario is reflected in NESC Report No. 88, *"Ireland in the European Community: Performance, Prospects and Strategy"* (1989).

(ii) The Social Dimension

While the economic consequences of emigration involve advantageous as well as disadvantageous aspects, when a wider social and psychological perspective is taken, there is little doubt that emigration still causes immense personal distress and is one of the most painful features of Irish life. It induces a sense of national failure and loss of esteem, which cannot help the adjustment of our young people to life either in Ireland or abroad. Despite the fact that emigration now entails a much less permanent sundering of family and friendship ties with Ireland than in the past, it still represents a relatively traumatic event in many young people's lives. Moreover, these developments will not change the reality on the ground for many Irish emigrants or for the families from which they come. In the first place, the outflow from Ireland will probably continue to be towards the United Kingdom, where special problems arise in relation to the adjustment of Irish people to the dominant culture. Secondly, a significant flow will still continue further afield, to the United States and other New World countries, where special legal and other problems face the newly-arrived Irish immigrant. Finally, even if the EC achieves the goal of a much higher degree of social and economic integration during the 1990s, it is obvious that vast social and cultural differences will persist between the individual member states, and that an Irish person arriving in mainland Europe will continue to face significant adjustment problems, especially if he or she comes with little or no educational qualifications and without adequate material and social support. For all of these reasons, despite the fact that the legal and social status of the typical Irish emigrant to Britain and Europe is now vastly improved from what it was, there is no basis for complacency about the gravity of the personal problems that exist behind the emigration statistics. In particular, the problem cannot be dismissed as being no longer relevant in an EC context.

(iii) Demographic Consequences

Persistent large-scale emigration alters the age structure of the population by depleting the proportion in the "young active" (15-44 years) age group and increasing the proportions in the dependent age groups. In previous years, due to the combination of a high birth rate and a high rate of emigration, Ireland's age structure had relatively high proportions in both the young dependent (under 15 years) and old dependent (over 64 years) age groups. This unusual age distribution is now changing due to the sharp fall in the birth rate from 1980 onwards. The fall in the birth rate is having a much more pronounced impact on the age structure than any that can be attributed to fluctuations in the rate of emigration. These longer-term effects will have a profound influence on many aspects of economic and social life (in the educational and health care areas for example). However, a consideration of such issues is outside the scope of this study.

(iv) Attitudinal Aspects

Another factor of wider socio-economic dimensions is the inhibiting effect of emigration on national attitudes. The sustained loss of sizeable numbers of our more innovative young people can lead to an undue degree of caution or conservatism on both economic and social issues – not an appealing prospect since Irish society already exhibits such tendencies to a significant degree. This can arise not only from the actual population losses involving young people, but also in the longer term because of the age imbalance in the population which this creates. These effects are, perhaps, all the more significant as emigration removes a large element of each youth cohort at a point when they can begin to use their talents to contribute to society. There is, furthermore, an undesirable self-perpetuating element involved here as the more young people perceive national attitudes to be out of touch with those which prevail in Western society generally, the more they will be inclined to emigrate.

On the other hand, it must be recognised that the migratory inflow, particularly the return of former emigrants, must obviously contribute to a wider understanding of global economic, social and political issues, and would have some influence on national attitudes.

5. FACTORS WHICH MAY INFLUENCE THE FUTURE PATTERN OF EXTERNAL MIGRATION

Supply pressures in the Irish labour market, and in the youth labour market in particular, are high, and will remain so until they begin to ease around the turn of the century. The analyses in Chapter 4 showed that to accommodate the potential labour force increase over the next ten years will require an annual net employment rise of between 20,000 and 25,000 (or between 1½ and 2 per cent). This, it should be noted, does not take into account the need to make some headway in reducing the current level of unemployment which still stands at over 200,000.

Turning to the influence of Ireland's relative economic performance on the outflow of population from the country, we have repeatedly emphasised the role of economic underperformance as the key factor in recent periods of large-scale emigration such as the 1950s and 1980s. The prospects for the future are, therefore, crucially dependent on how rapidly employment and living standards improve in Ireland relative to what happens in Britain, Europe and elsewhere. The immediate prospects in this regard are good, in as much as we have now entered a phase when the rate of growth in Ireland exceeds that in Britain. The marked underperformance of the Irish economy during the 1980s was due to several factors, including the necessity of adjusting to past policy mistakes, that should not hopefully recur in the 1990s, (even though the current Gulf crisis casts a cloud over the horizon).

Maintaining a high rate of economic growth is not, however, sufficient of itself to ensure that employment expands rapidly and the need for emigration is reduced. The link between the growth of output and the growth of employment depends, definitionally, on the rate of increase in output per person (or on the productivity of labour). Some insights into this issue may be gained by looking at the relationship between these variables for three broad sectors during some recent periods. These are shown in Table 9.1.[7]

These data show that during the 1960s and 1970s, there were sizeable increases in both output and employment in the industrial sector, but in the period from 1981 to 1990, even though there was a substantial rise in industrial output, this was accompanied by a much greater rise in productivity, and employment in this sector fell substantially.

Table 9.1

Annual Average Rates of Growth in Output, Employment and Productivity by Sector Over the Period 1962-1990

Sector	Output			Employment			Productivity		
	1962-71	1971-81	1981-90	1962-71	1971-81	1981-90	1962-71	1971-81	1981-90
	Per cent								
Agriculture	1.53	1.13	2.75	-3.35	-3.22	-1.89	5.04	4.50	4.73
Industry	5.89	4.77	4.50	2.05	1.27	-1.32	3.76	3.46	5.90
Services	3.53	4.13	1.74	0.99	2.54	0.84	2.52	1.56	0.89
Total (1)	4.23	3.81	2.68	-0.05	0.89	-0.25	4.23	2.89	2.94
GDP growth at constant market prices	4.00	3.17	1.24	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: (1) Department of Finance, Data Bank of Economic Times Series. Research Paper 1/87.
(2) Central Statistics Office. National Income and Expenditure (various issues).
(3) ESRI estimates of output growth in 1990.

Note: (1) The total figures in the "output" columns relate to annual average GDP growth at constant market prices.

7. For several reasons, care must be exercised in trying to draw inferences from these data. The measurement of output and employment in the service sector is fraught with problems. In many subsectors of services, it is not possible to derive independent measures of output (e.g. in the Public sector) and in these instances output is based on earnings. Furthermore, the periods chosen do not represent comparable phases of the business cycle and hence there is a risk of confounding cyclical variations with structural changes, even though this problem would be reduced to the extent that the periods used are relatively long.

The expansion in the primary producing areas (agriculture and industry) during the two earlier decades was accompanied by a comparable rate of output growth in the services sector and this was translated into substantial employment gains, particularly in the 1970s. In the 1980s, however, even though substantial output growth again occurred in agriculture and industry, this did not carry over into a comparable rate of expansion in services. The annual average rate of output growth in the services sector over the period from 1981 to 1990 was about 13/4 per cent, compared with rates of 31/2 and 4 per cent respectively in the 1960s and 1970s. However, services employment continued to rise (albeit at a slower pace) during the 1980s because of a fall in the rate of productivity growth in this sector (a feature which raises questions about the quality of much of the employment creation in this sphere).

The rapid decline in industrial employment in the early 1980s was, to a significant extent, a once-off adjustment because of rationalisation and "shake-outs" arising from severe recessionary conditions. The Irish manufacturing sector involved a sizeable proportion of older traditional industries (such as textiles, clothing, car assembly etc.,) which were highly vulnerable in a free trade environment. However, this major restructuring leaves the industrial sector in a much stronger position to resume growth during the 1990s with the prospect of further employment creation. However, even bearing in mind the recent increases, it is questionable as to whether these will be on the same scale as in past periods.[8] Furthermore, the achievement of significant growth in this sector will depend critically on the ability of the Irish economy to maintain or improve its international competitiveness.

There are a number of reasons for the rather poor output performance in the services area in recent years. The first, and most obvious reason, relates to cuts in public expenditure which (until 1988 at any rate) mainly took the form of reductions in Public sector numbers. In different circumstances, one might expect some compensating effects in private services and other areas (if, for example, these cuts resulted in reduced taxation) but in the economic circumstances of the 1980s, no such effect was possible as the reductions in question were made in order to lower the budget deficit and to reduce Government borrowing. It is also relevant to ask

8. The most recent official labour force estimates indicate a sizeable increase of 16,000 in industrial employment in the year to April 1990, of which 9,000 related to manufacturing and 7,000 to building and construction.

One must also bear in mind, however, that industrial investment in Ireland tends to be of a high productivity nature. One must also have regard to longer term European trends. Over the period from 1970 to 1980, total industrial employment in what now constitutes the twelve member states of the EC fell by nearly 4 million, from 50.6 million to 46.7 million. During the first half of the 1980s, this total declined more rapidly, by a further 6 million, reaching a level of 40.6 million in 1986. In more recent years, there has been a modest rise in industrial employment in the EC, the total having risen to 41.1 million by 1988.

In the 1970s, while significant decreases in industrial employment occurred in all the larger member states (except Italy where the total remained static) Ireland, Greece and Portugal recorded sizeable increases. In the 1980s, there were decreases in all the countries involved, except Denmark and Italy.

It is of interest to note that in the United States, on the other hand, industrial employment rose by over 3 million between 1970 and 1980 (from 27.0 million to 30.3 million). After declining in the early 1980s, more recent figures for 1988 show the total to be about 1/2 million above the 1980 level.

(and this is, of course, more questionable) whether changes in the nature and composition of the industrial sector were also a constraining factor in so far as output (and thus employment) growth in services was concerned. With the decline of indigenous firms and the continuing growth of foreign industrial investment, it is inevitable that the manufacturing sector should become increasingly characterised by units which tend to be more self contained and thus have weaker linkages with the rest of the economy. This, when considered with the levels of profit repatriation that now appear to prevail, could contribute to a situation where the employment creation effects of industrial growth in the rest of the economy are diminished.

The period of cuts in Public sector employment now appears to be over, but one cannot expect any significant expansion in this area over the coming years because of the continuing need to restrain the level of public spending. One might summarise the position by saying that the current stabilisation in the level of public expenditure and employment should create a situation where private sector employment gains are no longer being negated (as they have been in recent years).

It is of interest to compare some aspects of the Irish experience, as described, with the trends for other countries. Appendix Table A9.5 contains estimates of annual average changes in gross value added at constant prices, employment and productivity for fourteen Western economies over the period from 1980 to 1987. One feature of the output trends which stands out is the relatively slow growth in services in Ireland (1.6 per cent annual average compared figures of 2 or more for most other countries), even though output expansion in this country in the primary producing areas was on a par with those for other economies. Only Belgium (with an annual average of 1.4 per cent) recorded a smaller growth rate for activities in the service area. This aspect is all the more notable since the rate of productivity growth for industry in Ireland during the period involved (nearly 6 per cent per year on average) appears to have been quite exceptional in international terms, far outstripping the corresponding rates for all the other countries covered. This lends credence to the argument related to "knock-on" effects as adverted to in the preceding paragraphs; in other words, the carry-over into services activity from the primary producing areas appears to be lower in Ireland than in other Western economies, and since the output/employment relationship in services in this country appears to be similar to elsewhere, this suggests that the lower than average rate of employment expansion in this sector derives primarily from slow output growth.

In summary, therefore, when account is taken of the extent of the potential for increase in the Irish labour force over the coming decade, and the constraints which now appear to apply to achieving high levels of employment creation, it is clear that it will be difficult during the 1990s to generate employment at the pace that would be required to absorb into employment in Ireland all those who are likely to wish to work here. However, such an outcome should not be dismissed as unattainable. Recently prepared macroeconomic forecasts project significant employment expansion in the immediate future. The summary update of the ESRI Medium-Term

Review (published in April 1990) predicts that over the period 1989-1994, employment is likely to increase by about 17,000 (or 1.3 per cent) a year. The most recent official labour force estimates indicate a net employment increase of no less than 30,000 in the year to April 1990. Even though the ESRI forecast envisages further emigration, it is anticipated that it will be on a much-reduced scale compared with the levels reached in the late 1980s. However, at the end of the period covered by the forecast, it is predicted that unemployment will still stand at a level of about 190,000 or 13.8 per cent of the labour force.

The essential question, however, is whether high levels of employment growth can be achieved continuously for the entire decade, given the likelihood of cyclical variations over which we have very limited control, since they are in large measure externally determined. While the large increase achieved in 1989/90 represents a welcome change after years of disappointment on the employment front, it would be unduly optimistic to presume that this state of expansion could be sustained (particularly in view of the unfavourable trends evident in large external economies such as the UK and the US). It is obvious that great uncertainty attaches to any projections of output, employment and emigration for an economy as open to international influences as Ireland. On the one hand, accelerated growth in the EC could provide a stimulus for an even better performance than that projected in recent analyses, while on the other hand, adverse international shocks could plunge the economy back into recession.[9]

The fact that we face the interrelated problems of emigration and high domestic unemployment creates additional difficulties since progress achieved in one area can be at the expense of the other. An expansion in jobs in high-tech industries may require skills which will induce former emigrants with particular qualifications to return. However, these may then "crowd-out" similarly qualified but less experienced younger persons from the home labour market who may then have to endure unemployment or emigrate. Furthermore, the nature and composition of present-day job creation in many respects offers little comfort to the existing unemployed, many of whom are older long-term unemployed workers or with outdated skills. Wage moderation could contribute to stimulating domestic employment growth but by widening the gap between real incomes here and abroad it could also encourage a higher level of emigration.

Thus the twin problems of unemployment and emigration are likely to remain with us throughout the 1990s, even if on a diminished scale. However, even in the event of lower net emigration, the scene is likely to be increasingly characterised by

9. In considering what is within the realms of possibility in achieving consistently large employment increases, perhaps some useful insight could be obtained by looking at aspects of the experience and policies adopted in some less developed countries which have also had to accommodate significant population pressures.
Undoubtedly, spectacular employment increases have been achieved in these countries, but in circumstances where social conditions remain underdeveloped.

sizeable gross flows inwards and outwards because of the manner in which labour demand is likely to develop. Policy should thus be directed not only to maximising employment growth which is, of course, the primary requirement, but also to minimising the problems of those who are obliged to leave, as well as maximising the "return benefits" from all emigrants.

6. POLICY ISSUES

(i) The Need to maintain a High Rate of Output and Employment Growth

Over the years, many initiatives have been taken in response to the related problems of unemployment and emigration. These have included active agricultural, industrial and manpower policies, and expansionary fiscal policies. It is beyond the scope of the present study to review the effectiveness of all these initiatives. However, there is no escape from the basic requirement that the only way to significantly reduce emigration is through the attainment of higher levels of employment creation. A detailed consideration of this issue is, however, a major task in itself and is one which is outside the scope of this study. It is considered appropriate, however, to make the following summary observations, in the light of our findings on the problem of emigration.

The basic issues involved relate to (a) the actual output growth requirement and (b) the employment intensity of this growth. Clearly, little can be done in the way of countering unemployment and emigration if we do not achieve satisfactory growth levels in the first instance. In this regard, as mentioned in the preceding section, the current medium-term outlook is reasonably optimistic, even if there are some grounds for concern.[10] However, apart from the need to achieve growth *per se*, of equal importance is the desirability of attaining a stable and consistent growth pattern over time. In the 1980s, the Irish economy was characterised by violent swings in output growth from one year to the next. Such fluctuations create uncertainty (particularly in relation to investment decisions) and make it all the more difficult to realise conditions necessary for sustained economic advance.

As for the second factor, the employment intensity of growth, this is obviously crucial in the context of generating the required levels of employment expansion. Our earlier comments in this chapter raised questions about the link between the growth of employment and output in Ireland. This is a complex area and we can but comment briefly on the more important aspects which we will attempt to summarise under the following headings.

(a) Sectoral policies (for industry, building sector, services, public sector etc.)

(b) Wages costs (including social insurance contributions)

10. Apart from any global consequences arising from the Gulf crisis, there are the effects of high interest rates and the possibility of a recession in the United Kingdom.

and

(c) Taxation.

With regard to sectoral policy considerations, the relevant issues have been discussed extensively elsewhere, including in earlier reports published by NESC. As indicated earlier in this Chapter, the performance of the industrial sector and indeed of the internationally traded sector as a whole, is a key factor in this context, not only in so far as some of these sectors may provide potential for direct employment growth, but more importantly, because of the extent to which this output growth stimulates expansion and employment in the rest of the economy. Relevant policy issues here include the manner in which the industrial sector should be restructured and, in particular, the types of industrial venture that we should seek to promote and how we should promote them. Heretofore, incentives in the industrial area have involved a heavy emphasis on grant aiding capital expenditure. The extent of profit repatriation by multinationals, and how this might be minimised, either by introducing incentives designed to retain such profits, or perhaps by considering a restructuring of the system of corporate taxation, is also relevant.

As for public sector employment, restraint in government expenditure effectively rules out the possibility of any significant increases in employment occurring in this area in the years ahead. It should be said, in any case, that the authors are not in favour of using the Public sector purely as a means of employment creation. However, this view is not meant to exclude the possibility of an expansion in Public sector services where there is a manifest need for such services and where it is clear that the Public sector is in the best position, by direct or indirect means, to organise and/or provide these services. Nor is it meant to exclude Public sector intervention in instances of acute social deprivation, such as, for example, in relation to combating long-term unemployment. There are now indications that the Public sector retrenchment in recent years is coming to an end and that existing staffing levels are likely to be maintained. Therefore, aside from any question of expansion, if existing vacancies are from now on to be filled, the renewed Public sector intake could have a significant impact on both youth unemployment and emigration.[11]

With regard to wage related costs, while these are not the only element influencing employers' hiring decisions, there is ample econometric evidence of a negative relationship between the product wage and changes in employment levels. However, since there are many dimensions to the problem, it is best dealt with in the context of wider discussions, in the course of which, full consideration can be given to all issues, including equity related ones. The authors favour the principle of national collective understanding as embodying, in present circumstances, the most appropriate means of achieving a proper balance between wage and other costs

11. Earlier analyses in this chapter (see Appendix Table A9.3) highlighted the dramatic effects of the reduction in the Public sector intake on youth employment opportunities. It is to be expected, therefore, that even a modest resumption of this intake could have a significant impact on youth unemployment and emigration.

which affords due respect to both economic and social issues and, above all, avoids the situation where employment creation is put at risk.

It is, of course, necessary that wage costs should be kept within reasonable limits in order to maintain our competitive position. In order to maintain this competitiveness, pay increases in Ireland should not exceed those of our competitors abroad when both are expressed in a common currency. However, in the context of considering emigration, there is another (and perhaps conflicting) dimension. If earnings in this country are depressed to too great an extent, while this may be beneficial in terms of job creation, it will also serve to increase the attractiveness of employment abroad and thus create a greater inducement to emigrate.[12] In particular, dissatisfaction with income levels could cause the more enterprising and innovative to leave, in effect, further altering the composition of the emigrant flows to our disadvantage. This highlights the trade-off which we have repeatedly mentioned in this Report between the goals of minimising emigration and ensuring a satisfactory rate of improvement in living standards in Ireland.

With regard to personal taxation, while the move towards easing the overall burden currently taking place is obviously welcome from many points of view, in so far as emigration is concerned, the impact of recent measures is likely to have been minimal – despite the frequent pronouncements that curbing emigration is one of the reasons for such measures. The taxation concessions introduced in recent budgets have involved a range of measures which have benefited the general body of taxpayers rather than any one group that might be particularly susceptible to emigration. If one of the primary objectives of reducing personal taxation is to counter emigration, then it would be more appropriate to target foregone tax revenue on those most affected, e.g. young people aged between 18 and 24 years. However, such an approach (which would presumably involve the introduction of a new set of allowances) raises other issues. The current tendency in the sphere of personal taxation is to simplify and streamline procedures rather than to create further exceptions. Furthermore, a targeted approach of this kind would involve substantial deadweight losses as it would also have to apply to the majority of young people who continue to find employment in Ireland and who do not emigrate. There would also be equity considerations involved. Furthermore, the actual consequences of such a measure are not clear. While there would be obvious financial benefits to the young working recipients (and thus an inducement to stay and not to emigrate – particularly for the better qualified), the degree to which the effects would carry over into job creation (as distinct from higher profits for employers) is a key issue.[13]

12. It is relevant to recall the analyses in Chapter 5 which indicated that relative differences in net earnings between Ireland and the U.K. have an effect on net migration flows.

13. Since the net earnings of young employees would rise, employers should be able to bid down real gross wages to some extent – an outcome that would be all the more likely as labour supply would tend to increase because of the perceived improvement in net wages. This should in turn create an incentive for employers to take on more staff, but the crucial question here is how the equation would divide between higher employment and higher profits.

(ii) Basic Policy Approaches

There are now some strong pointers that the employment situation in general is improving, particularly in so far as the private sector is concerned. It is important to note that in recent years, even though the total numbers at work have remained more or less unchanged, significant increases in private sector employment have taken place but these have been obscured by decreases in the numbers at work in the Public sector. In this regard, the next few years will be crucial in demonstrating the extent to which the private sector can meet the challenge and generate employment increases sufficient to make at least some headway in alleviating unemployment and emigration. Currently, the prospects for private sector expansion are favourable even if some slowing down in the overall rate of output is anticipated. The national finances are being brought to order: price rises and wage increases have remained at modest levels: there could be some further easing of the personal taxation position which should further stimulate the economy – all of which have contributed to a relatively high level of business confidence.

A basic question here is how best, in terms of broad policy approaches, this employment expansion can be supported and accelerated further. There are several schools of thought on this issue but, broadly speaking, they devolve down to two basic approaches which we will now comment on, without expressing any views on the appropriateness of either.

One possible approach involves a more market oriented and less interventionist stance. This would involve dismantling many of the existing instruments of intervention (of a sectoral, fiscal or labour market nature), some of which are considered to have encouraged capital investment at the expense of employment creation. Such an approach would also involve pursuing a policy of deregulation in the labour market, on the basis that institutionally introduced rigidities (in regard to employment protection for example) have acted as a deterrent to the engagement of workers by employers. Advocates of this approach point to developments in the United States and the United Kingdom during the 1980s where non-interventionist policies were pursued with some vigour and where significant employment increases have occurred. Critics of this approach point to the possible exacerbation of inequities in society with the attendant problems that this creates. There are, of course, some constraints; basic elements of social support would have to be maintained. Furthermore, existing Community legislation (relating for example to equality, employment protection etc.) would have to be observed.

An alternative approach would involve not so much an increase in state intervention, but more a reconsideration of interventions already undertaken in the light of experience. For example, some of the supports or incentives introduced in the industrial sector may not be considered to have given rise to an adequate response in employment terms – but this does not mean that a total withdrawal from intervention is the best course to adopt. Measures can be reviewed and amended in the light of past performance, and to take account of changing economic and labour market conditions. While market forces would continue to form the main basis for growth and employment creation with this approach, the view is that strategic interventions (by means of manpower policies,tax adjustments, incentives or even by more direct involvement) can be made to advantage in order to advance the position in terms of employment creation. Furthermore, in this context, it is considered that the provision of social support not only contributes to greater equity in society, but has positive efficiency implications in the long run as it helps to avoid social discontent. The main criticism of this approach is that there is a danger of propping up inefficient enterprises and outdated processes and of creating inflexibilities in the economy; institutionalised interventions can be difficult to alter or dismantle when the need arises. Furthermore, an active role for the State in the areas referred to implies less scope for easing the overall burden of taxation.

Since our economy and society is so complex and its relationship to other economies and societies so intricate and important, the wisest policy course to adopt would appear to be one of informed scepticism towards an unequivocal acceptance of either conceptual orientation with their different underlying value bases. However, that does not imply that one cannot be informed by the valid insights of both approaches in analysing the forces likely to generate economic growth. The excesses of "statism" are all too obvious in our recent economic history, but, on the other hand, so also are the obvious failures of native private enterprise. In this sense, the preceding expose should not be interpreted as indicating that the only options are extreme in one form or another. The reality is that only modest variations from the status quo can normally be entertained at any one time, an outcome which is reinforced by the democratic setting within which the relevant decisions are made.

(iii) How do our Emigrants Fare?

Thus far, the discussion of emigration in this chapter has centred principally on the domestic consequences of emigration. One cannot, however, ignore the impact of emigration on those directly involved, the actual emigrants. Any consideration of the actual circumstances of emigrants needs to take into account both the long-term and short-term aspects. This chapter deals with the long-term assimilation of the Irish in the United Kingdom and with the more recent problems associated with the emigration of unskilled and unqualified young people.

As for longer-term effects, the research described in Chapter 7 indicates that, generally speaking, first generation Irish residents in the United Kingdom (i.e. those who were born in Ireland) appear to fare less well than their British counterparts. When viewed against the background of the overall UK occupational profile, the Irish appear to be concentrated at both ends of this spectrum with, on one hand, a significant minority of well qualified emigrants who appear to do quite well, but on

the other hand, a much larger group concentrated in unskilled and manual occupations. The evidence indicates that the Irish are significantly under represented in what one might call the "centre ground" of the range of occupations (i.e., clerical and lower grade managerial and executive positions) with, it would appear, many emigrants who possess qualifications appropriate to such activities ending up in manual and unskilled jobs.

There are a number of possible reasons for this. The problem derives in part from a predisposition which many Irish emigrants have towards certain kinds of manual employment (in the building industry, for example). It also arises because of problems which emigrants encounter in having their levels of educational attainment fully recognised in the UK. The latter problem applies mainly to young persons with Second Level qualifications.

Manual work is attractive to emigrants (even to those with good Second Level qualifications) because of the prospect of initial high earnings vis-a-vis other types of employment. However, if emigrants remain in this type of work for an extended period, it is difficult to progress out of it. Thus, the prospects for longer term occupational and social advance are diminished.

There are other reasons which contribute to the occupational imbalance. A notable feature of the research in question here is that for the younger age groups (i.e., those aged 20 to 29 years), the occupational or socio-economic status of Irish emigrants appears to be much the same as that of the indigenous United Kingdom population (see Chapter 7, Table 7.17). This is clearly not the case for older Irish emigrants who, when viewed as a group, exhibit a significantly lower occupational profile when considered with their British counterparts. This may be due to the presence among young Irish emigrants of significant numbers of highly qualified persons who subsequently return to Ireland. If such a selective return migration process were to extend over time, it would give rise to an under-representation of such qualified achievers among the older age groups in the Irish emigrant population as a whole. This aspect appears to be borne out by evidence presented earlier (see Chapter 3, Table 3.17) which indicated that the return flow of former emigrants to Ireland involves a substantial proportion of skilled, better qualified persons.

The disadvantages which seem to apply to first generation Irish do not appear to carry over into subsequent generations. The analyses presented in Chapter 7 indicate that the occupational profile of second generation Irish (i.e. those with one or both parents born in Ireland) is broadly similar to that of the indigenous UK population. Thus, whatever problems may have stood in the way of the original emigrants. UK society (through its educational system, labour market mechanisms, etc.,) does not appear to have operated in a disadvantageous manner in so far as their offspring are concerned. Indeed, given the intergenerational changes in the occupational profiles, it may be said that the system appears to have corrected for some of the disadvantages which applied to the original emigrants.

Let us now consider the absorption problems of the current emigrants, especially those with lower levels of educational attainment. This analysis is confined to those who enter the UK labour market, as it has not been possible to obtain relevant information on recent experiences elsewhere (see Chapter 7).

Even though the group in question forms only a minority of all emigrants (about 15 per cent in 1987/88), the problems they face are considerable. The analysis in Chapter 6 indicated that because of the domestic labour market situation, persons in this group are subject to strong "push" influences in so far as emigration is concerned. However, because of inadequate preparation prior to departure (often due to resource constraints), the circumstances in which they find themselves on arriving in the United Kingdom are no better from an employment point of view than what they were in Ireland; in addition, they face considerable problems in finding accommodation and in adjusting culturally to their new environment.

This issue is important since, as indicated in Chapter 4, emigration is likely to continue throughout the 1990s and is likely to impact disproportionately on this group. Even in the event of considerable economic buoyancy in the Irish economy, unskilled and unqualified youth are unlikely to benefit, as the ensuing labour demand is likely to be for qualified persons with up-to-date skills. Thus, since emigration is likely to continue to present one of the few options open to persons with low levels of educational attainment, it is appropriate to consider what the policy responses to this should be.

The seriousness of the problems faced by this group suggest that a positive policy on emigration should be developed. This should be done with a view to achieving the following objectives:

(1) Minimise the personal difficulties and trauma our emigrants face when they go to the United Kingdom, other EC countries and the United States; increase their probability of attaining secure economic and social positions in their new country – positions which should be at least commensurate with their educational and training qualifications when compared to their peers in the host country.

(2) Maximise the benefits to Ireland of emigrant outflows by countering emigrant alienation and promote conditions so that they can return to Ireland as often as possible.

(3) For those who are obliged to live abroad for a considerable period, to encourage their eventual return to Ireland so that we can benefit from their training and professional experience and thus enhance the quality of our labour force as well as the civic and cultural life of the country.

There is a need to ensure that our emigrants are well informed and well prepared. This is necessary, not only in providing information on employment and

accommodation conditions in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, but also concerning the cultural adaptations that are necessary. It was a general view of the informants with whom we had discussions in the UK that the degree of preparation of some recent emigrants from Ireland to Britain is very poor. They appear to be less well prepared when compared to those involved in previous emigrant flows – primarily because so many earlier emigrants (who came from rural areas and who knew that they had to adjust to a large and strange urban environment) had family, relatives or neighbours in Britain who helped to ease their way into the British way of life. Indeed, many may have been significantly pre-socialised to the reality of life abroad by their extensive contacts with previous migrants. This is no longer the case for a large proportion of current migrants who come from urban areas, who have few contacts abroad and who anticipate life in London as being an extension of their current life-style.

With regard to actual measures, schools should be targeted for emigration information programmes, particularly where sizeable numbers of the pupils are likely to emigrate (for example, schools with high proportions of pre-Leaving Certificate school leavers). Detailed information/advice and counselling intervention programmes should be developed about conditions in the main emigration destination areas, particularly the United Kingdom and the United States. At present, a number of such programmes are available on a small scale, both from the Dublin and other emigration advice centres.

FAS has been expanding its information/advice and counselling services on emigration through its countrywide network of manpower offices. These programmes should be developed and expanded – with particular emphasis placed on the most at-risk groups, particularly early school leavers and deprived youth. Links with schools should be strengthened since these should provide the most effective means of targeting those at risk.

Besides effective outreach programmes, which should be developed in co-operation with voluntary agencies, the expansion of the new Youth Reach programmes to cover most or all of these early school leavers should provide an institutional means to make contact with such young people. Youth Reach programmes should, therefore, as a matter of course, include detailed emigration information, advice and counselling services.

Given the prospect of continuing emigration for the next decade, the Irish government should actively develop policies to protect and, as far as possible, advance the interests of our emigrants, particularly those going to other EC countries where the government has the benefit of EC membership and can resort to EC law in advancing its case.

As labour scarcities develop in different EC countries, the foreign employment recruitment functions of FAS should be expanded beyond the limited current provisions. In particular, the bilateral arrangements made with other EC governmental employment agencies should be expanded as rapidly as possible, particularly with those in the UK. The obvious advantages of Irish emigrants seeking their first foreign job through FAS – with, where possible, a standard enforceable labour contract guaranteeing equality of treatment and full recognition of educational qualifications – hardly needs elaboration.

FAS should also consider developing a research/ information service on British labour market opportunities to be provided to immigrant welfare agencies in Britain and Ireland. In order to move younger emigrants away from dependence on ghettoised Irish niches in the British labour market, we need to develop such specialist information, advice and counselling arrangements.

In the context of post-1992 harmonisation, and the development for Community-wide free labour market, it is suggested that an EC-funded project should be developed to help build a close working relationship between, for example, FAS and the equivalent UK manpower authorities such that the transition from school (in Ireland) to work (in UK) should be as efficient and trouble-free as possible. If the free movement of labour across frontiers is to mean anything, it has to ensure that emigrant workers are treated fairly and that their transition is as smooth as for local workers in so far as this can be arranged. If we cannot achieve this between Ireland and the UK, what hope have we further afield?

Of particular relevance in this context is the attainment of a fair return to young Irish emigrants on their educational and training qualifications. This depends not only on their knowledge, attitudes and behaviour but also on the information, attitudes and behaviour of employing bodies in the host country. There is evidence of lack of knowledge among British employers about the meaning and quality of Irish educational/training qualifications. This suggests that there should be governmental negotiations on the recognition and value and quality of Irish educational and training qualifications by UK public authorities, job recruitment and employment agencies, as well as by the larger corporate employers. In this regard, most difficulties appear to arise with second level, rather than third level qualifications and for those with FAS training qualifications other than traditional apprenticeships.

We have to assume that despite counselling and attempts to discourage them, many poorly resourced emigrants will emigrate anyway. Given the difficulty of establishing themselves in London and elsewhere, there is a need for a much more positive policy of emigrant help (including financial aid) which should be channelled through organisations such as DION.[14] If one can assist such agencies in their welfare and rescue work in preventing deprived emigrants becoming streetwise

14. DION is an umbrella committee, organised under the auspices of the Irish Embassy in London, which decides on the distribution of the annual Irish Government grant to various voluntary bodies assisting emigrants.

and homeless, and helping them to secure their social welfare entitlements and facilitate their insertion into secure accommodation and jobs, then the worst consequences of the current emigration flow can be minimised. In other words, the objective is to reach these individuals before certain welfare dependent and lifetime habits are formed – circumstances from which it is almost impossible to escape once they become established.

Any funding of Irish or other emigrant welfare emergency centres in Britain should, however, ensure, in the first place, that Irish emigrants there receive their full entitlement to publicly provided resources in welfare, housing and employment/ career advice and counselling. It is necessary to ensure that Irish State and voluntary funding is not being used to displace, or replace, statutory provisions, which should be as available to Irish emigrants as to others. In this regard, information on the extent of Irish immigrant access to State and Local Authority services would be valuable. In addition, it is necessary to build up effective relationships between Irish welfare agencies and British official bodies in, for example, housing and welfare, mainly to ensure that the latter are aware and take cognisance of the different cultural characteristics of the Irish emigrants and facilitate their access to services to which they are entitled.

At several points, we have studied the links between unemployment and the decision to emigrate. We have also noted that on arrival emigrants are likely to come into contact with the social welfare system of their new country of residence. In view of the importance of social welfare supports to emigrants and potential emigrants, and their possible impact on the level and pattern of emigration, there is need for detailed research on this topic.

(iv) Issues Raised by the Outflow of Highly Skilled Emigrants

A high rate of emigration among skilled persons, particularly among award holders from Third Level institutions, raises issues of quite a different kind to those discussed in the preceding section. Foremost among these is the question of how to share the financing of the education and training involved between the recipient and the general taxpayer. The case for taxpayer financing (as is currently the case) is undermined by a high rate of emigration among graduates, even though the position is mitigated to the extent that some of these persons will eventually return. It must be remembered that a significant proportion of the current migrant inflow involves highly skilled persons (see Chapter 3, Table 3.17) and, on the basis of past experience, this return flow should increase substantially in the event of an economic upturn. On the other hand, it must also be recognised that throughout the 1980s, the gross population loss through emigration exceeded 350,000 and the exodus is expected to continue in the 1990s, even if at a somewhat lower rate. One must presume that a significant proportion of the persons involved will not return[15] and, in so far as highly qualified persons are concerned, this represents a significant loss in terms of the resources which were invested in them, even when allowance is made for the offsetting benefits for Ireland arising from the presence of such Irish emigrants in other countries.

There are a number of ways in which one can approach this problem. One is that some of the costs of Irish courses be borne by taxpayers in the countries in which the graduates eventually work. One might say that this trend is already apparent in the form of increased funding being provided by the European Community for Irish third level education, and to a smaller extent, by the increasing numbers of Irish students enrolled in UK third level institutions. Currently, EC funding for Third Level courses is closely related to the content of courses, with an emphasis on programmes with strong labour market connections (business related studies, etc.). There would, however, in our circumstances appear to be a case for trying to persuade the EC Commission to extend the criteria to include the "migratory" aspect, particularly in circumstances where the Community as a whole benefits. Engineering and other professional courses would appear to be an obvious candidate for inclusion in this regard as many of the emigrant graduates in such disciplines go to work in other Community countries and thus make a significant contribution in an area which is of growing importance from a technological point of view.

Another approach would be to shift from tax financing to loan financing, with remission of loan payments in return for Irish income tax payments. While there are practical obstacles in implementing this proposal, they should not prevent serious consideration being given to it.[16]

15. It is of interest to consider the size of the gross inflows and outflows of qualified persons, in so far as these can be estimated. It will be recalled from Chapter 3 that a substantial proportion of former emigrants who return to work in Ireland are in the "professional/technical" occupational category. It can be deduced from the figures given in Tables 3.16 and 3.17 that the total influx of such persons came to about 20,000 between 1980 and 1990. Some of these persons would have, of course, have acquired expertise or qualifications while they were abroad. The gross population outflow over the same period was about 350,000 and if one applies to this total the ratio reflecting the proportion of persons with the occupation "professional and technical workers" in the population aged 18 to 24 years (7.9 per cent as estimated from the 1981 Census), it suggests an outflow of perhaps up to 28,000 over this ten-year period for persons in this occupational group. The figures for graduate emigration (see Table 3.12) suggests that the pace of such outflows has increased significantly in recent years. The data, therefore, suggest that while there has been considerable movement in and out of the country by persons with professional and technical qualifications, the 1980s has seen a fairly substantial net loss in this regard.

16. For a more detailed treatment of this issue, see "Graduating to Jobs Abroad: The Economic Cost of Rising Graduate Emigration" by Paul Tansey. *FAS Labour Market Review, June 1990.*

Appendix Tables

Table A2.1

Gross Migrating Outflow from Ireland in the Year to April 1988, Classified by Country of Destination

Country of Destination	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total
	'000			%		
U.K.	24.1	14.6	38.7	74.5	64.6	68.6
Other E.C.	1.7	1.3	3.0	5.0	5.7	5.2
U.S.A.	4.2	3.6	7.8	12.4	15.9	13.8
Other	3.8	3.1	6.9	11.2	13.7	12.2
Total	33.7	22.6	56.4	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Garvey and Maguire 1989. Structure of Gross Migration Flows (Labour Force Survey estimates). ESRI Seminar, November 1989.

Notes: As the basic information was obtained from households included in the 1988 Labour Force Survey, the estimates do not cover situations where an entire family emigrated.

Table A3.1

Age-Distribution of Emigrants from the whole of Ireland (32 Countries) over the period from 1852 to 1921

Period	Percentage of total emigration occurring within the age groups								All ages
	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-54	55 and over	Not Spec-fied	
	%								
Males									
1852-54 [a]	22.6	14.7	28.1	21.2		12.2	1.1	0.1	100.0
1861-70	13.7	8.4	33.7	20.1	9.0	9.0	0.9	6.3	100.0
1871-80	13.5	10.2	31.7	20.9	10.5	11.8	1.3	0.1	100.0
1881-90	13.7	15.0	38.3	15.5	6.6	9.5	1.3	0.1	100.0
1891-1900	8.5	11.0	41.6	23.4	6.2	7.4	1.4	0.0	100.0
1901-10	9.0	11.6	42.1	21.3	7.8	7.2	1.0	0.0	100.0
1911-21 [b]	4.3	12.7	41.6	28.1		7.5	0.8	0.0	100.0
Females									
1852-54 [a]	22.0	18.8	28.4	16.8		12.6	1.3	0.1	100.0
1861-70	16.1	13.1	34.0	13.3	6.9	10.9	1.2	4.5	100.0
1871-80	15.7	17.8	33.8	13.6	7.6	10.0	1.4	0.1	100.0
1881-90	13.9	26.0	35.5	10.0	4.8	8.5	1.2	0.1	100.0
1891-1900	7.3	22.1	44.1	14.1	4.6	6.7	1.1	0.0	100.0
1901-10	8.8	25.2	39.5	14.0	5.1	6.2	1.2	0.0	100.0
1911-21 [b]	8.7	26.5	39.5	18.2		6.1	1.0	–	100.0

Source: Commission on Emigration and Other Population Problems: Reports (1954).

Notes: a 3 years only; figures for years from 1855 to 1860 not available.
b 11 years.

Table A3.2

Age-Distribution of Overseas Migration from the Republic 1924-39

Age	Males	Females
		%
Under 15	9	16
15-24	52	55
25-29	20	13
30 and over	19	16
Total	100	100

Source: Commission on Emigration and Other Population problems: Reports (1954).
Note: "Overseas migration" means movement to areas other than Britain and Europe (including the Mediterranean basin).

Table A3.3

Gross Emigration from each Province and County, 1851-1921

Province or County	1851 (May) 1900	1901-1910	1911-1921	1851 (May) 1900	1901-1910	1911-1921
	Numbers			Percentage		
Ireland – 26 counties	3,065,392	266,311	115,960	100.0	100.0	100.0
Leinster	683,209	42,490	24,067	22.3	16.0	20.8
Munster	1,346,889	112,350	40,677	43.9	42.2	35.1
Connacht	616,439	85,133	37,044	20.1	32.0	31.9
Ulster (3 countries)	308,187	26,267	14,172	10.1	9.9	12.2
Unspecified	110,608	71	–	8.6	0.0	–
Carlow	32,204	2,417	1,179	1.1	0.9	1.0
Dublin	111,549	9,479	5,823	3.6	3.6	5.0
Kildare	35,898	2,602	1,832	1.2	1.0	1.6
Kilkenny	73,511	3,407	1.637	2.4	1.3	1.4
Laois	56,611	2,539	1,148	1.8	1.0	1.0
Longford	56,305	5,056	2,592	1.8	1.9	2.2
Louth	42,682	3,007	3,578	1.4	1.1	3.1
Meath	64,943	3,422	1,607	2.1	1.3	1.4
Offaly	58,012	3,315	1,349	1.9	1.2	1.2
Westmeath	50,283	2,579	1,062	1.6	1.0	0.9
Wexford	72,109	2,918	1,095	2.4	1.1	0.9
Wicklow	29,072	1,749	1,165	0.9	0.7	1.0
Clare	150,825	13,636	5,884	4.9	5.1	5.1
Cork	500,239	44,551	13,870	16.3	16.7	12.0
Kerry	211,265	23,340	9,582	6.9	8.8	8.3
Limerick	178,036	11,287	4,571	5.8	4.2	3.9
Tipperary	206,377	12,403	3,925	6.7	4.7	3.4
Waterford	100,147	7,133	2,845	3.3	2.7	2.5
Galway	200,967	26,578	10,932	6.6	10.0	9.4
Leitrim	74,250	8,302	4,171	2.4	3.1	3.6
Mayo	164,291	29,970	13,323	5.4	11.3	11.5
Roscommon	102,273	11,123	4,007	3.3	4.2	3.5
Sligo	74,658	9,160	4.521	2.4	3.4	3.9
Cavan	111,796	9,389	4,727	3.6	3.5	4.1
Donegal	122,506	12,559	7,044	4.0	4.7	6.1
Monaghan	73,825	4,319	2,401	2.4	1.6	2.1

Source: Commission on Emigration and Other Population Problems: Reports (1954).

Table A3.4

Number of Persons, Classified by Province and County of Residence and by Sex, Receiving New Travel Permits, Identity Cards and Passports to go to Employment, 1940-1951

Province or County	Numbers			Average annual rate per 1,000 population (1951)		
	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total
Ireland – 26 counties	213,420	149,558	362,978	12.9	9.4	11.1
Leinster	75,125	48,553	123,678	10.3	6.6	8.4
Munster	62,490	51,325	113,815	12.3	10.6	11.6
Connacht	55,391	37,286	92,677	20.2	15.2	17.2
Ulster (3 countries)	20,414	12,394	32,803	13.9	9.4	11.8
Carlow	1,911	1,577	3,488	9.7	8.8	9.3
Dublin	46,512	24,779	71,291	13.0	6.1	9.4
Kildare	2,069	1,816	3,885	5.2	5.5	5.3
Kilkenny	2,704	2,882	5,586	7.1	8.6	7.8
Laois	1,713	1,643	3,356	6.0	6.7	6.3
Longford	1,771	1,982	3,753	8.8	11.1	9.9
Louth	4,196	1,957	6,153	10.9	5.3	8.1
Meath	2,411	2,113	4,534	6.3	6.1	6.2
Offaly	1,439	1,681	3,120	4.6	6.3	5.4
Westmeath	2,183	2,057	4,240	6.9	7.3	7.1
Wexford	4,803	3,731	8,531	9.5	7.7	8.6
Wicklow	3,413	2,335	5,748	9.8	6.8	8.4
Clare	5,060	5,223	10,283	10.6	12.5	11.5
Cork	22,876	16,431	39,307	12.2	8.8	10.5
Kerry	12,076	10,356	22,432	16.5	15.7	16.1
Limerick	10,666	8,446	19,112	13.5	11.0	12.3
Tipperary	5,958	6,245	12,203	7.8	8.9	8.3
Waterford	5,854	4,624	10,478	14.0	11.3	12.7
Galway	13,950	10,295	24,275	14.0	12.5	13.8
Leitrim	3,013	3,158	6,171	12.2	15.2	13.6
Mayo	27,957	15,484	43,441	34.7	2.06	27.8
Roscommon	4,937	4,398	9,335	12.3	12.7	12.5
Sligo	5,504	3,951	9,455	15.9	12.4	14.2
Cavan	2,620	3,095	5,715	6.6	9.3	7.8
Donegal	15,965	7,508	23,473	21.4	10.7	16.2
Monaghan	1,829	1,791	3,620	5.7	6.7	6.0

Source: Commission on Emigration and Other Population Problems: Reports (1954).

Table A3.5

Internal net migration by County for certain twelve-month periods between 1970 and 1986

County	1970/71	1980/81	1985/86
	No.		
Carlow	– 210	– 146	– 142
Dublin	+3293	+3004	+3166
Kildare	+ 530	+ 694	+ 789
Kilkenny	– 257	+ 38	– 98
Laois	– 173	+ 9	– 91
Longford	– 196	– 189	– 184
Louth	– 63	– 173	– 323
Meath	+ 300	+ 752	+ 135
Offaly	– 285	– 296	– 378
Westmeath	– 278	– 98	– 131
Wexford	– 300	– 651	– 382
Wicklow	+ 510	+ 263	+ 141
Clare	+ 66	+ 237	– 48
Cork	+ 161	– 340	– 294
Kerry	– 319	– 474	– 423
Limerick	– 464	+ 231	+ 260
Tipperary North	– 261	– 184	– 511
Tipperary South	– 408	– 252	– 101
Waterford	+ 281	– 151	+ 9
Galway	– 141	+ 64	+ 835
Leitrim	– 193	– 168	– 252
Mayo	– 625	– 890	– 840
Roscommon	– 218	– 256	– 255
Sligo	– 146	– 66	– 48
Cavan	– 202	– 482	– 381
Donegal	– 254	– 379	– 267
Monaghan	– 148	– 97	– 186
State	–	–	–

Source: Censuses of Population 1971, 1981 and 1986.
Note: (1) The twelve-month periods involved end in April.

Table A3.6

Proportion of 1987 and 1988 Primary Degree Award Recipients who left full-time education and who emigrated to find work.

Faculty	1987	1988
	%	
Arts and Social Sciences	38.1	43.3
Science	34.3	35.7
Commerce and Business Studies	24.9	26.0
Medicine, Denistry etc.	31.6	28.2
Engineering	54.6	48.2
Law	8.5	17.8
Agriculture	33.3	18.3
Veterinary Medicine	59.3	32.6
Architecture	73.1	42.1
Food Science, Technology	34.6	25.6
All Faculties	36.8	35.9

Source: Higher Education Authority (1989). First Destination of Awards Recipients in Higher Education (1988).

Table A3.7

Net External Migration in Recent Intercensal Periods by Country of Birth.

Age Group	Country of Birth				Total
	Irish Republic	Northern Ireland	Great Britain	Other Countries	
	000				
1961-71					
0–14	−17.9	+2.5	+31.9	+6.9	+23.4
15–24	−94.8	+0.9	+0.5	+2.6	−90.8
25–34	−67.5	+0.4	+1.8	+1.0	−64.3
35–54	+0.3	+0.2	+1.8	+0.5	+2.8
55 and over	−3.2	−0.5	+0.5	+0.2	−3.0
All ages	−183.1	+3.5	+36.5	+11.2	−131.9
1971–81					
0–14	−12.1	+6.0	+43.5	+9.9	+47.3
15–24	−33.2	+3.7	+14.1	+5.2	−10.2
25–34	−15.0	+4.6	+5.9	+3.4	−1.1
35–44	+31.9	+2.6	+3.8	+1.3	+39.6
45–64	+6.1	+1.4	+1.3	+1.0	+9.8
65 and over	+16.8	+0.7	+0.6	+0.1	+18.2
All ages	−5.4	+19.0	+69.3	+21.0	+103.9

Source: "The History of Migration Flows in the Republic of Ireland", by Donal Garvey , *Population Trends No. 39* (Spring 1985), Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, London.

Table A4.1

Population and Labour Force by Single Year of Age in 1986, with Associated Participation Rates

Age	Population		Labour Force		Participation Rates	
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
15	36,083	34,148	2,693	1,712	0.0746	0.0501
16	35,086	33,670	7,006	4,221	0.1997	0.1254
17	34,170	32,292	12,676	7,946	0.3710	0.2461
18	32,526	31,004	19,444	14,600	0.5978	0.4709
19	32,022	30,099	23,279	20,065	0.7270	0.6666
20	31,167	30,066	24,525	22,346	0.7869	0.7432
21	30,488	29,693	25,603	23,035	0.8398	0.7758
22	28,706	28,328	25,551	22,498	0.8901	0.7942
23	27,381	27,612	25,346	21,473	0.9257	0.7777
24	26,370	26,613	25,013	19,813	0.9485	0.7445
25	27,086	27,045	25,958	18,746	0.9584	0.6931
26	26,007	26,024	25,122	16,721	0.9660	0.6425
27	25,232	25,392	24,455	14,866	0.9692	0.5855
28	25,126	25,314	24,376	13,577	0.9702	0.5363
29	25,635	25,578	24,891	12,417	0.9710	0.4855
30	24,643	24,629	23,942	10,895	0.9716	0.4424
31	24,967	24,764	24,266	9,943	0.9719	0.4015
32	24,243	23,784	23,531	8,765	0,9706	0.3685
33	24.970	24,619	24,224	8,162	0.9701	0.3315
34	23,375	22,695	22,675	7,159	0.9701	0.3154
35	23,638	22,920	22.869	6,888	0.9675	0.3005
36	23,147	22,914	22,358	6,402	0.9659	0.2794
37	23,492	23,052	22,681	6,184	0,9655	0.2683
38	23,237	22,663	22,399	5,962	0.9639	0.2631
39	22,896	21,781	22,028	5,610	0.9621	0.2576
40	22,072	21,223	21,093	5,517	0.9556	0.2600
41	20,295	19,531	19,456	5,136	0.9587	0.2630
42	19,424	18,534	18,561	4,815	0.9556	0.2598
43	18,982	18,621	18,048	4,775	0.9508	0.2564
44	17,189	15,880	16,290	4,286	0.9477	0.2699
45	17,211	15.961	16,254	4,337	0.9444	0.2717
46	17,221	16,554	16,146	4,315	0.9376	0.2607
47	16,472	15,865	15,391	4,263	0.9344	0.2637
48	15,502	14,813	14,451	3,932	0.9322	0.2654
49	16,363	15,778	15,144	4,148	0.9255	0.2629
50	15,595	14,981	14,241	3,951	0.9132	0.2637
51	15,230	14,588	13,857	3,673	0.9098	0.2518
52	14,897	14,177	13,365	3,615	0.8972	0.2550
53	15,267	14,969	13,615	3,598	0.8918	0.2404
54	14,167	13,640	12,452	3,368	0.8789	0.2469
55	14,791	14,342	12,736	3,405	0.8611	0.2374
56	14,369	14,323	12,144	3,247	0.8452	0.2267
57	14,039	14,402	11,618	3,149	0.8276	0.2187
58	13,405	13,852	10,762	2,877	0.8028	0.2077
59	13,910	14,782	10,946	2,935	0.7869	0.1986
60	13,443	14,527	10,104	2,758	0.7516	0.1899
61	13,622	14,818	9,736	2,537	0.7147	0.1712
62	13,347	14,388	9,172	2,462	0.6872	0.1711
63	13,571	14,911	8,667	2.214	0.6386	0.1485
64	13,236	14,115	7,733	2,025	0.5842	0.1435
65	13,428	14,831	5,162	1,302	0.3844	0.0878
66	13,049	14,593	3,659	939	0.2804	0.0643
67	12,111	13,604	3,244	848	0.2679	0.0623
68	10,742	11,954	2,731	673	0.2542	0.0563
69	11,750	13,436	2,727	639	0.2321	0.0476
70	11,019	12,392	2,348	504	0.2131	0.0407
71	10,863	12,904	2,078	487	0.1913	0.0377
72	9,841	11,938	1,725	409	0.1753	0.0343
73	9,896	11,900	1,698	391	0.1716	0.0329
74	9,262	10,981	1,392	311	0.1503	0.0283
75+	56,770	87,091	4,643	1,398	0.0818	0.0161
Total	1,244.044	1,271.898	920,300	409,346	0.7398	0.3218

Source: Census of Population 1986.

Table A6.1

Percentage of 1981/82 Second Level School Leavers who had Emigrated by 1987, by Social Class of origin and by Educational Level of Mother

(i) Social Class of Origin

1. Higher Professional	2. Lower Professional	3. Intermediate Non-Manual	4. Skilled Manual	5. Semi-Skilled Manual	6. Unskilled Manual	Overall Correlation
%						
50 (24)	42 (27)	39 (24)	29 (19)	37 (23)	30 (21)	r = – .08

(ii) Maternal Level of Education

1. Primary Education only	2. Intermediate or Group Cert.	3. Leaving Certificate	4. Post L.C. Cert or Diploma	5. Primary Degree etc.	Overall Correlation
%					
31 (20)	38 (23)	46 (28)	47 (28)	59 (34)	r = .14

Source: Follow-up Survey of 1981/82 Second Level School Leavers (see text).

Table A6.2

Percentage of 1981/82 Second Level School Leavers who had Emigrated by 1987 according to Level of Remotness of place of origin

Migration Status	Remoteness Scores											Total
	1	3 (Dublin Cork Limerick	9	13	18	23	33-35	55-70	80-90	120-160	300+ (Very Remote open country places)	
	%											
Still at home	63	44	45	48	44	44	54	43	39	36	31	49
Intra Co Migration	13	15	15	15	16	19	7	11	23	16	9	15
Inter Co (Irish) Migration	3	23	16	15	20	18	15	16	17	15	25	14
Emigrant	21	19	23	21	20	19	25	30	22	34	34	23
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total Nos.	391	144	207	154	173	121	116	121	93	61	49	1630

$r = .11, p < 001.$

Source: Follow-up Survey of 1981/82 Second Level School Leavers (see text).

Note: Remoteness is measured using a modified "size/distance" approach to represent both the size of place in which respondents lived while at post-primary school, and the distance of that place from larger urban or metropolitan centres: its overall centrality or remoteness.

$$R = 100 \frac{1}{P_1} \times \frac{D_1}{P_2} \times \text{(Co. Remoteness Index)}$$

where P_1 = size of place in which school is situated.
D_1 = Distance to nearest town of greater than 3,000 population.
P_2 = size of nearest town.

The county remoteness index (county in which nearest town of over 3,000 is located) is computed by the following formula:

$$C_R = 1 + \frac{D_2}{P_3} + \frac{D_3}{P_4}$$

P_3 = Population of Dublin
P_4 = Population of nearest "regional" centre (i.e., greater than 25,000).
D_2 = Distance to Dublin.
D_3 = Distance to nearest regional centre.

Table A6.3

Migration Status of 1981/82 Male and Female School Leavers by 1987

Gender	Migration Status 1987: Still at Home	Left Home but living locally	Inter-County Migration	Emigrated	Total
	%				
Male	53	10	13	25	100 (n=809)
Female	45	19	15	21	100 (n=811)

$x^2 = 31.04$, df = 3, $p < .001$.
Source: Follow-up Survey of 1981/82 Second Level School Leavers (see text).

Table A6.4

Percentage of 1981/82 Second Level School Leavers who had migrated internally and emigrated by 1987 according to Level of Educational Qualification attained

Migration	Level of Education Achieved: 1 No Quals	2 Group Cert.	3 Inter. Cert.	4 Post Inter Cert.	5 Leaving Cert.	6 Attempted Third Level	7 3rd Level Cert. or Diploma	8 Degree	Total
	%								
% Migrated Internally:	5	6	7	9	14	19	19	28	14
% Emigrated:	18	17	20	22	24	38	31	33	24
(No.):	(110)	(129)	(233)	(95)	(639)	(80)	(109)	(200)	(1595)

$r = .20$; $p < .001$.
Source: Follow-up Survey of 1981/82 Second Level School Leavers (see text).
Note: The educational level of respondent is measured using the following scale: 1 = pre-Group Certificate or with no educational qualifications; 2 = Group Certificate; 3 = Intermediate Certificate; 4 = Post Intermediate Certificate; 5 = Leaving Certificate; 6 = Entered Third Level but left without any qualifications; 7 = 3rd level Certificate or Diploma; 8 = Degree.

Table A6.5

Percentage Distribution of Respondents by Belief about Attainability of Occupational/Income Aspirations Locally

Values of Variables	"Occupational Satisfaction"	"Income Satisfaction"
	%	
1. "Very satisfied" with current employment/ occupational, and income, position:	30	12
2. "Satisfied" with current employment/ occupation (and income) position:	44	52
3. "Dissatisfied" with current position, but think it "likely" or "Very likely" that can get what one wants/aspires to locally:	6	10
4. "Very Dissatisfied", but again thinks it as "at least, likely" will get what one wants locally:	9	13
5. "Very Dissatisfied", or "Dissatisfied", and thinks it "unlikely" that will get what one wants locally:	8	10
6. "Very Dissatisfied", and thinks it "very unlikely" will get what one wants locally:	3	5
Total	100 (n=1,045)	100 (n=1,045)

* Correlations with Migration Intentions: Occ. Sat. $r = .33$; Inc. Sat. $r = .25$
Source: Follow-up Survey of 1981/82 Second Level School Leavers (see text)

Table A6.6

Per cent respondents who intend to migrate by level of perceived frustration of expectations or dissatisfaction with local community characteristics.

(Figures in parentheses refer to respondents with definite plans made to migrate – predominantly emigrate).

Variable	Satisfied	Moderately Dissatisfied	Very Dissatisfied	Overall Relationship to Migration Plans (Pearson Corr.)
	%			
Occupational	18	34	64	
Satisfaction	(7)	(9)	(25)	r = .36
Income	17	24	52	
Satisfaction	(3)	(4)	(18)	r = .27
Societal	26	29	45	r = .14
Satisfaction	(10)	(7)	(6)	
	Very Low	Moderate	Very High	
Self Confidence	41	26	29	r = -.12
	(12)	(8)	(10)	

Table A7.1

UK population by Country of Birth, 1951-1981

	Population (thousands)			
	1951	1961	1971	1981
United Kingdom	46,846	48,808	50,670	50,770
Irish Republic	532	709	709	612
Old Commonwealth	99	110	143	155
African Commonwealth	17	46	164	292
Caribbean Commonwealth	17	174	304	297
India	119	166	322	390
Pakistan & Bangladesh	12	32	140	235
Mediterranean Commonwealth	33	77	118	130
Remainder New Commonwealth	21	47	103	172
Other Europe	562	604	681	663
USA	66	102	111	118
Rest of World	96	137	189	310

Source: OPCS, *Demographic Review*, Table 5:1.

Table A7.2

Population by Country of Birth and Region of Residence, 1981

Region	Country of Birth				
	UK	Ireland	Caribbean	India	Pak/Bangl
North	6	1	0	1	2
York/Humb	9	5	4	6	17
East Mid	7	5	5	9	4
East Anglia	3	2	1	1	1
South East	29	50	66	51	37
South West	8	5	3	3	2
West Mid	9	13	14	18	19
North West	12	13	1	1	1
Wales	5	2	1	1	1
Scotland	10	4	1	2	3

Source: OPCS, *Demographic Review*, Table 5:2

Table A7.3

Sex Ratio by Age and Country of Birth, 1971-1981

Country of Birth	Year	Age				
		All	0-14	15-29	30-44	45+
UK	1971	94	105	103	100	80
	1981	94	105	103	101	81
Irish Republic	1971	92	106	87	95	91
	1981	88	104	84	91	88
Caribbean	1971	100	95	72	112	136
	1981	96	102	80	81	123
India	1971	118	118	111	145	99
	1981	103	112	94	105	108
Pak/Bangl	1971	258	184	232	313	326
	1981	143	141	122	130	220

Source: OPCS, *Demographic Review*, Table 5:10

Table A7.4

School Leaving Age Among Respondents Aged 16-49, by Nationality

Nationality	13	14	15	16	17	18	Total	N
				%				
British	0.3	9.90	46.6	25.1	8.1	9.6	100	64,896
Irish Born	6.1	36.6	18.9	17.1	9.8	6.7	100	984
Second Generation Irish	0	8.1	37.0	34.0	9.0	13.0	100	1,602

Source: U.K General Household Surveys, 1980-1983.

Table A7.5

Respondent's Socio-Economic Group by Educational Qualification Cross Classified by Father's SEG and Respondent's Nationality

BRITISH

Service Class Fathers	Educational Qualifications			
SEG	3rd level	2nd level	None	N
Service	83	25	4	2300
Inter	12	46	37	1962
Working	5	28	43	1341
Total	100	100	100	

Intermediate Class Fathers	Educational Qualifications			
SEG	3rd level	2nd level	None	N
Service	81	21	12	1251
Inter	10	44	38	1698
Working	8	33	49	1596
Total	100	100	100	

Working Class Fathers	Educational Qualifications			
SEG	3rd level	2nd level	None	N
Service	73	15	8	1944
Inter	13	40	27	3447
Working	14	45	63	5703
Total	100	100	100	

Table A7.5 (continued)

IRISH

Service Class Fathers	Educational Qualifications			
SEG	3rd level	2nd level	None	N
Service	83	25	4	21
Inter	17	0	57	18
Working	0	50	29	10
Total	100	100	100	

Intermediate Class Fathers	Educational Qualifications			
SEG	3rd level	2nd level	None	N
Service	100	0	0	14
Inter	0	33	50	18
Working	0	66	50	12
Total	100	100	100	

Working Class Fathers	Educational Qualifications			
SEG	3rd level	2nd level	None	N
Service	83	25	4	42
Inter	0	50	23	48
Working	0	25	73	120
Total	100	100	100	

Source: U.K General Household Surveys, 1980-1983.

Table A7.5 (continued)

SECOND GENERATION IRISH				
Service Class Fathers	Educational Qualifications			
SEG	3rd level	2nd level	None	N
Service	75	25	50	51
Inter	25	45	25	45
Working	0	25	25	42
Total	100	100	100	

Intermediate Class Fathers	Educational Qualifications			
SEG	3rd level	2nd level	None	N
Service	18	18	0	24
Inter	40	40	69	54
Working	40	40	18	78
Total	100	100	100	

Working Class Fathers	Educational Qualifications			
SEG	3rd level	2nd level	None	N
Service	45	17	10	60
Inter	36	49	24	120
Working	18	38	64	174
Total	100	100	100	

Source: U.K General Household Surveys, 1980-1983.

Table A7.6

Ethnicity by Weekly Wage

	%		
£Stg	British	Irish	Second Generation
0-50	24.3	26.0	19.5
51-100	32.3	31.2.	35.8
101-150	26.3	26.2	28.6
151-200	10.5	10.1	10.3
201-300	5.2	5.0	3.7
301-400	1.0	0.7	1.0
401-500	0.2	0	1.0
501-600	0.1	0	0
601-749	0.02	0	0
750+	0.05	0	0
Total	100	100	100

Source: U.K General Household Surveys, 1980-1983.

Table A7.7

Socio-Economic Group by Sex

SEG	British (%)	Irish (%)	Second Generation (%)
(Male)			
Man25+	8	4	6
Em<25	3	2	2
Man<25	5	2	4
SelfEm	1	0	0
ProWork	5	3	3
Ancil/Art	6	4	7
ForSupNo	2	1	3
JunNonMan	9	3	12
PerServ	1	3	2
ForSupMa	7	10	5
SkillMa	27	24	30
SemiSkill	14	23	13
Unskill	5	11	7
NonPro	6	8	6
Total	100	100	100
(Female)			
Man25+	1	1	1
Em<25	1	1	0
Man<25	2	2	1
SelfEm	0	1	0
ProWork	1	0	1
Ancil/Art	10	13	15
ForSupNo	3	1	4
JunNonMan	35	22	40
PerServ	13	25	11
ForSupMa	1	1	1
SkillMa	5	3	4
SemiSkill	14	17	11
Unskill	9	12	7
NonPro	3	1	3
Total	100	100	100

Source: U.K General Household Surveys, 1980-1983.

Table A9.1

Population and Numbers at Work in 1981 and 1988 according to age, with corresponding Employment/Population Ratios

Age	1981 At Work (000)	1981 Population (000)	1981 Employment/Pop. Ratio	1988 At Work (000)	1988 Population (000)	1988 Employment/Pop. Ratio
Males						
15-24	174.5	310.1	56.3	125.7	312.2	40.3
25-44	367.9	428.2	85.9	375.3	473.5	79.3
45-64	233.2	297.2	78.5	210.0	299.0	70.2
65+	39.9	115.5	24.1	29.7	170.5	17.4
Total	815.5	1200.9	67.9	740.7	1255.2	59.0
Females						
15-24	141.7	298.4	47.5	109.1	298.1	36.5
25-44	122.0	411.1	29.7	173.5	467.6	37.1
45-64	60.9	292.8	20.8	60.5	298.7	20.3
65+	10.7	202.5	5.3	7.4	220.7	3.4
Total	335.3	1204.6	27.8	350.5	1285.1	27.3

Sources: Census of Population, 1981.
Labour Force Survey, 1988.

Table A9.2

Situation of Second Level School Leavers according to Occupation on year after leaving Full-time Education, 1979-1988

Occupational Group (1)	Year of Leaving									
	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
	Number									
Professional managerial	4,000	4,000	2,800	2,400	2,000	2,000	2,400	3,100	2,200	2,000
Clerical	15,800	12,900	8,400	5,100	4,500	4,100	6,800	6,400	5,900	5,400
Service	7,600	7,100	6,700	7,300	8,000	6,600	6,900	8,200	8,200	8,700
Agricultural	1,600	2,000	1,900	1,900	2,300	1,700	1,600	1,400	1,900	1,700
Skilled, unskilled manual	14,400	13,100	12,600	9,800	11,800	10,600	10,500	9,300	10,300	10,600
Total at work	43,400	39,100	32,400	26,500	28,600	25,000	28,200	28,400	28,400	28,400
Unemployed	4,900	8,200	9,900	17,100	15,800	17,300	14,100	15,000	13,000	10,800
Entered labour force	48,300	47,100	42,200	43,800	44,400	42,300	42,300	43,400	41,400	39,200
In education[2]	14,300	16,600	16,100	17,500	16,600	17,300	18,900	19,200	20,400	22,300
Emigrated	1,400	800	2,600	800	1,600	1,900	2,600	2,700	4,900	6,500
Total	64,100	64,700	61,000	62,000	62,600	61,400	63,700	65,400	66,700	67,900

Source: Department of Labour Annual Survey of Second Level School Leavers.

Notes: (1) For a small proportion of respondents in these surveys the occupation is not known. This group has been distributed pro rata over the various occupational categories on the basis of the distribution for the larger group for which occupations are known.

(2) The category "in education" includes those classified as "not available for work".

Table A9.3

Situation of Second Level School Leavers according to Sector One year after leaving Full-Time Education, 1979-1988

Sector (1)	Year of Leaving									
	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
	Number									
Agriculture	1,700	1,900	1,800	2,000	2,200	1,500	1,500	1,700	1,600	1,400
Industry	13,100	12,100	10,600	8,100	8,900	7,400	8,600	7,800	8,100	9,300
Distribution	9,400	7,600	7,300	6,400	7,800	6,000	6,000	6,800	8,200	7,400
Banking, etc.	4,100	2,900	1,900	900	800	1,500	1,200	2,900	2,600	2,500
Transport, etc.	2,100	2,000	1,400	800	500	700	600	600	900	700
Public admin., defence	4,600	4,000	1,800	800	800	800	2,100	2,000	300	300
Professional services	5,000	5,700	4,800	4,100	4,100	4,000	4,000	2,000	2,100	2,200
Personal services	3,500	2,700	2,700	3,600	3,500	3,200	4,200	4,800	4,700	4,500
Total at work	43,400	38,900	32,300	26,700	28,600	25,000	28,200	28,400	28,400	28,400
Unemployed	4,900	8,200	9,900	17,100	15,800	17,300	14,100	15,000	13,000	10,800
Entered labour force	48,300	47,100	42,200	43,800	44,400	42,300	42,300	43,400	41,400	39,200
In education(2)	14,300	16,600	16,100	17,500	16,600	17,300	18,900	19,200	20,400	22,300
Emigrated	1,400	800	2,600	800	1,600	1,900	2,600	2,700	4,900	6,500
Total school leavers	64,100	64,600	61,000	62,000	62,600	61,400	63,700	65,400	66,700	67,900

Source: Department of Labour Annual Second Level School Leavers' Survey.

Notes: (1) For a small proportion of respondents in those surveys, the sector in which employed is not known. This group has been distributed pro rata over the various sectoral categories on the basis of the distribution for the larger group for which sectors are recorded.

(2) The category "In Education" includes those classified as "not available for work".

Table A9.4

Number of Persons on the Live Register classified by age 1980-1989

Year (October)	Under 25	25 to 34	35 to 44	45 to 64	Total	Estimated Net Migration
			Number			(000)
1980	27,326	32,476	20,053	29,679	109,534	+2
1981	35,369	35,638	23,892	33,457	128,356	-1
1982	47,540	46,620	30,184	39,134	163,478	-14
1983	59,251	56,091	35,651	44,989	195,982	-9
1984	64,802	59,546	39,487	47,643	211,478	-20
1985	67,671	65,624	42,584	49,756	225,635	-28
1986	70,661	67,480	44,207	48,812	231,160	-27
1987	75,435	71,879	48,445	52,609	248,368	-32
1988	60,881	68,936	50,011	54,197	234,025	-46
1989	59,332	65,809	51,019	57,917	234,077	-31

Source: Central Statistics Office. Live Register. Quarterly Age Analysis.

Table A9.5

Annual Average Changes in Gross Value Added at Constant Prices, Employment and Productivity for Selected Countries over the Period 1980-87

Country	Gross Value Added at Constant Prices 1980-87			Employment 1980-87			Productivity Change 1980-87		
	Agric.	Industry	Services	Agric.	Industry	Services	Agric.	Industry	Services
					%				
Belgium	+2.2	+0.8	+1.4	-1.6	-2.9	+0.4	+3.9	+3.8	+1.0
Denmark	+3.1	+2.3	+2.0	-2.2	-0.6	+1.5	+5.4	+2.9	+0.5
Germany	+1.4	-0.4	+2.4	-1.1	-1.4	+0.8	+5.6	+1.0	+1.6
Greece	-0.3	-0.4	+2.2	-1.8	-0.2	+1.9	+2.6	-0.2	+0.3
Spain	+0.8	+2.4	+2.3	-3.5	-1.7	+1.8	+4.5	+4.2	+0.5
France	+2.3	+0.2	+2.5	-3.1	-2.4	+4.3	+5.6	+2.3	+1.2
Italy	+1.1	+1.0	+2.6	-4.1	-1.9	+2.6	+5.4	+3.0	–
Netherlands	+4.1	+0.2	+1.6	–	-1.3	+1.7	+4.1	+1.1	–
U.K.	+2.9	+1.4	+2.7	-1.4	-3.3	+1.5	+4.4	+4.9	+1.2
Ireland	+1.2	+2.7	+1.6	-3.4	-3.0	+1.0	+4.8	+5.9	+0.6
USA	+3.8	+3.8	+3.2	-0.4	+0.1	+2.7	+4.2	+3.7	+0.5
Austria	+0.7	+0.7	+1.9	-2.6	-1.7	+1.3	+3.4	+2.4	+0.6
Norway	+2.1	+2.1	+2.5	-1.9	+0.2	+2.6	+4.1	+1.9	–
Finland	-3.3	+3.0	+3.8	-2.1	-0.9	+2.3	-0.2	+3.4	+1.5

Sources: (1) Central Statistics Office (special national accounts tabulations).
(2) EUROSTAT (1989). Employment and Unemployment. Luxembourg.
(3) OECD (1989). Economic Outlook. Historical Statistics 1960-1987.

Appendices

Appendix A.1 (Chapter 6)

Measuring Respondents "Societal Satisfaction"

Responses (+ Scoring) Allowed

Three questions asked: "How much of your present situation (employed or unemployed) is due to":	"Not at all due"	"A little due to it"	"Somewhat due to it"	"Very much due to it"
(i) Irelands poor economic position in the world	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(ii) The policies of the government	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(iii) The way in which the society is set up to benefit the rich and powerful	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)

An additional two questions asked: (iv) "How likely is it, do you think, that you will be employed this time next year?": very likely (1), likely (2), unlikely (3), very unlikely (4). And item (v) asked: "Thinking of all your friends, what proportion of them are employed?": Score: (1) = "Almost all"; (2) = "most"; (3) = "almost half employed and half unemployed"; and (4) = "most or all of them are unemployed". The responses to the 5 questions are highly intercorrelated, although they were "scattered" amongst other questions or attitudinal items. Combined, these 5 items form a single scale with a high reliability index (Alpha = .76). Mean = 1.8, standard deviation = 0.7.

Appendix A.2 (Chapter 6)

Measuring Respondents' Self Confidence

Three questions asked:

"Can you tell one how much of your present situation is due to?":

(i) "Your own skills and training;"
(ii) "The amount of effort you put into your work;"
(iii) "How good you are at your work and the quality of your skills."

Responses were coded from (1) "not at all due to", (i.e. low self confidence) to (4): "very much due to", (high self confidence). The scaled responses to these 3 questions are highly intercorrelated.The responses to 4 other questions were also highly correlated with these: "How strongly would you agree or disagree with":

(4) "Sometimes I feel that there is almost nothing I do that is needed by anyone".

(5) "Generally I'm very satisfied with my life".

(6) "I feel I have very little control over things happening to me".

(7) "I often feel helpless in dealing with problems in my life".

The responses to item (5) were recoded to conform to the other negatively worded questions according to the following scale: 1 = "strongly agree" (highly lacking in self confidence), to 4 = "highly disagree" (highly self confident).

The scaled responses from these 7 questions were summed and divided by the number of applicable items for each respondent. This gave a final scale which varied from: 1 = highly lacking in self confidence, (or very low in feeling of self competency), to a maximum score of 4 = highly self confident, or positive feelings of self competency and effectiveness. Reliability is very high: Alpha = .78. Mean Score = 3.0, Standard Deviation = 0.57.

Appendix A.3 (Chapter 6)

Measuring Attitudes to the Adequacy of Schooling

Four individual items were phrased in response to the general question:

"To what extent do you feel that your (second level) education has benefited or helped you in:"

(1) "Increasing your chances of getting a good job?"

(2) "Providing you with some understanding of the world of work?

(3) "Preparing you for adult life in general".

(4) "Increasing your ability to play a full and responsible part in your society?"

Besides these 4 items, 2 more general questions were asked:

(5) "To what extend have you found that the things you learned (in school) have been of use to you in coping with employment and working life?"

(6) "How much did you gain from your second level education in preparing you for your adult life in general?"

Responses to those 6 questions were coded from:

1 = Yes, a lot of help (or "gained immensely" or "a lot" from education).	to 3 ="gained nothing", or of "no help" at all.

The ranked scores are summed across the 6 responses and divided by the number of applicable answers; so the final scale ranges from 1.0 to 3.0. The higher the score the more negative the attitude. The average score is 2.1, which is moderately negative. The scaled responses to the 6 questions are highly intercorrelated and form a highly reliable Likert Scale (Alpha = .81).

Appendix B.1 (Chapter 7)

Logit Analysis is used to test the goodness of fit of the model in which school leaving age depends on both cohort and ethnicity (Table 7.11). The dependent variable is the log odds of leaving school at 14/15 or 16/17/18. The model in Fienberg's notation becomes

$$\ln(Mijl/Mij2) = W + W_A(i) + W_B(j) \quad 1$$

where A represents ethnicity and B represents cohort. Ethnicity categories are numbered 1 to 3, British, Irish and Second Generation Irish. Cohorts are also numbered 1 to 3, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49. Fitting this model to the data a reasonable fit is obtained. The likelihood ratio chi square is 2.12588 with 4 degrees of freedom, p=.713.

The parameters for this model are as follows:

Constant W	.07	(.04)
British W_A1	.07	(.04)
Irish W_A2	-.02	(.07)
Cohort1 W_A1	-.50	(.01)
Cohort2 W_A2	.12	(.01)

As the above model shows, the parameters for the three cohorts are highly significant. However, in the case or ethnicity, the parameters are less than twice their standard errors and are therefore not significantly different from zero. The question therefore arises as to whether the data can be modelled satisfactorily without the ethnicity variable. By dropping this variable from the model we test the null hypothesis that there was no difference between the three ethnic groups in their school leaving age. Therefore, one fits the model

$$\ln(Mijl/Mij2) = W + W_{Bj}$$

This model gives a G of 1.65 with 2 degrees of freedom and p=.437. This model gives a global test and by inspecting residuals one can look for specific instances where an ethnic group's SLA differed from what was expected. However, none of the standard residuals reached a value of 2. One can therefore conclude that the global test has not obscured specific variations in the school leaving age among the ethnic groups. Cohort not ethnicity determined one's SLA.

1 S.E Fienberg, *The Analysis of Cross-Classified Categorical Data 2nd ed.* (London, 1985) p.97

Appendix B.2 (Chapter 7)

Crosstabulations for Qualifications, Ethnicity and Age (Table 7.13) are detailed and do not necessarily give a clear picture of the inter-relationship between the variables using Fienberg's notation we can fit five models, where l=hedqual with values i=Third level, i=Secondary, i=No Qualifications: 2=Ethnicity with values j=British, j=Irish, j=Second Generation Irish; 3=Age k=20-29, k=30-39, k=40-49. Fitting the models to the data the following results were obtained:

(2)(3)(1)	G_2	620.13	Df=20	p=.000
(23)(1)	G_2	565.78	Df=16	p=.000
(23)(12)	G_2	511.72	Df=12	p=.000
(23)(13)	G_2	42.791	Df=12	p=.000
(23)(12)(13)	G_2	4.299	Df=8	p=.829

All of the above models with the exception of (23)(12)(13) prove to be unsatisfactory fits. Information from this model is, however, difficult to interpret. A number of parameters are less than their standard errors and are therefore not significantly different from zero. Thus, the interpretation of the estimated effects is complex. Alternative logit models known as the log continuation ratio models may be used. Fienberg recommends them particularly "when the response categories have a natural order such as educational attainment..."[2] In these models the dependent variable Hedqual is divided to give two effects. In the A models below one tests whether the incidence of third level or secondary education differs acros the ethnic groups/cohorts. In the B models below one asks whether people gain an qualifications or no qualifications. Fitting continuation ratio models to the data th following results were obtained:

(A) Level of Qualification: Third Level or Secondary

(2)(3)(1)	G	67.53	Df=8	P=2E-11
(23)(1)	G	67.53	Df=8	p=2E=ll
(23)(12)	G	66.66	Df=6	p=2E-12
(23)(13)	G	4.10	Df=6	p=.662
(23)(12)(13)	G	2.6	Df=4	p=.627

(B) No Qualification or Any Qualification (Sec. or Third Level)

(2)(3)(1)	G_2	498.24	Df=8	p=.000
(23)(1)	G_2	498.24	Df=8	p=.000
(23)(12)	G_2	445.06	Df=6	p=.000

2 Fienberg, p.110

(23)(13)	G_2	38.68	Df=6	p=.000
(23)(12)(13)	G_2	1.31	Df=4	p=.860

The models (23)(13) and (23)(12)(13) in A provide acceptable fits for the data. However, in model (23)(12)(13) the parameters for the Irish WA2 is less than twice its standard error and this suggests that model (23)(13) would be a better fit. The parameters for this model are

Constant	W	-.433	(.01)
Cohort	W_B1	-.157	(.02)
Cohort	W_B2	.09	(.02)

Model (23)(13) in A gives a global test. By inspecting the residuals one can look for specific instances where an ethnic groups qualifications differed from what was expected. None of the standard residuals reached a value of 2 and it can be concluded that the test has not obscured specific variations. Overall one can conclude that differences occurred over the cohorts, not across the ethnic groups.

Model B (23)(12)(13) which asks whether people got any qualifications or no qualifications, does provide an acceptable fit to the data. The parameters for the model are as follows:

Constant	W	-.046	(.04)
British	W_A1	.154	(.04)
Irish	W_A2	-.423	(.07)
2ndIr	W_A3	.269	(.07)
Cohort	W_B1	.288	(.01)
Cohort	W_B2	-.053	(.01)
Cohort3	W_B3	-.235	(.01)

None of the standard residuals reach a value of 2 for this model and one can conclude that there were differences in the level of qualifications obtained across the ethnic groups and over the cohorts.

From the above it can be seen that different continuation ratio models fit, depending on the level of qualification that is being considered. Thus, when one considers whether people get any qualifications or no qualifications, model B(23)(12)(13) is the only one that provides an acceptable fit. In this particular case ethnicity does make a difference to obtaining qualifications or not. When one asks what level of qualification was reached by those who had obtained any qualifications model A(23)(13) provides the most acceptable fit. Therefore, at this level ethnicity does

not make a difference. One can conclude that once Irish individuals achieve some level of qualification, their achievements do not differ from the British or Second generation groups. On a final note, the achievements of the second generation Irish should be observed. They succeed equally as well as the British if not better. This illustrates that assimilation in the educational sphere has occurred.

Appendix B.3 (Chapter 7)

The relationship between socio-economic group, ethnicity and qualifications is complicated but the data in Table 7.19 may be modelled, giving a clearer picture of the relationship between the variables. Although none of the models provided a satisfactory fit, the residuals show that the relationship between ethnicity and class does vary with educational level. In this exercise the class, ethnicity, and education variables are represented as 1,2 and 3 respectively.

Model	Deviance	Df
(2)(3)(1)	7318	20
(23)(1)	7295	20
(23)(12)	7268	20
(23)(13)	44	12
(23)(12)(13)	15	8

None of the above models provide a satisfactory fit to the data. Model (23)(13) shows that there is an association between SEG and qualifications. When the interaction term between SEG and ethnicity is added the model provides a more acceptable fit. However, some of the residuals in Model (23)(12)(13) are greater than two, and the three way interaction is needed. Therefore, the relationship between ethnicity and class does vary with educational level.

The information in the models above may be better understood if independence models for the three educational groups are fitted. They will test the hypothesis that once one accounts for educational differences, no differences will occur between the ethnic groups in terms of their class location. The following results were obtained:

(2)(3)(1)	Third Level	G_2=7.6	Df=4	p=.102
(2)(3)(1)	Secondary	G_2=11	Df=4	p=.020
(2)(3)(1)	No Quals.	G_2=9	Df=4	p=.050

The best fit is obtained for the third level model. There are no differences between the ethnic groups in terms of their class location once one accounts for educational differences. The other two models do not provide as good a fit. Examination of the residuals suggest that once one has accounted for educational differences, there are some small differences between the ethnic groups in terms of their class location. In particular, Second Generation Irish with Secondary Qualifications are more likely to be found in the Intermediate class group. First Generation Irish with no qualifications are even more likely to be found in the Working class. These models show that there are differences in I class attainment between ethnic group groups once educational differences have been accounted for.

Appendix B.4 (Chapter 7)

Detailed cross classifications by respondent's ethnic group, and social origins and educational qualifications are given in Appendix Table A7.5. These data are summarised in the models below, where 1 is class, 2 is education, 3 is social origins and 4 is ethnicity.

Model	D.F.	G_2	
(234)(1)	5015	52	p=.000
(234)(12)	344	48	p=.000
(234)(13)	4472	48	p=.000
(234)(14)	5000	48	p=.000
(234)(12)(13)	61	44	p=.043
(234)(12)(14)	331	44	p=.000
(234)(13)(14)	4459	40	p=.000
(234)(12)(13)(14)	47	40	p=.197
(234)(123)(14)	25	32	p=.115
(234)(124)(13)	42	32	p=.104
(234)(134)(12)	38	32	p=.205
(234)(123)(124)	20	24	p=.668

The above table shows that there are six acceptable models. Model (234)(12)(13) provides a reasonable fit and is also the most parsimonious model. This model suggests that the relationship between education, origins and ethnicity, and thereafter ethnicity has no impact on class. Two of the adjusted residuals in this model are greater than two and in order to see if this model (234)(12)(13) would fit any better, one can fit loglinear models which compare ethnic groups. In the model which compares the British with the Irish, the G2=42, with D.F.=26 and p=.020. Comparing the British and Second Generation Irish, the model gives a G2=33, with D.F.=26 and p=.057. Since the model for the British vs Irish does not provide as good as a fit, one can conclude that ethnicity does have some impact on the class attainments of the Irish. For the British and Second Generation Irish ethnicity is less important in determining their class attainments.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ABRAMSON, J.J. (1976). "On the Sociology of Ethnicity and Social Change: A model of Rootedness and Rootlessness", The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 43-60. Dublin.

ACTION GROUP FOR IRISH YOUTH (1988). Young and Irish. London.

ACTION GROUP FOR IRISH YOUTH (1985). Irish Youth in London. London.

ARENSBERG, C. (1937). The Irish Countryman. Harvard University Press.

BLITZ, R.C. (1977). A Cost Benefit Analysis of Foreign Workers in West Germany, Kyklos, Vol. xxx. No. 3.

BORG, D.G. (1969). Principles of Demography, John Wiley and Sons Inc., New York. p. 534.

BRADLEY J. and J. FITZGERALD (1990). Medium Term Prospects for Ireland: An Update. ESRI Quarterly Economic Commentary, April 1990. Dublin.

BRADLEY, J., J. FITZGERALD, D. HURLEY, L. O'SULLIVAN and A. STOREY (1989). HERMES-IRELAND, A Model of the Irish Economy: Structure and Performance. The Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin.

BREEN, R. (1984). Education and other Labour Market. Work and Unemployment among Recent Cohorts of Irish School Leavers. The Economic and Social Research Institute. General Research Series, Paper No. 119. Dublin.

BRENNAN, P. (Revd.) (1987). The Kiltimagh Diaspora, Kiltimagh.

BRENT, Irish Advisory Service (1988). Irish Homeless Families in London.

BROWN, J.S., SCHWARZWELLER, H., et al. (1963). "Kentucky Mountain Migration and the Stem Family". Rural Sociology, Vol. 28, pp. 48-69.

CALMFORS, L. and J. DRIFFILL (1988). Centralisation of Wage Bargaining and Macroeconomic Performance. Economic Policy, April 1988.

CARA (1988). Irish Homelessness - The Hidden Dimensions. London.

CARA (1987). The Housing Position of Young Irish People in London. London.

CASTLES, and KOSSACK (1973), Revised (1985). Migrant Workers and Class Structures in Western Europe. Oxford University Press.

CENTRAL STATISTICS OFFICE (1990). Economic Series, August 1990.

CENTRAL STATISTICS OFFICE (1989). Labour Force Survey 1988. Stationery Office, Dublin.

CENTRAL STATISTICS OFFICE (1989). CENSUS 86 Vol. II. Ages and Marital Status. Stationery Office, Dublin.

CENTRAL STATISTICS OFFICE (1988). The Trend of Employment and Unemployment 1979-1985. Stationery Office, Dublin.

CENTRAL STATISTICS OFFICE (1988). CENSUS 1986 Vol. I. Population Classified by Areas. Stationery Office, Dublin.

CENTRAL STATISTICS OFFICE (1986). Census of Population of Ireland 1981, Vol. IX. Usual Residence and Migration; Birth Places. Stationery Office, Dublin.

CENTRAL STATISTICS OFFICE (1984). Census of Population of Ireland 1981. Vol. II. Ages and Marital Status Classified by Areas. Stationery Office, Dublin.

CENTRAL STATISTICS OFFICE (1984). Report on Vital Statistics 1981. Stationery Office, Dublin.

CENTRAL STATISTICS OFFICE (1978). Census of Population of Ireland 1971. Vol. XI. Usual Residence and Migration, Birth Places. Stationery Office, Dublin.

CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, London (1988). Annual Abstract of Statistics. HMSO, London.

CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, London (1972). Abstract of Regional Statistics, No. 7, 1971. HMSO, London.

CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, London, Regional Trends (various issues). HMSO. London.

COLEMAN, (1983). "The Demography of Ethnic Minorities", Journal of Biosocial Science, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 43-87.

COMMISSION ON EMIGRATION AND OTHER POPULATION PROBLEMS (1954). Stationery Office, Dublin.

CONNELL, K.H. (1950). The Population of Ireland 1750-1845. Oxford University Press.

CONNIFFE, D. and K.A. KENNEDY, (Eds.) (1984). Employment and Unemployment Policy for Ireland. The Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin.
CONNOR, T. (1987). The London Irish. London Strategic Policy Unit.
CONNOR, T. (1985). Irish Youth in London. London Irish Centre.
CORCORAN, T., D.O'CONNOR, and S. MULLIN (1986). Transition from School to Work. Report on a Follow-Up Survey of 1981-82 School Leavers, Nov-Dec. 1984. Youth Employment Agency. Dublin.

DAHLBERG, A. and B. HOLMLUND (1978). The Interaction of Migration Income and Employment in Sweden. Demography, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 259-266.
DE JONG, G., et. al. (1986). "Migration Intentions and Behaviour. Decisionmaking in a Rural Philippines Parish", in J.T. Fawcett, (Ed.), Population and Environment, Vol. 8, No. 1.
DE JONG, G., et. al. (1983). "International and Internal Migration Decisionmaking". International Migration Review, Vol. 17, No. 3.
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE (1987). Data Bank of Economic Time Series. Research Paper 1/87. Dublin.
DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE (Statistics Branch) (1926). Census of Population 1926, Volume X, General Report. Stationery Office, Dublin.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR. Annual Survey of Second Level School Leavers (Various Issues). Dublin.
DESBARATS, J. (1983). "Spatial Choice and Constraints on Behaviour". Annals of the Association of American Geographers, No. 73, pp. 340-357.

EIDENSTADT, S.N. (1954). The Absorption of Immigrants, Routledge and Keegan Paul, London.
EUROSTAT (1988). Demographic and Labour Force Analysis Based on EUROSTAT Data Banks. Population and Social Conditions. Theme 3, Studies and Analyses Series D. Office of Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg.
EUROSTAT. Employment and Unemployment Statistics (Various Issues). Office of Official Publications of the European Communities. Luxembourg.

FULLER T., et. al. (1986). "Mobility Plans and Mobility Behaviour: Convergences and Divergences in Thailand" Population and Environment. Vol. 8, No. 2.

GARDNER, R., et al. (1986). "The Best Laid Schemes: An Analysis of the Discrepancies between Migration Intentions and Behaviour". Population and Environment, Vol. 8, No. 2.
GARVEY, D. (1985). History of Migration Flows in the Republic of Ireland. Population Trends No. 39, Office of Population Surveys, London.
GARVEY, D. and M. McGUIRE (1989). The Structure of Gross Migration Flows (Labour Force Survey Estimates). Economic and Social Research Institute Seminar, November 1989. Dublin.
GEARY, P. and C. O GRADA (1989). "Postwar Migration Between Ireland and the UK" in "European Mobility: Trends and Consequences" (Eds. I. Gordon and A.P. Thirwall).
GEARY, R.C. and J.G. HUGHES (1970). International Migration in Ireland. Economic and Social Research Institute, General Research Series, Paper No. 54, Dublin.
GILMORE, B. (1989). Lecture at Irish Episcopal Commission on Emigrants Conference. Dublin.
GORDON, M.M. (1964). Assimilation in American Life. Oxford University Press.

HAGEMANN, R.P. and G. NICOLETT (1989). Population Ageing: Economic Effects and Some Policy Implications for Financing and Public Pensions: OECD Economic Studies. Spring 1989, p. 84, Paris.
HALSEY, A., A. HEATH, and J. RIDGE (1980). Origins and Destinations: Family Class and Education in Modern Britain. London.
HANNAN, D.F. (1970). Rural Exodus. Geoffrey Chapman. London.
HANNAN, D.F. (1986). Schooling and the Labour Market. Shannon Curriculum Development Centre.
HEAT, A. (1987). Social Mobility, Fontana. London.
HEATH, A., and J. RIDGE (1983). "Social Mobility of Ethnic Minorities". Journal of Biosocial Science Supplement, Vol. 8, pp. 169-184.
HIGHER EDUCATION AUTHORITY (1989). The First Destination of Award Recipients in Higher Education (1988). Dublin.

HONOHAN, P. (1984). The Evolution of the Rate of Unemployment in Ireland. Economic and Social Research Institute, Quarterly Economic Commentary, May 1984. Dublin.
HORNSBY-SMITH, M. and A. DALE (1988). "The Assimilation of Irish Immigrants in England". British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 34, No. 14.
HUGH ES, J.G. (1977). Estimates of Annual Net Migration and their Relationship with Series of Annual Net Passenger Movement: Ireland 1926-76. Economic and Social Research Institute, Memorandum Series No. 122. Dublin.
HUGHES, J.G. and B.M. WALSH (1980). Internal Migration Flows in Ireland and their Determinants. Economic and Social Research Institute, General Research Series, Paper No. 98. Dublin.
HUGHES, J.G. and B.M. WALSH (1976). "Migration Flows between Ireland, the UK and the Rest of the World". European Demographic Review, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 125-149.

JACKSON, J. (1963). The Irish in Britain. Routledge and Keegan Paul. The Open University.
JONES, J. and A.D. SMYTH (1970). The Economic Impact of Commonwealth Emigration. Cambridge University Press.

KEENAN, J.J. (1981). Irish Migration: All or Nothing Resolved? The Economic and Social Review, Vol. xii, No. 3 (April). pp. 169-186. Dublin.
KELLY, A.C. (1988). Economic Consequences of Population Change in the Third World. Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. xxvi, (December), pp. 1685-1728.
KENNEDY, K.A., T. GIBLIN and D. McHUGH (1988). The Economic Development of Ireland in the 20th Century. Routledge, London.

LANDALE, N. and A. GUEST (1985). "Constraints, Satisfaction and Residential Mobility". Demography, Vol. 22, No. 2.
LONDON STRATEGIC POLICY UNIT (1984). Policy Report on the Irish Community. Greater London Council.

McMILLAN, M.J. (1982). The Economic Effects of International Migration: A Survey. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. xx, No. 3, March, p. 267.
MEENAN, J. (1970). The Irish Economy since 1922. Liverpool University Press.
MILES, R. (1982). Racism and Migrant Labour. Routledge and Keegan Paul, London.
MOROKVASIC, M. (1984). "Introduction to Migration Studies". Current Sociology, Vol. 32, No. 2.
MUELLBAUER, J. and A. MURPHY (1988). UK House Prices and Migration: Economic and Investment Aspects. Shearson, Lehman, Hutton, London, September p. 90.

NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (1989). Ireland in the European Community: Performance Prospects and Strategy. Dublin.
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (1985). Manpower Policy in Ireland. Dublin.

O'BRIAN, M. (1981) Irish Immigrants in London and their Social Orientation. M. Phil. Thesis. City University. London
O'DONOVAN, I. (1984). Migration: A Study of the Irish in Britain with special reference to Birmingham. D. Phil, University of Birmingham.
OECD (1989). Economic Outlook, Historical Statistics 1960-1987. Paris.
OECD (1989). Economic Survey of Sweden 1988/'89. Paris.
OECD (1985). Employment Outlook 1985. Paris.
OECD (1978). Economic Survey of Yugoslavia. Paris.
OECD (1978). Economic Survey of Greece. Paris.
O GRADA, C. (1986). "Determinants of Irish Emigration: A Note". International Migration Review. Vol. 20, No. 3.
O'HIGGINS, K. and M. BOYLE (1988). State Care: Some Children's Alternative, Economic and Social Research Institute, Broadsheet No. 24. Dublin.
O'MEACHAIR, G. and A., BURNS (1988). Irish Homelessness - the Hidden Dimension. CARA, Irish Homeless Project. 1988, Aldgate Press.

PAYNE, G., T. PAYNE, and T. CHAPMAN (1983). Trends in Female Social Mobility, in Gamarnikov et al (Eds), Gender, Class and Work. London.

POMP, R.D. (1985). The Experience of the Philippines in Taxing its Non-resident Citizens. International Law and Politics, Vol. 17, pp. 245-286.

RANDALL, G. (1988). No Way Home: Homeless Young People in Central London. Centrepoint, London.

REX, J. and MOORE, R. (1967). Race, Community and Conflict: A Study of Sparkbrook. Oxford University Press.

RICHARDSON, A. (1974). British Immigrants and Australia: A Psychio-Social Inquiry, Australia National University Press, Canberra.

RICHMOND, A. (1971). Migration and Rate Relations in an English City. Oxford.

ROSS, M. (1972). Further Data on County Incomes in the 60s. Economic and Social Research Institute, General Research Series, Paper No. 64. Dublin.

SAUNDERS, C. (1988). "Thatcher's Untouchables", (Homeless Teenagers). New Statesman and Society, 23-30 December. London.

SCHWARZWELLER, H. (1964). "Education, Migration and Economic Life Chances of Entrants to the Labour Force from a Low Income Rural Area". Rural Sociology, Vol. 29, pp. 152-267.

SELL, R. and G.F. DE JONG (1978). "Towards a Motivational Theory of Migration Decision Making". Journal of Population, Vol. I, pp. 315-335.

SEXTON, J.J. (1987). Recent Changes in the Irish Population and the Pattern of Emigration. Irish Banking Review. August, Dublin.

SEXTON, J.J. and B.M. WALSH (1982). A Study of Labour Force Flows 1961-'80. Economic and Social Research Institute, Quarterly Economic Commentary, May, Dublin.

SHIL (1988), Move on Housing: The Permanent Needs of Residents of Hostels and Special Needs Housing Projects in London, London.

SHUVAL, T.J. (1963). Immigrants on the Threshold. Atherton Press, New York.

SPEARE, A. (1974). "Residential Satisfaction as an Intervening Variable in Residential Mobility", Demography, Vol. 11, pp. 173-188.

SQUIRE, L. (1981). Employment Policy in Developing Countries: A Survey of Issues in Evidence. Oxford University Press.

TANSEY, P. (1990). The Economic Cost of Rising Graduate Emigration. FAS Labour Market Review, June 1990. Dublin.

TAYLOR, S. (1986). Smalltown Boys and Girls. Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of London.

WALSH, B.M. (1989). Testing for the Existence of Macro Economic Feedback from Large-scale Migration. The Economic and Social Review, Dublin.

WALSH, B.M. (1987). Why is Unemployment so high in Ireland? in "Perspectives on Economic Policy". Centre for Economic Research, University College Dublin.

WALSH, B.M. (1987). The Impact of Demographic Variables on Unemployment, in "The Challenge of Unemployment". Administration, Vol. xxxv, No. 3, Dublin.

WALSH, B.M. (1974). Expectations, Information and Human Migration: Specifying an Econometric Model of Irish Migration to Britain. Journal of Regional Science, Vol. xiv, No. 1, pp. 107-120. London.

WALSH, B.M. (1970). An Empirical Study of the Age Structure of the Irish Population. Economic and Social Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, January 1970. Dublin.

WALSH, B.M. (1968). Some Irish Population Problems Reconsidered. Economic and Social Research Institute, General Research Series, Paper No. 42, Dublin.

WALSH, J.A. (1984). To go or Not to Go: The Migration Intentions of Leaving Certificate Students. Report, Department of Geography, Carysfort College, Dublin.

WALTER, B. (1988). Irish Women in London. London Strategic Policy Unit.

WALTER, B. (1980). "Time Space Patterns of Second Wave Irish Immigration into British Towns". Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Vol. 15, No. 3.

NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL PUBLICATIONS

NOTE: The date on the front cover of the report refers to the date the report was submitted to the Government. The dates listed here are the dates of publication.

	Title	Date
1.	Report on the Economy in 1973 and the Prospects for 1974	April 1974
2.	Comments on Capital Taxation Proposals	July 1974
3.	The Economy in 1974 and Outlook for 1975	Nov 1974
4.	Regional Policy in Ireland: A Review	Jan 1975
5.	Population and Employment Projections: 1971-86	Feb 1975
6.	Comments on the OECD Report on Manpower Policy in Ireland	July 1975
7.	Jobs and Living Standards: Projections and Implications	June 1975
8.	An Approach to Social Policy	June 1975
9.	Report on Inflation	June 1975
10.	Causes and Effects of Inflation in Ireland	Oct 1975
11.	Income Distribution: A Preliminary Report	Sept 1975
12.	Educational Expenditure in Ireland	Jan 1976
13.	Economy in 1975 and Prospects for 1976	Oct 1975
14.	Population Projections 1971-86: The Implications for Social Planning - Dwelling Needs	Feb 1976
15.	The Taxation of Farming Profits	Feb 1976
16.	Some Aspects of Finance for Owner-Occupied Housing	June 1976
17.	Statistics for Social Policy	Sept 1976
18.	Population Projections 1971-86: The Implications for Education	July 1976
19.	Rural Areas: Social Planning Problems	July 1976
20.	The Future of Public Expenditures in Ireland	July 1976
21.	Report on Public Expenditure	July 1976
22.	Institutional Arrangements for Regional Economic Development	July 1976
23.	Report on Housing Subsidies	Feb 1977
24.	A Comparative Study of Output, Value-Added and Growth in Irish and Dutch Agriculture	Dec 1976
25.	Towards a Social Report	Mar 1977
26.	Prelude to Planning	Oct 1976
27.	New Farm Operators, 1971 to 1975	April 1977
28.	Service-type Employment and Regional Development	July 1977
29.	Some Major Issues in Health Policy	July 1977
30.	Personal Incomes by County in 1973	July 1977
31.	The Potential for Growth in Irish Tax Revenues	Sept 1977
32.	The Work of the NESC: 1974-1976	Sept 1977
33.	Comments on Economic and Social Development, 1976-1980	July 1977
34.	Alternative Growth Rates in Irish Agriculture	Oct 1977
35.	Population and Employment Projections 1986: A Reassessment	Oct 1977
36.	Universality and Selectivity: Strategies in Social Policy	Jan 1978
37.	Integrated Approaches to Personal Income Taxes and Transfers	Mar 1978
38.	Universality and Selectivity: Social Services in Ireland	June 1978
39.	The Work of the NESC: 1977	June 1978
40.	Policies to Accelerate Agriculture Development	Sept 1978
41.	Rural Areas: Change and Development	Sept 1978
42.	Report on Policies for Agricultural and Rural Development	Sept 1978
43.	Productivity and Management	Feb 1979
44.	Comments on Development for Full Employment	Dec 1978
45.	Urbanisation and Regional Development in Ireland	June 1979
46.	Irish Forestry Policy	Sept 1979
47.	Alternative Strategies for Family Income Support	April 1980

48. Transport Policy ....Mar 1980
49. Enterprise in the Public Sector ....May 1980
50. Major Issues in Planning Services for Mentally and Physically Handicapped Persons ....Oct 1980
51. Personal Incomes by Region in 1977 ....July 1980
52. Tourism Policy .... Dec 1980
53. Economic and Social Policy 1980-83: Aims and Recommendations .... Nov 1980
54. The Future of the National Economic and Social Council ....Feb 1981
55. Urbanisation: Problems of Growth and Decay in Dublin .... Sept 1981
56. Industrial Policy and Development: A Survey of Literature from the Early 1960s to the Present ....Feb 1981
57. Industrial Employment and the Regions 1960-82 ....May 1981
58. The Socio-Economic Position of Ireland within the European Economic Community .....Sept 1981
59. The Importance of Infrastructure to Industrial Development in Ireland - Roads, Telecommunications and Water Supply ....Sept 1981
60. Minerals Policy ....Oct 1981
61. Irish Social Policies: Priorities for Future Development ....Nov 1981
62. Economic and Social Policy 1981 - Aims and Recommendations .... Oct 1981
63. Population and Labour Force Projections by County and Region, 1979-1991 ....Oct 1982
64. A Review of Industrial Policy (A Summary of this report is available separately) ....Oct 1982
65. Farm Incomes ....Nov 1982
66. Policies for Industrial Development: Conclusions and Recommendations ....Oct 1982
67. An Analysis of Job Losses in Irish Manufacturing Industry ....June 1983
68. Social Planning in Ireland: Its Purposes and Organisational Requirements ....April 1983
69. Housing Requirements and Population Change, 1981-1991 ....August 1983
70. Economic and Social Policy 1982: Aims and Recommendations ....April 1983
71. Education: The Implications of Demographic Change ....April 1984
72. Social Welfare: The Implications of Demographic Change ....April 1984
73. Health Services: The Implications of Demographic Change ....April 1984
74. Irish Energy Policy ....April 1984
75. Economic and Social Policy 1983: Aims and Recommendations.A Review of the Implications of Recent Demographic Changes for Education, Social Welfare and the Health Services (Background Paper) ....April 1984
76. The Role of the Financial System in Financing the Traded Sectors ....Oct 1984
77. The Criminal Justice System: Policy and Performance ....Feb 1985
78. Information for Policy ....July 1985
79. Economic and Social Policy Assessment ....Jan 1985
80. The Financing of Local Authorities ....May 1985
81. Designation of Areas for Industrial Policy ....Nov 1985
82. Manpower Policy in Ireland ....Jan 1986
83. A Strategy for Development 1986-1990 ....Nov 1986
    (A Summary of this report is available separately)
84. Community Care Services: An Overview ....Nov 1987
85. Redistribution Through State Social Expenditure in the Republic of Ireland: 1973-1980 ..Dec 1988
86. The Nature and Functioning of Labour Markets ....Dec 1988
87. A Review of Housing Policy ....Mar 1989
88. Ireland in the European Community: Performance, Prospects and Strategy ....Sept 1989
89. A Strategy for the Nineties: Economic Stability and Structural Change ....Oct 1990